Commit e7cafc45 authored by Johan Hedberg's avatar Johan Hedberg Committed by Marcel Holtmann

Bluetooth: Pass initiator/acceptor information to hci_conn_security()

We're interested in whether an authentication request is because of a
remote or local action. So far hci_conn_security() has been used both
for incoming and outgoing actions (e.g. RFCOMM or L2CAP connect
requests) so without some modifications it cannot know which peer is
responsible for requesting authentication.

This patch adds a new "bool initiator" parameter to hci_conn_security()
to indicate which side is responsible for the request and updates the
current users to pass this information correspondingly.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
parent c1d4fa7a
......@@ -720,7 +720,8 @@ struct hci_conn *hci_connect_sco(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, bdaddr_t *dst,
__u16 setting);
int hci_conn_check_link_mode(struct hci_conn *conn);
int hci_conn_check_secure(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level);
int hci_conn_security(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level, __u8 auth_type);
int hci_conn_security(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level, __u8 auth_type,
bool initiator);
int hci_conn_change_link_key(struct hci_conn *conn);
int hci_conn_switch_role(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 role);
......
......@@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ int l2cap_chan_connect(struct l2cap_chan *chan, __le16 psm, u16 cid,
bdaddr_t *dst, u8 dst_type);
int l2cap_chan_send(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len);
void l2cap_chan_busy(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int busy);
int l2cap_chan_check_security(struct l2cap_chan *chan);
int l2cap_chan_check_security(struct l2cap_chan *chan, bool initiator);
void l2cap_chan_set_defaults(struct l2cap_chan *chan);
int l2cap_ertm_init(struct l2cap_chan *chan);
void l2cap_chan_add(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_chan *chan);
......
......@@ -973,7 +973,8 @@ static void hci_conn_encrypt(struct hci_conn *conn)
}
/* Enable security */
int hci_conn_security(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level, __u8 auth_type)
int hci_conn_security(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level, __u8 auth_type,
bool initiator)
{
BT_DBG("hcon %p", conn);
......
......@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ static inline u8 l2cap_get_auth_type(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
}
/* Service level security */
int l2cap_chan_check_security(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
int l2cap_chan_check_security(struct l2cap_chan *chan, bool initiator)
{
struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
__u8 auth_type;
......@@ -785,7 +785,8 @@ int l2cap_chan_check_security(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
auth_type = l2cap_get_auth_type(chan);
return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, chan->sec_level, auth_type);
return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, chan->sec_level, auth_type,
initiator);
}
static u8 l2cap_get_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
......@@ -1278,7 +1279,7 @@ static void l2cap_do_start(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
if (!(conn->info_state & L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_DONE))
return;
if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan) &&
if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, true) &&
__l2cap_no_conn_pending(chan)) {
l2cap_start_connection(chan);
}
......@@ -1357,7 +1358,7 @@ static void l2cap_conn_start(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
}
if (chan->state == BT_CONNECT) {
if (!l2cap_chan_check_security(chan) ||
if (!l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, true) ||
!__l2cap_no_conn_pending(chan)) {
l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
continue;
......@@ -1379,7 +1380,7 @@ static void l2cap_conn_start(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
rsp.scid = cpu_to_le16(chan->dcid);
rsp.dcid = cpu_to_le16(chan->scid);
if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan)) {
if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, false)) {
if (test_bit(FLAG_DEFER_SETUP, &chan->flags)) {
rsp.result = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CR_PEND);
rsp.status = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CS_AUTHOR_PEND);
......@@ -3849,7 +3850,7 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_connect(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
chan->ident = cmd->ident;
if (conn->info_state & L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_DONE) {
if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan)) {
if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, false)) {
if (test_bit(FLAG_DEFER_SETUP, &chan->flags)) {
l2cap_state_change(chan, BT_CONNECT2);
result = L2CAP_CR_PEND;
......@@ -7191,7 +7192,7 @@ int l2cap_chan_connect(struct l2cap_chan *chan, __le16 psm, u16 cid,
if (hcon->state == BT_CONNECTED) {
if (chan->chan_type != L2CAP_CHAN_CONN_ORIENTED) {
__clear_chan_timer(chan);
if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan))
if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, true))
l2cap_state_change(chan, BT_CONNECTED);
} else
l2cap_do_start(chan);
......
......@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
} else if ((sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECT2 &&
test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags)) ||
sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECTED) {
if (!l2cap_chan_check_security(chan))
if (!l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, true))
set_bit(BT_SK_SUSPEND, &bt_sk(sk)->flags);
else
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
......
......@@ -3202,7 +3202,7 @@ static int pair_device(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
cmd->user_data = conn;
if (conn->state == BT_CONNECTED &&
hci_conn_security(conn, sec_level, auth_type))
hci_conn_security(conn, sec_level, auth_type, true))
pairing_complete(cmd, 0);
err = 0;
......
......@@ -227,7 +227,8 @@ static int rfcomm_check_security(struct rfcomm_dlc *d)
break;
}
return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, d->sec_level, auth_type);
return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, d->sec_level, auth_type,
d->out);
}
static void rfcomm_session_timeout(unsigned long arg)
......
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