Commit 009bce1d authored by Sean Christopherson's avatar Sean Christopherson Committed by Thomas Gleixner

x86/split_lock: Don't write MSR_TEST_CTRL on CPUs that aren't whitelisted

Choo! Choo!  All aboard the Split Lock Express, with direct service to
Wreckage!

Skip split_lock_verify_msr() if the CPU isn't whitelisted as a possible
SLD-enabled CPU model to avoid writing MSR_TEST_CTRL.  MSR_TEST_CTRL
exists, and is writable, on many generations of CPUs.  Writing the MSR,
even with '0', can result in bizarre, undocumented behavior.

This fixes a crash on Haswell when resuming from suspend with a live KVM
guest.  Because APs use the standard SMP boot flow for resume, they will
go through split_lock_init() and the subsequent RDMSR/WRMSR sequence,
which runs even when sld_state==sld_off to ensure SLD is disabled.  On
Haswell (at least, my Haswell), writing MSR_TEST_CTRL with '0' will
succeed and _may_ take the SMT _sibling_ out of VMX root mode.

When KVM has an active guest, KVM performs VMXON as part of CPU onlining
(see kvm_starting_cpu()).  Because SMP boot is serialized, the resulting
flow is effectively:

  on_each_ap_cpu() {
     WRMSR(MSR_TEST_CTRL, 0)
     VMXON
  }

As a result, the WRMSR can disable VMX on a different CPU that has
already done VMXON.  This ultimately results in a #UD on VMPTRLD when
KVM regains control and attempt run its vCPUs.

The above voodoo was confirmed by reworking KVM's VMXON flow to write
MSR_TEST_CTRL prior to VMXON, and to serialize the sequence as above.
Further verification of the insanity was done by redoing VMXON on all
APs after the initial WRMSR->VMXON sequence.  The additional VMXON,
which should VM-Fail, occasionally succeeded, and also eliminated the
unexpected #UD on VMPTRLD.

The damage done by writing MSR_TEST_CTRL doesn't appear to be limited
to VMX, e.g. after suspend with an active KVM guest, subsequent reboots
almost always hang (even when fudging VMXON), a #UD on a random Jcc was
observed, suspend/resume stability is qualitatively poor, and so on and
so forth.

  kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:386!
  CPU: 1 PID: 2592 Comm: CPU 6/KVM Tainted: G      D
  Hardware name: ASUS Q87M-E/Q87M-E, BIOS 1102 03/03/2014
  RIP: 0010:kvm_spurious_fault+0xf/0x20
  Call Trace:
   vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs+0x1fb/0x2b0
   vmx_vcpu_load+0x3e/0x160
   kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x48/0x260
   finish_task_switch+0x140/0x260
   __schedule+0x460/0x720
   _cond_resched+0x2d/0x40
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x82e/0x1ca0
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x363/0x5c0
   ksys_ioctl+0x88/0xa0
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x170
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: dbaba470 ("x86/split_lock: Rework the initialization flow of split lock detection")
Signed-off-by: default avatarSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200605192605.7439-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
parent 7ad81676
......@@ -49,6 +49,13 @@ enum split_lock_detect_state {
static enum split_lock_detect_state sld_state __ro_after_init = sld_off;
static u64 msr_test_ctrl_cache __ro_after_init;
/*
* With a name like MSR_TEST_CTL it should go without saying, but don't touch
* MSR_TEST_CTL unless the CPU is one of the whitelisted models. Writing it
* on CPUs that do not support SLD can cause fireworks, even when writing '0'.
*/
static bool cpu_model_supports_sld __ro_after_init;
/*
* Processors which have self-snooping capability can handle conflicting
* memory type across CPUs by snooping its own cache. However, there exists
......@@ -1071,7 +1078,8 @@ static void sld_update_msr(bool on)
static void split_lock_init(void)
{
split_lock_verify_msr(sld_state != sld_off);
if (cpu_model_supports_sld)
split_lock_verify_msr(sld_state != sld_off);
}
static void split_lock_warn(unsigned long ip)
......@@ -1177,5 +1185,6 @@ void __init cpu_set_core_cap_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
return;
}
cpu_model_supports_sld = true;
split_lock_setup();
}
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