Commit edc90b7d authored by Xiao Guangrong's avatar Xiao Guangrong Committed by Paolo Bonzini

KVM: MMU: fix SMAP virtualization

KVM may turn a user page to a kernel page when kernel writes a readonly
user page if CR0.WP = 1. This shadow page entry will be reused after
SMAP is enabled so that kernel is allowed to access this user page

Fix it by setting SMAP && !CR0.WP into shadow page's role and reset mmu
once CR4.SMAP is updated
Signed-off-by: default avatarXiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
parent 428e3d08
......@@ -169,6 +169,10 @@ Shadow pages contain the following information:
Contains the value of cr4.smep && !cr0.wp for which the page is valid
(pages for which this is true are different from other pages; see the
treatment of cr0.wp=0 below).
role.smap_andnot_wp:
Contains the value of cr4.smap && !cr0.wp for which the page is valid
(pages for which this is true are different from other pages; see the
treatment of cr0.wp=0 below).
gfn:
Either the guest page table containing the translations shadowed by this
page, or the base page frame for linear translations. See role.direct.
......@@ -344,10 +348,16 @@ on fault type:
(user write faults generate a #PF)
In the first case there is an additional complication if CR4.SMEP is
enabled: since we've turned the page into a kernel page, the kernel may now
execute it. We handle this by also setting spte.nx. If we get a user
fetch or read fault, we'll change spte.u=1 and spte.nx=gpte.nx back.
In the first case there are two additional complications:
- if CR4.SMEP is enabled: since we've turned the page into a kernel page,
the kernel may now execute it. We handle this by also setting spte.nx.
If we get a user fetch or read fault, we'll change spte.u=1 and
spte.nx=gpte.nx back.
- if CR4.SMAP is disabled: since the page has been changed to a kernel
page, it can not be reused when CR4.SMAP is enabled. We set
CR4.SMAP && !CR0.WP into shadow page's role to avoid this case. Note,
here we do not care the case that CR4.SMAP is enabled since KVM will
directly inject #PF to guest due to failed permission check.
To prevent an spte that was converted into a kernel page with cr0.wp=0
from being written by the kernel after cr0.wp has changed to 1, we make
......
......@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ union kvm_mmu_page_role {
unsigned nxe:1;
unsigned cr0_wp:1;
unsigned smep_andnot_wp:1;
unsigned smap_andnot_wp:1;
};
};
......
......@@ -3736,8 +3736,8 @@ static void reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
}
}
void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept)
static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept)
{
unsigned bit, byte, pfec;
u8 map;
......@@ -3918,6 +3918,7 @@ static void init_kvm_tdp_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
bool smep = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMEP);
bool smap = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMAP);
struct kvm_mmu *context = &vcpu->arch.mmu;
MMU_WARN_ON(VALID_PAGE(context->root_hpa));
......@@ -3936,6 +3937,8 @@ void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
context->base_role.cr0_wp = is_write_protection(vcpu);
context->base_role.smep_andnot_wp
= smep && !is_write_protection(vcpu);
context->base_role.smap_andnot_wp
= smap && !is_write_protection(vcpu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_init_shadow_mmu);
......@@ -4207,12 +4210,18 @@ void kvm_mmu_pte_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
const u8 *new, int bytes)
{
gfn_t gfn = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
union kvm_mmu_page_role mask = { .word = 0 };
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
LIST_HEAD(invalid_list);
u64 entry, gentry, *spte;
int npte;
bool remote_flush, local_flush, zap_page;
union kvm_mmu_page_role mask = (union kvm_mmu_page_role) {
.cr0_wp = 1,
.cr4_pae = 1,
.nxe = 1,
.smep_andnot_wp = 1,
.smap_andnot_wp = 1,
};
/*
* If we don't have indirect shadow pages, it means no page is
......@@ -4238,7 +4247,6 @@ void kvm_mmu_pte_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
++vcpu->kvm->stat.mmu_pte_write;
kvm_mmu_audit(vcpu, AUDIT_PRE_PTE_WRITE);
mask.cr0_wp = mask.cr4_pae = mask.nxe = mask.smep_andnot_wp = 1;
for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(vcpu->kvm, sp, gfn) {
if (detect_write_misaligned(sp, gpa, bytes) ||
detect_write_flooding(sp)) {
......
......@@ -71,8 +71,6 @@ enum {
int handle_mmio_page_fault_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, bool direct);
void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool execonly);
void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
bool ept);
static inline unsigned int kvm_mmu_available_pages(struct kvm *kvm)
{
......
......@@ -702,8 +702,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_xcr);
int kvm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
{
unsigned long old_cr4 = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
unsigned long pdptr_bits = X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PSE |
X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_SMEP;
unsigned long pdptr_bits = X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PAE |
X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP;
if (cr4 & CR4_RESERVED_BITS)
return 1;
......@@ -744,9 +745,6 @@ int kvm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
(!(cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) && (old_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE)))
kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & X86_CR4_SMAP)
update_permission_bitmask(vcpu, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu, false);
if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)
kvm_update_cpuid(vcpu);
......
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