Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - major AppArmor update: policy namespaces & lots of fixes

   - add /sys/kernel/security/lsm node for easy detection of loaded LSMs

   - SELinux cgroupfs labeling support

   - SELinux context mounts on tmpfs, ramfs, devpts within user
     namespaces

   - improved TPM 2.0 support"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (117 commits)
  tpm: declare tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() as static
  tpm: Fix expected number of response bytes of TPM1.2 PCR Extend
  tpm xen: drop unneeded chip variable
  tpm: fix misspelled "facilitate" in module parameter description
  tpm_tis: fix the error handling of init_tis()
  KEYS: Use memzero_explicit() for secret data
  KEYS: Fix an error code in request_master_key()
  sign-file: fix build error in sign-file.c with libressl
  selinux: allow changing labels for cgroupfs
  selinux: fix off-by-one in setprocattr
  tpm: silence an array overflow warning
  tpm: fix the type of owned field in cap_t
  tpm: add securityfs support for TPM 2.0 firmware event log
  tpm: enhance read_log_of() to support Physical TPM event log
  tpm: enhance TPM 2.0 PCR extend to support multiple banks
  tpm: implement TPM 2.0 capability to get active PCR banks
  tpm: fix RC value check in tpm2_seal_trusted
  tpm_tis: fix iTPM probe via probe_itpm() function
  tpm: Begin the process to deprecate user_read_timer
  tpm: remove tpm_read_index and tpm_write_index from tpm.h
  ...

Documentation/security/LSM.txt

@@ -22,6 +22,13 @@ system, building their checks on top of the defined capability hooks.
 For more details on capabilities, see capabilities(7) in the Linux
 man-pages project.
 
+A list of the active security modules can be found by reading
+/sys/kernel/security/lsm. This is a comma separated list, and
+will always include the capability module. The list reflects the
+order in which checks are made. The capability module will always
+be first, followed by any "minor" modules (e.g. Yama) and then
+the one "major" module (e.g. SELinux) if there is one configured.
+
 Based on https://lkml.org/lkml/2007/10/26/215,
 a new LSM is accepted into the kernel when its intent (a description of
 what it tries to protect against and in what cases one would expect to

drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ menuconfig TCG_TPM
 	tristate "TPM Hardware Support"
 	depends on HAS_IOMEM
 	select SECURITYFS
+	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
 	---help---
 	  If you have a TPM security chip in your system, which
 	  implements the Trusted Computing Group's specification,

drivers/char/tpm/Makefile

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 #
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) += tpm.o
 tpm-y := tpm-interface.o tpm-dev.o tpm-sysfs.o tpm-chip.o tpm2-cmd.o \
-		tpm_eventlog.o
+		tpm1_eventlog.o tpm2_eventlog.o
 tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o tpm_acpi.o
 tpm-$(CONFIG_OF) += tpm_of.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TIS_CORE) += tpm_tis_core.o

drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/st33zp24.c

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
 
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
-#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/wait.h>

drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c

@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)
  * Allocates a new struct tpm_chip instance and assigns a free
  * device number for it. Must be paired with put_device(&chip->dev).
  */
-struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *dev,
+struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *pdev,
 				const struct tpm_class_ops *ops)
 {
 	struct tpm_chip *chip;
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *dev,
 	rc = idr_alloc(&dev_nums_idr, NULL, 0, TPM_NUM_DEVICES, GFP_KERNEL);
 	mutex_unlock(&idr_lock);
 	if (rc < 0) {
-		dev_err(dev, "No available tpm device numbers\n");
+		dev_err(pdev, "No available tpm device numbers\n");
 		kfree(chip);
 		return ERR_PTR(rc);
 	}
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *dev,
 
 	chip->dev.class = tpm_class;
 	chip->dev.release = tpm_dev_release;
-	chip->dev.parent = dev;
+	chip->dev.parent = pdev;
 	chip->dev.groups = chip->groups;
 
 	if (chip->dev_num == 0)
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *dev,
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
-	if (!dev)
+	if (!pdev)
 		chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_VIRTUAL;
 
 	cdev_init(&chip->cdev, &tpm_fops);

drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c

@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ static void user_reader_timeout(unsigned long ptr)
 {
 	struct file_priv *priv = (struct file_priv *)ptr;
 
+	pr_warn("TPM user space timeout is deprecated (pid=%d)\n",
+		task_tgid_nr(current));
+
 	schedule_work(&priv->work);
 }
 
@@ -157,7 +160,7 @@ static ssize_t tpm_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
 
 	/* Set a timeout by which the reader must come claim the result */
-	mod_timer(&priv->user_read_timer, jiffies + (60 * HZ));
+	mod_timer(&priv->user_read_timer, jiffies + (120 * HZ));
 
 	return in_size;
 }

drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include "tpm.h"
 
 #define READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE 314
+#define READ_PUBEK_RESULT_MIN_BODY_SIZE (28 + 256)
 #define TPM_ORD_READPUBEK cpu_to_be32(124)
 static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_readpubek_header = {
 	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
@@ -39,7 +40,8 @@ static ssize_t pubek_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct tpm_chip *chip = to_tpm_chip(dev);
 
 	tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_readpubek_header;
-	err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
+	err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE,
+			       READ_PUBEK_RESULT_MIN_BODY_SIZE, 0,
 			       "attempting to read the PUBEK");
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
@@ -95,7 +97,8 @@ static ssize_t pcrs_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct tpm_chip *chip = to_tpm_chip(dev);
 
 	rc = tpm_getcap(chip, TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR, &cap,
-			"attempting to determine the number of PCRS");
+			"attempting to determine the number of PCRS",
+			sizeof(cap.num_pcrs));
 	if (rc)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -120,7 +123,8 @@ static ssize_t enabled_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	ssize_t rc;
 
 	rc = tpm_getcap(to_tpm_chip(dev), TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM, &cap,
-			"attempting to determine the permanent enabled state");
+			"attempting to determine the permanent enabled state",
+			sizeof(cap.perm_flags));
 	if (rc)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -136,7 +140,8 @@ static ssize_t active_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	ssize_t rc;
 
 	rc = tpm_getcap(to_tpm_chip(dev), TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM, &cap,
-			"attempting to determine the permanent active state");
+			"attempting to determine the permanent active state",
+			sizeof(cap.perm_flags));
 	if (rc)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -152,7 +157,8 @@ static ssize_t owned_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	ssize_t rc;
 
 	rc = tpm_getcap(to_tpm_chip(dev), TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER, &cap,
-			"attempting to determine the owner state");
+			"attempting to determine the owner state",
+			sizeof(cap.owned));
 	if (rc)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -168,7 +174,8 @@ static ssize_t temp_deactivated_show(struct device *dev,
 	ssize_t rc;
 
 	rc = tpm_getcap(to_tpm_chip(dev), TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL, &cap,
-			"attempting to determine the temporary state");
+			"attempting to determine the temporary state",
+			sizeof(cap.stclear_flags));
 	if (rc)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -186,7 +193,8 @@ static ssize_t caps_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	char *str = buf;
 
 	rc = tpm_getcap(chip, TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER, &cap,
-			"attempting to determine the manufacturer");
+			"attempting to determine the manufacturer",
+			sizeof(cap.manufacturer_id));
 	if (rc)
 		return 0;
 	str += sprintf(str, "Manufacturer: 0x%x\n",
@@ -194,7 +202,8 @@ static ssize_t caps_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 
 	/* Try to get a TPM version 1.2 TPM_CAP_VERSION_INFO */
 	rc = tpm_getcap(chip, TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_2, &cap,
-			"attempting to determine the 1.2 version");
+			"attempting to determine the 1.2 version",
+			sizeof(cap.tpm_version_1_2));
 	if (!rc) {
 		str += sprintf(str,
 			       "TCG version: %d.%d\nFirmware version: %d.%d\n",
@@ -205,7 +214,8 @@ static ssize_t caps_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	} else {
 		/* Otherwise just use TPM_STRUCT_VER */
 		rc = tpm_getcap(chip, TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_1, &cap,
-				"attempting to determine the 1.1 version");
+				"attempting to determine the 1.1 version",
+				sizeof(cap.tpm_version));
 		if (rc)
 			return 0;
 		str += sprintf(str,

drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h

@@ -34,8 +34,7 @@
 #include <linux/acpi.h>
 #include <linux/cdev.h>
 #include <linux/highmem.h>
-
-#include "tpm_eventlog.h"
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 
 enum tpm_const {
 	TPM_MINOR = 224,	/* officially assigned */
@@ -97,6 +96,7 @@ enum tpm2_return_codes {
 };
 
 enum tpm2_algorithms {
+	TPM2_ALG_ERROR		= 0x0000,
 	TPM2_ALG_SHA1		= 0x0004,
 	TPM2_ALG_KEYEDHASH	= 0x0008,
 	TPM2_ALG_SHA256		= 0x000B,
@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ enum tpm2_permanent_handles {
 };
 
 enum tpm2_capabilities {
+	TPM2_CAP_PCRS		= 5,
 	TPM2_CAP_TPM_PROPERTIES = 6,
 };
 
@@ -148,6 +149,11 @@ enum tpm_chip_flags {
 	TPM_CHIP_FLAG_HAVE_TIMEOUTS	= BIT(4),
 };
 
+struct tpm_bios_log {
+	void *bios_event_log;
+	void *bios_event_log_end;
+};
+
 struct tpm_chip_seqops {
 	struct tpm_chip *chip;
 	const struct seq_operations *seqops;
@@ -187,6 +193,8 @@ struct tpm_chip {
 
 	const struct attribute_group *groups[3];
 	unsigned int groups_cnt;
+
+	u16 active_banks[7];
 #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
 	acpi_handle acpi_dev_handle;
 	char ppi_version[TPM_PPI_VERSION_LEN + 1];
@@ -195,17 +203,6 @@ struct tpm_chip {
 
 #define to_tpm_chip(d) container_of(d, struct tpm_chip, dev)
 
-static inline int tpm_read_index(int base, int index)
-{
-	outb(index, base);
-	return inb(base+1) & 0xFF;
-}
-
-static inline void tpm_write_index(int base, int index, int value)
-{
-	outb(index, base);
-	outb(value & 0xFF, base+1);
-}
 struct tpm_input_header {
 	__be16	tag;
 	__be32	length;
@@ -284,7 +281,7 @@ struct permanent_flags_t {
 typedef union {
 	struct	permanent_flags_t perm_flags;
 	struct	stclear_flags_t	stclear_flags;
-	bool	owned;
+	__u8	owned;
 	__be32	num_pcrs;
 	struct	tpm_version_t	tpm_version;
 	struct	tpm_version_1_2_t tpm_version_1_2;
@@ -387,6 +384,11 @@ struct tpm_cmd_t {
 	tpm_cmd_params	params;
 } __packed;
 
+struct tpm2_digest {
+	u16 alg_id;
+	u8 digest[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE];
+} __packed;
+
 /* A string buffer type for constructing TPM commands. This is based on the
  * ideas of string buffer code in security/keys/trusted.h but is heap based
  * in order to keep the stack usage minimal.
@@ -493,10 +495,11 @@ enum tpm_transmit_flags {
 
 ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
 		     unsigned int flags);
-ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, const void *cmd, int len,
-			 unsigned int flags, const char *desc);
+ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, const void *buf, size_t bufsiz,
+			 size_t min_rsp_body_len, unsigned int flags,
+			 const char *desc);
 ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap,
-		   const char *desc);
+		   const char *desc, size_t min_cap_length);
 int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *);
 int tpm1_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip);
 int tpm_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip);
@@ -529,8 +532,14 @@ static inline void tpm_add_ppi(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 }
 #endif
 
+static inline inline u32 tpm2_rc_value(u32 rc)
+{
+	return (rc & BIT(7)) ? rc & 0xff : rc;
+}
+
 int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf);
-int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash);
+int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u32 count,
+		    struct tpm2_digest *digests);
 int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *out, size_t max);
 int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 		      struct trusted_key_payload *payload,

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c → drivers/char/tpm/tpm1_eventlog.c

@@ -390,9 +390,6 @@ int tpm_bios_log_setup(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	unsigned int cnt;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
-		return 0;
-
 	rc = tpm_read_log(chip);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
@@ -407,7 +404,13 @@ int tpm_bios_log_setup(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	cnt++;
 
 	chip->bin_log_seqops.chip = chip;
-	chip->bin_log_seqops.seqops = &tpm_binary_b_measurements_seqops;
+	if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
+		chip->bin_log_seqops.seqops =
+			&tpm2_binary_b_measurements_seqops;
+	else
+		chip->bin_log_seqops.seqops =
+			&tpm_binary_b_measurements_seqops;
+
 
 	chip->bios_dir[cnt] =
 	    securityfs_create_file("binary_bios_measurements",
@@ -418,17 +421,21 @@ int tpm_bios_log_setup(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 		goto err;
 	cnt++;
 
-	chip->ascii_log_seqops.chip = chip;
-	chip->ascii_log_seqops.seqops = &tpm_ascii_b_measurements_seqops;
+	if (!(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)) {
 
-	chip->bios_dir[cnt] =
-	    securityfs_create_file("ascii_bios_measurements",
-				   0440, chip->bios_dir[0],
-				   (void *)&chip->ascii_log_seqops,
-				   &tpm_bios_measurements_ops);
-	if (IS_ERR(chip->bios_dir[cnt]))
-		goto err;
-	cnt++;
+		chip->ascii_log_seqops.chip = chip;
+		chip->ascii_log_seqops.seqops =
+			&tpm_ascii_b_measurements_seqops;
+
+		chip->bios_dir[cnt] =
+			securityfs_create_file("ascii_bios_measurements",
+					       0440, chip->bios_dir[0],
+					       (void *)&chip->ascii_log_seqops,
+					       &tpm_bios_measurements_ops);
+		if (IS_ERR(chip->bios_dir[cnt]))
+			goto err;
+		cnt++;
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 

drivers/char/tpm/tpm2_eventlog.c

+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *      Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * Access to TPM 2.0 event log as written by Firmware.
+ * It assumes that writer of event log has followed TCG Specification
+ * for Family "2.0" and written the event data in little endian.
+ * With that, it doesn't need any endian conversion for structure
+ * content.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include "tpm.h"
+#include "tpm_eventlog.h"
+
+/*
+ * calc_tpm2_event_size() - calculate the event size, where event
+ * is an entry in the TPM 2.0 event log. The event is of type Crypto
+ * Agile Log Entry Format as defined in TCG EFI Protocol Specification
+ * Family "2.0".
+
+ * @event: event whose size is to be calculated.
+ * @event_header: the first event in the event log.
+ *
+ * Returns size of the event. If it is an invalid event, returns 0.
+ */
+static int calc_tpm2_event_size(struct tcg_pcr_event2 *event,
+				struct tcg_pcr_event *event_header)
+{
+	struct tcg_efi_specid_event *efispecid;
+	struct tcg_event_field *event_field;
+	void *marker;
+	void *marker_start;
+	u32 halg_size;
+	size_t size;
+	u16 halg;
+	int i;
+	int j;
+
+	marker = event;
+	marker_start = marker;
+	marker = marker + sizeof(event->pcr_idx) + sizeof(event->event_type)
+		+ sizeof(event->count);
+
+	efispecid = (struct tcg_efi_specid_event *)event_header->event;
+
+	for (i = 0; (i < event->count) && (i < TPM2_ACTIVE_PCR_BANKS);
+	     i++) {
+		halg_size = sizeof(event->digests[i].alg_id);
+		memcpy(&halg, marker, halg_size);
+		marker = marker + halg_size;
+		for (j = 0; (j < efispecid->num_algs); j++) {
+			if (halg == efispecid->digest_sizes[j].alg_id) {
+				marker = marker +
+					efispecid->digest_sizes[j].digest_size;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	event_field = (struct tcg_event_field *)marker;
+	marker = marker + sizeof(event_field->event_size)
+		+ event_field->event_size;
+	size = marker - marker_start;
+
+	if ((event->event_type == 0) && (event_field->event_size == 0))
+		return 0;
+
+	return size;
+}
+
+static void *tpm2_bios_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = m->private;
+	struct tpm_bios_log *log = &chip->log;
+	void *addr = log->bios_event_log;
+	void *limit = log->bios_event_log_end;
+	struct tcg_pcr_event *event_header;
+	struct tcg_pcr_event2 *event;
+	size_t size;
+	int i;
+
+	event_header = addr;
+	size = sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event) - sizeof(event_header->event)
+		+ event_header->event_size;
+
+	if (*pos == 0) {
+		if (addr + size < limit) {
+			if ((event_header->event_type == 0) &&
+			    (event_header->event_size == 0))
+				return NULL;
+			return SEQ_START_TOKEN;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (*pos > 0) {
+		addr += size;
+		event = addr;
+		size = calc_tpm2_event_size(event, event_header);
+		if ((addr + size >=  limit) || (size == 0))
+			return NULL;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < (*pos - 1); i++) {
+		event = addr;
+		size = calc_tpm2_event_size(event, event_header);
+
+		if ((addr + size >= limit) || (size == 0))
+			return NULL;
+		addr += size;
+	}
+
+	return addr;
+}
+
+static void *tpm2_bios_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v,
+					 loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct tcg_pcr_event *event_header;
+	struct tcg_pcr_event2 *event;
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = m->private;
+	struct tpm_bios_log *log = &chip->log;
+	void *limit = log->bios_event_log_end;
+	size_t event_size;
+	void *marker;
+
+	event_header = log->bios_event_log;
+
+	if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
+		event_size = sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event) -
+			sizeof(event_header->event) + event_header->event_size;
+		marker = event_header;
+	} else {
+		event = v;
+		event_size = calc_tpm2_event_size(event, event_header);
+		if (event_size == 0)
+			return NULL;
+		marker = event;
+	}
+
+	marker = marker + event_size;
+	if (marker >= limit)
+		return NULL;
+	v = marker;
+	event = v;
+
+	event_size = calc_tpm2_event_size(event, event_header);
+	if (((v + event_size) >= limit) || (event_size == 0))
+		return NULL;
+
+	(*pos)++;
+	return v;
+}
+
+static void tpm2_bios_measurements_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+}
+
+static int tpm2_binary_bios_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+	struct tpm_chip *chip = m->private;
+	struct tpm_bios_log *log = &chip->log;
+	struct tcg_pcr_event *event_header = log->bios_event_log;
+	struct tcg_pcr_event2 *event = v;
+	void *temp_ptr;
+	size_t size;
+
+	if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
+		size = sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event) -
+			sizeof(event_header->event) + event_header->event_size;
+
+		temp_ptr = event_header;
+
+		if (size > 0)
+			seq_write(m, temp_ptr, size);
+	} else {
+		size = calc_tpm2_event_size(event, event_header);
+		temp_ptr = event;
+		if (size > 0)
+			seq_write(m, temp_ptr, size);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+const struct seq_operations tpm2_binary_b_measurements_seqops = {
+	.start = tpm2_bios_measurements_start,
+	.next = tpm2_bios_measurements_next,
+	.stop = tpm2_bios_measurements_stop,
+	.show = tpm2_binary_bios_measurements_show,
+};

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_acpi.c

@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	u64 len, start;
 	struct tpm_bios_log *log;
 
+	if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
 	log = &chip->log;
 
 	/* Unfortuntely ACPI does not associate the event log with a specific

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_atmel.h

@@ -96,6 +96,12 @@ enum tpm_atmel_addr {
 	TPM_ATMEL_BASE_ADDR_HI = 0x09
 };
 
+static inline int tpm_read_index(int base, int index)
+{
+	outb(index, base);
+	return inb(base+1) & 0xFF;
+}
+
 /* Verify this is a 1.1 Atmel TPM */
 static int atmel_verify_tpm11(void)
 {

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c

@@ -264,10 +264,12 @@ static const struct tpm_class_ops tpm_crb = {
 static int crb_check_resource(struct acpi_resource *ares, void *data)
 {
 	struct resource *io_res = data;
-	struct resource res;
+	struct resource_win win;
+	struct resource *res = &(win.res);
 
-	if (acpi_dev_resource_memory(ares, &res)) {
-		*io_res = res;
+	if (acpi_dev_resource_memory(ares, res) ||
+	    acpi_dev_resource_address_space(ares, &win)) {
+		*io_res = *res;
 		io_res->name = NULL;
 	}
 

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h

@@ -2,9 +2,12 @@
 #ifndef __TPM_EVENTLOG_H__
 #define __TPM_EVENTLOG_H__
 
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+
 #define TCG_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX	255
 #define MAX_TEXT_EVENT		1000	/* Max event string length */
 #define ACPI_TCPA_SIG		"TCPA"	/* 0x41504354 /'TCPA' */
+#define TPM2_ACTIVE_PCR_BANKS	3
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
 #define do_endian_conversion(x) be32_to_cpu(x)
@@ -17,11 +20,6 @@ enum bios_platform_class {
 	BIOS_SERVER = 0x01,
 };
 
-struct tpm_bios_log {
-	void *bios_event_log;
-	void *bios_event_log_end;
-};
-
 struct tcpa_event {
 	u32 pcr_index;
 	u32 event_type;
@@ -73,6 +71,49 @@ enum tcpa_pc_event_ids {
 	HOST_TABLE_OF_DEVICES,
 };
 
+/* http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/tcg-efi-protocol-specification/ */
+
+struct tcg_efi_specid_event_algs {
+	u16 alg_id;
+	u16 digest_size;
+} __packed;
+
+struct tcg_efi_specid_event {
+	u8 signature[16];
+	u32 platform_class;
+	u8 spec_version_minor;
+	u8 spec_version_major;
+	u8 spec_errata;
+	u8 uintnsize;
+	u32 num_algs;
+	struct tcg_efi_specid_event_algs digest_sizes[TPM2_ACTIVE_PCR_BANKS];
+	u8 vendor_info_size;
+	u8 vendor_info[0];
+} __packed;
+
+struct tcg_pcr_event {
+	u32 pcr_idx;
+	u32 event_type;
+	u8 digest[20];
+	u32 event_size;
+	u8 event[0];
+} __packed;
+
+struct tcg_event_field {
+	u32 event_size;
+	u8 event[0];
+} __packed;
+
+struct tcg_pcr_event2 {
+	u32 pcr_idx;
+	u32 event_type;
+	u32 count;
+	struct tpm2_digest digests[TPM2_ACTIVE_PCR_BANKS];
+	struct tcg_event_field event;
+} __packed;
+
+extern const struct seq_operations tpm2_binary_b_measurements_seqops;
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_ACPI)
 int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip);
 #else

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c

@@ -40,11 +40,12 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(vio, tpm_ibmvtpm_device_table);
 
 /**
  * ibmvtpm_send_crq - Send a CRQ request
+ *
  * @vdev:	vio device struct
  * @w1:		first word
  * @w2:		second word
  *
- * Return value:
+ * Return:
  *	0 -Sucess
  *	Non-zero - Failure
  */
@@ -55,11 +56,12 @@ static int ibmvtpm_send_crq(struct vio_dev *vdev, u64 w1, u64 w2)
 
 /**
  * tpm_ibmvtpm_recv - Receive data after send
+ *
  * @chip:	tpm chip struct
  * @buf:	buffer to read
- * count:	size of buffer
+ * @count:	size of buffer
  *
- * Return value:
+ * Return:
  *	Number of bytes read
  */
 static int tpm_ibmvtpm_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
@@ -96,12 +98,13 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
 
 /**
  * tpm_ibmvtpm_send - Send tpm request
+ *
  * @chip:	tpm chip struct
  * @buf:	buffer contains data to send
- * count:	size of buffer
+ * @count:	size of buffer
  *
- * Return value:
- *	Number of bytes sent
+ * Return:
+ *	Number of bytes sent or < 0 on error.
  */
 static int tpm_ibmvtpm_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
 {
@@ -170,11 +173,12 @@ static u8 tpm_ibmvtpm_status(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 
 /**
  * ibmvtpm_crq_get_rtce_size - Send a CRQ request to get rtce size
+ *
  * @ibmvtpm:	vtpm device struct
  *
- * Return value:
- *	0 - Success
- *	Non-zero - Failure
+ * Return:
+ *	0 on success.
+ *	Non-zero on failure.
  */
 static int ibmvtpm_crq_get_rtce_size(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
 {
@@ -197,11 +201,12 @@ static int ibmvtpm_crq_get_rtce_size(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
 /**
  * ibmvtpm_crq_get_version - Send a CRQ request to get vtpm version
  *			   - Note that this is vtpm version and not tpm version
+ *
  * @ibmvtpm:	vtpm device struct
  *
- * Return value:
- *	0 - Success
- *	Non-zero - Failure
+ * Return:
+ *	0 on success.
+ *	Non-zero on failure.
  */
 static int ibmvtpm_crq_get_version(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
 {
@@ -225,9 +230,9 @@ static int ibmvtpm_crq_get_version(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
  * ibmvtpm_crq_send_init_complete - Send a CRQ initialize complete message
  * @ibmvtpm:	vtpm device struct
  *
- * Return value:
- *	0 - Success
- *	Non-zero - Failure
+ * Return:
+ *	0 on success.
+ *	Non-zero on failure.
  */
 static int ibmvtpm_crq_send_init_complete(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
 {
@@ -245,9 +250,9 @@ static int ibmvtpm_crq_send_init_complete(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
  * ibmvtpm_crq_send_init - Send a CRQ initialize message
  * @ibmvtpm:	vtpm device struct
  *
- * Return value:
- *	0 - Success
- *	Non-zero - Failure
+ * Return:
+ *	0 on success.
+ *	Non-zero on failure.
  */
 static int ibmvtpm_crq_send_init(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
 {
@@ -265,8 +270,7 @@ static int ibmvtpm_crq_send_init(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
  * tpm_ibmvtpm_remove - ibm vtpm remove entry point
  * @vdev:	vio device struct
  *
- * Return value:
- *	0
+ * Return: Always 0.
  */
 static int tpm_ibmvtpm_remove(struct vio_dev *vdev)
 {
@@ -303,18 +307,19 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_remove(struct vio_dev *vdev)
  * tpm_ibmvtpm_get_desired_dma - Get DMA size needed by this driver
  * @vdev:	vio device struct
  *
- * Return value:
- *	Number of bytes the driver needs to DMA map
+ * Return:
+ *	Number of bytes the driver needs to DMA map.
  */
 static unsigned long tpm_ibmvtpm_get_desired_dma(struct vio_dev *vdev)
 {
 	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(&vdev->dev);
 	struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
 
-	/* ibmvtpm initializes at probe time, so the data we are
-	* asking for may not be set yet. Estimate that 4K required
-	* for TCE-mapped buffer in addition to CRQ.
-	*/
+	/*
+	 * ibmvtpm initializes at probe time, so the data we are
+	 * asking for may not be set yet. Estimate that 4K required
+	 * for TCE-mapped buffer in addition to CRQ.
+	 */
 	if (!ibmvtpm)
 		return CRQ_RES_BUF_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE;
 
@@ -325,8 +330,7 @@ static unsigned long tpm_ibmvtpm_get_desired_dma(struct vio_dev *vdev)
  * tpm_ibmvtpm_suspend - Suspend
  * @dev:	device struct
  *
- * Return value:
- *	0
+ * Return: Always 0.
  */
 static int tpm_ibmvtpm_suspend(struct device *dev)
 {
@@ -350,11 +354,12 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_suspend(struct device *dev)
 
 /**
  * ibmvtpm_reset_crq - Reset CRQ
+ *
  * @ibmvtpm:	ibm vtpm struct
  *
- * Return value:
- *	0 - Success
- *	Non-zero - Failure
+ * Return:
+ *	0 on success.
+ *	Non-zero on failure.
  */
 static int ibmvtpm_reset_crq(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
 {
@@ -376,10 +381,10 @@ static int ibmvtpm_reset_crq(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
 
 /**
  * tpm_ibmvtpm_resume - Resume from suspend
+ *
  * @dev:	device struct
  *
- * Return value:
- *	0
+ * Return: Always 0.
  */
 static int tpm_ibmvtpm_resume(struct device *dev)
 {
@@ -434,10 +439,10 @@ static const struct dev_pm_ops tpm_ibmvtpm_pm_ops = {
 
 /**
  * ibmvtpm_crq_get_next - Get next responded crq
- * @ibmvtpm	vtpm device struct
  *
- * Return value:
- *	vtpm crq pointer
+ * @ibmvtpm:	vtpm device struct
+ *
+ * Return: vtpm crq pointer or NULL.
  */
 static struct ibmvtpm_crq *ibmvtpm_crq_get_next(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
 {
@@ -455,11 +460,10 @@ static struct ibmvtpm_crq *ibmvtpm_crq_get_next(struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
 
 /**
  * ibmvtpm_crq_process - Process responded crq
- * @crq		crq to be processed
- * @ibmvtpm	vtpm device struct
  *
- * Return value:
- *	Nothing
+ * @crq:	crq to be processed
+ * @ibmvtpm:	vtpm device struct
+ *
  */
 static void ibmvtpm_crq_process(struct ibmvtpm_crq *crq,
 				struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm)
@@ -528,6 +532,7 @@ static void ibmvtpm_crq_process(struct ibmvtpm_crq *crq,
 
 /**
  * ibmvtpm_interrupt -	Interrupt handler
+ *
  * @irq:		irq number to handle
  * @vtpm_instance:	vtpm that received interrupt
  *
@@ -554,12 +559,13 @@ static irqreturn_t ibmvtpm_interrupt(int irq, void *vtpm_instance)
 
 /**
  * tpm_ibmvtpm_probe - ibm vtpm initialize entry point
+ *
  * @vio_dev:	vio device struct
  * @id:		vio device id struct
  *
- * Return value:
- *	0 - Success
- *	Non-zero - Failure
+ * Return:
+ *	0 on success.
+ *	Non-zero on failure.
  */
 static int tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_dev *vio_dev,
 				   const struct vio_device_id *id)
@@ -671,11 +677,12 @@ static struct vio_driver ibmvtpm_driver = {
 };
 
 /**
- * ibmvtpm_module_init - Initialize ibm vtpm module
+ * ibmvtpm_module_init - Initialize ibm vtpm module.
  *
- * Return value:
- *	0 -Success
- *	Non-zero - Failure
+ *
+ * Return:
+ *	0 on success.
+ *	Non-zero on failure.
  */
 static int __init ibmvtpm_module_init(void)
 {
@@ -683,10 +690,7 @@ static int __init ibmvtpm_module_init(void)
 }
 
 /**
- * ibmvtpm_module_exit - Teardown ibm vtpm module
- *
- * Return value:
- *	Nothing
+ * ibmvtpm_module_exit - Tear down ibm vtpm module.
  */
 static void __exit ibmvtpm_module_exit(void)
 {

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_nsc.c

@@ -278,6 +278,18 @@ static struct platform_driver nsc_drv = {
 	},
 };
 
+static inline int tpm_read_index(int base, int index)
+{
+	outb(index, base);
+	return inb(base+1) & 0xFF;
+}
+
+static inline void tpm_write_index(int base, int index, int value)
+{
+	outb(index, base);
+	outb(value & 0xFF, base+1);
+}
+
 static int __init init_nsc(void)
 {
 	int rc = 0;

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c

@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ int tpm_read_log_of(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	const u32 *sizep;
 	const u64 *basep;
 	struct tpm_bios_log *log;
+	u32 size;
+	u64 base;
 
 	log = &chip->log;
 	if (chip->dev.parent && chip->dev.parent->of_node)
@@ -41,18 +43,35 @@ int tpm_read_log_of(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	if (sizep == NULL || basep == NULL)
 		return -EIO;
 
-	if (*sizep == 0) {
+	/*
+	 * For both vtpm/tpm, firmware has log addr and log size in big
+	 * endian format. But in case of vtpm, there is a method called
+	 * sml-handover which is run during kernel init even before
+	 * device tree is setup. This sml-handover function takes care
+	 * of endianness and writes to sml-base and sml-size in little
+	 * endian format. For this reason, vtpm doesn't need conversion
+	 * but physical tpm needs the conversion.
+	 */
+	if (of_property_match_string(np, "compatible", "IBM,vtpm") < 0) {
+		size = be32_to_cpup(sizep);
+		base = be64_to_cpup(basep);
+	} else {
+		size = *sizep;
+		base = *basep;
+	}
+
+	if (size == 0) {
 		dev_warn(&chip->dev, "%s: Event log area empty\n", __func__);
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
-	log->bios_event_log = kmalloc(*sizep, GFP_KERNEL);
+	log->bios_event_log = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!log->bios_event_log)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	log->bios_event_log_end = log->bios_event_log + *sizep;
+	log->bios_event_log_end = log->bios_event_log + size;
 
-	memcpy(log->bios_event_log, __va(*basep), *sizep);
+	memcpy(log->bios_event_log, __va(base), size);
 
 	return 0;
 }

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c

@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, struct tpm_info *tpm_info,
 		irq = tpm_info->irq;
 
 	if (itpm)
-		phy->priv.flags |= TPM_TIS_ITPM_POSSIBLE;
+		phy->priv.flags |= TPM_TIS_ITPM_WORKAROUND;
 
 	return tpm_tis_core_init(dev, &phy->priv, irq, &tpm_tcg,
 				 acpi_dev_handle);
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ static int __init init_tis(void)
 	acpi_bus_unregister_driver(&tis_acpi_driver);
 err_acpi:
 #endif
-	platform_device_unregister(force_pdev);
+	platform_driver_unregister(&tis_drv);
 err_platform:
 	if (force_pdev)
 		platform_device_unregister(force_pdev);

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c

@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ static int tpm_tis_send_data(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len)
 	struct tpm_tis_data *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
 	int rc, status, burstcnt;
 	size_t count = 0;
-	bool itpm = priv->flags & TPM_TIS_ITPM_POSSIBLE;
+	bool itpm = priv->flags & TPM_TIS_ITPM_WORKAROUND;
 
 	if (request_locality(chip, 0) < 0)
 		return -EBUSY;
@@ -464,6 +464,9 @@ static int probe_itpm(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	size_t len = sizeof(cmd_getticks);
 	u16 vendor;
 
+	if (priv->flags & TPM_TIS_ITPM_WORKAROUND)
+		return 0;
+
 	rc = tpm_tis_read16(priv, TPM_DID_VID(0), &vendor);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		return rc;
@@ -479,12 +482,15 @@ static int probe_itpm(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	tpm_tis_ready(chip);
 	release_locality(chip, priv->locality, 0);
 
+	priv->flags |= TPM_TIS_ITPM_WORKAROUND;
+
 	rc = tpm_tis_send_data(chip, cmd_getticks, len);
-	if (rc == 0) {
+	if (rc == 0)
 		dev_info(&chip->dev, "Detected an iTPM.\n");
-		rc = 1;
-	} else
+	else {
+		priv->flags &= ~TPM_TIS_ITPM_WORKAROUND;
 		rc = -EFAULT;
+	}
 
 out:
 	tpm_tis_ready(chip);
@@ -552,7 +558,8 @@ static int tpm_tis_gen_interrupt(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
 		return tpm2_get_tpm_pt(chip, 0x100, &cap2, desc);
 	else
-		return tpm_getcap(chip, TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT, &cap, desc);
+		return tpm_getcap(chip, TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT, &cap, desc,
+				  0);
 }
 
 /* Register the IRQ and issue a command that will cause an interrupt. If an
@@ -740,15 +747,10 @@ int tpm_tis_core_init(struct device *dev, struct tpm_tis_data *priv, int irq,
 		 (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) ? "2.0" : "1.2",
 		 vendor >> 16, rid);
 
-	if (!(priv->flags & TPM_TIS_ITPM_POSSIBLE)) {
-		probe = probe_itpm(chip);
-		if (probe < 0) {
-			rc = -ENODEV;
-			goto out_err;
-		}
-
-		if (!!probe)
-			priv->flags |= TPM_TIS_ITPM_POSSIBLE;
+	probe = probe_itpm(chip);
+	if (probe < 0) {
+		rc = -ENODEV;
+		goto out_err;
 	}
 
 	/* Figure out the capabilities */

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.h

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ enum tis_defaults {
 #define	TPM_RID(l)			(0x0F04 | ((l) << 12))
 
 enum tpm_tis_flags {
-	TPM_TIS_ITPM_POSSIBLE		= BIT(0),
+	TPM_TIS_ITPM_WORKAROUND		= BIT(0),
 };
 
 struct tpm_tis_data {

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_spi.c

@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@
 #include <linux/acpi.h>
 #include <linux/freezer.h>
 
-#include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/spi/spi.h>
 #include <linux/gpio.h>
 #include <linux/of_irq.h>

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_vtpm_proxy.c

@@ -65,7 +65,12 @@ static void vtpm_proxy_delete_device(struct proxy_dev *proxy_dev);
 /**
  * vtpm_proxy_fops_read - Read TPM commands on 'server side'
  *
- * Return value:
+ * @filp: file pointer
+ * @buf: read buffer
+ * @count: number of bytes to read
+ * @off: offset
+ *
+ * Return:
  *	Number of bytes read or negative error code
  */
 static ssize_t vtpm_proxy_fops_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
@@ -115,7 +120,12 @@ static ssize_t vtpm_proxy_fops_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 /**
  * vtpm_proxy_fops_write - Write TPM responses on 'server side'
  *
- * Return value:
+ * @filp: file pointer
+ * @buf: write buffer
+ * @count: number of bytes to write
+ * @off: offset
+ *
+ * Return:
  *	Number of bytes read or negative error value
  */
 static ssize_t vtpm_proxy_fops_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
@@ -155,10 +165,12 @@ static ssize_t vtpm_proxy_fops_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
 }
 
 /*
- * vtpm_proxy_fops_poll: Poll status on 'server side'
+ * vtpm_proxy_fops_poll - Poll status on 'server side'
+ *
+ * @filp: file pointer
+ * @wait: poll table
  *
- * Return value:
- *      Poll flags
+ * Return: Poll flags
  */
 static unsigned int vtpm_proxy_fops_poll(struct file *filp, poll_table *wait)
 {
@@ -185,6 +197,8 @@ static unsigned int vtpm_proxy_fops_poll(struct file *filp, poll_table *wait)
 /*
  * vtpm_proxy_fops_open - Open vTPM device on 'server side'
  *
+ * @filp: file pointer
+ *
  * Called when setting up the anonymous file descriptor
  */
 static void vtpm_proxy_fops_open(struct file *filp)
@@ -196,8 +210,9 @@ static void vtpm_proxy_fops_open(struct file *filp)
 
 /**
  * vtpm_proxy_fops_undo_open - counter-part to vtpm_fops_open
+ *       Call to undo vtpm_proxy_fops_open
  *
- * Call to undo vtpm_proxy_fops_open
+ *@proxy_dev: tpm proxy device
  */
 static void vtpm_proxy_fops_undo_open(struct proxy_dev *proxy_dev)
 {
@@ -212,9 +227,11 @@ static void vtpm_proxy_fops_undo_open(struct proxy_dev *proxy_dev)
 }
 
 /*
- * vtpm_proxy_fops_release: Close 'server side'
+ * vtpm_proxy_fops_release - Close 'server side'
  *
- * Return value:
+ * @inode: inode
+ * @filp: file pointer
+ * Return:
  *      Always returns 0.
  */
 static int vtpm_proxy_fops_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
@@ -245,7 +262,10 @@ static const struct file_operations vtpm_proxy_fops = {
 /*
  * Called when core TPM driver reads TPM responses from 'server side'
  *
- * Return value:
+ * @chip: tpm chip to use
+ * @buf: receive buffer
+ * @count: bytes to read
+ * Return:
  *      Number of TPM response bytes read, negative error value otherwise
  */
 static int vtpm_proxy_tpm_op_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
@@ -282,7 +302,11 @@ static int vtpm_proxy_tpm_op_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
 /*
  * Called when core TPM driver forwards TPM requests to 'server side'.
  *
- * Return value:
+ * @chip: tpm chip to use
+ * @buf: send buffer
+ * @count: bytes to send
+ *
+ * Return:
  *      0 in case of success, negative error value otherwise.
  */
 static int vtpm_proxy_tpm_op_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
@@ -442,7 +466,7 @@ static inline void vtpm_proxy_delete_proxy_dev(struct proxy_dev *proxy_dev)
 /*
  * Create a /dev/tpm%d and 'server side' file descriptor pair
  *
- * Return value:
+ * Return:
  *      Returns file pointer on success, an error value otherwise
  */
 static struct file *vtpm_proxy_create_device(
@@ -571,7 +595,7 @@ static long vtpmx_ioc_new_dev(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl,
 /*
  * vtpmx_fops_ioctl: ioctl on /dev/vtpmx
  *
- * Return value:
+ * Return:
  *      Returns 0 on success, a negative error code otherwise.
  */
 static long vtpmx_fops_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int ioctl,

drivers/char/tpm/xen-tpmfront.c

@@ -289,7 +289,6 @@ static int tpmfront_probe(struct xenbus_device *dev,
 		const struct xenbus_device_id *id)
 {
 	struct tpm_private *priv;
-	struct tpm_chip *chip;
 	int rv;
 
 	priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -306,7 +305,6 @@ static int tpmfront_probe(struct xenbus_device *dev,
 
 	rv = setup_ring(dev, priv);
 	if (rv) {
-		chip = dev_get_drvdata(&dev->dev);
 		ring_free(priv);
 		return rv;
 	}

fs/proc/base.c

@@ -2488,6 +2488,12 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
 	length = -ESRCH;
 	if (!task)
 		goto out_no_task;
+
+	/* A task may only write its own attributes. */
+	length = -EACCES;
+	if (current != task)
+		goto out;
+
 	if (count > PAGE_SIZE)
 		count = PAGE_SIZE;
 
@@ -2503,14 +2509,13 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
 	}
 
 	/* Guard against adverse ptrace interaction */
-	length = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+	length = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
 	if (length < 0)
 		goto out_free;
 
-	length = security_setprocattr(task,
-				      (char*)file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name,
+	length = security_setprocattr(file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name,
 				      page, count);
-	mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
 out_free:
 	kfree(page);
 out:

include/linux/lsm_hooks.h

@@ -352,8 +352,7 @@
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @inode_getattr:
  *	Check permission before obtaining file attributes.
- *	@mnt is the vfsmount where the dentry was looked up
- *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the file.
+ *	@path contains the path structure for the file.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @inode_setxattr:
  *	Check permission before setting the extended attributes
@@ -666,11 +665,6 @@
  *	@sig contains the signal value.
  *	@secid contains the sid of the process where the signal originated
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_wait:
- *	Check permission before allowing a process to reap a child process @p
- *	and collect its status information.
- *	@p contains the task_struct for process.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @task_prctl:
  *	Check permission before performing a process control operation on the
  *	current process.
@@ -1507,7 +1501,6 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*task_movememory)(struct task_struct *p);
 	int (*task_kill)(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 				int sig, u32 secid);
-	int (*task_wait)(struct task_struct *p);
 	int (*task_prctl)(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 				unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
 	void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
@@ -1547,8 +1540,7 @@ union security_list_options {
 	void (*d_instantiate)(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
 
 	int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
-	int (*setprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value,
-				size_t size);
+	int (*setprocattr)(const char *name, void *value, size_t size);
 	int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);
 	int (*secid_to_secctx)(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
 	int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
@@ -1768,7 +1760,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct list_head task_getscheduler;
 	struct list_head task_movememory;
 	struct list_head task_kill;
-	struct list_head task_wait;
 	struct list_head task_prctl;
 	struct list_head task_to_inode;
 	struct list_head ipc_permission;
@@ -1876,6 +1867,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
 	struct list_head		list;
 	struct list_head		*head;
 	union security_list_options	hook;
+	char				*lsm;
 };
 
 /*
@@ -1888,15 +1880,10 @@ struct security_hook_list {
 	{ .head = &security_hook_heads.HEAD, .hook = { .HEAD = HOOK } }
 
 extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
+extern char *lsm_names;
 
-static inline void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
-				      int count)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
-		list_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
-}
+extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
+				char *lsm);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
 /*

include/linux/security.h

@@ -332,7 +332,6 @@ int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p);
 int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p);
 int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 			int sig, u32 secid);
-int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p);
 int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 			unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
 void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
@@ -361,7 +360,7 @@ int security_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
 			unsigned nsops, int alter);
 void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
 int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
-int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
+int security_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size);
 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
@@ -980,11 +979,6 @@ static inline int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static inline int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2,
 				      unsigned long arg3,
 				      unsigned long arg4,
@@ -1106,7 +1100,7 @@ static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char *
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
-static inline int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+static inline int security_setprocattr(char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }

kernel/exit.c

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
 #include <linux/tty.h>
 #include <linux/iocontext.h>
 #include <linux/key.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/acct.h>
 #include <linux/tsacct_kern.h>
@@ -1390,7 +1389,7 @@ static int wait_task_continued(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *p)
  * Returns nonzero for a final return, when we have unlocked tasklist_lock.
  * Returns zero if the search for a child should continue;
  * then ->notask_error is 0 if @p is an eligible child,
- * or another error from security_task_wait(), or still -ECHILD.
+ * or still -ECHILD.
  */
 static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace,
 				struct task_struct *p)
@@ -1410,20 +1409,6 @@ static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace,
 	if (!ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	ret = security_task_wait(p);
-	if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
-		/*
-		 * If we have not yet seen any eligible child,
-		 * then let this error code replace -ECHILD.
-		 * A permission error will give the user a clue
-		 * to look for security policy problems, rather
-		 * than for mysterious wait bugs.
-		 */
-		if (wo->notask_error)
-			wo->notask_error = ret;
-		return 0;
-	}
-
 	if (unlikely(exit_state == EXIT_TRACE)) {
 		/*
 		 * ptrace == 0 means we are the natural parent. In this case
@@ -1516,7 +1501,7 @@ static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace,
  * Returns nonzero for a final return, when we have unlocked tasklist_lock.
  * Returns zero if the search for a child should continue; then
  * ->notask_error is 0 if there were any eligible children,
- * or another error from security_task_wait(), or still -ECHILD.
+ * or still -ECHILD.
  */
 static int do_wait_thread(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *tsk)
 {

kernel/seccomp.c

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/coredump.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -486,6 +487,17 @@ void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	}
 }
 
+static void seccomp_init_siginfo(siginfo_t *info, int syscall, int reason)
+{
+	memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
+	info->si_signo = SIGSYS;
+	info->si_code = SYS_SECCOMP;
+	info->si_call_addr = (void __user *)KSTK_EIP(current);
+	info->si_errno = reason;
+	info->si_arch = syscall_get_arch();
+	info->si_syscall = syscall;
+}
+
 /**
  * seccomp_send_sigsys - signals the task to allow in-process syscall emulation
  * @syscall: syscall number to send to userland
@@ -496,13 +508,7 @@ void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
 static void seccomp_send_sigsys(int syscall, int reason)
 {
 	struct siginfo info;
-	memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
-	info.si_signo = SIGSYS;
-	info.si_code = SYS_SECCOMP;
-	info.si_call_addr = (void __user *)KSTK_EIP(current);
-	info.si_errno = reason;
-	info.si_arch = syscall_get_arch();
-	info.si_syscall = syscall;
+	seccomp_init_siginfo(&info, syscall, reason);
 	force_sig_info(SIGSYS, &info, current);
 }
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
@@ -634,10 +640,17 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
 		return 0;
 
 	case SECCOMP_RET_KILL:
-	default:
+	default: {
+		siginfo_t info;
 		audit_seccomp(this_syscall, SIGSYS, action);
+		/* Show the original registers in the dump. */
+		syscall_rollback(current, task_pt_regs(current));
+		/* Trigger a manual coredump since do_exit skips it. */
+		seccomp_init_siginfo(&info, this_syscall, data);
+		do_coredump(&info);
 		do_exit(SIGSYS);
 	}
+	}
 
 	unreachable();
 

samples/seccomp/bpf-helper.h

@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ union arg64 {
 #define ARG_32(idx) \
 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, LO_ARG(idx))
 
-/* Loads hi into A and lo in X */
+/* Loads lo into M[0] and hi into M[1] and A */
 #define ARG_64(idx) \
 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, LO_ARG(idx)), \
 	BPF_STMT(BPF_ST, 0), /* lo -> M[0] */ \
@@ -153,88 +153,107 @@ union arg64 {
 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (value), 1, 0), \
 	jt
 
-/* Checks the lo, then swaps to check the hi. A=lo,X=hi */
+#define JA32(value, jt) \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JSET+BPF_K, (value), 0, 1), \
+	jt
+
+#define JGE32(value, jt) \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGE+BPF_K, (value), 0, 1), \
+	jt
+
+#define JGT32(value, jt) \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (value), 0, 1), \
+	jt
+
+#define JLE32(value, jt) \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (value), 1, 0), \
+	jt
+
+#define JLT32(value, jt) \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGE+BPF_K, (value), 1, 0), \
+	jt
+
+/*
+ * All the JXX64 checks assume lo is saved in M[0] and hi is saved in both
+ * A and M[1]. This invariant is kept by restoring A if necessary.
+ */
 #define JEQ64(lo, hi, jt) \
+	/* if (hi != arg.hi) goto NOMATCH; */ \
 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 5), \
 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), /* swap in lo */ \
+	/* if (lo != arg.lo) goto NOMATCH; */ \
 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (lo), 0, 2), \
-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), /* passed: swap hi back in */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), \
 	jt, \
-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1) /* failed: swap hi back in */
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1)
 
 #define JNE64(lo, hi, jt) \
-	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (hi), 5, 0), \
-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), /* swap in lo */ \
+	/* if (hi != arg.hi) goto MATCH; */ \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 3), \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), \
+	/* if (lo != arg.lo) goto MATCH; */ \
 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (lo), 2, 0), \
-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), /* passed: swap hi back in */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), \
 	jt, \
-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1) /* failed: swap hi back in */
-
-#define JA32(value, jt) \
-	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JSET+BPF_K, (value), 0, 1), \
-	jt
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1)
 
 #define JA64(lo, hi, jt) \
+	/* if (hi & arg.hi) goto MATCH; */ \
 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JSET+BPF_K, (hi), 3, 0), \
-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), /* swap in lo */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), \
+	/* if (lo & arg.lo) goto MATCH; */ \
 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JSET+BPF_K, (lo), 0, 2), \
-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), /* passed: swap hi back in */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), \
 	jt, \
-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1) /* failed: swap hi back in */
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1)
 
-#define JGE32(value, jt) \
-	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGE+BPF_K, (value), 0, 1), \
-	jt
-
-#define JLT32(value, jt) \
-	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGE+BPF_K, (value), 1, 0), \
-	jt
-
-/* Shortcut checking if hi > arg.hi. */
 #define JGE64(lo, hi, jt) \
+	/* if (hi > arg.hi) goto MATCH; */ \
 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (hi), 4, 0), \
+	/* if (hi != arg.hi) goto NOMATCH; */ \
 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 5), \
-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), /* swap in lo */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), \
+	/* if (lo >= arg.lo) goto MATCH; */ \
 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGE+BPF_K, (lo), 0, 2), \
-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), /* passed: swap hi back in */ \
-	jt, \
-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1) /* failed: swap hi back in */
-
-#define JLT64(lo, hi, jt) \
-	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGE+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 4), \
-	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 5), \
-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), /* swap in lo */ \
-	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (lo), 2, 0), \
-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), /* passed: swap hi back in */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), \
 	jt, \
-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1) /* failed: swap hi back in */
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1)
 
-#define JGT32(value, jt) \
-	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (value), 0, 1), \
-	jt
-
-#define JLE32(value, jt) \
-	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (value), 1, 0), \
-	jt
-
-/* Check hi > args.hi first, then do the GE checking */
 #define JGT64(lo, hi, jt) \
+	/* if (hi > arg.hi) goto MATCH; */ \
 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (hi), 4, 0), \
+	/* if (hi != arg.hi) goto NOMATCH; */ \
 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 5), \
-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), /* swap in lo */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), \
+	/* if (lo > arg.lo) goto MATCH; */ \
 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (lo), 0, 2), \
-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), /* passed: swap hi back in */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), \
 	jt, \
-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1) /* failed: swap hi back in */
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1)
 
 #define JLE64(lo, hi, jt) \
-	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (hi), 6, 0), \
-	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 3), \
-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), /* swap in lo */ \
+	/* if (hi < arg.hi) goto MATCH; */ \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGE+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 4), \
+	/* if (hi != arg.hi) goto NOMATCH; */ \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 5), \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), \
+	/* if (lo <= arg.lo) goto MATCH; */ \
 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGT+BPF_K, (lo), 2, 0), \
-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), /* passed: swap hi back in */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), \
+	jt, \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1)
+
+#define JLT64(lo, hi, jt) \
+	/* if (hi < arg.hi) goto MATCH; */ \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGE+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 4), \
+	/* if (hi != arg.hi) goto NOMATCH; */ \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (hi), 0, 5), \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 0), \
+	/* if (lo < arg.lo) goto MATCH; */ \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JGE+BPF_K, (lo), 2, 0), \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1), \
 	jt, \
-	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1) /* failed: swap hi back in */
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_MEM, 1)
 
 #define LOAD_SYSCALL_NR \
 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \

scripts/sign-file.c

@@ -41,7 +41,9 @@
  * signing with anything other than SHA1 - so we're stuck with that if such is
  * the case.
  */
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L || defined(OPENSSL_NO_CMS)
+#if defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || \
+	OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L || \
+	defined(OPENSSL_NO_CMS)
 #define USE_PKCS7
 #endif
 #ifndef USE_PKCS7

security/apparmor/Kconfig

@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
 	select CRYPTO
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
 	default y
-
 	help
 	  This option selects whether introspection of loaded policy
 	  is available to userspace via the apparmor filesystem.
@@ -45,7 +44,6 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT
        bool "Enable policy hash introspection by default"
        depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
        default y
-
        help
          This option selects whether sha1 hashing of loaded policy
 	 is enabled by default. The generation of sha1 hashes for
@@ -54,3 +52,32 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT
 	 however it can slow down policy load on some devices. In
 	 these cases policy hashing can be disabled by default and
 	 enabled only if needed.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG
+	bool "Build AppArmor with debug code"
+	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
+	default n
+	help
+	  Build apparmor with debugging logic in apparmor. Not all
+	  debugging logic will necessarily be enabled. A submenu will
+	  provide fine grained control of the debug options that are
+	  available.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_ASSERTS
+	bool "Build AppArmor with debugging asserts"
+	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable code assertions made with AA_BUG. These are primarily
+	  function entry preconditions but also exist at other key
+	  points. If the assert is triggered it will trigger a WARN
+	  message.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES
+	bool "Debug messages enabled by default"
+	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG
+	default n
+	help
+	  Set the default value of the apparmor.debug kernel parameter.
+	  When enabled, various debug messages will be logged to
+	  the kernel message buffer.

security/apparmor/Makefile

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
 
 apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
-              resource.o sid.o file.o
+              resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o
 apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
 
 clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h

security/apparmor/audit.c

@@ -18,60 +18,8 @@
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/policy_ns.h"
 
-const char *const op_table[] = {
-	"null",
-
-	"sysctl",
-	"capable",
-
-	"unlink",
-	"mkdir",
-	"rmdir",
-	"mknod",
-	"truncate",
-	"link",
-	"symlink",
-	"rename_src",
-	"rename_dest",
-	"chmod",
-	"chown",
-	"getattr",
-	"open",
-
-	"file_perm",
-	"file_lock",
-	"file_mmap",
-	"file_mprotect",
-
-	"create",
-	"post_create",
-	"bind",
-	"connect",
-	"listen",
-	"accept",
-	"sendmsg",
-	"recvmsg",
-	"getsockname",
-	"getpeername",
-	"getsockopt",
-	"setsockopt",
-	"socket_shutdown",
-
-	"ptrace",
-
-	"exec",
-	"change_hat",
-	"change_profile",
-	"change_onexec",
-
-	"setprocattr",
-	"setrlimit",
-
-	"profile_replace",
-	"profile_load",
-	"profile_remove"
-};
 
 const char *const audit_mode_names[] = {
 	"normal",
@@ -114,23 +62,23 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
 
 	if (aa_g_audit_header) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor=");
-		audit_log_string(ab, aa_audit_type[sa->aad->type]);
+		audit_log_string(ab, aa_audit_type[aad(sa)->type]);
 	}
 
-	if (sa->aad->op) {
+	if (aad(sa)->op) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " operation=");
-		audit_log_string(ab, op_table[sa->aad->op]);
+		audit_log_string(ab, aad(sa)->op);
 	}
 
-	if (sa->aad->info) {
+	if (aad(sa)->info) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " info=");
-		audit_log_string(ab, sa->aad->info);
-		if (sa->aad->error)
-			audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", sa->aad->error);
+		audit_log_string(ab, aad(sa)->info);
+		if (aad(sa)->error)
+			audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", aad(sa)->error);
 	}
 
-	if (sa->aad->profile) {
-		struct aa_profile *profile = sa->aad->profile;
+	if (aad(sa)->profile) {
+		struct aa_profile *profile = aad(sa)->profile;
 		if (profile->ns != root_ns) {
 			audit_log_format(ab, " namespace=");
 			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->ns->base.hname);
@@ -139,9 +87,9 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
 		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->base.hname);
 	}
 
-	if (sa->aad->name) {
+	if (aad(sa)->name) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->name);
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->name);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -153,7 +101,7 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
 void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa,
 		  void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *))
 {
-	sa->aad->type = type;
+	aad(sa)->type = type;
 	common_lsm_audit(sa, audit_pre, cb);
 }
 
@@ -161,7 +109,6 @@ void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa,
  * aa_audit - Log a profile based audit event to the audit subsystem
  * @type: audit type for the message
  * @profile: profile to check against (NOT NULL)
- * @gfp: allocation flags to use
  * @sa: audit event (NOT NULL)
  * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL)
  *
@@ -169,14 +116,13 @@ void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa,
  *
  * Returns: error on failure
  */
-int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
-	     struct common_audit_data *sa,
+int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
 	     void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *))
 {
-	BUG_ON(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
 
 	if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO) {
-		if (likely(!sa->aad->error)) {
+		if (likely(!aad(sa)->error)) {
 			if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
 				return 0;
 			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
@@ -188,23 +134,23 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
 	if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET ||
 	    (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED &&
 	     AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET))
-		return sa->aad->error;
+		return aad(sa)->error;
 
 	if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED)
 		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
 
 	if (!unconfined(profile))
-		sa->aad->profile = profile;
+		aad(sa)->profile = profile;
 
 	aa_audit_msg(type, sa, cb);
 
-	if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
+	if (aad(sa)->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
 		(void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL,
 			sa->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK && sa->u.tsk ?
 				    sa->u.tsk : current);
 
-	if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
-		return complain_error(sa->aad->error);
+	if (aad(sa)->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
+		return complain_error(aad(sa)->error);
 
-	return sa->aad->error;
+	return aad(sa)->error;
 }

security/apparmor/capability.c

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/capability.h"
@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
  * audit_caps - audit a capability
  * @profile: profile being tested for confinement (NOT NULL)
  * @cap: capability tested
+ @audit: whether an audit record should be generated
  * @error: error code returned by test
  *
  * Do auditing of capability and handle, audit/complain/kill modes switching
@@ -62,17 +64,16 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
  *
  * Returns: 0 or sa->error on success,  error code on failure
  */
-static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int error)
+static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit,
+		      int error)
 {
 	struct audit_cache *ent;
 	int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
-	struct common_audit_data sa;
-	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
-	sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
-	sa.aad = &aad;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, OP_CAPABLE);
 	sa.u.cap = cap;
-	sa.aad->op = OP_CAPABLE;
-	sa.aad->error = error;
+	aad(&sa)->error = error;
+	if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT)
+		aad(&sa)->info = "optional: no audit";
 
 	if (likely(!error)) {
 		/* test if auditing is being forced */
@@ -104,7 +105,7 @@ static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int error)
 	}
 	put_cpu_var(audit_cache);
 
-	return aa_audit(type, profile, GFP_ATOMIC, &sa, audit_cb);
+	return aa_audit(type, profile, &sa, audit_cb);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -133,11 +134,10 @@ int aa_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit)
 {
 	int error = profile_capable(profile, cap);
 
-	if (!audit) {
-		if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
-			return complain_error(error);
-		return error;
+	if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) {
+		if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+			return error;
 	}
 
-	return audit_caps(profile, cap, error);
+	return audit_caps(profile, cap, audit, error);
 }

security/apparmor/context.c

@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@
  * License.
  *
  *
- * AppArmor sets confinement on every task, via the the aa_task_cxt and
- * the aa_task_cxt.profile, both of which are required and are not allowed
- * to be NULL.  The aa_task_cxt is not reference counted and is unique
+ * AppArmor sets confinement on every task, via the the aa_task_ctx and
+ * the aa_task_ctx.profile, both of which are required and are not allowed
+ * to be NULL.  The aa_task_ctx is not reference counted and is unique
  * to each cred (which is reference count).  The profile pointed to by
- * the task_cxt is reference counted.
+ * the task_ctx is reference counted.
  *
  * TODO
  * If a task uses change_hat it currently does not return to the old
@@ -30,28 +30,28 @@
 #include "include/policy.h"
 
 /**
- * aa_alloc_task_context - allocate a new task_cxt
+ * aa_alloc_task_context - allocate a new task_ctx
  * @flags: gfp flags for allocation
  *
  * Returns: allocated buffer or NULL on failure
  */
-struct aa_task_cxt *aa_alloc_task_context(gfp_t flags)
+struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_context(gfp_t flags)
 {
-	return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_task_cxt), flags);
+	return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), flags);
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_free_task_context - free a task_cxt
- * @cxt: task_cxt to free (MAYBE NULL)
+ * aa_free_task_context - free a task_ctx
+ * @ctx: task_ctx to free (MAYBE NULL)
  */
-void aa_free_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *cxt)
+void aa_free_task_context(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
 {
-	if (cxt) {
-		aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
-		aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
-		aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+	if (ctx) {
+		aa_put_profile(ctx->profile);
+		aa_put_profile(ctx->previous);
+		aa_put_profile(ctx->onexec);
 
-		kzfree(cxt);
+		kzfree(ctx);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ void aa_free_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *cxt)
  * @new: a blank task context      (NOT NULL)
  * @old: the task context to copy  (NOT NULL)
  */
-void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *new, const struct aa_task_cxt *old)
+void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_ctx *new, const struct aa_task_ctx *old)
 {
 	*new = *old;
 	aa_get_profile(new->profile);
@@ -93,31 +93,36 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_get_task_profile(struct task_struct *task)
  */
 int aa_replace_current_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 {
-	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cxt();
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = current_ctx();
 	struct cred *new;
-	BUG_ON(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
 
-	if (cxt->profile == profile)
+	if (ctx->profile == profile)
 		return 0;
 
+	if (current_cred() != current_real_cred())
+		return -EBUSY;
+
 	new  = prepare_creds();
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	cxt = cred_cxt(new);
-	if (unconfined(profile) || (cxt->profile->ns != profile->ns))
+	ctx = cred_ctx(new);
+	if (unconfined(profile) || (ctx->profile->ns != profile->ns))
 		/* if switching to unconfined or a different profile namespace
 		 * clear out context state
 		 */
-		aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt);
+		aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx);
 
-	/* be careful switching cxt->profile, when racing replacement it
-	 * is possible that cxt->profile->replacedby->profile is the reference
+	/*
+	 * be careful switching ctx->profile, when racing replacement it
+	 * is possible that ctx->profile->proxy->profile is the reference
 	 * keeping @profile valid, so make sure to get its reference before
-	 * dropping the reference on cxt->profile */
+	 * dropping the reference on ctx->profile
+	 */
 	aa_get_profile(profile);
-	aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
-	cxt->profile = profile;
+	aa_put_profile(ctx->profile);
+	ctx->profile = profile;
 
 	commit_creds(new);
 	return 0;
@@ -131,15 +136,15 @@ int aa_replace_current_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
  */
 int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile)
 {
-	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
 	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	cxt = cred_cxt(new);
+	ctx = cred_ctx(new);
 	aa_get_profile(profile);
-	aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
-	cxt->onexec = profile;
+	aa_put_profile(ctx->onexec);
+	ctx->onexec = profile;
 
 	commit_creds(new);
 	return 0;
@@ -157,28 +162,28 @@ int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile)
  */
 int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, u64 token)
 {
-	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
 	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	BUG_ON(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
 
-	cxt = cred_cxt(new);
-	if (!cxt->previous) {
+	ctx = cred_ctx(new);
+	if (!ctx->previous) {
 		/* transfer refcount */
-		cxt->previous = cxt->profile;
-		cxt->token = token;
-	} else if (cxt->token == token) {
-		aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
+		ctx->previous = ctx->profile;
+		ctx->token = token;
+	} else if (ctx->token == token) {
+		aa_put_profile(ctx->profile);
 	} else {
-		/* previous_profile && cxt->token != token */
+		/* previous_profile && ctx->token != token */
 		abort_creds(new);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
-	cxt->profile = aa_get_newest_profile(profile);
+	ctx->profile = aa_get_newest_profile(profile);
 	/* clear exec on switching context */
-	aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
-	cxt->onexec = NULL;
+	aa_put_profile(ctx->onexec);
+	ctx->onexec = NULL;
 
 	commit_creds(new);
 	return 0;
@@ -195,27 +200,27 @@ int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, u64 token)
  */
 int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 token)
 {
-	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
 	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	cxt = cred_cxt(new);
-	if (cxt->token != token) {
+	ctx = cred_ctx(new);
+	if (ctx->token != token) {
 		abort_creds(new);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 	/* ignore restores when there is no saved profile */
-	if (!cxt->previous) {
+	if (!ctx->previous) {
 		abort_creds(new);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
-	cxt->profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->previous);
-	BUG_ON(!cxt->profile);
+	aa_put_profile(ctx->profile);
+	ctx->profile = aa_get_newest_profile(ctx->previous);
+	AA_BUG(!ctx->profile);
 	/* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
-	aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt);
+	aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx);
 
 	commit_creds(new);
 	return 0;

security/apparmor/crypto.c

@@ -29,6 +29,43 @@ unsigned int aa_hash_size(void)
 	return apparmor_hash_size;
 }
 
+char *aa_calc_hash(void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	struct {
+		struct shash_desc shash;
+		char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(apparmor_tfm)];
+	} desc;
+	char *hash = NULL;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (!apparmor_tfm)
+		return NULL;
+
+	hash = kzalloc(apparmor_hash_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!hash)
+		goto fail;
+
+	desc.shash.tfm = apparmor_tfm;
+	desc.shash.flags = 0;
+
+	error = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash);
+	if (error)
+		goto fail;
+	error = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, (u8 *) data, len);
+	if (error)
+		goto fail;
+	error = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash);
+	if (error)
+		goto fail;
+
+	return hash;
+
+fail:
+	kfree(hash);
+
+	return ERR_PTR(error);
+}
+
 int aa_calc_profile_hash(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 version, void *start,
 			 size_t len)
 {
@@ -37,7 +74,7 @@ int aa_calc_profile_hash(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 version, void *start,
 		char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(apparmor_tfm)];
 	} desc;
 	int error = -ENOMEM;
-	u32 le32_version = cpu_to_le32(version);
+	__le32 le32_version = cpu_to_le32(version);
 
 	if (!aa_g_hash_policy)
 		return 0;

security/apparmor/file.c

@@ -67,24 +67,24 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
 	kuid_t fsuid = current_fsuid();
 
-	if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+	if (aad(sa)->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
-		audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.request);
+		audit_file_mask(ab, aad(sa)->fs.request);
 	}
-	if (sa->aad->fs.denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+	if (aad(sa)->fs.denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
-		audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.denied);
+		audit_file_mask(ab, aad(sa)->fs.denied);
 	}
-	if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+	if (aad(sa)->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d",
 				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, fsuid));
 		audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d",
-				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, sa->aad->fs.ouid));
+				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, aad(sa)->fs.ouid));
 	}
 
-	if (sa->aad->fs.target) {
+	if (aad(sa)->fs.target) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
-		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->fs.target);
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->fs.target);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -104,54 +104,53 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
  * Returns: %0 or error on failure
  */
 int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
-		  gfp_t gfp, int op, u32 request, const char *name,
+		  const char *op, u32 request, const char *name,
 		  const char *target, kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error)
 {
 	int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
-	struct common_audit_data sa;
-	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
-	sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK, op);
+
+	sa.u.tsk = NULL;
+	aad(&sa)->fs.request = request;
+	aad(&sa)->name = name;
+	aad(&sa)->fs.target = target;
+	aad(&sa)->fs.ouid = ouid;
+	aad(&sa)->info = info;
+	aad(&sa)->error = error;
 	sa.u.tsk = NULL;
-	sa.aad = &aad;
-	aad.op = op,
-	aad.fs.request = request;
-	aad.name = name;
-	aad.fs.target = target;
-	aad.fs.ouid = ouid;
-	aad.info = info;
-	aad.error = error;
-
-	if (likely(!sa.aad->error)) {
+
+	if (likely(!aad(&sa)->error)) {
 		u32 mask = perms->audit;
 
 		if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
 			mask = 0xffff;
 
 		/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
-		sa.aad->fs.request &= mask;
+		aad(&sa)->fs.request &= mask;
 
-		if (likely(!sa.aad->fs.request))
+		if (likely(!aad(&sa)->fs.request))
 			return 0;
 		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
 	} else {
 		/* only report permissions that were denied */
-		sa.aad->fs.request = sa.aad->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
+		aad(&sa)->fs.request = aad(&sa)->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
+		AA_BUG(!aad(&sa)->fs.request);
 
-		if (sa.aad->fs.request & perms->kill)
+		if (aad(&sa)->fs.request & perms->kill)
 			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
 
 		/* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
-		if ((sa.aad->fs.request & perms->quiet) &&
+		if ((aad(&sa)->fs.request & perms->quiet) &&
 		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
 		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
-			sa.aad->fs.request &= ~perms->quiet;
+			aad(&sa)->fs.request &= ~perms->quiet;
 
-		if (!sa.aad->fs.request)
-			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad->error;
+		if (!aad(&sa)->fs.request)
+			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : aad(&sa)->error;
 	}
 
-	sa.aad->fs.denied = sa.aad->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
-	return aa_audit(type, profile, gfp, &sa, file_audit_cb);
+	aad(&sa)->fs.denied = aad(&sa)->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
+	return aa_audit(type, profile, &sa, file_audit_cb);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -276,8 +275,9 @@ static inline bool is_deleted(struct dentry *dentry)
  *
  * Returns: %0 else error if access denied or other error
  */
-int aa_path_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
-		 int flags, u32 request, struct path_cond *cond)
+int aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile,
+		 const struct path *path, int flags, u32 request,
+		 struct path_cond *cond)
 {
 	char *buffer = NULL;
 	struct file_perms perms = {};
@@ -301,8 +301,8 @@ int aa_path_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
 		if (request & ~perms.allow)
 			error = -EACCES;
 	}
-	error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, op, request, name,
-			      NULL, cond->uid, info, error);
+	error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, op, request, name, NULL,
+			      cond->uid, info, error);
 	kfree(buffer);
 
 	return error;
@@ -349,8 +349,8 @@ static inline bool xindex_is_subset(u32 link, u32 target)
 int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 		 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
 {
-	struct path link = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
-	struct path target = { new_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
+	struct path link = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt, .dentry = new_dentry };
+	struct path target = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt, .dentry = old_dentry };
 	struct path_cond cond = {
 		d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_uid,
 		d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 	error = 0;
 
 audit:
-	error = aa_audit_file(profile, &lperms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_LINK, request,
+	error = aa_audit_file(profile, &lperms, OP_LINK, request,
 			      lname, tname, cond.uid, info, error);
 	kfree(buffer);
 	kfree(buffer2);
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry,
  *
  * Returns: %0 if access allowed else error
  */
-int aa_file_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct file *file,
+int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct file *file,
 		 u32 request)
 {
 	struct path_cond cond = {

security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h

 /*
  * AppArmor security module
  *
- * This file contains AppArmor basic global and lib definitions
+ * This file contains AppArmor basic global
  *
  * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
  * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
@@ -15,10 +15,7 @@
 #ifndef __APPARMOR_H
 #define __APPARMOR_H
 
-#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/fs.h>
-
-#include "match.h"
+#include <linux/types.h>
 
 /*
  * Class of mediation types in the AppArmor policy db
@@ -43,73 +40,4 @@ extern bool aa_g_logsyscall;
 extern bool aa_g_paranoid_load;
 extern unsigned int aa_g_path_max;
 
-/*
- * DEBUG remains global (no per profile flag) since it is mostly used in sysctl
- * which is not related to profile accesses.
- */
-
-#define AA_DEBUG(fmt, args...)						\
-	do {								\
-		if (aa_g_debug && printk_ratelimit())			\
-			printk(KERN_DEBUG "AppArmor: " fmt, ##args);	\
-	} while (0)
-
-#define AA_ERROR(fmt, args...)						\
-	do {								\
-		if (printk_ratelimit())					\
-			printk(KERN_ERR "AppArmor: " fmt, ##args);	\
-	} while (0)
-
-/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
-extern int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
-
-/* fn's in lib */
-char *aa_split_fqname(char *args, char **ns_name);
-void aa_info_message(const char *str);
-void *__aa_kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags);
-
-static inline void *kvmalloc(size_t size)
-{
-	return __aa_kvmalloc(size, 0);
-}
-
-static inline void *kvzalloc(size_t size)
-{
-	return __aa_kvmalloc(size, __GFP_ZERO);
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_strneq - compare null terminated @str to a non null terminated substring
- * @str: a null terminated string
- * @sub: a substring, not necessarily null terminated
- * @len: length of @sub to compare
- *
- * The @str string must be full consumed for this to be considered a match
- */
-static inline bool aa_strneq(const char *str, const char *sub, int len)
-{
-	return !strncmp(str, sub, len) && !str[len];
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_dfa_null_transition - step to next state after null character
- * @dfa: the dfa to match against
- * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
- *
- * aa_dfa_null_transition transitions to the next state after a null
- * character which is not used in standard matching and is only
- * used to separate pairs.
- */
-static inline unsigned int aa_dfa_null_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
-						  unsigned int start)
-{
-	/* the null transition only needs the string's null terminator byte */
-	return aa_dfa_next(dfa, start, 0);
-}
-
-static inline bool mediated_filesystem(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	return !(dentry->d_sb->s_flags & MS_NOUSER);
-}
-
 #endif /* __APPARMOR_H */

security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h

@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
 #ifndef __AA_APPARMORFS_H
 #define __AA_APPARMORFS_H
 
+extern struct path aa_null;
+
 enum aa_fs_type {
 	AA_FS_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
 	AA_FS_TYPE_STRING,
@@ -62,12 +64,16 @@ extern const struct file_operations aa_fs_seq_file_ops;
 extern void __init aa_destroy_aafs(void);
 
 struct aa_profile;
-struct aa_namespace;
+struct aa_ns;
 
 enum aafs_ns_type {
 	AAFS_NS_DIR,
 	AAFS_NS_PROFS,
 	AAFS_NS_NS,
+	AAFS_NS_RAW_DATA,
+	AAFS_NS_LOAD,
+	AAFS_NS_REPLACE,
+	AAFS_NS_REMOVE,
 	AAFS_NS_COUNT,
 	AAFS_NS_MAX_COUNT,
 	AAFS_NS_SIZE,
@@ -83,12 +89,19 @@ enum aafs_prof_type {
 	AAFS_PROF_MODE,
 	AAFS_PROF_ATTACH,
 	AAFS_PROF_HASH,
+	AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA,
+	AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH,
+	AAFS_PROF_RAW_ABI,
 	AAFS_PROF_SIZEOF,
 };
 
 #define ns_dir(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_NS_DIR])
 #define ns_subns_dir(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_NS_NS])
 #define ns_subprofs_dir(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_NS_PROFS])
+#define ns_subdata_dir(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_NS_RAW_DATA])
+#define ns_subload(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_NS_LOAD])
+#define ns_subreplace(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_NS_REPLACE])
+#define ns_subremove(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_NS_REMOVE])
 
 #define prof_dir(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_PROF_DIR])
 #define prof_child_dir(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_PROF_PROFS])
@@ -97,8 +110,8 @@ void __aa_fs_profile_rmdir(struct aa_profile *profile);
 void __aa_fs_profile_migrate_dents(struct aa_profile *old,
 				   struct aa_profile *new);
 int __aa_fs_profile_mkdir(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *parent);
-void __aa_fs_namespace_rmdir(struct aa_namespace *ns);
-int __aa_fs_namespace_mkdir(struct aa_namespace *ns, struct dentry *parent,
-			    const char *name);
+void __aa_fs_ns_rmdir(struct aa_ns *ns);
+int __aa_fs_ns_mkdir(struct aa_ns *ns, struct dentry *parent,
+		     const char *name);
 
 #endif /* __AA_APPARMORFS_H */

security/apparmor/include/audit.h

@@ -46,97 +46,115 @@ enum audit_type {
 	AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO
 };
 
-extern const char *const op_table[];
-enum aa_ops {
-	OP_NULL,
-
-	OP_SYSCTL,
-	OP_CAPABLE,
-
-	OP_UNLINK,
-	OP_MKDIR,
-	OP_RMDIR,
-	OP_MKNOD,
-	OP_TRUNC,
-	OP_LINK,
-	OP_SYMLINK,
-	OP_RENAME_SRC,
-	OP_RENAME_DEST,
-	OP_CHMOD,
-	OP_CHOWN,
-	OP_GETATTR,
-	OP_OPEN,
-
-	OP_FPERM,
-	OP_FLOCK,
-	OP_FMMAP,
-	OP_FMPROT,
-
-	OP_CREATE,
-	OP_POST_CREATE,
-	OP_BIND,
-	OP_CONNECT,
-	OP_LISTEN,
-	OP_ACCEPT,
-	OP_SENDMSG,
-	OP_RECVMSG,
-	OP_GETSOCKNAME,
-	OP_GETPEERNAME,
-	OP_GETSOCKOPT,
-	OP_SETSOCKOPT,
-	OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN,
-
-	OP_PTRACE,
-
-	OP_EXEC,
-	OP_CHANGE_HAT,
-	OP_CHANGE_PROFILE,
-	OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC,
-
-	OP_SETPROCATTR,
-	OP_SETRLIMIT,
-
-	OP_PROF_REPL,
-	OP_PROF_LOAD,
-	OP_PROF_RM,
-};
+#define OP_NULL NULL
+
+#define OP_SYSCTL "sysctl"
+#define OP_CAPABLE "capable"
+
+#define OP_UNLINK "unlink"
+#define OP_MKDIR "mkdir"
+#define OP_RMDIR "rmdir"
+#define OP_MKNOD "mknod"
+#define OP_TRUNC "truncate"
+#define OP_LINK "link"
+#define OP_SYMLINK "symlink"
+#define OP_RENAME_SRC "rename_src"
+#define OP_RENAME_DEST "rename_dest"
+#define OP_CHMOD "chmod"
+#define OP_CHOWN "chown"
+#define OP_GETATTR "getattr"
+#define OP_OPEN "open"
+
+#define OP_FPERM "file_perm"
+#define OP_FLOCK "file_lock"
+#define OP_FMMAP "file_mmap"
+#define OP_FMPROT "file_mprotect"
+
+#define OP_CREATE "create"
+#define OP_POST_CREATE "post_create"
+#define OP_BIND "bind"
+#define OP_CONNECT "connect"
+#define OP_LISTEN "listen"
+#define OP_ACCEPT "accept"
+#define OP_SENDMSG "sendmsg"
+#define OP_RECVMSG "recvmsg"
+#define OP_GETSOCKNAME "getsockname"
+#define OP_GETPEERNAME "getpeername"
+#define OP_GETSOCKOPT "getsockopt"
+#define OP_SETSOCKOPT "setsockopt"
+#define OP_SHUTDOWN "socket_shutdown"
+
+#define OP_PTRACE "ptrace"
+
+#define OP_EXEC "exec"
+
+#define OP_CHANGE_HAT "change_hat"
+#define OP_CHANGE_PROFILE "change_profile"
+#define OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC "change_onexec"
+
+#define OP_SETPROCATTR "setprocattr"
+#define OP_SETRLIMIT "setrlimit"
+
+#define OP_PROF_REPL "profile_replace"
+#define OP_PROF_LOAD "profile_load"
+#define OP_PROF_RM "profile_remove"
 
 
 struct apparmor_audit_data {
 	int error;
-	int op;
+	const char *op;
 	int type;
 	void *profile;
 	const char *name;
 	const char *info;
 	union {
-		void *target;
+		/* these entries require a custom callback fn */
+		struct {
+			struct aa_profile *peer;
+			struct {
+				const char *target;
+				u32 request;
+				u32 denied;
+				kuid_t ouid;
+			} fs;
+		};
 		struct {
+			const char *name;
 			long pos;
-			void *target;
+			const char *ns;
 		} iface;
 		struct {
 			int rlim;
 			unsigned long max;
 		} rlim;
-		struct {
-			const char *target;
-			u32 request;
-			u32 denied;
-			kuid_t ouid;
-		} fs;
 	};
 };
 
-/* define a short hand for apparmor_audit_data structure */
-#define aad apparmor_audit_data
+/* macros for dealing with  apparmor_audit_data structure */
+#define aad(SA) ((SA)->apparmor_audit_data)
+#define DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME, T, X)					\
+	/* TODO: cleanup audit init so we don't need _aad = {0,} */	\
+	struct apparmor_audit_data NAME ## _aad = { .op = (X), };	\
+	struct common_audit_data NAME =					\
+	{								\
+	.type = (T),							\
+	.u.tsk = NULL,							\
+	};								\
+	NAME.apparmor_audit_data = &(NAME ## _aad)
 
 void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa,
 		  void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *));
-int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
-	     struct common_audit_data *sa,
+int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
 	     void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *));
 
+#define aa_audit_error(ERROR, SA, CB)				\
+({								\
+	aad((SA))->error = (ERROR);				\
+	aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_ERROR, (SA), (CB));		\
+	aad((SA))->error;					\
+})
+
+
 static inline int complain_error(int error)
 {
 	if (error == -EPERM || error == -EACCES)

security/apparmor/include/crypto.h

@@ -18,9 +18,14 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
 unsigned int aa_hash_size(void);
+char *aa_calc_hash(void *data, size_t len);
 int aa_calc_profile_hash(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 version, void *start,
 			 size_t len);
 #else
+static inline char *aa_calc_hash(void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
 static inline int aa_calc_profile_hash(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 version,
 				       void *start, size_t len)
 {

security/apparmor/include/domain.h

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 
 void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain);
 int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest);
-int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *name, bool onexec,
-		      bool permtest);
+int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, bool onexec, bool permtest,
+		      bool stack);
 
 #endif /* __AA_DOMAIN_H */

security/apparmor/include/file.h

@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static inline u16 dfa_map_xindex(u16 mask)
 	dfa_map_xindex((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] >> 14) & 0x3fff)
 
 int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
-		  gfp_t gfp, int op, u32 request, const char *name,
+		  const char *op, u32 request, const char *name,
 		  const char *target, kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error);
 
 /**
@@ -171,13 +171,14 @@ unsigned int aa_str_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 			  const char *name, struct path_cond *cond,
 			  struct file_perms *perms);
 
-int aa_path_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
-		 int flags, u32 request, struct path_cond *cond);
+int aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile,
+		 const struct path *path, int flags, u32 request,
+		 struct path_cond *cond);
 
 int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 		 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
 
-int aa_file_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct file *file,
+int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct file *file,
 		 u32 request);
 
 static inline void aa_free_file_rules(struct aa_file_rules *rules)

security/apparmor/include/match.h

@@ -100,13 +100,15 @@ struct aa_dfa {
 	struct table_header *tables[YYTD_ID_TSIZE];
 };
 
+extern struct aa_dfa *nulldfa;
+
 #define byte_to_byte(X) (X)
 
-#define UNPACK_ARRAY(TABLE, BLOB, LEN, TYPE, NTOHX) \
+#define UNPACK_ARRAY(TABLE, BLOB, LEN, TTYPE, BTYPE, NTOHX)	\
 	do { \
 		typeof(LEN) __i; \
-		TYPE *__t = (TYPE *) TABLE; \
-		TYPE *__b = (TYPE *) BLOB; \
+		TTYPE *__t = (TTYPE *) TABLE; \
+		BTYPE *__b = (BTYPE *) BLOB; \
 		for (__i = 0; __i < LEN; __i++) { \
 			__t[__i] = NTOHX(__b[__i]); \
 		} \
@@ -117,6 +119,9 @@ static inline size_t table_size(size_t len, size_t el_size)
 	return ALIGN(sizeof(struct table_header) + len * el_size, 8);
 }
 
+int aa_setup_dfa_engine(void);
+void aa_teardown_dfa_engine(void);
+
 struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags);
 unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 			      const char *str, int len);
@@ -127,6 +132,21 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
 
 void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref);
 
+/**
+ * aa_get_dfa - increment refcount on dfa @p
+ * @dfa: dfa  (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to @dfa if @dfa is NULL will return NULL
+ * Requires: @dfa must be held with valid refcount when called
+ */
+static inline struct aa_dfa *aa_get_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
+{
+	if (dfa)
+		kref_get(&(dfa->count));
+
+	return dfa;
+}
+
 /**
  * aa_put_dfa - put a dfa refcount
  * @dfa: dfa to put refcount   (MAYBE NULL)

security/apparmor/nulldfa.in

+0x1B, 0x5E, 0x78, 0x3D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x74, 0x66, 0x6C, 0x65, 0x78, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00