Merge branch 'keys-misc' into keys-next

Miscellaneous keyrings changes.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Documentation/security/keys.txt

@@ -823,6 +823,36 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
      A process must have search permission on the key for this function to be
      successful.
 
+ (*) Compute a Diffie-Hellman shared secret or public key
+
+       long keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, struct keyctl_dh_params *params,
+		   char *buffer, size_t buflen);
+
+     The params struct contains serial numbers for three keys:
+
+	 - The prime, p, known to both parties
+	 - The local private key
+	 - The base integer, which is either a shared generator or the
+	   remote public key
+
+     The value computed is:
+
+	result = base ^ private (mod prime)
+
+     If the base is the shared generator, the result is the local
+     public key.  If the base is the remote public key, the result is
+     the shared secret.
+
+     The buffer length must be at least the length of the prime, or zero.
+
+     If the buffer length is nonzero, the length of the result is
+     returned when it is successfully calculated and copied in to the
+     buffer. When the buffer length is zero, the minimum required
+     buffer length is returned.
+
+     This function will return error EOPNOTSUPP if the key type is not
+     supported, error ENOKEY if the key could not be found, or error
+     EACCES if the key is not readable by the caller.
 
 ===============
 KERNEL SERVICES

include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h

@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_KEYCTL_H
 #define _LINUX_KEYCTL_H
 
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
 /* special process keyring shortcut IDs */
 #define KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING		-1	/* - key ID for thread-specific keyring */
 #define KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING	-2	/* - key ID for process-specific keyring */
@@ -57,5 +59,13 @@
 #define KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV		20	/* instantiate a partially constructed key */
 #define KEYCTL_INVALIDATE		21	/* invalidate a key */
 #define KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT		22	/* get a user's persistent keyring */
+#define KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE		23	/* Compute Diffie-Hellman values */
+
+/* keyctl structures */
+struct keyctl_dh_params {
+	__s32 private;
+	__s32 prime;
+	__s32 base;
+};
 
 #endif /*  _LINUX_KEYCTL_H */

security/integrity/Kconfig

@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
 	default n
         select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
         select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
-        select PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
         select CRYPTO_RSA
         select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
 	help

security/keys/Kconfig

@@ -41,6 +41,10 @@ config BIG_KEYS
 	bool "Large payload keys"
 	depends on KEYS
 	depends on TMPFS
+	select CRYPTO
+	select CRYPTO_AES
+	select CRYPTO_ECB
+	select CRYPTO_RNG
 	help
 	  This option provides support for holding large keys within the kernel
 	  (for example Kerberos ticket caches).  The data may be stored out to
@@ -81,3 +85,14 @@ config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
 	  Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.
 
 	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+config KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
+       bool "Diffie-Hellman operations on retained keys"
+       depends on KEYS
+       select MPILIB
+       help
+	 This option provides support for calculating Diffie-Hellman
+	 public keys and shared secrets using values stored as keys
+	 in the kernel.
+
+	 If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.

security/keys/Makefile

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS) += persistent.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS) += dh.o
 
 #
 # Key types

security/keys/big_key.c

@@ -14,8 +14,10 @@
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <keys/user-type.h>
 #include <keys/big_key-type.h>
+#include <crypto/rng.h>
 
 /*
  * Layout of key payload words.
@@ -27,6 +29,14 @@ enum {
 	big_key_len,
 };
 
+/*
+ * Crypto operation with big_key data
+ */
+enum big_key_op {
+	BIG_KEY_ENC,
+	BIG_KEY_DEC,
+};
+
 /*
  * If the data is under this limit, there's no point creating a shm file to
  * hold it as the permanently resident metadata for the shmem fs will be at
@@ -34,6 +44,11 @@ enum {
  */
 #define BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD (sizeof(struct inode) + sizeof(struct dentry))
 
+/*
+ * Key size for big_key data encryption
+ */
+#define ENC_KEY_SIZE	16
+
 /*
  * big_key defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
  * arbitrary blob of data as the payload
@@ -49,6 +64,54 @@ struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
 	.read			= big_key_read,
 };
 
+/*
+ * Crypto names for big_key data encryption
+ */
+static const char big_key_rng_name[] = "stdrng";
+static const char big_key_alg_name[] = "ecb(aes)";
+
+/*
+ * Crypto algorithms for big_key data encryption
+ */
+static struct crypto_rng *big_key_rng;
+static struct crypto_blkcipher *big_key_blkcipher;
+
+/*
+ * Generate random key to encrypt big_key data
+ */
+static inline int big_key_gen_enckey(u8 *key)
+{
+	return crypto_rng_get_bytes(big_key_rng, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encrypt/decrypt big_key data
+ */
+static int big_key_crypt(enum big_key_op op, u8 *data, size_t datalen, u8 *key)
+{
+	int ret = -EINVAL;
+	struct scatterlist sgio;
+	struct blkcipher_desc desc;
+
+	if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(big_key_blkcipher, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE)) {
+		ret = -EAGAIN;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	desc.flags = 0;
+	desc.tfm = big_key_blkcipher;
+
+	sg_init_one(&sgio, data, datalen);
+
+	if (op == BIG_KEY_ENC)
+		ret = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sgio, &sgio, datalen);
+	else
+		ret = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, &sgio, &sgio, datalen);
+
+error:
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /*
  * Preparse a big key
  */
@@ -56,6 +119,8 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
 	struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path];
 	struct file *file;
+	u8 *enckey;
+	u8 *data = NULL;
 	ssize_t written;
 	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
 	int ret;
@@ -73,16 +138,43 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		/* Create a shmem file to store the data in.  This will permit the data
 		 * to be swapped out if needed.
 		 *
-		 * TODO: Encrypt the stored data with a temporary key.
+		 * File content is stored encrypted with randomly generated key.
 		 */
-		file = shmem_kernel_file_setup("", datalen, 0);
+		size_t enclen = ALIGN(datalen, crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(big_key_blkcipher));
+
+		/* prepare aligned data to encrypt */
+		data = kmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!data)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		memcpy(data, prep->data, datalen);
+		memset(data + datalen, 0x00, enclen - datalen);
+
+		/* generate random key */
+		enckey = kmalloc(ENC_KEY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!enckey) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto error;
+		}
+
+		ret = big_key_gen_enckey(enckey);
+		if (ret)
+			goto err_enckey;
+
+		/* encrypt aligned data */
+		ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_ENC, data, enclen, enckey);
+		if (ret)
+			goto err_enckey;
+
+		/* save aligned data to file */
+		file = shmem_kernel_file_setup("", enclen, 0);
 		if (IS_ERR(file)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(file);
-			goto error;
+			goto err_enckey;
 		}
 
-		written = kernel_write(file, prep->data, prep->datalen, 0);
-		if (written != datalen) {
+		written = kernel_write(file, data, enclen, 0);
+		if (written != enclen) {
 			ret = written;
 			if (written >= 0)
 				ret = -ENOMEM;
@@ -92,12 +184,15 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		/* Pin the mount and dentry to the key so that we can open it again
 		 * later
 		 */
+		prep->payload.data[big_key_data] = enckey;
 		*path = file->f_path;
 		path_get(path);
 		fput(file);
+		kfree(data);
 	} else {
 		/* Just store the data in a buffer */
 		void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
+
 		if (!data)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -108,7 +203,10 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 
 err_fput:
 	fput(file);
+err_enckey:
+	kfree(enckey);
 error:
+	kfree(data);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -119,10 +217,10 @@ void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
 	if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
 		struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path];
+
 		path_put(path);
-	} else {
-		kfree(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]);
 	}
+	kfree(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -147,15 +245,15 @@ void big_key_destroy(struct key *key)
 {
 	size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
 
-	if (datalen) {
+	if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
 		struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
+
 		path_put(path);
 		path->mnt = NULL;
 		path->dentry = NULL;
-	} else {
-		kfree(key->payload.data[big_key_data]);
-		key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL;
 	}
+	kfree(key->payload.data[big_key_data]);
+	key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -188,17 +286,41 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
 	if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
 		struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
 		struct file *file;
-		loff_t pos;
+		u8 *data;
+		u8 *enckey = (u8 *)key->payload.data[big_key_data];
+		size_t enclen = ALIGN(datalen, crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(big_key_blkcipher));
+
+		data = kmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!data)
+			return -ENOMEM;
 
 		file = dentry_open(path, O_RDONLY, current_cred());
-		if (IS_ERR(file))
-			return PTR_ERR(file);
+		if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(file);
+			goto error;
+		}
 
-		pos = 0;
-		ret = vfs_read(file, buffer, datalen, &pos);
-		fput(file);
-		if (ret >= 0 && ret != datalen)
+		/* read file to kernel and decrypt */
+		ret = kernel_read(file, 0, data, enclen);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret != enclen) {
 			ret = -EIO;
+			goto err_fput;
+		}
+
+		ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_DEC, data, enclen, enckey);
+		if (ret)
+			goto err_fput;
+
+		ret = datalen;
+
+		/* copy decrypted data to user */
+		if (copy_to_user(buffer, data, datalen) != 0)
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+
+err_fput:
+		fput(file);
+error:
+		kfree(data);
 	} else {
 		ret = datalen;
 		if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data],
@@ -209,8 +331,48 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Register key type
+ */
 static int __init big_key_init(void)
 {
 	return register_key_type(&key_type_big_key);
 }
+
+/*
+ * Initialize big_key crypto and RNG algorithms
+ */
+static int __init big_key_crypto_init(void)
+{
+	int ret = -EINVAL;
+
+	/* init RNG */
+	big_key_rng = crypto_alloc_rng(big_key_rng_name, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(big_key_rng)) {
+		big_key_rng = NULL;
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	/* seed RNG */
+	ret = crypto_rng_reset(big_key_rng, NULL, crypto_rng_seedsize(big_key_rng));
+	if (ret)
+		goto error;
+
+	/* init block cipher */
+	big_key_blkcipher = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(big_key_alg_name, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(big_key_blkcipher)) {
+		big_key_blkcipher = NULL;
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+error:
+	crypto_free_rng(big_key_rng);
+	big_key_rng = NULL;
+	return ret;
+}
+
 device_initcall(big_key_init);
+late_initcall(big_key_crypto_init);

security/keys/compat.c

@@ -132,6 +132,10 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, u32, option,
 	case KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT:
 		return keyctl_get_persistent(arg2, arg3);
 
+	case KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE:
+		return keyctl_dh_compute(compat_ptr(arg2), compat_ptr(arg3),
+					 arg4);
+
 	default:
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}

security/keys/dh.c

+/* Crypto operations using stored keys
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2016, Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/mpi.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * Public key or shared secret generation function [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1]
+ *
+ * ya = g^xa mod p;
+ * or
+ * ZZ = yb^xa mod p;
+ *
+ * where xa is the local private key, ya is the local public key, g is
+ * the generator, p is the prime, yb is the remote public key, and ZZ
+ * is the shared secret.
+ *
+ * Both are the same calculation, so g or yb are the "base" and ya or
+ * ZZ are the "result".
+ */
+static int do_dh(MPI result, MPI base, MPI xa, MPI p)
+{
+	return mpi_powm(result, base, xa, p);
+}
+
+static ssize_t mpi_from_key(key_serial_t keyid, size_t maxlen, MPI *mpi)
+{
+	struct key *key;
+	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	long status;
+	ssize_t ret;
+
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, KEY_NEED_READ);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		ret = -ENOKEY;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+
+	ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	if (key->type == &key_type_user) {
+		down_read(&key->sem);
+		status = key_validate(key);
+		if (status == 0) {
+			const struct user_key_payload *payload;
+
+			payload = user_key_payload(key);
+
+			if (maxlen == 0) {
+				*mpi = NULL;
+				ret = payload->datalen;
+			} else if (payload->datalen <= maxlen) {
+				*mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(payload->data,
+							 payload->datalen);
+				if (*mpi)
+					ret = payload->datalen;
+			} else {
+				ret = -EINVAL;
+			}
+		}
+		up_read(&key->sem);
+	}
+
+	key_put(key);
+error:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+		       char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
+{
+	long ret;
+	MPI base, private, prime, result;
+	unsigned nbytes;
+	struct keyctl_dh_params pcopy;
+	uint8_t *kbuf;
+	ssize_t keylen;
+	size_t resultlen;
+
+	if (!params || (!buffer && buflen)) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (copy_from_user(&pcopy, params, sizeof(pcopy)) != 0) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.prime, buflen, &prime);
+	if (keylen < 0 || !prime) {
+		/* buflen == 0 may be used to query the required buffer size,
+		 * which is the prime key length.
+		 */
+		ret = keylen;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* The result is never longer than the prime */
+	resultlen = keylen;
+
+	keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.base, SIZE_MAX, &base);
+	if (keylen < 0 || !base) {
+		ret = keylen;
+		goto error1;
+	}
+
+	keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.private, SIZE_MAX, &private);
+	if (keylen < 0 || !private) {
+		ret = keylen;
+		goto error2;
+	}
+
+	result = mpi_alloc(0);
+	if (!result) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto error3;
+	}
+
+	kbuf = kmalloc(resultlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!kbuf) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto error4;
+	}
+
+	ret = do_dh(result, base, private, prime);
+	if (ret)
+		goto error5;
+
+	ret = mpi_read_buffer(result, kbuf, resultlen, &nbytes, NULL);
+	if (ret != 0)
+		goto error5;
+
+	ret = nbytes;
+	if (copy_to_user(buffer, kbuf, nbytes) != 0)
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+
+error5:
+	kfree(kbuf);
+error4:
+	mpi_free(result);
+error3:
+	mpi_free(private);
+error2:
+	mpi_free(base);
+error1:
+	mpi_free(prime);
+out:
+	return ret;
+}

security/keys/internal.h

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/key-type.h>
 #include <linux/task_work.h>
+#include <linux/keyctl.h>
 
 struct iovec;
 
@@ -257,6 +258,17 @@ static inline long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t uid, key_serial_t destring)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
+extern long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *, char __user *,
+			      size_t);
+#else
+static inline long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+				     char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Debugging key validation
  */

security/keys/keyctl.c

@@ -1686,6 +1686,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
 	case KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT:
 		return keyctl_get_persistent((uid_t)arg2, (key_serial_t)arg3);
 
+	case KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE:
+		return keyctl_dh_compute((struct keyctl_dh_params __user *) arg2,
+					 (char __user *) arg3,
+					 (size_t) arg4);
+
 	default:
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}

security/keys/user_defined.c

@@ -96,45 +96,25 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_free_preparse);
  */
 int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
-	struct user_key_payload *upayload, *zap;
-	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+	struct user_key_payload *zap = NULL;
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = -EINVAL;
-	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
-		goto error;
-
-	/* construct a replacement payload */
-	ret = -ENOMEM;
-	upayload = kmalloc(sizeof(*upayload) + datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!upayload)
-		goto error;
-
-	upayload->datalen = datalen;
-	memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen);
-
 	/* check the quota and attach the new data */
-	zap = upayload;
-
-	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, datalen);
-
-	if (ret == 0) {
-		/* attach the new data, displacing the old */
-		if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
-			zap = key->payload.data[0];
-		else
-			zap = NULL;
-		rcu_assign_keypointer(key, upayload);
-		key->expiry = 0;
-	}
+	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->datalen);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* attach the new data, displacing the old */
+	key->expiry = prep->expiry;
+	if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
+		zap = rcu_dereference_key(key);
+	rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload.data[0]);
+	prep->payload.data[0] = NULL;
 
 	if (zap)
 		kfree_rcu(zap, rcu);
-
-error:
 	return ret;
 }
-
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_update);
 
 /*