Commit 7361c36c authored by Eric W. Biederman's avatar Eric W. Biederman Committed by David S. Miller

af_unix: Allow credentials to work across user and pid namespaces.

In unix_skb_parms store pointers to struct pid and struct cred instead
of raw uid, gid, and pid values, then translate the credentials on
reception into values that are meaningful in the receiving processes
namespaces.
Signed-off-by: default avatarEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: default avatarPavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
parent 257b5358
...@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ struct unix_address { ...@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ struct unix_address {
}; };
struct unix_skb_parms { struct unix_skb_parms {
struct ucred creds; /* Skb credentials */ struct pid *pid; /* Skb credentials */
const struct cred *cred;
struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */ struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
u32 secid; /* Security ID */ u32 secid; /* Security ID */
...@@ -31,7 +32,6 @@ struct unix_skb_parms { ...@@ -31,7 +32,6 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {
}; };
#define UNIXCB(skb) (*(struct unix_skb_parms *)&((skb)->cb)) #define UNIXCB(skb) (*(struct unix_skb_parms *)&((skb)->cb))
#define UNIXCREDS(skb) (&UNIXCB((skb)).creds)
#define UNIXSID(skb) (&UNIXCB((skb)).secid) #define UNIXSID(skb) (&UNIXCB((skb)).secid)
#define unix_state_lock(s) spin_lock(&unix_sk(s)->lock) #define unix_state_lock(s) spin_lock(&unix_sk(s)->lock)
......
...@@ -1316,18 +1316,20 @@ static void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb) ...@@ -1316,18 +1316,20 @@ static void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
int i; int i;
scm->fp = UNIXCB(skb).fp; scm->fp = UNIXCB(skb).fp;
skb->destructor = sock_wfree;
UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL; UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--) for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--)
unix_notinflight(scm->fp->fp[i]); unix_notinflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
} }
static void unix_destruct_fds(struct sk_buff *skb) static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
{ {
struct scm_cookie scm; struct scm_cookie scm;
memset(&scm, 0, sizeof(scm)); memset(&scm, 0, sizeof(scm));
unix_detach_fds(&scm, skb); scm.pid = UNIXCB(skb).pid;
scm.cred = UNIXCB(skb).cred;
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
unix_detach_fds(&scm, skb);
/* Alas, it calls VFS */ /* Alas, it calls VFS */
/* So fscking what? fput() had been SMP-safe since the last Summer */ /* So fscking what? fput() had been SMP-safe since the last Summer */
...@@ -1350,10 +1352,22 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb) ...@@ -1350,10 +1352,22 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--) for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--)
unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]); unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
skb->destructor = unix_destruct_fds;
return 0; return 0;
} }
static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool send_fds)
{
int err = 0;
UNIXCB(skb).pid = get_pid(scm->pid);
UNIXCB(skb).cred = get_cred(scm->cred);
UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
if (scm->fp && send_fds)
err = unix_attach_fds(scm, skb);
skb->destructor = unix_destruct_scm;
return err;
}
/* /*
* Send AF_UNIX data. * Send AF_UNIX data.
*/ */
...@@ -1410,12 +1424,9 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock, ...@@ -1410,12 +1424,9 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
if (skb == NULL) if (skb == NULL)
goto out; goto out;
memcpy(UNIXCREDS(skb), &siocb->scm->creds, sizeof(struct ucred)); err = unix_scm_to_skb(siocb->scm, skb, true);
if (siocb->scm->fp) { if (err)
err = unix_attach_fds(siocb->scm, skb); goto out_free;
if (err)
goto out_free;
}
unix_get_secdata(siocb->scm, skb); unix_get_secdata(siocb->scm, skb);
skb_reset_transport_header(skb); skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
...@@ -1585,16 +1596,14 @@ static int unix_stream_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock, ...@@ -1585,16 +1596,14 @@ static int unix_stream_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
*/ */
size = min_t(int, size, skb_tailroom(skb)); size = min_t(int, size, skb_tailroom(skb));
memcpy(UNIXCREDS(skb), &siocb->scm->creds, sizeof(struct ucred));
/* Only send the fds in the first buffer */ /* Only send the fds in the first buffer */
if (siocb->scm->fp && !fds_sent) { err = unix_scm_to_skb(siocb->scm, skb, !fds_sent);
err = unix_attach_fds(siocb->scm, skb); if (err) {
if (err) { kfree_skb(skb);
kfree_skb(skb); goto out_err;
goto out_err;
}
fds_sent = true;
} }
fds_sent = true;
err = memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, size), msg->msg_iov, size); err = memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, size), msg->msg_iov, size);
if (err) { if (err) {
...@@ -1711,7 +1720,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, ...@@ -1711,7 +1720,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
siocb->scm = &tmp_scm; siocb->scm = &tmp_scm;
memset(&tmp_scm, 0, sizeof(tmp_scm)); memset(&tmp_scm, 0, sizeof(tmp_scm));
} }
siocb->scm->creds = *UNIXCREDS(skb); scm_set_cred(siocb->scm, UNIXCB(skb).pid, UNIXCB(skb).cred);
unix_set_secdata(siocb->scm, skb); unix_set_secdata(siocb->scm, skb);
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) { if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
...@@ -1860,14 +1869,14 @@ static int unix_stream_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, ...@@ -1860,14 +1869,14 @@ static int unix_stream_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
if (check_creds) { if (check_creds) {
/* Never glue messages from different writers */ /* Never glue messages from different writers */
if (memcmp(UNIXCREDS(skb), &siocb->scm->creds, if ((UNIXCB(skb).pid != siocb->scm->pid) ||
sizeof(siocb->scm->creds)) != 0) { (UNIXCB(skb).cred != siocb->scm->cred)) {
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb); skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
break; break;
} }
} else { } else {
/* Copy credentials */ /* Copy credentials */
siocb->scm->creds = *UNIXCREDS(skb); scm_set_cred(siocb->scm, UNIXCB(skb).pid, UNIXCB(skb).cred);
check_creds = 1; check_creds = 1;
} }
......
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