Commit e74e1d55 authored by Boyan Karatotev's avatar Boyan Karatotev Committed by Will Deacon

kselftests/arm64: add a basic Pointer Authentication test

PAuth signs and verifies return addresses on the stack. It does so by
inserting a Pointer Authentication code (PAC) into some of the unused top
bits of an address. This is achieved by adding paciasp/autiasp instructions
at the beginning and end of a function.

This feature is partially backwards compatible with earlier versions of the
ARM architecture. To coerce the compiler into emitting fully backwards
compatible code the main file is compiled to target an earlier ARM version.
This allows the tests to check for the feature and print meaningful error
messages instead of crashing.

Add a test to verify that corrupting the return address results in a
SIGSEGV on return.
Signed-off-by: default avatarBoyan Karatotev <boyan.karatotev@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarVincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarAmit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
Acked-by: default avatarShuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200918104715.182310-2-boian4o1@gmail.comSigned-off-by: default avatarWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
parent f75aef39
...@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ ...@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
ARCH ?= $(shell uname -m 2>/dev/null || echo not) ARCH ?= $(shell uname -m 2>/dev/null || echo not)
ifneq (,$(filter $(ARCH),aarch64 arm64)) ifneq (,$(filter $(ARCH),aarch64 arm64))
ARM64_SUBTARGETS ?= tags signal ARM64_SUBTARGETS ?= tags signal pauth
else else
ARM64_SUBTARGETS := ARM64_SUBTARGETS :=
endif endif
......
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
# Copyright (C) 2020 ARM Limited
# preserve CC value from top level Makefile
ifeq ($(CC),cc)
CC := $(CROSS_COMPILE)gcc
endif
CFLAGS += -mbranch-protection=pac-ret
# check if the compiler supports ARMv8.3 and branch protection with PAuth
pauth_cc_support := $(shell if ($(CC) $(CFLAGS) -march=armv8.3-a -E -x c /dev/null -o /dev/null 2>&1) then echo "1"; fi)
ifeq ($(pauth_cc_support),1)
TEST_GEN_PROGS := pac
TEST_GEN_FILES := pac_corruptor.o
endif
include ../../lib.mk
ifeq ($(pauth_cc_support),1)
# pac* and aut* instructions are not available on architectures berfore
# ARMv8.3. Therefore target ARMv8.3 wherever they are used directly
$(OUTPUT)/pac_corruptor.o: pac_corruptor.S
$(CC) -c $^ -o $@ $(CFLAGS) -march=armv8.3-a
# when -mbranch-protection is enabled and the target architecture is ARMv8.3 or
# greater, gcc emits pac* instructions which are not in HINT NOP space,
# preventing the tests from occurring at all. Compile for ARMv8.2 so tests can
# run on earlier targets and print a meaningful error messages
$(OUTPUT)/pac: pac.c $(OUTPUT)/pac_corruptor.o
$(CC) $^ -o $@ $(CFLAGS) -march=armv8.2-a
endif
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/* Copyright (C) 2020 ARM Limited */
#ifndef _HELPER_H_
#define _HELPER_H_
void pac_corruptor(void);
#endif
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
// Copyright (C) 2020 ARM Limited
#include <sys/auxv.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <setjmp.h>
#include "../../kselftest_harness.h"
#include "helper.h"
#define ASSERT_PAUTH_ENABLED() \
do { \
unsigned long hwcaps = getauxval(AT_HWCAP); \
/* data key instructions are not in NOP space. This prevents a SIGILL */ \
ASSERT_NE(0, hwcaps & HWCAP_PACA) TH_LOG("PAUTH not enabled"); \
} while (0)
sigjmp_buf jmpbuf;
void pac_signal_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *uc)
{
if (signum == SIGSEGV || signum == SIGILL)
siglongjmp(jmpbuf, 1);
}
/* check that a corrupted PAC results in SIGSEGV or SIGILL */
TEST(corrupt_pac)
{
struct sigaction sa;
ASSERT_PAUTH_ENABLED();
if (sigsetjmp(jmpbuf, 1) == 0) {
sa.sa_sigaction = pac_signal_handler;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_RESETHAND;
sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, NULL);
sigaction(SIGILL, &sa, NULL);
pac_corruptor();
ASSERT_TRUE(0) TH_LOG("SIGSEGV/SIGILL signal did not occur");
}
}
TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/* Copyright (C) 2020 ARM Limited */
.global pac_corruptor
.text
/*
* Corrupting a single bit of the PAC ensures the authentication will fail. It
* also guarantees no possible collision. TCR_EL1.TBI0 is set by default so no
* top byte PAC is tested
*/
pac_corruptor:
paciasp
/* corrupt the top bit of the PAC */
eor lr, lr, #1 << 53
autiasp
ret
Markdown is supported
0%
or
You are about to add 0 people to the discussion. Proceed with caution.
Finish editing this message first!
Please register or to comment