Commit a068d937 authored by Mimi Zohar's avatar Mimi Zohar

Merge branch 'validate-policy-rules' into next-integrity

From "ima: Fix rule parsing bugs and extend KEXEC_CMDLINE rule support"
coverletter.

This series ultimately extends the supported IMA rule conditionals for
the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function. As of today, there's an imbalance in
IMA language conditional support for KEXEC_CMDLINE rules in comparison
to KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK rules. The KEXEC_CMDLINE
rules do not support *any* conditionals so you cannot have a sequence of
rules like this:

 dont_measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK obj_type=foo_t
 dont_measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK obj_type=foo_t
 dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t
 measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
 measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
 measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE

Instead, KEXEC_CMDLINE rules can only be measured or not measured and
there's no additional flexibility in today's implementation of the
KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function.

With this series, the above sequence of rules becomes valid and any
calls to kexec_file_load() with a kernel and initramfs inode type of
foo_t will not be measured (that includes the kernel cmdline buffer)
while all other objects given to a kexec_file_load() syscall will be
measured. There's obviously not an inode directly associated with the
kernel cmdline buffer but this patch series ties the inode based
decision making for KEXEC_CMDLINE to the kernel's inode. I think this
will be intuitive to policy authors.

While reading IMA code and preparing to make this change, I realized
that the buffer based hook functions (KEXEC_CMDLINE and KEY_CHECK) are
quite special in comparison to longer standing hook functions. These
buffer based hook functions can only support measure actions and there
are some restrictions on the conditionals that they support. However,
the rule parser isn't enforcing any of those restrictions and IMA policy
authors wouldn't have any immediate way of knowing that the policy that
they wrote is invalid. For example, the sequence of rules above parses
successfully in today's kernel but the
"dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE ..." rule is incorrectly handled in
ima_match_rules(). The dont_measure rule is *always* considered to be a
match so, surprisingly, no KEXEC_CMDLINE measurements are made.

While making the rule parser more strict, I realized that the parser
does not correctly free all of the allocated memory associated with an
ima_rule_entry when going down some error paths. Invalid policy loaded
by the policy administrator could result in small memory leaks.
parents 34e980bb 4834177e
...@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, ...@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id); enum kernel_read_file_id id);
extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry); extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size); extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size); extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size);
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image); extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image);
...@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) ...@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
return -EOPNOTSUPP; return -EOPNOTSUPP;
} }
static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size) {} static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
......
...@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, ...@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
goto out; goto out;
} }
ima_kexec_cmdline(image->cmdline_buf, ima_kexec_cmdline(kernel_fd, image->cmdline_buf,
image->cmdline_buf_len - 1); image->cmdline_buf_len - 1);
} }
......
...@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, ...@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
int pcr, const char *keyring); int pcr, const char *keyring);
void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
...@@ -372,7 +372,6 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, ...@@ -372,7 +372,6 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len, int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
struct modsig **modsig); struct modsig **modsig);
void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf, loff_t size); void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf, loff_t size);
...@@ -382,11 +381,6 @@ int ima_get_raw_modsig(const struct modsig *modsig, const void **data, ...@@ -382,11 +381,6 @@ int ima_get_raw_modsig(const struct modsig *modsig, const void **data,
u32 *data_len); u32 *data_len);
void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig); void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig);
#else #else
static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
{
return false;
}
static inline int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, static inline int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf,
loff_t buf_len, struct modsig **modsig) loff_t buf_len, struct modsig **modsig)
{ {
...@@ -420,6 +414,7 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig) ...@@ -420,6 +414,7 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
#define security_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init #define security_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
#define security_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
#define security_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match #define security_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
#else #else
...@@ -430,6 +425,10 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, ...@@ -430,6 +425,10 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
return -EINVAL; return -EINVAL;
} }
static inline void security_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
{
}
static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
void *lsmrule) void *lsmrule)
{ {
......
...@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, ...@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
/** /**
* ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy. * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
* @inode: pointer to inode to measure * @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated
* @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
* @secid: secid of the task being validated * @secid: secid of the task being validated
* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC, * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
......
...@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, ...@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
rc = is_binary_blacklisted(digest, digestsize); rc = is_binary_blacklisted(digest, digestsize);
if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE)) if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
process_buffer_measurement(digest, digestsize, process_buffer_measurement(NULL, digest, digestsize,
"blacklisted-hash", NONE, "blacklisted-hash", NONE,
pcr, NULL); pcr, NULL);
} }
......
...@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, ...@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
* if the IMA policy is configured to measure a key linked * if the IMA policy is configured to measure a key linked
* to the given keyring. * to the given keyring.
*/ */
process_buffer_measurement(payload, payload_len, process_buffer_measurement(NULL, payload, payload_len,
keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0, keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0,
keyring->description); keyring->description);
} }
...@@ -726,6 +726,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) ...@@ -726,6 +726,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
/* /*
* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log. * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log.
* @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK)
* @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log. * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log.
* @size: size of buffer(in bytes). * @size: size of buffer(in bytes).
* @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry. * @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry.
...@@ -735,7 +736,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) ...@@ -735,7 +736,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
* *
* Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log.
*/ */
void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
int pcr, const char *keyring) int pcr, const char *keyring)
{ {
...@@ -768,7 +769,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, ...@@ -768,7 +769,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
*/ */
if (func) { if (func) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), secid, 0, func, action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
&pcr, &template, keyring); &pcr, &template, keyring);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE)) if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
return; return;
...@@ -823,16 +824,26 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, ...@@ -823,16 +824,26 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
/** /**
* ima_kexec_cmdline - measure kexec cmdline boot args * ima_kexec_cmdline - measure kexec cmdline boot args
* @kernel_fd: file descriptor of the kexec kernel being loaded
* @buf: pointer to buffer * @buf: pointer to buffer
* @size: size of buffer * @size: size of buffer
* *
* Buffers can only be measured, not appraised. * Buffers can only be measured, not appraised.
*/ */
void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size) void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
{ {
if (buf && size != 0) struct fd f;
process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, "kexec-cmdline",
KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL); if (!buf || !size)
return;
f = fdget(kernel_fd);
if (!f.file)
return;
process_buffer_measurement(file_inode(f.file), buf, size,
"kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL);
fdput(f);
} }
static int __init init_ima(void) static int __init init_ima(void)
......
...@@ -32,26 +32,6 @@ struct modsig { ...@@ -32,26 +32,6 @@ struct modsig {
u8 raw_pkcs7[]; u8 raw_pkcs7[];
}; };
/**
* ima_hook_supports_modsig - can the policy allow modsig for this hook?
*
* modsig is only supported by hooks using ima_post_read_file(), because only
* they preload the contents of the file in a buffer. FILE_CHECK does that in
* some cases, but not when reached from vfs_open(). POLICY_CHECK can support
* it, but it's not useful in practice because it's a text file so deny.
*/
bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
{
switch (func) {
case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK:
case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
case MODULE_CHECK:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
/* /*
* ima_read_modsig - Read modsig from buf. * ima_read_modsig - Read modsig from buf.
* *
......
This diff is collapsed.
...@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void) ...@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void)
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_keys, list) { list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_keys, list) {
if (!timer_expired) if (!timer_expired)
process_buffer_measurement(entry->payload, process_buffer_measurement(NULL, entry->payload,
entry->payload_len, entry->payload_len,
entry->keyring_name, entry->keyring_name,
KEY_CHECK, 0, KEY_CHECK, 0,
......
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