Commit 2e884fc9 authored by James Morris's avatar James Morris

Merge branch 'next-integrity' of...

Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next-integrity

From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA
kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys.  This pull
request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for
verifying the PE kernel image signature.*

Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp
files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated.
 The remaining patches are cleanup.

*Upstream commit "993a1103 (x86/kexec: Fix a kexec_file_load()
failure)" is required for testing.
parents e7a44cfd e7fde070
......@@ -531,9 +531,17 @@ static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loader_data)
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
static int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
{
return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
int ret;
ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) {
ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
}
return ret;
}
#endif
......
......@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
static struct key *secondary_trusted_keys;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
static struct key *platform_trusted_keys;
#endif
extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list[];
extern __initconst const unsigned long system_certificate_list_size;
......@@ -237,11 +240,22 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
#else
trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys;
#endif
} else if (trusted_keys == VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING) {
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
trusted_keys = platform_trusted_keys;
#else
trusted_keys = NULL;
#endif
if (!trusted_keys) {
ret = -ENOKEY;
pr_devel("PKCS#7 platform keyring is not available\n");
goto error;
}
}
ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret == -ENOKEY)
pr_err("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n");
pr_devel("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n");
goto error;
}
......@@ -266,3 +280,10 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_pkcs7_signature);
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
void __init set_platform_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring)
{
platform_trusted_keys = keyring;
}
#endif
......@@ -3462,6 +3462,7 @@ struct dentry *vfs_tmpfile(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, int open_flag)
inode->i_state |= I_LINKABLE;
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
}
ima_post_create_tmpfile(inode);
return child;
out_err:
......
......@@ -61,5 +61,13 @@ static inline struct key *get_ima_blacklist_keyring(void)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING */
#if defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) && \
defined(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
extern void __init set_platform_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring);
#else
static inline void set_platform_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring)
{
}
#endif
#endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */
......@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ struct linux_binprm;
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask);
extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode);
extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
......@@ -56,6 +57,10 @@ static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
return 0;
}
static inline void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode)
{
}
static inline void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
{
return;
......
......@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
* should be used.
*/
#define VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING ((struct key *)1UL)
#define VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING ((struct key *)2UL)
/*
* The use to which an asymmetric key is being put.
......
......@@ -87,6 +87,9 @@ static int __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id, key_perm_t perm,
pr_info("Can't allocate %s keyring (%d)\n",
keyring_name[id], err);
keyring[id] = NULL;
} else {
if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM)
set_platform_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
}
return err;
......
......@@ -173,8 +173,7 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
if ((evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) &&
type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
crypto_shash_update(desc, &inode->i_sb->s_uuid.b[0],
sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid));
crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid, UUID_SIZE);
crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
}
......
......@@ -563,7 +563,6 @@ static int __init init_evm(void)
{
int error;
struct list_head *pos, *q;
struct xattr_list *xattr;
evm_init_config();
......@@ -580,11 +579,8 @@ static int __init init_evm(void)
error:
if (error != 0) {
if (!list_empty(&evm_config_xattrnames)) {
list_for_each_safe(pos, q, &evm_config_xattrnames) {
xattr = list_entry(pos, struct xattr_list,
list);
list_for_each_safe(pos, q, &evm_config_xattrnames)
list_del(pos);
}
}
}
......
......@@ -396,6 +396,33 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
/**
* ima_post_create_tmpfile - mark newly created tmpfile as new
* @file : newly created tmpfile
*
* No measuring, appraising or auditing of newly created tmpfiles is needed.
* Skip calling process_measurement(), but indicate which newly, created
* tmpfiles are in policy.
*/
void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode)
{
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
int must_appraise;
must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK);
if (!must_appraise)
return;
/* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
if (!iint)
return;
/* needed for writing the security xattrs */
set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
}
/**
* ima_post_path_mknod - mark as a new inode
* @dentry: newly created dentry
......@@ -413,9 +440,13 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
if (!must_appraise)
return;
/* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
if (iint)
iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;
if (!iint)
return;
/* needed for re-opening empty files */
iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;
}
/**
......
......@@ -60,11 +60,11 @@ static int blksize;
static struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
enum {
Opt_err = -1, Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update
Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update, Opt_err
};
enum {
Opt_error = -1, Opt_default, Opt_ecryptfs, Opt_enc32
Opt_default, Opt_ecryptfs, Opt_enc32, Opt_error
};
static const match_table_t key_format_tokens = {
......
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