Commit febebaf3 authored by Francis Laniel's avatar Francis Laniel Committed by Linus Torvalds

drivers/misc/lkdtm: add new file in LKDTM to test fortified strscpy

This new test ensures that fortified strscpy has the same behavior than
vanilla strscpy (e.g.  returning -E2BIG when src content is truncated).
Finally, it generates a crash at runtime because there is a write overflow
in destination string.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201122162451.27551-5-laniel_francis@privacyrequired.comSigned-off-by: default avatarFrancis Laniel <laniel_francis@privacyrequired.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
parent 33e56a59
...@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += rodata_objcopy.o ...@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += rodata_objcopy.o
lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += usercopy.o lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += usercopy.o
lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += stackleak.o lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += stackleak.o
lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += cfi.o lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += cfi.o
lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += fortify.o
KASAN_SANITIZE_rodata.o := n KASAN_SANITIZE_rodata.o := n
KASAN_SANITIZE_stackleak.o := n KASAN_SANITIZE_stackleak.o := n
......
...@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ static const struct crashtype crashtypes[] = { ...@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ static const struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {
CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_KERNEL), CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_KERNEL),
CRASHTYPE(STACKLEAK_ERASING), CRASHTYPE(STACKLEAK_ERASING),
CRASHTYPE(CFI_FORWARD_PROTO), CRASHTYPE(CFI_FORWARD_PROTO),
CRASHTYPE(FORTIFIED_STRSCPY),
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
CRASHTYPE(DOUBLE_FAULT), CRASHTYPE(DOUBLE_FAULT),
#endif #endif
......
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Copyright (c) 2020 Francis Laniel <laniel_francis@privacyrequired.com>
*
* Add tests related to fortified functions in this file.
*/
#include "lkdtm.h"
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
/*
* Calls fortified strscpy to test that it returns the same result as vanilla
* strscpy and generate a panic because there is a write overflow (i.e. src
* length is greater than dst length).
*/
void lkdtm_FORTIFIED_STRSCPY(void)
{
char *src;
char dst[5];
struct {
union {
char big[10];
char src[5];
};
} weird = { .big = "hello!" };
char weird_dst[sizeof(weird.src) + 1];
src = kstrdup("foobar", GFP_KERNEL);
if (src == NULL)
return;
/* Vanilla strscpy returns -E2BIG if size is 0. */
if (strscpy(dst, src, 0) != -E2BIG)
pr_warn("FAIL: strscpy() of 0 length did not return -E2BIG\n");
/* Vanilla strscpy returns -E2BIG if src is truncated. */
if (strscpy(dst, src, sizeof(dst)) != -E2BIG)
pr_warn("FAIL: strscpy() did not return -E2BIG while src is truncated\n");
/* After above call, dst must contain "foob" because src was truncated. */
if (strncmp(dst, "foob", sizeof(dst)) != 0)
pr_warn("FAIL: after strscpy() dst does not contain \"foob\" but \"%s\"\n",
dst);
/* Shrink src so the strscpy() below succeeds. */
src[3] = '\0';
/*
* Vanilla strscpy returns number of character copied if everything goes
* well.
*/
if (strscpy(dst, src, sizeof(dst)) != 3)
pr_warn("FAIL: strscpy() did not return 3 while src was copied entirely truncated\n");
/* After above call, dst must contain "foo" because src was copied. */
if (strncmp(dst, "foo", sizeof(dst)) != 0)
pr_warn("FAIL: after strscpy() dst does not contain \"foo\" but \"%s\"\n",
dst);
/* Test when src is embedded inside a union. */
strscpy(weird_dst, weird.src, sizeof(weird_dst));
if (strcmp(weird_dst, "hello") != 0)
pr_warn("FAIL: after strscpy() weird_dst does not contain \"hello\" but \"%s\"\n",
weird_dst);
/* Restore src to its initial value. */
src[3] = 'b';
/*
* Use strlen here so size cannot be known at compile time and there is
* a runtime write overflow.
*/
strscpy(dst, src, strlen(src));
pr_warn("FAIL: No overflow in above strscpy()\n");
kfree(src);
}
...@@ -104,4 +104,7 @@ void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING(void); ...@@ -104,4 +104,7 @@ void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING(void);
/* cfi.c */ /* cfi.c */
void lkdtm_CFI_FORWARD_PROTO(void); void lkdtm_CFI_FORWARD_PROTO(void);
/* fortify.c */
void lkdtm_FORTIFIED_STRSCPY(void);
#endif #endif
...@@ -68,3 +68,4 @@ USERCOPY_STACK_BEYOND ...@@ -68,3 +68,4 @@ USERCOPY_STACK_BEYOND
USERCOPY_KERNEL USERCOPY_KERNEL
STACKLEAK_ERASING OK: the rest of the thread stack is properly erased STACKLEAK_ERASING OK: the rest of the thread stack is properly erased
CFI_FORWARD_PROTO CFI_FORWARD_PROTO
FORTIFIED_STRSCPY
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