sch_cake: Fix out of bounds when parsing TCP options and header
The TCP option parser in cake qdisc (cake_get_tcpopt and cake_tcph_may_drop) could read one byte out of bounds. When the length is 1, the execution flow gets into the loop, reads one byte of the opcode, and if the opcode is neither TCPOPT_EOL nor TCPOPT_NOP, it reads one more byte, which exceeds the length of 1. This fix is inspired by commit 9609dad2 ("ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack out of bounds when parsing TCP options."). v2 changes: Added doff validation in cake_get_tcphdr to avoid parsing garbage as TCP header. Although it wasn't strictly an out-of-bounds access (memory was allocated), garbage values could be read where CAKE expected the TCP header if doff was smaller than 5. Cc: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com> Fixes: 8b713881 ("sch_cake: Add optional ACK filter") Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@nvidia.com> Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@toke.dk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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