ice: call ice_is_malicious_vf() from ice_vc_process_vf_msg()

The main loop in __ice_clean_ctrlq first checks if a VF might be malicious
before calling ice_vc_process_vf_msg(). This results in duplicate code in
both functions to obtain a reference to the VF, and exports the
ice_is_malicious_vf() from ice_virtchnl.c unnecessarily.

Refactor ice_is_malicious_vf() to be a static function that takes a pointer
to the VF. Call this in ice_vc_process_vf_msg() just after we obtain a
reference to the VF by calling ice_get_vf_by_id.

Pass the mailbox data from the __ice_clean_ctrlq function into
ice_vc_process_vf_msg() instead of calling ice_is_malicious_vf().

This reduces the number of exported functions and avoids the need to obtain
the VF reference twice for every mailbox message.

Note that the state check for ICE_VF_STATE_DIS is kept in
ice_is_malicious_vf() and we call this before checking that state in
ice_vc_process_vf_msg. This is intentional, as we stop responding to VF
messages from a VF once we detect that it may be overflowing the mailbox.
This ensures that we continue to silently ignore the message as before
without responding via ice_vc_send_msg_to_vf().
Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski <michal.swiatkowski@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Marek Szlosek <marek.szlosek@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>

drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c

@@ -1517,8 +1517,7 @@ static int __ice_clean_ctrlq(struct ice_pf *pf, enum ice_ctl_q q_type)
 			data.max_num_msgs_mbx = hw->mailboxq.num_rq_entries;
 			data.async_watermark_val = ICE_MBX_OVERFLOW_WATERMARK;
 
-			if (!ice_is_malicious_vf(pf, &event, &data))
-				ice_vc_process_vf_msg(pf, &event);
+			ice_vc_process_vf_msg(pf, &event, &data);
 			break;
 		case ice_aqc_opc_fw_logging:
 			ice_output_fw_log(hw, &event.desc, event.msg_buf);

drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c

@@ -3834,27 +3834,26 @@ void ice_virtchnl_set_repr_ops(struct ice_vf *vf)
 }
 
 /**
- * ice_is_malicious_vf - helper function to detect a malicious VF
- * @pf: ptr to struct ice_pf
- * @event: pointer to the AQ event
+ * ice_is_malicious_vf - check if this vf might be overflowing mailbox
+ * @vf: the VF to check
  * @mbxdata: data about the state of the mailbox
+ *
+ * Detect if a given VF might be malicious and attempting to overflow the PF
+ * mailbox. If so, log a warning message and ignore this event.
  */
-bool
-ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
-		    struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
+static bool
+ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_vf *vf, struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
 {
-	s16 vf_id = le16_to_cpu(event->desc.retval);
-	struct device *dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf);
 	bool report_malvf = false;
-	struct ice_vf *vf;
+	struct device *dev;
+	struct ice_pf *pf;
 	int status;
 
-	vf = ice_get_vf_by_id(pf, vf_id);
-	if (!vf)
-		return false;
+	pf = vf->pf;
+	dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf);
 
 	if (test_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_DIS, vf->vf_states))
-		goto out_put_vf;
+		return vf->mbx_info.malicious;
 
 	/* check to see if we have a newly malicious VF */
 	status = ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(&pf->hw, mbxdata, &vf->mbx_info,
@@ -3872,9 +3871,6 @@ ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
 			 pf_vsi ? pf_vsi->netdev->dev_addr : zero_addr);
 	}
 
-out_put_vf:
-	ice_put_vf(vf);
-
 	return vf->mbx_info.malicious;
 }
 
@@ -3882,11 +3878,13 @@ ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
  * ice_vc_process_vf_msg - Process request from VF
  * @pf: pointer to the PF structure
  * @event: pointer to the AQ event
+ * @mbxdata: information used to detect VF attempting mailbox overflow
  *
  * called from the common asq/arq handler to
  * process request from VF
  */
-void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event)
+void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
+			   struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
 {
 	u32 v_opcode = le32_to_cpu(event->desc.cookie_high);
 	s16 vf_id = le16_to_cpu(event->desc.retval);
@@ -3908,6 +3906,10 @@ void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event)
 
 	mutex_lock(&vf->cfg_lock);
 
+	/* Check if the VF is trying to overflow the mailbox */
+	if (ice_is_malicious_vf(vf, mbxdata))
+		goto finish;
+
 	/* Check if VF is disabled. */
 	if (test_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_DIS, vf->vf_states)) {
 		err = -EPERM;

drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.h

@@ -63,10 +63,8 @@ int
 ice_vc_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_vf *vf, u32 v_opcode,
 		      enum virtchnl_status_code v_retval, u8 *msg, u16 msglen);
 bool ice_vc_isvalid_vsi_id(struct ice_vf *vf, u16 vsi_id);
-bool
-ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
-		    struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata);
-void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event);
+void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
+			   struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata);
 #else /* CONFIG_PCI_IOV */
 static inline void ice_virtchnl_set_dflt_ops(struct ice_vf *vf) { }
 static inline void ice_virtchnl_set_repr_ops(struct ice_vf *vf) { }
@@ -86,16 +84,9 @@ static inline bool ice_vc_isvalid_vsi_id(struct ice_vf *vf, u16 vsi_id)
 	return false;
 }
 
-static inline bool
-ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf __always_unused *pf,
-		    struct ice_rq_event_info __always_unused *event,
-		    struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
-{
-	return false;
-}
-
 static inline void
-ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event)
+ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
+		      struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
 {
 }
 #endif /* !CONFIG_PCI_IOV */