Commit a47dd5f0 authored by Paolo Bonzini's avatar Paolo Bonzini Committed by Thomas Gleixner

x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush algorithm

To mitigate the L1 Terminal Fault vulnerability it's required to flush L1D
on VMENTER to prevent rogue guests from snooping host memory.

CPUs will have a new control MSR via a microcode update to flush L1D with a
single MSR write, but in the absence of microcode a fallback to a software
based flush algorithm is required.

Add a software flush loop which is based on code from Intel.

[ tglx: Split out from combo patch ]
[ bpetkov: Polish the asm code ]
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
parent a399477e
......@@ -9563,6 +9563,46 @@ static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
}
/*
* Software based L1D cache flush which is used when microcode providing
* the cache control MSR is not loaded.
*
* The L1D cache is 32 KiB on Nehalem and later microarchitectures, but to
* flush it is required to read in 64 KiB because the replacement algorithm
* is not exactly LRU. This could be sized at runtime via topology
* information but as all relevant affected CPUs have 32KiB L1D cache size
* there is no point in doing so.
*/
#define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4
static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages;
static void __maybe_unused vmx_l1d_flush(void)
{
int size = PAGE_SIZE << L1D_CACHE_ORDER;
asm volatile(
/* First ensure the pages are in the TLB */
"xorl %%eax, %%eax\n"
".Lpopulate_tlb:\n\t"
"movzbl (%[empty_zp], %%" _ASM_AX "), %%ecx\n\t"
"addl $4096, %%eax\n\t"
"cmpl %%eax, %[size]\n\t"
"jne .Lpopulate_tlb\n\t"
"xorl %%eax, %%eax\n\t"
"cpuid\n\t"
/* Now fill the cache */
"xorl %%eax, %%eax\n"
".Lfill_cache:\n"
"movzbl (%[empty_zp], %%" _ASM_AX "), %%ecx\n\t"
"addl $64, %%eax\n\t"
"cmpl %%eax, %[size]\n\t"
"jne .Lfill_cache\n\t"
"lfence\n"
:: [empty_zp] "r" (vmx_l1d_flush_pages),
[size] "r" (size)
: "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx");
}
static void update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr)
{
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
......@@ -13110,13 +13150,29 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
.enable_smi_window = enable_smi_window,
};
static void __init vmx_setup_l1d_flush(void)
static int __init vmx_setup_l1d_flush(void)
{
struct page *page;
if (vmentry_l1d_flush == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER ||
!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
return;
return 0;
page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, L1D_CACHE_ORDER);
if (!page)
return -ENOMEM;
vmx_l1d_flush_pages = page_address(page);
static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
return 0;
}
static void vmx_free_l1d_flush_pages(void)
{
if (vmx_l1d_flush_pages) {
free_pages((unsigned long)vmx_l1d_flush_pages, L1D_CACHE_ORDER);
vmx_l1d_flush_pages = NULL;
}
}
static int __init vmx_init(void)
......@@ -13152,12 +13208,16 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void)
}
#endif
vmx_setup_l1d_flush();
r = vmx_setup_l1d_flush();
if (r)
return r;
r = kvm_init(&vmx_x86_ops, sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx),
__alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx), THIS_MODULE);
if (r)
__alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx), THIS_MODULE);
if (r) {
vmx_free_l1d_flush_pages();
return r;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
rcu_assign_pointer(crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss,
......@@ -13199,6 +13259,7 @@ static void __exit vmx_exit(void)
static_branch_disable(&enable_evmcs);
}
#endif
vmx_free_l1d_flush_pages();
}
module_init(vmx_init)
......
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