KVM: arm64: Eagerly restore host fpsimd/sve state in pKVM

When running in protected mode we don't want to leak protected
guest state to the host, including whether a guest has used
fpsimd/sve. Therefore, eagerly restore the host state on guest
exit when running in protected mode, which happens only if the
guest has used fpsimd/sve.
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240603122852.3923848-7-tabba@google.comSigned-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h

@@ -321,6 +321,17 @@ static inline void __hyp_sve_restore_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	write_sysreg_el1(__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, ZCR_EL1), SYS_ZCR);
 }
 
+static inline void __hyp_sve_save_host(void)
+{
+	struct cpu_sve_state *sve_state = *host_data_ptr(sve_state);
+
+	sve_state->zcr_el1 = read_sysreg_el1(SYS_ZCR);
+	write_sysreg_s(ZCR_ELx_LEN_MASK, SYS_ZCR_EL2);
+	__sve_save_state(sve_state->sve_regs + sve_ffr_offset(kvm_host_sve_max_vl),
+			 &sve_state->fpsr,
+			 true);
+}
+
 static void kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 /*
@@ -355,7 +366,7 @@ static bool kvm_hyp_handle_fpsimd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
 	/* Valid trap.  Switch the context: */
 
 	/* First disable enough traps to allow us to update the registers */
-	if (sve_guest)
+	if (sve_guest || (is_protected_kvm_enabled() && system_supports_sve()))
 		cpacr_clear_set(0, CPACR_ELx_FPEN | CPACR_ELx_ZEN);
 	else
 		cpacr_clear_set(0, CPACR_ELx_FPEN);

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c

@@ -23,20 +23,80 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_nvhe_init_params, kvm_init_params);
 
 void __kvm_hyp_host_forward_smc(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt);
 
+static void __hyp_sve_save_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, ZCR_EL1) = read_sysreg_el1(SYS_ZCR);
+	/*
+	 * On saving/restoring guest sve state, always use the maximum VL for
+	 * the guest. The layout of the data when saving the sve state depends
+	 * on the VL, so use a consistent (i.e., the maximum) guest VL.
+	 */
+	sve_cond_update_zcr_vq(vcpu_sve_max_vq(vcpu) - 1, SYS_ZCR_EL2);
+	__sve_save_state(vcpu_sve_pffr(vcpu), &vcpu->arch.ctxt.fp_regs.fpsr, true);
+	write_sysreg_s(ZCR_ELx_LEN_MASK, SYS_ZCR_EL2);
+}
+
+static void __hyp_sve_restore_host(void)
+{
+	struct cpu_sve_state *sve_state = *host_data_ptr(sve_state);
+
+	/*
+	 * On saving/restoring host sve state, always use the maximum VL for
+	 * the host. The layout of the data when saving the sve state depends
+	 * on the VL, so use a consistent (i.e., the maximum) host VL.
+	 *
+	 * Setting ZCR_EL2 to ZCR_ELx_LEN_MASK sets the effective length
+	 * supported by the system (or limited at EL3).
+	 */
+	write_sysreg_s(ZCR_ELx_LEN_MASK, SYS_ZCR_EL2);
+	__sve_restore_state(sve_state->sve_regs + sve_ffr_offset(kvm_host_sve_max_vl),
+			    &sve_state->fpsr,
+			    true);
+	write_sysreg_el1(sve_state->zcr_el1, SYS_ZCR);
+}
+
+static void fpsimd_sve_flush(void)
+{
+	*host_data_ptr(fp_owner) = FP_STATE_HOST_OWNED;
+}
+
+static void fpsimd_sve_sync(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!guest_owns_fp_regs())
+		return;
+
+	cpacr_clear_set(0, CPACR_ELx_FPEN | CPACR_ELx_ZEN);
+	isb();
+
+	if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu))
+		__hyp_sve_save_guest(vcpu);
+	else
+		__fpsimd_save_state(&vcpu->arch.ctxt.fp_regs);
+
+	if (system_supports_sve())
+		__hyp_sve_restore_host();
+	else
+		__fpsimd_restore_state(*host_data_ptr(fpsimd_state));
+
+	*host_data_ptr(fp_owner) = FP_STATE_HOST_OWNED;
+}
+
 static void flush_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
 {
 	struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu = hyp_vcpu->host_vcpu;
 
+	fpsimd_sve_flush();
+
 	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt	= host_vcpu->arch.ctxt;
 
 	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.sve_state	= kern_hyp_va(host_vcpu->arch.sve_state);
-	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.sve_max_vl	= host_vcpu->arch.sve_max_vl;
+	/* Limit guest vector length to the maximum supported by the host.  */
+	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.sve_max_vl	= min(host_vcpu->arch.sve_max_vl, kvm_host_sve_max_vl);
 
 	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hw_mmu	= host_vcpu->arch.hw_mmu;
 
 	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2	= host_vcpu->arch.hcr_el2;
 	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.mdcr_el2	= host_vcpu->arch.mdcr_el2;
-	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.cptr_el2	= host_vcpu->arch.cptr_el2;
 
 	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.iflags	= host_vcpu->arch.iflags;
 
@@ -54,10 +114,11 @@ static void sync_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
 	struct vgic_v3_cpu_if *host_cpu_if = &host_vcpu->arch.vgic_cpu.vgic_v3;
 	unsigned int i;
 
+	fpsimd_sve_sync(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu);
+
 	host_vcpu->arch.ctxt		= hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt;
 
 	host_vcpu->arch.hcr_el2		= hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2;
-	host_vcpu->arch.cptr_el2	= hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.cptr_el2;
 
 	host_vcpu->arch.fault		= hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.fault;
 

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c

@@ -588,6 +588,8 @@ int __pkvm_init_vcpu(pkvm_handle_t handle, struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu,
 	if (ret)
 		unmap_donated_memory(hyp_vcpu, sizeof(*hyp_vcpu));
 
+	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.cptr_el2 = kvm_get_reset_cptr_el2(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu);
+
 	return ret;
 }
 

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c

@@ -184,7 +184,21 @@ static bool kvm_handle_pvm_sys64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
 
 static void kvm_hyp_save_fpsimd_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	__fpsimd_save_state(*host_data_ptr(fpsimd_state));
+	/*
+	 * Non-protected kvm relies on the host restoring its sve state.
+	 * Protected kvm restores the host's sve state as not to reveal that
+	 * fpsimd was used by a guest nor leak upper sve bits.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(is_protected_kvm_enabled() && system_supports_sve())) {
+		__hyp_sve_save_host();
+
+		/* Re-enable SVE traps if not supported for the guest vcpu. */
+		if (!vcpu_has_sve(vcpu))
+			cpacr_clear_set(CPACR_ELx_ZEN, 0);
+
+	} else {
+		__fpsimd_save_state(*host_data_ptr(fpsimd_state));
+	}
 }
 
 static const exit_handler_fn hyp_exit_handlers[] = {