x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user()
The functions get_user() and put_user() check that the target address range resides in the user space portion of the virtual address space. In order to perform this check, the functions compare the end of the range against TASK_SIZE_MAX. For kernels compiled with CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL, this process requires some additional trickery using ALTERNATIVE, as TASK_SIZE_MAX depends on the paging mode in use. Linus suggested that this check could be simplified for 64-bit kernels. It is sufficient to check bit 63 of the address to ensure that the range belongs to user space. Additionally, the use of branches can be avoided by setting the target address to all ones if bit 63 is set. There's no need to check the end of the access range as there's huge gap between end of userspace range and start of the kernel range. The gap consists of canonical hole and unused ranges on both kernel and userspace sides. If an address with bit 63 set is passed down, it will trigger a #GP exception. _ASM_EXTABLE_UA() complains about this. Replace it with plain _ASM_EXTABLE() as it is expected behaviour now. The updated get_user() and put_user() checks are also compatible with Linear Address Masking, which allows user space to encode metadata in the upper bits of pointers and eliminates the need to untag the address before handling it. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230312112612.31869-2-kirill.shutemov%40linux.intel.com
Showing
Please register or sign in to comment