- 09 Jan, 2015 2 commits
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Johan Hovold authored
commit b6684228 upstream. Allow more than one viperboard to be connected by registering with PLATFORM_DEVID_AUTO instead of PLATFORM_DEVID_NONE. The subdevices are currently registered with PLATFORM_DEVID_NONE, which will cause a name collision on the platform bus when a second viperboard is plugged in: viperboard 1-2.4:1.0: version 0.00 found at bus 001 address 004 ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 181 at /home/johan/work/omicron/src/linux/fs/sysfs/dir.c:31 sysfs_warn_dup+0x74/0x84() sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/bus/platform/devices/viperboard-gpio' Modules linked in: i2c_viperboard viperboard netconsole [last unloaded: viperboard] CPU: 0 PID: 181 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 3.17.0-rc6 #1 [<c0016bf4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0013860>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) [<c0013860>] (show_stack) from [<c04305f8>] (dump_stack+0x24/0x28) [<c04305f8>] (dump_stack) from [<c0040fb4>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x80/0x98) [<c0040fb4>] (warn_slowpath_common) from [<c004100c>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x40/0x48) [<c004100c>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c016f1bc>] (sysfs_warn_dup+0x74/0x84) [<c016f1bc>] (sysfs_warn_dup) from [<c016f548>] (sysfs_do_create_link_sd.isra.2+0xcc/0xd0) [<c016f548>] (sysfs_do_create_link_sd.isra.2) from [<c016f588>] (sysfs_create_link+0x3c/0x48) [<c016f588>] (sysfs_create_link) from [<c02867ec>] (bus_add_device+0x12c/0x1e0) [<c02867ec>] (bus_add_device) from [<c0284820>] (device_add+0x410/0x584) [<c0284820>] (device_add) from [<c0289440>] (platform_device_add+0xd8/0x26c) [<c0289440>] (platform_device_add) from [<c02a5ae4>] (mfd_add_device+0x240/0x344) [<c02a5ae4>] (mfd_add_device) from [<c02a5ce0>] (mfd_add_devices+0xb8/0x110) [<c02a5ce0>] (mfd_add_devices) from [<bf00d1c8>] (vprbrd_probe+0x160/0x1b0 [viperboard]) [<bf00d1c8>] (vprbrd_probe [viperboard]) from [<c030c000>] (usb_probe_interface+0x1bc/0x2a8) [<c030c000>] (usb_probe_interface) from [<c028768c>] (driver_probe_device+0x14c/0x3ac) [<c028768c>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c02879e4>] (__driver_attach+0xa4/0xa8) [<c02879e4>] (__driver_attach) from [<c0285698>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x70/0xa4) [<c0285698>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c0287030>] (driver_attach+0x2c/0x30) [<c0287030>] (driver_attach) from [<c030a288>] (usb_store_new_id+0x170/0x1ac) [<c030a288>] (usb_store_new_id) from [<c030a2f8>] (new_id_store+0x34/0x3c) [<c030a2f8>] (new_id_store) from [<c02853ec>] (drv_attr_store+0x30/0x3c) [<c02853ec>] (drv_attr_store) from [<c016eaa8>] (sysfs_kf_write+0x5c/0x60) [<c016eaa8>] (sysfs_kf_write) from [<c016dc68>] (kernfs_fop_write+0xd4/0x194) [<c016dc68>] (kernfs_fop_write) from [<c010fe40>] (vfs_write+0xb4/0x1c0) [<c010fe40>] (vfs_write) from [<c01104a8>] (SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0) [<c01104a8>] (SyS_write) from [<c000f900>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48) ---[ end trace 98e8603c22d65817 ]--- viperboard 1-2.4:1.0: Failed to add mfd devices to core. viperboard: probe of 1-2.4:1.0 failed with error -17 Signed-off-by:
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Linus Walleij authored
commit 871c3cf4 upstream. The least significat byte of the GPIO value read register on the STMPE24xx series is on addres 0xA4 not 0xA5. Correct against datasheet and tested on the STMPE2401 hardware. Signed-off-by:
Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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- 07 Jan, 2015 38 commits
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Filipe Manana authored
commit 678886bd upstream. When we abort a transaction we iterate over all the ranges marked as dirty in fs_info->freed_extents[0] and fs_info->freed_extents[1], clear them from those trees, add them back (unpin) to the free space caches and, if the fs was mounted with "-o discard", perform a discard on those regions. Also, after adding the regions to the free space caches, a fitrim ioctl call can see those ranges in a block group's free space cache and perform a discard on the ranges, so the same issue can happen without "-o discard" as well. This causes corruption, affecting one or multiple btree nodes (in the worst case leaving the fs unmountable) because some of those ranges (the ones in the fs_info->pinned_extents tree) correspond to btree nodes/leafs that are referred by the last committed super block - breaking the rule that anything that was committed by a transaction is untouched until the next transaction commits successfully. I ran into this while running in a loop (for several hours) the fstest that I recently submitted: [PATCH] fstests: add btrfs test to stress chunk allocation/removal and fstrim The corruption always happened when a transaction aborted and then fsck complained like this: _check_btrfs_filesystem: filesystem on /dev/sdc is inconsistent *** fsck.btrfs output *** Check tree block failed, want=94945280, have=0 Check tree block failed, want=94945280, have=0 Check tree block failed, want=94945280, have=0 Check tree block failed, want=94945280, have=0 Check tree block failed, want=94945280, have=0 read block failed check_tree_block Couldn't open file system In this case 94945280 corresponded to the root of a tree. Using frace what I observed was the following sequence of steps happened: 1) transaction N started, fs_info->pinned_extents pointed to fs_info->freed_extents[0]; 2) node/eb 94945280 is created; 3) eb is persisted to disk; 4) transaction N commit starts, fs_info->pinned_extents now points to fs_info->freed_extents[1], and transaction N completes; 5) transaction N + 1 starts; 6) eb is COWed, and btrfs_free_tree_block() called for this eb; 7) eb range (94945280 to 94945280 + 16Kb) is added to fs_info->pinned_extents (fs_info->freed_extents[1]); 8) Something goes wrong in transaction N + 1, like hitting ENOSPC for example, and the transaction is aborted, turning the fs into readonly mode. The stack trace I got for example: [112065.253935] [<ffffffff8140c7b6>] dump_stack+0x4d/0x66 [112065.254271] [<ffffffff81042984>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7f/0x98 [112065.254567] [<ffffffffa0325990>] ? __btrfs_abort_transaction+0x50/0x10b [btrfs] [112065.261674] [<ffffffff810429e5>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x48/0x50 [112065.261922] [<ffffffffa032949e>] ? btrfs_free_path+0x26/0x29 [btrfs] [112065.262211] [<ffffffffa0325990>] __btrfs_abort_transaction+0x50/0x10b [btrfs] [112065.262545] [<ffffffffa036b1d6>] btrfs_remove_chunk+0x537/0x58b [btrfs] [112065.262771] [<ffffffffa033840f>] btrfs_delete_unused_bgs+0x1de/0x21b [btrfs] [112065.263105] [<ffffffffa0343106>] cleaner_kthread+0x100/0x12f [btrfs] (...) [112065.264493] ---[ end trace dd7903a975a31a08 ]--- [112065.264673] BTRFS: error (device sdc) in btrfs_remove_chunk:2625: errno=-28 No space left [112065.264997] BTRFS info (device sdc): forced readonly 9) The clear kthread sees that the BTRFS_FS_STATE_ERROR bit is set in fs_info->fs_state and calls btrfs_cleanup_transaction(), which in turn calls btrfs_destroy_pinned_extent(); 10) Then btrfs_destroy_pinned_extent() iterates over all the ranges marked as dirty in fs_info->freed_extents[], and for each one it calls discard, if the fs was mounted with "-o discard", and adds the range to the free space cache of the respective block group; 11) btrfs_trim_block_group(), invoked from the fitrim ioctl code path, sees the free space entries and performs a discard; 12) After an umount and mount (or fsck), our eb's location on disk was full of zeroes, and it should have been untouched, because it was marked as dirty in the fs_info->pinned_extents tree, and therefore used by the trees that the last committed superblock points to. Fix this by not performing a discard and not adding the ranges to the free space caches - it's useless from this point since the fs is now in readonly mode and we won't write free space caches to disk anymore (otherwise we would leak space) nor any new superblock. By not adding the ranges to the free space caches, it prevents other code paths from allocating that space and write to it as well, therefore being safer and simpler. This isn't a new problem, as it's been present since 2011 (git commit acce952b). Signed-off-by:
Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
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Josef Bacik authored
commit a2804695 upstream. We use the modified list to keep track of which extents have been modified so we know which ones are candidates for logging at fsync() time. Newly modified extents are added to the list at modification time, around the same time the ordered extent is created. We do this so that we don't have to wait for ordered extents to complete before we know what we need to log. The problem is when something like this happens log extent 0-4k on inode 1 copy csum for 0-4k from ordered extent into log sync log commit transaction log some other extent on inode 1 ordered extent for 0-4k completes and adds itself onto modified list again log changed extents see ordered extent for 0-4k has already been logged at this point we assume the csum has been copied sync log crash On replay we will see the extent 0-4k in the log, drop the original 0-4k extent which is the same one that we are replaying which also drops the csum, and then we won't find the csum in the log for that bytenr. This of course causes us to have errors about not having csums for certain ranges of our inode. So remove the modified list manipulation in unpin_extent_cache, any modified extents should have been added well before now, and we don't want them re-logged. This fixes my test that I could reliably reproduce this problem with. Thanks, Signed-off-by:
Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
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Michael Halcrow authored
commit 94208064 upstream. Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when the current bit offset is 2. Signed-off-by:
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com> Reported-by:
Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Suggested-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Tyler Hicks authored
commit 332b122d upstream. The ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option greatly changes the functionality of an eCryptfs mount. Instead of encrypting and decrypting lower files, it provides a unified view of the encrypted files in the lower filesystem. The presence of the ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option is intended to force a read-only mount and modifying files is not supported when the feature is in use. See the following commit for more information: e77a56dd [PATCH] eCryptfs: Encrypted passthrough This patch forces the mount to be read-only when the ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option is specified by setting the MS_RDONLY flag on the superblock. Additionally, this patch removes some broken logic in ecryptfs_open() that attempted to prevent modifications of files when the encrypted view feature was in use. The check in ecryptfs_open() was not sufficient to prevent file modifications using system calls that do not operate on a file descriptor. Signed-off-by:
Priya Bansal <p.bansal@samsung.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jan Kara authored
commit a1d47b26 upstream. UDF specification allows arbitrarily large symlinks. However we support only symlinks at most one block large. Check the length of the symlink so that we don't access memory beyond end of the symlink block. Reported-by:
Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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Oleg Nesterov authored
commit 24c037eb upstream. alloc_pid() does get_pid_ns() beforehand but forgets to put_pid_ns() if it fails because disable_pid_allocation() was called by the exiting child_reaper. We could simply move get_pid_ns() down to successful return, but this fix tries to be as trivial as possible. Signed-off-by:
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Cc: Sterling Alexander <stalexan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Jan Kara authored
commit a682e9c2 upstream. If some error happens in NCP_IOC_SETROOT ioctl, the appropriate error return value is then (in most cases) just overwritten before we return. This can result in reporting success to userspace although error happened. This bug was introduced by commit 2e54eb96 ("BKL: Remove BKL from ncpfs"). Propagate the errors correctly. Coverity id: 1226925. Fixes: 2e54eb96 ("BKL: Remove BKL from ncpfs") Signed-off-by:
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Rabin Vincent authored
commit 7e77bdeb upstream. If a request is backlogged, it's complete() handler will get called twice: once with -EINPROGRESS, and once with the final error code. af_alg's complete handler, unlike other users, does not handle the -EINPROGRESS but instead always completes the completion that recvmsg() is waiting on. This can lead to a return to user space while the request is still pending in the driver. If userspace closes the sockets before the requests are handled by the driver, this will lead to use-after-frees (and potential crashes) in the kernel due to the tfm having been freed. The crashes can be easily reproduced (for example) by reducing the max queue length in cryptod.c and running the following (from http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html) on AES-NI capable hardware: $ while true; do kcapi -x 1 -e -c '__ecb-aes-aesni' \ -k 00000000000000000000000000000000 \ -p 00000000000000000000000000000000 >/dev/null & done Signed-off-by:
Rabin Vincent <rabin.vincent@axis.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by:
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Richard Guy Briggs authored
commit 041d7b98 upstream. A regression was caused by commit 780a7654: audit: Make testing for a valid loginuid explicit. (which in turn attempted to fix a regression caused by e1760bd5) When audit_krule_to_data() fills in the rules to get a listing, there was a missing clause to convert back from AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET to AUDIT_LOGINUID. This broke userspace by not returning the same information that was sent and expected. The rule: auditctl -a exit,never -F auid=-1 gives: auditctl -l LIST_RULES: exit,never f24=0 syscall=all when it should give: LIST_RULES: exit,never auid=-1 (0xffffffff) syscall=all Tag it so that it is reported the same way it was set. Create a new private flags audit_krule field (pflags) to store it that won't interact with the public one from the API. Signed-off-by:
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
commit db86da7c upstream. A security fix in caused the way the unprivileged remount tests were using user namespaces to break. Tweak the way user namespaces are being used so the test works again. Signed-off-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
commit 66d2f338 upstream. Now that setgroups can be disabled and not reenabled, setting gid_map without privielge can now be enabled when setgroups is disabled. This restores most of the functionality that was lost when unprivileged setting of gid_map was removed. Applications that use this functionality will need to check to see if they use setgroups or init_groups, and if they don't they can be fixed by simply disabling setgroups before writing to gid_map. Reviewed-by:
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
commit 9cc46516 upstream. - Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc/<pid>/setgroups A value of "deny" means the setgroups system call is disabled in the current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the future in this user namespace. A value of "allow" means the segtoups system call is enabled. - Descendant user namespaces inherit the value of setgroups from their parents. - A proc file is used (instead of a sysctl) as sysctls currently do not allow checking the permissions at open time. - Writing to the proc file is restricted to before the gid_map for the user namespace is set. This ensures that disabling setgroups at a user namespace level will never remove the ability to call setgroups from a process that already has that ability. A process may opt in to the setgroups disable for itself by creating, entering and configuring a user namespace or by calling setns on an existing user namespace with setgroups disabled. Processes without privileges already can not call setgroups so this is a noop. Prodcess with privilege become processes without privilege when entering a user namespace and as with any other path to dropping privilege they would not have the ability to call setgroups. So this remains within the bounds of what is possible without a knob to disable setgroups permanently in a user namespace. Signed-off-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
commit f0d62aec upstream. Generalize id_map_mutex so it can be used for more state of a user namespace. Reviewed-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
commit f95d7918 upstream. If you did not create the user namespace and are allowed to write to uid_map or gid_map you should already have the necessary privilege in the parent user namespace to establish any mapping you want so this will not affect userspace in practice. Limiting unprivileged uid mapping establishment to the creator of the user namespace makes it easier to verify all credentials obtained with the uid mapping can be obtained without the uid mapping without privilege. Limiting unprivileged gid mapping establishment (which is temporarily absent) to the creator of the user namespace also ensures that the combination of uid and gid can already be obtained without privilege. This is part of the fix for CVE-2014-8989. Reviewed-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
commit 80dd00a2 upstream. setresuid allows the euid to be set to any of uid, euid, suid, and fsuid. Therefor it is safe to allow an unprivileged user to map their euid and use CAP_SETUID privileged with exactly that uid, as no new credentials can be obtained. I can not find a combination of existing system calls that allows setting uid, euid, suid, and fsuid from the fsuid making the previous use of fsuid for allowing unprivileged mappings a bug. This is part of a fix for CVE-2014-8989. Reviewed-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
commit be7c6dba upstream. As any gid mapping will allow and must allow for backwards compatibility dropping groups don't allow any gid mappings to be established without CAP_SETGID in the parent user namespace. For a small class of applications this change breaks userspace and removes useful functionality. This small class of applications includes tools/testing/selftests/mount/unprivilged-remount-test.c Most of the removed functionality will be added back with the addition of a one way knob to disable setgroups. Once setgroups is disabled setting the gid_map becomes as safe as setting the uid_map. For more common applications that set the uid_map and the gid_map with privilege this change will have no affect. This is part of a fix for CVE-2014-8989. Reviewed-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
commit 273d2c67 upstream. setgroups is unique in not needing a valid mapping before it can be called, in the case of setgroups(0, NULL) which drops all supplemental groups. The design of the user namespace assumes that CAP_SETGID can not actually be used until a gid mapping is established. Therefore add a helper function to see if the user namespace gid mapping has been established and call that function in the setgroups permission check. This is part of the fix for CVE-2014-8989, being able to drop groups without privilege using user namespaces. Reviewed-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
commit 0542f17b upstream. The rule is simple. Don't allow anything that wouldn't be allowed without unprivileged mappings. It was previously overlooked that establishing gid mappings would allow dropping groups and potentially gaining permission to files and directories that had lesser permissions for a specific group than for all other users. This is the rule needed to fix CVE-2014-8989 and prevent any other security issues with new_idmap_permitted. The reason for this rule is that the unix permission model is old and there are programs out there somewhere that take advantage of every little corner of it. So allowing a uid or gid mapping to be established without privielge that would allow anything that would not be allowed without that mapping will result in expectations from some code somewhere being violated. Violated expectations about the behavior of the OS is a long way to say a security issue. Signed-off-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
commit 7ff4d90b upstream. Today there are 3 instances of setgroups and due to an oversight their permission checking has diverged. Add a common function so that they may all share the same permission checking code. This corrects the current oversight in the current permission checks and adds a helper to avoid this in the future. A user namespace security fix will update this new helper, shortly. Signed-off-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
commit b2f5d4dc upstream. Forced unmount affects not just the mount namespace but the underlying superblock as well. Restrict forced unmount to the global root user for now. Otherwise it becomes possible a user in a less privileged mount namespace to force the shutdown of a superblock of a filesystem in a more privileged mount namespace, allowing a DOS attack on root. Signed-off-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
commit 4a44a19b upstream. - MNT_NODEV should be irrelevant except when reading back mount flags, no longer specify MNT_NODEV on remount. - Test MNT_NODEV on devpts where it is meaningful even for unprivileged mounts. - Add a test to verify that remount of a prexisting mount with the same flags is allowed and does not change those flags. - Cleanup up the definitions of MS_REC, MS_RELATIME, MS_STRICTATIME that are used when the code is built in an environment without them. - Correct the test error messages when tests fail. There were not 5 tests that tested MS_RELATIME. Signed-off-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
commit 3e186641 upstream. Now that remount is properly enforcing the rule that you can't remove nodev at least sandstorm.io is breaking when performing a remount. It turns out that there is an easy intuitive solution implicitly add nodev on remount when nodev was implicitly added on mount. Tested-by:
Cedric Bosdonnat <cbosdonnat@suse.com> Tested-by:
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by:
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Luis Henriques authored
commit 9d367e5e upstream. thermal_unregister_governors() and class_unregister() were being called in the wrong order. Fixes: 80a26a5c ("Thermal: build thermal governors into thermal_sys module") Signed-off-by:
Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Johannes Berg authored
commit 28a9bc68 upstream. When writing the code to allow per-station GTKs, I neglected to take into account the management frame keys (index 4 and 5) when freeing the station and only added code to free the first four data frame keys. Fix this by iterating the array of keys over the right length. Fixes: e31b8213 ("cfg80211/mac80211: allow per-station GTKs") Signed-off-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Andreas Müller authored
commit d025933e upstream. As multicast-frames can't be fragmented, "dot11MulticastReceivedFrameCount" stopped being incremented after the use-after-free fix. Furthermore, the RX-LED will be triggered by every multicast frame (which wouldn't happen before) which wouldn't allow the LED to rest at all. Fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89431 which also had the patch. Fixes: b8fff407 ("mac80211: fix use-after-free in defragmentation") Signed-off-by:
Andreas Müller <goo@stapelspeicher.org> [rewrite commit message] Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit b26bdde5 upstream. When loading encrypted-keys module, if the last check of aes_get_sizes() in init_encrypted() fails, the driver just returns an error without unregistering its key type. This results in the stale entry in the list. In addition to memory leaks, this leads to a kernel crash when registering a new key type later. This patch fixes the problem by swapping the calls of aes_get_sizes() and register_key_type(), and releasing resources properly at the error paths. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=908163Signed-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jan Kara authored
commit 4e202462 upstream. We didn't check length of rock ridge ER records before printing them. Thus corrupted isofs image can cause us to access and print some memory behind the buffer with obvious consequences. Reported-and-tested-by:
Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no> Signed-off-by:
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Richard Guy Briggs authored
commit 42f74461 upstream. SFR reported this 2013-05-15: > After merging the final tree, today's linux-next build (i386 defconfig) > produced this warning: > > kernel/auditfilter.c: In function 'audit_data_to_entry': > kernel/auditfilter.c:426:3: warning: this decimal constant is unsigned only > in ISO C90 [enabled by default] > > Introduced by commit 780a7654 ("audit: Make testing for a valid > loginuid explicit") from Linus' tree. Replace this decimal constant in the code with a macro to make it more readable (add to the unsigned cast to quiet the warning). Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by:
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Andy Lutomirski authored
commit 3fb2f423 upstream. It turns out that there's a lurking ABI issue. GCC, when compiling this in a 32-bit program: struct user_desc desc = { .entry_number = idx, .base_addr = base, .limit = 0xfffff, .seg_32bit = 1, .contents = 0, /* Data, grow-up */ .read_exec_only = 0, .limit_in_pages = 1, .seg_not_present = 0, .useable = 0, }; will leave .lm uninitialized. This means that anything in the kernel that reads user_desc.lm for 32-bit tasks is unreliable. Revert the .lm check in set_thread_area(). The value never did anything in the first place. Fixes: 0e58af4e ("x86/tls: Disallow unusual TLS segments") Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/d7875b60e28c512f6a6fc0baf5714d58e7eaadbb.1418856405.git.luto@amacapital.netSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
commit c1c6156f upstream. This function isn't right and it causes a static checker warning: drivers/md/dm-thin.c:3016 maybe_resize_data_dev() error: potentially using uninitialized 'sb_data_size'. It should set "*count" and return zero on success the same as the sm_metadata_get_nr_blocks() function does earlier. Fixes: 3241b1d3 ('dm: add persistent data library') Signed-off-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Acked-by:
Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Darrick J. Wong authored
commit 445559cd upstream. When dm-bufio sets out to use the bio built into a struct dm_buffer to issue an IO, it needs to call bio_reset after it's done with the bio so that we can free things attached to the bio such as the integrity payload. Therefore, inject our own endio callback to take care of the bio_reset after calling submit_io's end_io callback. Test case: 1. modprobe scsi_debug delay=0 dif=1 dix=199 ato=1 dev_size_mb=300 2. Set up a dm-bufio client, e.g. dm-verity, on the scsi_debug device 3. Repeatedly read metadata and watch kmalloc-192 leak! Signed-off-by:
Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Peng Tao authored
commit 4bd5a980 upstream. nfs4_layoutget_release() drops layout hdr refcnt. Grab the refcnt early so that it is safe to call .release in case nfs4_alloc_pages fails. Signed-off-by:
Peng Tao <tao.peng@primarydata.com> Fixes: a47970ff ("NFSv4.1: Hold reference to layout hdr in layoutget") Signed-off-by:
Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by:
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Hannes Reinecke authored
commit b6c92b7e upstream. The .eh_abort_handler needs to return SUCCESS, FAILED, or FAST_IO_FAIL. So fixup all callers to adhere to this requirement. Reviewed-by:
Robert Elliott <elliott@hp.com> Signed-off-by:
Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by:
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Sumit.Saxena@avagotech.com authored
commit 170c2387 upstream. Corrected wait_event() call which was waiting for wrong completion status (0xFF). Signed-off-by:
Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@avagotech.com> Signed-off-by:
Kashyap Desai <kashyap.desai@avagotech.com> Reviewed-by:
Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Baruch Siach authored
commit 0031a98a upstream. Make force_ro consistent with other sysfs entries. Fixes: 371a689f ('mmc: MMC boot partitions support') Cc: Andrei Warkentin <andrey.warkentin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il> Signed-off-by:
Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov authored
commit 1a5fb99d upstream. Some boards with TC6393XB chip require full state restore during system resume thanks to chip's VCC being cut off during suspend (Sharp SL-6000 tosa is one of them). Failing to do so would result in ohci Oops on resume due to internal memory contentes being changed. Fail ohci suspend on tc6393xb is full state restore is required. Recommended workaround is to unbind tmio-ohci driver before suspend and rebind it after resume. Signed-off-by:
Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dbaryshkov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Andy Lutomirski authored
commit 29fa6825 upstream. paravirt_enabled has the following effects: - Disables the F00F bug workaround warning. There is no F00F bug workaround any more because Linux's standard IDT handling already works around the F00F bug, but the warning still exists. This is only cosmetic, and, in any event, there is no such thing as KVM on a CPU with the F00F bug. - Disables 32-bit APM BIOS detection. On a KVM paravirt system, there should be no APM BIOS anyway. - Disables tboot. I think that the tboot code should check the CPUID hypervisor bit directly if it matters. - paravirt_enabled disables espfix32. espfix32 should *not* be disabled under KVM paravirt. The last point is the purpose of this patch. It fixes a leak of the high 16 bits of the kernel stack address on 32-bit KVM paravirt guests. Fixes CVE-2014-8134. Suggested-by:
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Andy Lutomirski authored
commit 0e58af4e upstream. Users have no business installing custom code segments into the GDT, and segments that are not present but are otherwise valid are a historical source of interesting attacks. For completeness, block attempts to set the L bit. (Prior to this patch, the L bit would have been silently dropped.) This is an ABI break. I've checked glibc, musl, and Wine, and none of them look like they'll have any trouble. Note to stable maintainers: this is a hardening patch that fixes no known bugs. Given the possibility of ABI issues, this probably shouldn't be backported quickly. Signed-off-by:
H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by:
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