- 20 Oct, 2021 2 commits
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Halil Pasic authored
Changing the deliverable mask in __airqs_kick_single_vcpu() is a bug. If one idle vcpu can't take the interrupts we want to deliver, we should look for another vcpu that can, instead of saying that we don't want to deliver these interrupts by clearing the bits from the deliverable_mask. Fixes: 9f30f621 ("KVM: s390: add gib_alert_irq_handler()") Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Mueller <mimu@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211019175401.3757927-3-pasic@linux.ibm.comSigned-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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Halil Pasic authored
The idea behind kicked mask is that we should not re-kick a vcpu that is already in the "kick" process, i.e. that was kicked and is is about to be dispatched if certain conditions are met. The problem with the current implementation is, that it assumes the kicked vcpu is going to enter SIE shortly. But under certain circumstances, the vcpu we just kicked will be deemed non-runnable and will remain in wait state. This can happen, if the interrupt(s) this vcpu got kicked to deal with got already cleared (because the interrupts got delivered to another vcpu). In this case kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable() would return false, and the vcpu would remain in kvm_vcpu_block(), but this time with its kicked_mask bit set. So next time around we wouldn't kick the vcpu form __airqs_kick_single_vcpu(), but would assume that we just kicked it. Let us make sure the kicked_mask is cleared before we give up on re-dispatching the vcpu. Fixes: 9f30f621 ("KVM: s390: add gib_alert_irq_handler()") Reported-by: Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Mueller <mimu@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211019175401.3757927-2-pasic@linux.ibm.comSigned-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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- 28 Sep, 2021 1 commit
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Janosch Frank authored
The latest compile changes pointed us to a few instances where we use the kernel documentation style but don't explain all variables or don't adhere to it 100%. It's easy to fix so let's do that. Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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- 27 Sep, 2021 1 commit
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Zhenzhong Duan authored
When updating the host's mask for its MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL user return entry, clear the mask in the found uret MSR instead of vmx->guest_uret_msrs[i]. Modifying guest_uret_msrs directly is completely broken as 'i' does not point at the MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL entry. In fact, it's guaranteed to be an out-of-bounds accesses as is always set to kvm_nr_uret_msrs in a prior loop. By sheer dumb luck, the fallout is limited to "only" failing to preserve the host's TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR. The out-of-bounds access is benign as it's guaranteed to clear a bit in a guest MSR value, which are always zero at vCPU creation on both x86-64 and i386. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 8ea8b8d6 ("KVM: VMX: Use common x86's uret MSR list as the one true list") Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210926015545.281083-1-zhenzhong.duan@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 24 Sep, 2021 3 commits
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Paolo Bonzini authored
Merge tag 'kvmarm-fixes-5.15-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into kvm-master KVM/arm64 fixes for 5.15, take #1 - Add missing FORCE target when building the EL2 object - Fix a PMU probe regression on some platforms
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Oliver Upton authored
Compiling the KVM selftests with clang emits the following warning: >> include/x86_64/processor.h:297:25: error: variable 'xmm0' is uninitialized when used here [-Werror,-Wuninitialized] >> return (unsigned long)xmm0; where xmm0 is accessed via an uninitialized register variable. Indeed, this is a misuse of register variables, which really should only be used for specifying register constraints on variables passed to inline assembly. Rather than attempting to read xmm registers via register variables, just explicitly perform the movq from the desired xmm register. Fixes: 783e9e51 ("kvm: selftests: add API testing infrastructure") Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Message-Id: <20210924005147.1122357-1-oupton@google.com> Reviewed-by: Ricardo Koller <ricarkol@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Oliver Upton authored
While x86 does not require any additional setup to use the ucall infrastructure, arm64 needs to set up the MMIO address used to signal a ucall to userspace. rseq_test does not initialize the MMIO address, resulting in the test spinning indefinitely. Fix the issue by calling ucall_init() during setup. Fixes: 61e52f16 ("KVM: selftests: Add a test for KVM_RUN+rseq to detect task migration bugs") Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Message-Id: <20210923220033.4172362-1-oupton@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 23 Sep, 2021 7 commits
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Lai Jiangshan authored
There is no user of tlbs_dirty. Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210918005636.3675-4-jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Lai Jiangshan authored
If gpte is changed from non-present to present, the guest doesn't need to flush tlb per SDM. So the host must synchronze sp before link it. Otherwise the guest might use a wrong mapping. For example: the guest first changes a level-1 pagetable, and then links its parent to a new place where the original gpte is non-present. Finally the guest can access the remapped area without flushing the tlb. The guest's behavior should be allowed per SDM, but the host kvm mmu makes it wrong. Fixes: 4731d4c7 ("KVM: MMU: out of sync shadow core") Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210918005636.3675-3-jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Lai Jiangshan authored
When kvm->tlbs_dirty > 0, some rmaps might have been deleted without flushing tlb remotely after kvm_sync_page(). If @gfn was writable before and it's rmaps was deleted in kvm_sync_page(), and if the tlb entry is still in a remote running VCPU, the @gfn is not safely protected. To fix the problem, kvm_sync_page() does the remote flush when needed to avoid the problem. Fixes: a4ee1ca4 ("KVM: MMU: delay flush all tlbs on sync_page path") Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210918005636.3675-2-jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Maxim Levitsky authored
These field correspond to features that we don't expose yet to L2 While currently there are no CVE worthy features in this field, if AMD adds more features to this field, that could allow guest escapes similar to CVE-2021-3653 and CVE-2021-3656. Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210914154825.104886-6-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Maxim Levitsky authored
GP SVM errata workaround made the #GP handler always emulate the SVM instructions. However these instructions #GP in case the operand is not 4K aligned, but the workaround code didn't check this and we ended up emulating these instructions anyway. This is only an emulation accuracy check bug as there is no harm for KVM to read/write unaligned vmcb images. Fixes: 82a11e9c ("KVM: SVM: Add emulation support for #GP triggered by SVM instructions") Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210914154825.104886-4-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Maxim Levitsky authored
Test that if: * L1 disables virtual interrupt masking, and INTR intercept. * L1 setups a virtual interrupt to be injected to L2 and enters L2 with interrupts disabled, thus the virtual interrupt is pending. * Now an external interrupt arrives in L1 and since L1 doesn't intercept it, it should be delivered to L2 when it enables interrupts. to do this L0 (abuses) V_IRQ to setup an interrupt window, and returns to L2. * L2 enables interrupts. This should trigger the interrupt window, injection of the external interrupt and delivery of the virtual interrupt that can now be done. * Test that now L2 gets those interrupts. This is the test that demonstrates the issue that was fixed in the previous patch. Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210914154825.104886-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Maxim Levitsky authored
In svm_clear_vintr we try to restore the virtual interrupt injection that might be pending, but we fail to restore the interrupt vector. Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210914154825.104886-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 22 Sep, 2021 26 commits
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Fares Mehanna authored
Intel PMU MSRs is in msrs_to_save_all[], so add AMD PMU MSRs to have a consistent behavior between Intel and AMD when using KVM_GET_MSRS, KVM_SET_MSRS or KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST. We have to add legacy and new MSRs to handle guests running without X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE. Signed-off-by: Fares Mehanna <faresx@amazon.de> Message-Id: <20210915133951.22389-1-faresx@amazon.de> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Maxim Levitsky authored
If L1 had invalid state on VM entry (can happen on SMM transactions when we enter from real mode, straight to nested guest), then after we load 'host' state from VMCS12, the state has to become valid again, but since we load the segment registers with __vmx_set_segment we weren't always updating emulation_required. Update emulation_required explicitly at end of load_vmcs12_host_state. Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210913140954.165665-8-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Maxim Levitsky authored
It is possible that when non root mode is entered via special entry (!from_vmentry), that is from SMM or from loading the nested state, the L2 state could be invalid in regard to non unrestricted guest mode, but later it can become valid. (for example when RSM emulation restores segment registers from SMRAM) Thus delay the check to VM entry, where we will check this and fail. Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210913140954.165665-7-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Maxim Levitsky authored
Since no actual VM entry happened, the VM exit information is stale. To avoid this, synthesize an invalid VM guest state VM exit. Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210913140954.165665-6-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Maxim Levitsky authored
Use return statements instead of nested if, and fix error path to free all the maps that were allocated. Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210913140954.165665-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Maxim Levitsky authored
Currently the KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES on SVM only reloads PDPTRs, and MSR bitmap, with former not really needed for SMM as SMM exit code reloads them again from SMRAM'S CR3, and later happens to work since MSR bitmap isn't modified while in SMM. Still it is better to be consistient with VMX. Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210913140954.165665-5-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Maxim Levitsky authored
When exiting SMM, pdpts are loaded again from the guest memory. This fixes a theoretical bug, when exit from SMM triggers entry to the nested guest which re-uses some of the migration code which uses this flag as a workaround for a legacy userspace. Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210913140954.165665-4-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Maxim Levitsky authored
Otherwise guest entry code might see incorrect L1 state (e.g paging state). Fixes: 37be407b ("KVM: nSVM: Fix L1 state corruption upon return from SMM") Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210913140954.165665-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
Windows Server 2022 with Hyper-V role enabled failed to boot on KVM when enlightened VMCS is advertised. Debugging revealed there are two exposed secondary controls it is not happy with: SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC and SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS. These controls are known to be unsupported, as there are no corresponding fields in eVMCSv1 (see the comment above EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_2NDEXEC definition). Previously, commit 31de3d25 ("x86/kvm/hyper-v: move VMX controls sanitization out of nested_enable_evmcs()") introduced the required filtering mechanism for VMX MSRs but for some reason put only known to be problematic (and not full EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_* lists) controls there. Note, Windows Server 2022 seems to have gained some sanity check for VMX MSRs: it doesn't even try to launch a guest when there's something it doesn't like, nested_evmcs_check_controls() mechanism can't catch the problem. Let's be bold this time and instead of playing whack-a-mole just filter out all unsupported controls from VMX MSRs. Fixes: 31de3d25 ("x86/kvm/hyper-v: move VMX controls sanitization out of nested_enable_evmcs()") Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210907163530.110066-1-vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Sean Christopherson authored
Check for a NULL cpumask_var_t when kicking multiple vCPUs via cpumask_available(), which performs a !NULL check if and only if cpumasks are configured to be allocated off-stack. This is a meaningless optimization, e.g. avoids a TEST+Jcc and TEST+CMOV on x86, but more importantly helps document that the NULL check is necessary even though all callers pass in a local variable. No functional change intended. Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210827092516.1027264-3-vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Sean Christopherson authored
Fix a benign data race reported by syzbot+KCSAN[*] by ensuring vcpu->cpu is read exactly once, and by ensuring the vCPU is booted from guest mode if kvm_arch_vcpu_should_kick() returns true. Fix a similar race in kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask() by ensuring the vCPU is interrupted if kvm_request_needs_ipi() returns true. Reading vcpu->cpu before vcpu->mode (via kvm_arch_vcpu_should_kick() or kvm_request_needs_ipi()) means the target vCPU could get migrated (change vcpu->cpu) and enter !OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE between reading vcpu->cpud and reading vcpu->mode. If that happens, the kick/IPI will be sent to the old pCPU, not the new pCPU that is now running the vCPU or reading SPTEs. Although failing to kick the vCPU is not exactly ideal, practically speaking it cannot cause a functional issue unless there is also a bug in the caller, and any such bug would exist regardless of kvm_vcpu_kick()'s behavior. The purpose of sending an IPI is purely to get a vCPU into the host (or out of reading SPTEs) so that the vCPU can recognize a change in state, e.g. a KVM_REQ_* request. If vCPU's handling of the state change is required for correctness, KVM must ensure either the vCPU sees the change before entering the guest, or that the sender sees the vCPU as running in guest mode. All architectures handle this by (a) sending the request before calling kvm_vcpu_kick() and (b) checking for requests _after_ setting vcpu->mode. x86's READING_SHADOW_PAGE_TABLES has similar requirements; KVM needs to ensure it kicks and waits for vCPUs that started reading SPTEs _before_ MMU changes were finalized, but any vCPU that starts reading after MMU changes were finalized will see the new state and can continue on uninterrupted. For uses of kvm_vcpu_kick() that are not paired with a KVM_REQ_*, e.g. x86's kvm_arch_sync_dirty_log(), the order of the kick must not be relied upon for functional correctness, e.g. in the dirty log case, userspace cannot assume it has a 100% complete log if vCPUs are still running. All that said, eliminate the benign race since the cost of doing so is an "extra" atomic cmpxchg() in the case where the target vCPU is loaded by the current pCPU or is not loaded at all. I.e. the kick will be skipped due to kvm_vcpu_exiting_guest_mode() seeing a compatible vcpu->mode as opposed to the kick being skipped because of the cpu checks. Keep the "cpu != me" checks even though they appear useless/impossible at first glance. x86 processes guest IPI writes in a fast path that runs in IN_GUEST_MODE, i.e. can call kvm_vcpu_kick() from IN_GUEST_MODE. And calling kvm_vm_bugged()->kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask() from IN_GUEST or READING_SHADOW_PAGE_TABLES is perfectly reasonable. Note, a race with the cpu_online() check in kvm_vcpu_kick() likely persists, e.g. the vCPU could exit guest mode and get offlined between the cpu_online() check and the sending of smp_send_reschedule(). But, the online check appears to exist only to avoid a WARN in x86's native_smp_send_reschedule() that fires if the target CPU is not online. The reschedule WARN exists because CPU offlining takes the CPU out of the scheduling pool, i.e. the WARN is intended to detect the case where the kernel attempts to schedule a task on an offline CPU. The actual sending of the IPI is a non-issue as at worst it will simpy be dropped on the floor. In other words, KVM's usurping of the reschedule IPI could theoretically trigger a WARN if the stars align, but there will be no loss of functionality. [*] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=cd4154e502f43f10808a Cc: Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@google.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Fixes: 97222cc8 ("KVM: Emulate local APIC in kernel") Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210827092516.1027264-2-vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
KASAN reports the following issue: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask+0x174/0x440 [kvm] Read of size 8 at addr ffffc9001364f638 by task qemu-kvm/4798 CPU: 0 PID: 4798 Comm: qemu-kvm Tainted: G X --------- --- Hardware name: AMD Corporation DAYTONA_X/DAYTONA_X, BIOS RYM0081C 07/13/2020 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xa5/0xe6 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x130 ? kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask+0x174/0x440 [kvm] __kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x114 ? kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask+0x174/0x440 [kvm] kasan_report+0x38/0x50 kasan_check_range+0xf5/0x1d0 kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask+0x174/0x440 [kvm] kvm_make_scan_ioapic_request_mask+0x84/0xc0 [kvm] ? kvm_arch_exit+0x110/0x110 [kvm] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 ioapic_write_indirect+0x59f/0x9e0 [kvm] ? static_obj+0xc0/0xc0 ? __lock_acquired+0x1d2/0x8c0 ? kvm_ioapic_eoi_inject_work+0x120/0x120 [kvm] The problem appears to be that 'vcpu_bitmap' is allocated as a single long on stack and it should really be KVM_MAX_VCPUS long. We also seem to clear the lower 16 bits of it with bitmap_zero() for no particular reason (my guess would be that 'bitmap' and 'vcpu_bitmap' variables in kvm_bitmap_or_dest_vcpus() caused the confusion: while the later is indeed 16-bit long, the later should accommodate all possible vCPUs). Fixes: 7ee30bc1 ("KVM: x86: deliver KVM IOAPIC scan request to target vCPUs") Fixes: 9a2ae9f6 ("KVM: x86: Zero the IOAPIC scan request dest vCPUs bitmap") Reported-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210827092516.1027264-7-vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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David Matlack authored
The calculation to get the per-slot dirty bitmap was incorrect leading to a buffer overrun. Fix it by splitting out the dirty bitmap into a separate bitmap per slot. Fixes: 609e6202 ("KVM: selftests: Support multiple slots in dirty_log_perf_test") Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210917173657.44011-4-dmatlack@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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David Matlack authored
All selftests that support the backing_src option were printing their own description of the flag and then calling backing_src_help() to dump the list of available backing sources. Consolidate the flag printing in backing_src_help() to align indentation, reduce duplicated strings, and improve consistency across tests. Note: Passing "-s" to backing_src_help is unnecessary since every test uses the same flag. However I decided to keep it for code readability at the call sites. While here this opportunistically fixes the incorrectly interleaved printing -x help message and list of backing source types in dirty_log_perf_test. Fixes: 609e6202 ("KVM: selftests: Support multiple slots in dirty_log_perf_test") Reviewed-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Message-Id: <20210917173657.44011-3-dmatlack@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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David Matlack authored
Every other KVM selftest uses -s for the backing_src, so switch demand_paging_test to match. Reviewed-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Message-Id: <20210917173657.44011-2-dmatlack@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Peter Gonda authored
A mirrored SEV-ES VM will need to call KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA to setup its vCPUs and have them measured, and their VMSAs encrypted. Without this change, it is impossible to have mirror VMs as part of SEV-ES VMs. Also allow the guest status check and debugging commands since they do not change any guest state. Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com> Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com> Cc: Nathan Tempelman <natet@google.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 54526d1f ("KVM: x86: Support KVM VMs sharing SEV context", 2021-04-21) Message-Id: <20210921150345.2221634-3-pgonda@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Peter Gonda authored
For mirroring SEV-ES the mirror VM will need more then just the ASID. The FD and the handle are required to all the mirror to call psp commands. The mirror VM will need to call KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA to setup its vCPUs' VMSAs for SEV-ES. Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com> Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com> Cc: Nathan Tempelman <natet@google.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 54526d1f ("KVM: x86: Support KVM VMs sharing SEV context", 2021-04-21) Message-Id: <20210921150345.2221634-2-pgonda@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Chenyi Qiang authored
Nested bus lock VM exits are not supported yet. If L2 triggers bus lock VM exit, it will be directed to L1 VMM, which would cause unexpected behavior. Therefore, handle L2's bus lock VM exits in L0 directly. Fixes: fe6b6bc8 ("KVM: VMX: Enable bus lock VM exit") Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Message-Id: <20210914095041.29764-1-chenyi.qiang@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Sean Christopherson authored
Use vcpu_idx to identify vCPU0 when updating HyperV's TSC page, which is shared by all vCPUs and "owned" by vCPU0 (because vCPU0 is the only vCPU that's guaranteed to exist). Using kvm_get_vcpu() to find vCPU works, but it's a rather odd and suboptimal method to check the index of a given vCPU. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210910183220.2397812-3-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Sean Christopherson authored
Read vcpu->vcpu_idx directly instead of bouncing through the one-line wrapper, kvm_vcpu_get_idx(), and drop the wrapper. The wrapper is a remnant of the original implementation and serves no purpose; remove it before it gains more users. Back when kvm_vcpu_get_idx() was added by commit 497d72d8 ("KVM: Add kvm_vcpu_get_idx to get vcpu index in kvm->vcpus"), the implementation was more than just a simple wrapper as vcpu->vcpu_idx did not exist and retrieving the index meant walking over the vCPU array to find the given vCPU. When vcpu_idx was introduced by commit 8750e72a ("KVM: remember position in kvm->vcpus array"), the helper was left behind, likely to avoid extra thrash (but even then there were only two users, the original arm usage having been removed at some point in the past). No functional change intended. Suggested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210910183220.2397812-2-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Hou Wenlong authored
According to Intel's SDM Vol2 and AMD's APM Vol3, when CR4.TSD is set, use rdtsc/rdtscp instruction above privilege level 0 should trigger a #GP. Fixes: d7eb8203 ("KVM: SVM: Add intercept checks for remaining group7 instructions") Signed-off-by: Hou Wenlong <houwenlong93@linux.alibaba.com> Message-Id: <1297c0dd3f1bb47a6d089f850b629c7aa0247040.1629257115.git.houwenlong93@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Sean Christopherson authored
Require the target guest page to be writable when pinning memory for RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA. Per the SEV API, the PSP writes to guest memory: The result is then encrypted with GCTX.VEK and written to the memory pointed to by GUEST_PADDR field. Fixes: 15fb7de1 ("KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com> Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210914210951.2994260-2-seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Mingwei Zhang authored
DECOMMISSION the current SEV context if binding an ASID fails after RECEIVE_START. Per AMD's SEV API, RECEIVE_START generates a new guest context and thus needs to be paired with DECOMMISSION: The RECEIVE_START command is the only command other than the LAUNCH_START command that generates a new guest context and guest handle. The missing DECOMMISSION can result in subsequent SEV launch failures, as the firmware leaks memory and might not able to allocate more SEV guest contexts in the future. Note, LAUNCH_START suffered the same bug, but was previously fixed by commit 934002cd ("KVM: SVM: Call SEV Guest Decommission if ASID binding fails"). Cc: Alper Gun <alpergun@google.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: David Rienjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com> Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Vipin Sharma <vipinsh@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com> Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Fixes: af43cbbf ("KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command") Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210912181815.3899316-1-mizhang@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Peter Gonda authored
The update-VMSA ioctl touches data stored in struct kvm_vcpu, and therefore should not be performed concurrently with any VCPU ioctl that might cause KVM or the processor to use the same data. Adds vcpu mutex guard to the VMSA updating code. Refactors out __sev_launch_update_vmsa() function to deal with per vCPU parts of sev_launch_update_vmsa(). Fixes: ad73109a ("KVM: SVM: Provide support to launch and run an SEV-ES guest") Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com> Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Message-Id: <20210915171755.3773766-1-pgonda@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Sergey Senozhatsky authored
grow_halt_poll_ns() ignores values between 0 and halt_poll_ns_grow_start (10000 by default). However, when we shrink halt_poll_ns we may fall way below halt_poll_ns_grow_start and endup with halt_poll_ns values that don't make a lot of sense: like 1 or 9, or 19. VCPU1 trace (halt_poll_ns_shrink equals 2): VCPU1 grow 10000 VCPU1 shrink 5000 VCPU1 shrink 2500 VCPU1 shrink 1250 VCPU1 shrink 625 VCPU1 shrink 312 VCPU1 shrink 156 VCPU1 shrink 78 VCPU1 shrink 39 VCPU1 shrink 19 VCPU1 shrink 9 VCPU1 shrink 4 Mirror what grow_halt_poll_ns() does and set halt_poll_ns to 0 as soon as new shrink-ed halt_poll_ns value falls below halt_poll_ns_grow_start. Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210902031100.252080-1-senozhatsky@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Yu Zhang authored
"VMXON pointer" is saved in vmx->nested.vmxon_ptr since commit 3573e22c ("KVM: nVMX: additional checks on vmxon region"). Also, handle_vmptrld() & handle_vmclear() now have logic to check the VMCS pointer against the VMXON pointer. So just remove the obsolete comments of handle_vmon(). Signed-off-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com> Message-Id: <20210908171731.18885-1-yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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