Commit 91f0abfd authored by Nicholas Bellinger's avatar Nicholas Bellinger

iscsi-target: Reject zero-length payloads during SecurityNegotiation

This patch changes iscsi_target_handle_csg_zero() to explicitly
reject login requests in SecurityNegotiation with a zero-length
payload, following the language in RFC-3720 Section 8.2:

  Whenever an iSCSI target gets a response whose keys, or their
  values, are not according to the step definition, it MUST answer
  with a Login reject with the "Initiator Error" or "Missing Parameter"
  status.

Previously when a zero-length login request in CSG=0 was received,
the target would send a login response with CSG=0 + T_BIT=0 asking
the initiator to complete authentication, and not fail the login
until MAX_LOGIN_PDUS was reached.  This change will now immediately
fail the login attempt with ISCSI_STATUS_CLS_INITIATOR_ERR status.
Reported-by: default avatarTejas Vaykole <tejas.vaykole@calsoftinc.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarNicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
parent 51a07f84
......@@ -773,6 +773,12 @@ static int iscsi_target_handle_csg_zero(
}
goto do_auth;
} else if (!payload_length) {
pr_err("Initiator sent zero length security payload,"
" login failed\n");
iscsit_tx_login_rsp(conn, ISCSI_STATUS_CLS_INITIATOR_ERR,
ISCSI_LOGIN_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED);
return -1;
}
if (login->first_request)
......
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