[ Upstream commit 7db0a6ef ]

Macs send the maximum buffer size in response on ioctl to validate
negotiate security information, which causes us to fail the mount
as the response buffer is larger than the expected response.

Changed ioctl response processing to allow for padding of validate
negotiate ioctl response and limit the maximum response size to
maximum buffer size.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <steve.french@primarydata.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit b704e70b ]

- trailing space maps to 0xF028
- trailing period maps to 0xF029

This fix corrects the mapping of file names which have a trailing character
that would otherwise be illegal (period or space) but is allowed by POSIX.
Signed-off-by: Bjoern Jacke <bjacke@samba.org>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit a5f6a6a9 ]

invalidate_bdev() calls cleancache_invalidate_inode() iff ->nrpages != 0
which doen't make any sense.

Make sure that invalidate_bdev() always calls cleancache_invalidate_inode()
regardless of mapping->nrpages value.

Fixes: c515e1fd ("mm/fs: add hooks to support cleancache")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170424164135.22350-3-aryabinin@virtuozzo.comSigned-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nikolay Borisov <n.borisov.lkml@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 9abc74a2 ]

This is broken since ever but sadly nobody noticed.
Recent versions of GDB set DR_CONTROL unconditionally and
UML dies due to a heap corruption. It turns out that
the PTRACE_POKEUSER was copy&pasted from i386 and assumes
that addresses are 4 bytes long.

Fix that by using 8 as address size in the calculation.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: jie cao <cj3054@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 3a158a62 ]

The metag implementation of strncpy_from_user() doesn't validate the src
pointer, which could allow reading of arbitrary kernel memory. Add a
short access_ok() check to prevent that.

Its still possible for it to read across the user/kernel boundary, but
it will invariably reach a NUL character after only 9 bytes, leaking
only a static kernel address being loaded into D0Re0 at the beginning of
__start, which is acceptable for the immediate fix.
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 26c9cb66 ]

Mac requires the unicode flag to be set for cifs, even for the smb
echo request (which doesn't have strings).

Without this Mac rejects the periodic echo requests (when mounting
with cifs) that we use to check if server is down
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 8a8b5663 ]

The __user_bad() macro used by access_ok() has a few corner cases
noticed by Al Viro where it doesn't behave correctly:

 - The kernel range check has off by 1 errors which permit access to the
   first and last byte of the kernel mapped range.

 - The kernel range check ends at LINCORE_BASE rather than
   META_MEMORY_LIMIT, which is ineffective when the kernel is in global
   space (an extremely uncommon configuration).

There are a couple of other shortcomings here too:

 - Access to the whole of the other address space is permitted (i.e. the
   global half of the address space when the kernel is in local space).
   This isn't ideal as it could theoretically still contain privileged
   mappings set up by the bootloader.

 - The size argument is unused, permitting user copies which start on
   valid pages at the end of the user address range and cross the
   boundary into the kernel address space (e.g. addr = 0x3ffffff0, size
   > 0x10).

It isn't very convenient to add size checks when disallowing certain
regions, and it seems far safer to be sure and explicit about what
userland is able to access, so invert the logic to allow certain regions
instead, and fix the off by 1 errors and missing size checks. This also
allows the get_fs() == KERNEL_DS check to be more easily optimised into
the user address range case.

We now have 3 such allowed regions:

 - The user address range (incorporating the get_fs() == KERNEL_DS
   check).

 - NULL (some kernel code expects this to work, and we'll always catch
   the fault anyway).

 - The core code memory region.

Fixes: 373cd784 ("metag: Memory handling")
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 0e2eb7d1 ]

Use the value of the BYTCHK field to determine the size of the
Data-Out buffer. For VERIFY, honor the VRPROTECT, DPO and FUA
fields. This patch avoids that LIO complains about a mismatch
between the expected transfer length and the SCSI CDB length
if the value of the BYTCHK field is 0.
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Cc: Max Lohrmann <post@wickenrode.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 390020ad ]

dm-bufio checks a watermark when it allocates a new buffer in
__bufio_new().  However, it doesn't check the watermark when the user
changes /sys/module/dm_bufio/parameters/max_cache_size_bytes.

This may result in a problem - if the watermark is high enough so that
all possible buffers are allocated and if the user lowers the value of
"max_cache_size_bytes", the watermark will never be checked against the
new value because no new buffer would be allocated.

To fix this, change __evict_old_buffers() so that it checks the
watermark.  __evict_old_buffers() is called every 30 seconds, so if the
user reduces "max_cache_size_bytes", dm-bufio will react to this change
within 30 seconds and decrease memory consumption.

Depends-on: 1b0fb5a5 ("dm bufio: avoid a possible ABBA deadlock")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 1b0fb5a5 ]

__get_memory_limit() tests if dm_bufio_cache_size changed and calls
__cache_size_refresh() if it did.  It takes dm_bufio_clients_lock while
it already holds the client lock.  However, lock ordering is violated
because in cleanup_old_buffers() dm_bufio_clients_lock is taken before
the client lock.

This results in a possible deadlock and lockdep engine warning.

Fix this deadlock by changing mutex_lock() to mutex_trylock().  If the
lock can't be taken, it will be re-checked next time when a new buffer
is allocated.

Also add "unlikely" to the if condition, so that the optimizer assumes
that the condition is false.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit ab89f0bd ]

Running 32bit userspace on 64bit kernel results in MSG_CMSG_COMPAT being
defined as 0x80000000. This results in sendmsg failure if used from 32bit
userspace running on 64bit kernel. Fix this by accounting for MSG_CMSG_COMPAT
in flags check in hci_sock_sendmsg.
Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl>
Signed-off-by: Marko Kiiskila <marko@runtime.io>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 7b4cc978 ]

Currently the case of writing via mmap to a file with inline data is not
handled.  This is maybe a rare case since it requires a writable memory
map of a very small file, but it is trivial to trigger with on
inline_data filesystem, and it causes the
'BUG_ON(ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA));' in
ext4_writepages() to be hit:

    mkfs.ext4 -O inline_data /dev/vdb
    mount /dev/vdb /mnt
    xfs_io -f /mnt/file \
	-c 'pwrite 0 1' \
	-c 'mmap -w 0 1m' \
	-c 'mwrite 0 1' \
	-c 'fsync'

	kernel BUG at fs/ext4/inode.c:2723!
	invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
	CPU: 1 PID: 2532 Comm: xfs_io Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-xfstests-00301-g071d9acf3d1f #633
	Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014
	task: ffff88003d3a8040 task.stack: ffffc90000300000
	RIP: 0010:ext4_writepages+0xc89/0xf8a
	RSP: 0018:ffffc90000303ca0 EFLAGS: 00010283
	RAX: 0000028410000000 RBX: ffff8800383fa3b0 RCX: ffffffff812afcdc
	RDX: 00000a9d00000246 RSI: ffffffff81e660e0 RDI: 0000000000000246
	RBP: ffffc90000303dc0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 869618e8f99b4fa5
	R10: 00000000852287a2 R11: 00000000a03b49f4 R12: ffff88003808e698
	R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 7fffffffffffffff R15: 7fffffffffffffff
	FS:  00007fd3e53094c0(0000) GS:ffff88003e400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
	CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
	CR2: 00007fd3e4c51000 CR3: 000000003d554000 CR4: 00000000003406e0
	Call Trace:
	 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x2a
	 ? kvm_clock_read+0x1e/0x20
	 do_writepages+0x23/0x2c
	 ? do_writepages+0x23/0x2c
	 __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x80/0x87
	 filemap_write_and_wait_range+0x67/0x8c
	 ext4_sync_file+0x20e/0x472
	 vfs_fsync_range+0x8e/0x9f
	 ? syscall_trace_enter+0x25b/0x2d0
	 vfs_fsync+0x1c/0x1e
	 do_fsync+0x31/0x4a
	 SyS_fsync+0x10/0x14
	 do_syscall_64+0x69/0x131
	 entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25

We could try to be smart and keep the inline data in this case, or at
least support delayed allocation when allocating the block, but these
solutions would be more complicated and don't seem worthwhile given how
rare this case seems to be.  So just fix the bug by calling
ext4_convert_inline_data() when we're asked to make a page writable, so
that any inline data gets evicted, with the block allocated immediately.
Reported-by: Nick Alcock <nick.alcock@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit d66bb160 ]

proc_create_mount_point() forgot to increase the parent's nlink, and
it resulted in unbalanced hard link numbers, e.g. /proc/fs shows one
less than expected.

Fixes: eb6d38d5 ("proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories...")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Tristan Ye <tristan.ye@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 4617f564 ]

When calling a dm ioctl that doesn't process any data
(IOCTL_FLAGS_NO_PARAMS), the contents of the data field in struct
dm_ioctl are left initialized.  Current code is incorrectly extending
the size of data copied back to user, causing the contents of kernel
stack to be leaked to user.  Fix by only copying contents before data
and allow the functions processing the ioctl to override.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <salidoa@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 13bf9fbf ]

The NFSv2/v3 code does not systematically check whether we decode past
the end of the buffer.  This generally appears to be harmless, but there
are a few places where we do arithmetic on the pointers involved and
don't account for the possibility that a length could be negative.  Add
checks to catch these.
Reported-by: Tuomas Haanpää <thaan@synopsys.com>
Reported-by: Ari Kauppi <ari@synopsys.com>
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit db44bac4 ]

Use a couple shortcuts that will simplify a following bugfix.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit e6838a29 ]

A client can append random data to the end of an NFSv2 or NFSv3 RPC call
without our complaining; we'll just stop parsing at the end of the
expected data and ignore the rest.

Encoded arguments and replies are stored together in an array of pages,
and if a call is too large it could leave inadequate space for the
reply.  This is normally OK because NFS RPC's typically have either
short arguments and long replies (like READ) or long arguments and short
replies (like WRITE).  But a client that sends an incorrectly long reply
can violate those assumptions.  This was observed to cause crashes.

Also, several operations increment rq_next_page in the decode routine
before checking the argument size, which can leave rq_next_page pointing
well past the end of the page array, causing trouble later in
svc_free_pages.

So, following a suggestion from Neil Brown, add a central check to
enforce our expectation that no NFSv2/v3 call has both a large call and
a large reply.

As followup we may also want to rewrite the encoding routines to check
more carefully that they aren't running off the end of the page array.

We may also consider rejecting calls that have any extra garbage
appended.  That would be safer, and within our rights by spec, but given
the age of our server and the NFS protocol, and the fact that we've
never enforced this before, we may need to balance that against the
possibility of breaking some oddball client.
Reported-by: Tuomas Haanpää <thaan@synopsys.com>
Reported-by: Ari Kauppi <ari@synopsys.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 3d615964 ]

DWC3 driver uses of_usb_get_phy_mode() which is
implemented in drivers/usb/phy/of.c and in bare minimal
configuration it might not be pulled in kernel binary.

In case of ARC or ARM this could be easily reproduced with
"allnodefconfig" +CONFIG_USB=m +CONFIG_USB_DWC3=m.

On building all ends-up with:
---------------------->8------------------
  Kernel: arch/arm/boot/Image is ready
  Kernel: arch/arm/boot/zImage is ready
  Building modules, stage 2.
  MODPOST 5 modules
ERROR: "of_usb_get_phy_mode" [drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3.ko] undefined!
make[1]: *** [__modpost] Error 1
make: *** [modules] Error 2
---------------------->8------------------
Signed-off-by: Alexey Brodkin <abrodkin@synopsys.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Cc: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Cc: Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>
Cc: linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 6e4cac23 ]

The FE setups of Intel SST bytcr_rt5640 and bytcr_rt5651 drivers carry
the ignore_suspend flag, and this prevents the suspend/resume working
properly while the stream is running, since SST core code has the
check of the running streams and returns -EBUSY.  Drop these
superfluous flags for fixing the behavior.

Also, the bytcr_rt5640 driver lacks of nonatomic flag in some FE
definitions, which leads to the kernel Oops at suspend/resume like:

  BUG: scheduling while atomic: systemd-sleep/3144/0x00000003
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x5c/0x7a
   __schedule_bug+0x55/0x70
   __schedule+0x63c/0x8c0
   schedule+0x3d/0x90
   schedule_timeout+0x16b/0x320
   ? del_timer_sync+0x50/0x50
   ? sst_wait_timeout+0xa9/0x170 [snd_intel_sst_core]
   ? sst_wait_timeout+0xa9/0x170 [snd_intel_sst_core]
   ? remove_wait_queue+0x60/0x60
   ? sst_prepare_and_post_msg+0x275/0x960 [snd_intel_sst_core]
   ? sst_pause_stream+0x9b/0x110 [snd_intel_sst_core]
   ....

This patch addresses these appropriately, too.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Acked-by: Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.1+
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 7c5bb4ac ]

Clevo P650RS and other similar devices require i8042 to be reset in order
to detect Synaptics touchpad.
Reported-by: Paweł Bylica <chfast@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ed Bordin <edbordin@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=190301Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 117aceb0 ]

When committing era metadata to disk, it doesn't always save the latest
spacemap metadata root in superblock. Due to this, metadata is getting
corrupted sometimes when reopening the device. The correct order of update
should be, pre-commit (shadows spacemap root), save the spacemap root
(newly shadowed block) to in-core superblock and then the final commit.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Somasundaram Krishnasamy <somasundaram.krishnasamy@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 7d1fedb6 ]

dm_btree_find_lowest_key() is giving incorrect results.  find_key()
traverses the btree correctly for finding the highest key, but there is
an error in the way it traverses the btree for retrieving the lowest
key.  dm_btree_find_lowest_key() fetches the first key of the rightmost
block of the btree instead of fetching the first key from the leftmost
block.

Fix this by conditionally passing the correct parameter to value64()
based on the @find_highest flag.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok <ezk@fsl.cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Vinothkumar Raja <vinraja@cs.stonybrook.edu>
Signed-off-by: Nidhi Panpalia <npanpalia@cs.stonybrook.edu>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 68baf692 ]

Historically struct device_node references were tracked using a kref embedded as
a struct field. Commit 75b57ecf ("of: Make device nodes kobjects so they
show up in sysfs") (Mar 2014) refactored device_nodes to be kobjects such that
the device tree could by more simply exposed to userspace using sysfs.

Commit 0829f6d1 ("of: device_node kobject lifecycle fixes") (Mar 2014)
followed up these changes to better control the kobject lifecycle and in
particular the referecne counting via of_node_get(), of_node_put(), and
of_node_init().

A result of this second commit was that it introduced an of_node_put() call when
a dynamic node is detached, in of_node_remove(), that removes the initial kobj
reference created by of_node_init().

Traditionally as the original dynamic device node user the pseries code had
assumed responsibilty for releasing this final reference in its platform
specific DLPAR detach code.

This patch fixes a refcount underflow introduced by commit 0829f6d1, and
recently exposed by the upstreaming of the recount API.

Messages like the following are no longer seen in the kernel log with this
patch following DLPAR remove operations of cpus and pci devices.

  rpadlpar_io: slot PHB 72 removed
  refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 3335 at lib/refcount.c:128 refcount_sub_and_test+0xf4/0x110

Fixes: 0829f6d1 ("of: device_node kobject lifecycle fixes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
[mpe: Make change log commit references more verbose]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 99e68909 ]

In mlx4_ib_add, procedure mlx4_ib_alloc_eqs is called to allocate EQs.

However, in the mlx4_ib_add error flow, procedure mlx4_ib_free_eqs is not
called to free the allocated EQs.

Fixes: e605b743 ("IB/mlx4: Increase the number of vectors (EQs) available for ULPs")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Signed-off-by: Jack Morgenstein <jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit d594aa02 ]

The minimum size for a new stack (512 bytes) setup for arch/x86/boot components
when the bootloader does not setup/provide a stack for the early boot components
is not "enough".

The setup code executing as part of early kernel startup code, uses the stack
beyond 512 bytes and accidentally overwrites and corrupts part of the BSS
section. This is exposed mostly in the early video setup code, where
it was corrupting BSS variables like force_x, force_y, which in-turn affected
kernel parameters such as screen_info (screen_info.orig_video_cols) and
later caused an exception/panic in console_init().

Most recent boot loaders setup the stack for early boot components, so this
stack overwriting into BSS section issue has not been exposed.
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish@bluestacks.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170419152015.10011-1-ashishkalra@Ashishs-MacBook-Pro.localSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 78f7a45d ]

I noticed that reading the snapshot file when it is empty no longer gives a
status. It suppose to show the status of the snapshot buffer as well as how
to allocate and use it. For example:

 ># cat snapshot
 # tracer: nop
 #
 #
 # * Snapshot is allocated *
 #
 # Snapshot commands:
 # echo 0 > snapshot : Clears and frees snapshot buffer
 # echo 1 > snapshot : Allocates snapshot buffer, if not already allocated.
 #                      Takes a snapshot of the main buffer.
 # echo 2 > snapshot : Clears snapshot buffer (but does not allocate or free)
 #                      (Doesn't have to be '2' works with any number that
 #                       is not a '0' or '1')

But instead it just showed an empty buffer:

 ># cat snapshot
 # tracer: nop
 #
 # entries-in-buffer/entries-written: 0/0   #P:4
 #
 #                              _-----=> irqs-off
 #                             / _----=> need-resched
 #                            | / _---=> hardirq/softirq
 #                            || / _--=> preempt-depth
 #                            ||| /     delay
 #           TASK-PID   CPU#  ||||    TIMESTAMP  FUNCTION
 #              | |       |   ||||       |         |

What happened was that it was using the ring_buffer_iter_empty() function to
see if it was empty, and if it was, it showed the status. But that function
was returning false when it was empty. The reason was that the iter header
page was on the reader page, and the reader page was empty, but so was the
buffer itself. The check only tested to see if the iter was on the commit
page, but the commit page was no longer pointing to the reader page, but as
all pages were empty, the buffer is also.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 651e22f2 ("ring-buffer: Always reset iterator to reader page")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit fe8c470a ]

gcc -O2 cannot always prove that the loop in acpi_power_get_inferred_state()
is enterered at least once, so it assumes that cur_state might not get
initialized:

drivers/acpi/power.c: In function 'acpi_power_get_inferred_state':
drivers/acpi/power.c:222:9: error: 'cur_state' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]

This sets the variable to zero at the start of the loop, to ensure that
there is well-defined behavior even for an empty list. This gets rid of
the warning.

The warning first showed up when the -Os flag got removed in a bug fix
patch in linux-4.11-rc5.

I would suggest merging this addon patch on top of that bug fix to avoid
introducing a new warning in the stable kernels.

Fixes: 61b79e16 (ACPI: Fix incompatibility with mcount-based function graph tracing)
Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit df62db5b ]

Currently the snapshot trigger enables the probe and then allocates the
snapshot. If the probe triggers before the allocation, it could cause the
snapshot to fail and turn tracing off. It's best to allocate the snapshot
buffer first, and then enable the trigger. If something goes wrong in the
enabling of the trigger, the snapshot buffer is still allocated, but it can
also be freed by the user by writting zero into the snapshot buffer file.

Also add a check of the return status of alloc_snapshot().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 77fd5c15 ("tracing: Add snapshot trigger to function probes")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 6fc091fb ]

Print correct command ring address using 'val_64'.

Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Chen <peter.chen@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit a12b8ab8 ]

Otherwise ttusb2_i2c_xfer can read or write beyond the end of static and
heap buffers.
Signed-off-by: Alyssa Milburn <amilburn@zall.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 31c5d192 ]

This development kit has an FT4232 on it with a custom USB VID/PID.
The FT4232 provides four UARTs, but only two are used. The UART 0
is used by the FlashPro5 programmer and UART 2 is connected to the
SmartFusion2 CortexM3 SoC UART port.

Note that the USB VID is registered to Actel according to Linux USB
VID database, but that was acquired by Microsemi.
Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit ea00353f ]

Laurent Pinchart reported that the Renesas R-Car H2 Lager board (r8a7790)
crashes during suspend tests.  Geert Uytterhoeven managed to reproduce the
issue on an M2-W Koelsch board (r8a7791):

  It occurs when the PME scan runs, once per second.  During PME scan, the
  PCI host bridge (rcar-pci) registers are accessed while its module clock
  has already been disabled, leading to the crash.

One reproducer is to configure s2ram to use "s2idle" instead of "deep"
suspend:

  # echo 0 > /sys/module/printk/parameters/console_suspend
  # echo s2idle > /sys/power/mem_sleep
  # echo mem > /sys/power/state

Another reproducer is to write either "platform" or "processors" to
/sys/power/pm_test.  It does not (or is less likely) to happen during full
system suspend ("core" or "none") because system suspend also disables
timers, and thus the workqueue handling PME scans no longer runs.  Geert
believes the issue may still happen in the small window between disabling
module clocks and disabling timers:

  # echo 0 > /sys/module/printk/parameters/console_suspend
  # echo platform > /sys/power/pm_test    # Or "processors"
  # echo mem > /sys/power/state

(Make sure CONFIG_PCI_RCAR_GEN2 and CONFIG_USB_OHCI_HCD_PCI are enabled.)

Rafael Wysocki agrees that PME scans should be suspended before the host
bridge registers become inaccessible.  To that end, queue the task on a
workqueue that gets frozen before devices suspend.

Rafael notes however that as a result, some wakeup events may be missed if
they are delivered via PME from a device without working IRQ (which hence
must be polled) and occur after the workqueue has been frozen.  If that
turns out to be an issue in practice, it may be possible to solve it by
calling pci_pme_list_scan() once directly from one of the host bridge's
pm_ops callbacks.

Stacktrace for posterity:

  PM: Syncing filesystems ... [   38.566237] done.
  PM: Preparing system for sleep (mem)
  Freezing user space processes ... [   38.579813] (elapsed 0.001 seconds) done.
  Freezing remaining freezable tasks ... (elapsed 0.001 seconds) done.
  PM: Suspending system (mem)
  PM: suspend of devices complete after 152.456 msecs
  PM: late suspend of devices complete after 2.809 msecs
  PM: noirq suspend of devices complete after 29.863 msecs
  suspend debug: Waiting for 5 second(s).
  Unhandled fault: asynchronous external abort (0x1211) at 0x00000000
  pgd = c0003000
  [00000000] *pgd=80000040004003, *pmd=00000000
  Internal error: : 1211 [#1] SMP ARM
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 1 PID: 20 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted
  4.9.0-rc1-koelsch-00011-g68db9bc8 #3383
  Hardware name: Generic R8A7791 (Flattened Device Tree)
  Workqueue: events pci_pme_list_scan
  task: eb56e140 task.stack: eb58e000
  PC is at pci_generic_config_read+0x64/0x6c
  LR is at rcar_pci_cfg_base+0x64/0x84
  pc : [<c041d7b4>]    lr : [<c04309a0>]    psr: 600d0093
  sp : eb58fe98  ip : c041d750  fp : 00000008
  r10: c0e2283c  r9 : 00000000  r8 : 600d0013
  r7 : 00000008  r6 : eb58fed6  r5 : 00000002  r4 : eb58feb4
  r3 : 00000000  r2 : 00000044  r1 : 00000008  r0 : 00000000
  Flags: nZCv  IRQs off  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment user
  Control: 30c5387d  Table: 6a9f6c80  DAC: 55555555
  Process kworker/1:1 (pid: 20, stack limit = 0xeb58e210)
  Stack: (0xeb58fe98 to 0xeb590000)
  fe80:                                                       00000002 00000044
  fea0: eb6f5800 c041d9b0 eb58feb4 00000008 00000044 00000000 eb78a000 eb78a000
  fec0: 00000044 00000000 eb9aff00 c0424bf0 eb78a000 00000000 eb78a000 c0e22830
  fee0: ea8a6fc0 c0424c5c eaae79c0 c0424ce0 eb55f380 c0e22838 eb9a9800 c0235fbc
  ff00: eb55f380 c0e22838 eb55f380 eb9a9800 eb9a9800 eb58e000 eb9a9824 c0e02100
  ff20: eb55f398 c02366c4 eb56e140 eb5631c0 00000000 eb55f380 c023641c 00000000
  ff40: 00000000 00000000 00000000 c023a928 cd105598 00000000 40506a34 eb55f380
  ff60: 00000000 00000000 dead4ead ffffffff ffffffff eb58ff74 eb58ff74 00000000
  ff80: 00000000 dead4ead ffffffff ffffffff eb58ff90 eb58ff90 eb58ffac eb5631c0
  ffa0: c023a844 00000000 00000000 c0206d68 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
  ffc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
  ffe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 3a81336c 10ccd1dd
  [<c041d7b4>] (pci_generic_config_read) from [<c041d9b0>]
  (pci_bus_read_config_word+0x58/0x80)
  [<c041d9b0>] (pci_bus_read_config_word) from [<c0424bf0>]
  (pci_check_pme_status+0x34/0x78)
  [<c0424bf0>] (pci_check_pme_status) from [<c0424c5c>] (pci_pme_wakeup+0x28/0x54)
  [<c0424c5c>] (pci_pme_wakeup) from [<c0424ce0>] (pci_pme_list_scan+0x58/0xb4)
  [<c0424ce0>] (pci_pme_list_scan) from [<c0235fbc>]
  (process_one_work+0x1bc/0x308)
  [<c0235fbc>] (process_one_work) from [<c02366c4>] (worker_thread+0x2a8/0x3e0)
  [<c02366c4>] (worker_thread) from [<c023a928>] (kthread+0xe4/0xfc)
  [<c023a928>] (kthread) from [<c0206d68>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c)
  Code: ea000000 e5903000 f57ff04f e3a00000 (e5843000)
  ---[ end trace 667d43ba3aa9e589 ]---

Fixes: df17e62e ("PCI: Add support for polling PME state on suspended legacy PCI devices")
Reported-and-tested-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart+renesas@ideasonboard.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org	# 2.6.37+
Cc: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Niklas Söderlund <niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms+renesas@verge.net.au>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit c90722b5 ]

Commit 43530b69 ("regulator: Use
regmap_read/write(), regmap_update_bits functions directly") intended
to replace working inline helper functions with standard regmap
calls.  However, it also inverted the set/clear logic of the "CORE ADJ
Allowed" bit.  That patch was clearly never tested, since without that
bit cleared, the core VDCDC1 voltage output does not react to I2C
configuration changes.

This patch fixes the issue by clearing the bit as in the original,
correct implementation.  Note for stable back porting that, due to
subsequent driver churn, this patch will not apply on every kernel
version.

Fixes: 43530b69 ("regulator: Use regmap_read/write(), regmap_update_bits functions directly")
Signed-off-by: Richard Cochran <rcochran@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit ee0fe833 ]

This code copies actual_length-128 bytes from the header, which will
underflow if the received buffer is too small.
Signed-off-by: Alyssa Milburn <amilburn@zall.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit c9f838d1 ]

This fixes CVE-2017-7472.

Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:

	#include <keyutils.h>

	int main()
	{
		for (;;)
			keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
	}

Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.

Fixes: d84f4f99 ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.29+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit c1644fe0 ]

This fixes CVE-2017-6951.

Userspace should not be able to do things with the "dead" key type as it
doesn't have some of the helper functions set upon it that the kernel
needs.  Attempting to use it may cause the kernel to crash.

Fix this by changing the name of the type to ".dead" so that it's rejected
up front on userspace syscalls by key_get_type_from_user().

Though this doesn't seem to affect recent kernels, it does affect older
ones, certainly those prior to:

	commit c06cfb08
	Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
	Date:   Tue Sep 16 17:36:06 2014 +0100
	KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse

which went in before 3.18-rc1.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit ee8f844e ]

This fixes CVE-2016-9604.

Keyrings whose name begin with a '.' are special internal keyrings and so
userspace isn't allowed to create keyrings by this name to prevent
shadowing.  However, the patch that added the guard didn't fix
KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING.  Not only can that create dot-named keyrings,
it can also subscribe to them as a session keyring if they grant SEARCH
permission to the user.

This, for example, allows a root process to set .builtin_trusted_keys as
its session keyring, at which point it has full access because now the
possessor permissions are added.  This permits root to add extra public
keys, thereby bypassing module verification.

This also affects kexec and IMA.

This can be tested by (as root):

	keyctl session .builtin_trusted_keys
	keyctl add user a a @s
	keyctl list @s

which on my test box gives me:

	2 keys in keyring:
	180010936: ---lswrv     0     0 asymmetric: Build time autogenerated kernel key: ae3d4a31b82daa8e1a75b49dc2bba949fd992a05
	801382539: --alswrv     0     0 user: a

Fix this by rejecting names beginning with a '.' in the keyctl.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 9e1ba4f2 ]

If we set a kprobe on a 'stdu' instruction on powerpc64, we see a kernel
OOPS:

  Bad kernel stack pointer cd93c840 at c000000000009868
  Oops: Bad kernel stack pointer, sig: 6 [#1]
  ...
  GPR00: c000001fcd93cb30 00000000cd93c840 c0000000015c5e00 00000000cd93c840
  ...
  NIP [c000000000009868] resume_kernel+0x2c/0x58
  LR [c000000000006208] program_check_common+0x108/0x180

On a 64-bit system when the user probes on a 'stdu' instruction, the kernel does
not emulate actual store in emulate_step() because it may corrupt the exception
frame. So the kernel does the actual store operation in exception return code
i.e. resume_kernel().

resume_kernel() loads the saved stack pointer from memory using lwz, which only
loads the low 32-bits of the address, causing the kernel crash.

Fix this by loading the 64-bit value instead.

Fixes: be96f633 ("powerpc: Split out instruction analysis part of emulate_step()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.18+
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
[mpe: Change log massage, add stable tag]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 62a6cfdd ]

commit 4fcd1813 ("Fix reconnect to not defer smb3 session reconnect
long after socket reconnect") added support for Negotiate requests to
be initiated by echo calls.

To avoid delays in calling echo after a reconnect, I added the patch
introduced by the commit b8c60012 ("Call echo service immediately
after socket reconnect").

This has however caused a regression with cifs shares which do not have
support for echo calls to trigger Negotiate requests. On connections
which need to call Negotiation, the echo calls trigger an error which
triggers a reconnect which in turn triggers another echo call. This
results in a loop which is only broken when an operation is performed on
the cifs share. For an idle share, it can DOS a server.

The patch uses the smb_operation can_echo() for cifs so that it is
called only if connection has been already been setup.

kernel bz: 194531
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jonathan Liu <net147@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>

[ Upstream commit 71d6ad08 ]

Don't assume that server is sane and won't return more data than
asked for.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>