Commit 1f6fa261 authored by Jaegeuk Kim's avatar Jaegeuk Kim

f2fs: remove f2fs_bug_on in terms of max_depth

There is no report on this bug_on case, but if malicious attacker changed this
field intentionally, we can just reset it as a MAX value.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
parent 732d5648
......@@ -172,8 +172,6 @@ static struct f2fs_dir_entry *find_in_level(struct inode *dir,
namehash = f2fs_dentry_hash(&name);
f2fs_bug_on(F2FS_I_SB(dir), level > MAX_DIR_HASH_DEPTH);
nbucket = dir_buckets(level, F2FS_I(dir)->i_dir_level);
nblock = bucket_blocks(level);
......@@ -238,6 +236,14 @@ struct f2fs_dir_entry *f2fs_find_entry(struct inode *dir,
goto out;
max_depth = F2FS_I(dir)->i_current_depth;
if (unlikely(max_depth > MAX_DIR_HASH_DEPTH)) {
f2fs_msg(F2FS_I_SB(dir)->sb, KERN_WARNING,
"Corrupted max_depth of %lu: %u",
dir->i_ino, max_depth);
max_depth = MAX_DIR_HASH_DEPTH;
F2FS_I(dir)->i_current_depth = max_depth;
mark_inode_dirty(dir);
}
for (level = 0; level < max_depth; level++) {
de = find_in_level(dir, level, &fname, res_page);
......
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