Commit d68be4c4 authored by Josh Poimboeuf's avatar Josh Poimboeuf Committed by Thomas Gleixner

x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with
the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2,
Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.

The default behavior is unchanged.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: default avatarJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6616d0ae169308516cfdf5216bedd169f8a8291b.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
parent 98af8452
......@@ -2514,15 +2514,20 @@
http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
mitigations=
Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities.
This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each
of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific
options.
[X86] Control optional mitigations for CPU
vulnerabilities. This is a set of curated,
arch-independent options, each of which is an
aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
off
Disable all optional CPU mitigations. This
improves system performance, but it may also
expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
Equivalent to: nopti [X86]
nospectre_v2 [X86]
spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
l1tf=off [X86]
auto (default)
Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
......@@ -2530,12 +2535,13 @@
users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
This is the default behavior.
Equivalent to: (default behavior)
auto,nosmt
Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, disabling SMT
if needed. This is for users who always want to
be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
mminit_loglevel=
[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
......
......@@ -440,7 +440,8 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
char arg[20];
int ret, i;
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
cpu_mitigations_off())
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
......@@ -672,7 +673,8 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
char arg[20];
int ret, i;
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable")) {
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable") ||
cpu_mitigations_off()) {
return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
} else {
ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
......@@ -996,6 +998,11 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
return;
if (cpu_mitigations_off())
l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
else if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
......
......@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
......@@ -115,7 +116,8 @@ void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(void)
}
}
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti")) {
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti") ||
cpu_mitigations_off()) {
pti_mode = PTI_FORCE_OFF;
pti_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
return;
......
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