Commit 049ae601 authored by Randy Dunlap's avatar Randy Dunlap Committed by James Morris

security: commoncap: clean up kernel-doc comments

Fix kernel-doc notation in commoncap.c.

Use correct (matching) function name in comments as in code.
Use correct function argument names in kernel-doc comments.
Use kernel-doc's "Return:" format for function return values.

Fixes these kernel-doc warnings:

../security/commoncap.c:1206: warning: expecting prototype for cap_task_ioprio(). Prototype was for cap_task_setioprio() instead
../security/commoncap.c:1219: warning: expecting prototype for cap_task_ioprio(). Prototype was for cap_task_setnice() instead
Signed-off-by: default avatarRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarSerge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
parent 82e5d8cc
......@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname)
/**
* cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
* @cred: The credentials to use
* @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability
* @targ_ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability
* @cap: The capability to check for
* @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h
*
......@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ int cap_capset(struct cred *new,
* affects the security markings on that inode, and if it is, should
* inode_killpriv() be invoked or the change rejected.
*
* Returns 1 if security.capability has a value, meaning inode_killpriv()
* Return: 1 if security.capability has a value, meaning inode_killpriv()
* is required, 0 otherwise, meaning inode_killpriv() is not required.
*/
int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
......@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
*
* Erase the privilege-enhancing security markings on an inode.
*
* Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
* Return: 0 if successful, -ve on error.
*/
int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
{
......@@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ static bool validheader(size_t size, const struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
* User requested a write of security.capability. If needed, update the
* xattr to change from v2 to v3, or to fixup the v3 rootid.
*
* If all is ok, we return the new size, on error return < 0.
* Return: On success, return the new size; on error, return < 0.
*/
int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, const void **ivalue, size_t size)
{
......@@ -822,7 +822,9 @@ static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
*
* Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being
* constructed by execve(). The proposed creds in @bprm->cred is altered,
* which won't take effect immediately. Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
* which won't take effect immediately.
*
* Return: 0 if successful, -ve on error.
*/
int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
{
......@@ -1049,7 +1051,9 @@ static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
* @flags: Indications of what has changed
*
* Fix up the results of setuid() call before the credential changes are
* actually applied, returning 0 to grant the changes, -ve to deny them.
* actually applied.
*
* Return: 0 to grant the changes, -ve to deny them.
*/
int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
{
......@@ -1119,7 +1123,9 @@ static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
* @p: The task to affect
*
* Detemine if the requested scheduler policy change is permitted for the
* specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
* specified task.
*
* Return: 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
*/
int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
......@@ -1127,12 +1133,14 @@ int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
}
/**
* cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if I/O priority change is permitted
* cap_task_setioprio - Detemine if I/O priority change is permitted
* @p: The task to affect
* @ioprio: The I/O priority to set
*
* Detemine if the requested I/O priority change is permitted for the specified
* task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
* task.
*
* Return: 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
*/
int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
{
......@@ -1140,12 +1148,14 @@ int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
}
/**
* cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if task priority change is permitted
* cap_task_setnice - Detemine if task priority change is permitted
* @p: The task to affect
* @nice: The nice value to set
*
* Detemine if the requested task priority change is permitted for the
* specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
* specified task.
*
* Return: 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
*/
int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
......@@ -1175,12 +1185,15 @@ static int cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
/**
* cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module
* @option: The process control function requested
* @arg2, @arg3, @arg4, @arg5: The argument data for this function
* @arg2: The argument data for this function
* @arg3: The argument data for this function
* @arg4: The argument data for this function
* @arg5: The argument data for this function
*
* Allow process control functions (sys_prctl()) to alter capabilities; may
* also deny access to other functions not otherwise implemented here.
*
* Returns 0 or +ve on success, -ENOSYS if this function is not implemented
* Return: 0 or +ve on success, -ENOSYS if this function is not implemented
* here, other -ve on error. If -ENOSYS is returned, sys_prctl() and other LSM
* modules will consider performing the function.
*/
......@@ -1315,7 +1328,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
* @pages: The size of the mapping
*
* Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current
* task is permitted, returning 1 if permission is granted, 0 if not.
* task is permitted.
*
* Return: 1 if permission is granted, 0 if not.
*/
int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
......@@ -1328,14 +1343,15 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
return cap_sys_admin;
}
/*
/**
* cap_mmap_addr - check if able to map given addr
* @addr: address attempting to be mapped
*
* If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need
* CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the
* capability security module. Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed
* -EPERM if not.
* capability security module.
*
* Return: 0 if this mapping should be allowed or -EPERM if not.
*/
int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
{
......
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