Commit ba9d2e0c authored by Daniel Borkmann's avatar Daniel Borkmann Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman

bpf: restrict stack pointer arithmetic for unprivileged

commit e4298d25 upstream.

Restrict stack pointer arithmetic for unprivileged users in that
arithmetic itself must not go out of bounds as opposed to the actual
access later on. Therefore after each adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() with
a stack pointer as a destination we simulate a check_stack_access()
of 1 byte on the destination and once that fails the program is
rejected for unprivileged program loads. This is analog to map
value pointer arithmetic and needed for masking later on.
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[backported to 4.14 sblbir]
Signed-off-by: default avatarBalbir Singh <sblbir@amzn.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parent afb711a6
......@@ -940,6 +940,31 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, int size,
}
}
static int check_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
int off, int size)
{
/* Stack accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we
* can determine what type of data were returned. See
* check_stack_read().
*/
if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
verbose("variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d",
tn_buf, off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
verbose("invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
return 0;
}
/* check read/write into map element returned by bpf_map_lookup_elem() */
static int __check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
int size)
......@@ -1322,23 +1347,10 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
}
} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
/* stack accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we can
* determine what type of data were returned.
* See check_stack_read().
*/
if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
verbose("variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d",
tn_buf, off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
off += reg->var_off.value;
if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
verbose("invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
err = check_stack_access(env, reg, off, size);
if (err)
return err;
if (env->prog->aux->stack_depth < -off)
env->prog->aux->stack_depth = -off;
......@@ -2195,11 +2207,19 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
/* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds
* in order to be able to sanitize access later on.
*/
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) {
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, prohibited for !root\n",
dst);
return -EACCES;
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1)) {
verbose("R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, "
"prohibited for !root\n", dst);
return -EACCES;
} else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK &&
check_stack_access(env, dst_reg, dst_reg->off +
dst_reg->var_off.value, 1)) {
verbose("R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, "
"prohibited for !root\n", dst);
return -EACCES;
}
}
return 0;
......
Markdown is supported
0%
or
You are about to add 0 people to the discussion. Proceed with caution.
Finish editing this message first!
Please register or to comment