- 23 Feb, 2017 40 commits
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Lars-Peter Clausen authored
commit 38740a5b upstream. When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed. Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined behaviour might occur. Fixes: 2e4c7553 ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support") Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de> Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - Adjust filename - We only use kiocb::private, not kiocb::ki_flags] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Peter Zijlstra authored
commit 321027c1 upstream. Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open() calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group into a hardware context. The problem is exactly that described in commit: f63a8daa ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking") ... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx relation can have changed under us. That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the established locking rules correctly. So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead). Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested() to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means we need to validate state after we acquire the locks. Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab) Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Fixes: f63a8daa ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.netSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - Use ACCESS_ONCE() instead of READ_ONCE() - Test perf_event::group_flags instead of group_caps - Add the err_locked cleanup block, which we didn't need before - Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Peter Zijlstra authored
commit 13005627 upstream. In case of: err_file: fput(event_file), we'll end up calling perf_release() which in turn will free the event. Do not then free the event _again_. Tested-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dvyukov@google.com Cc: eranian@google.com Cc: oleg@redhat.com Cc: panand@redhat.com Cc: sasha.levin@oracle.com Cc: vince@deater.net Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160224174947.697350349@infradead.orgSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Peter Zijlstra authored
commit f63a8daa upstream. There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those. It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please give it some thought in review. What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.orgSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Peter Hurley authored
commit dd42bf11 upstream. Line discipline drivers may mistakenly misuse ldisc-related fields when initializing. For example, a failure to initialize tty->receive_room in the N_GIGASET_M101 line discipline was recently found and fixed [1]. Now, the N_X25 line discipline has been discovered accessing the previous line discipline's already-freed private data [2]. Harden the ldisc interface against misuse by initializing revelant tty fields before instancing the new line discipline. [1] commit fd98e941 Author: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc> Date: Tue Jul 14 00:37:13 2015 +0200 isdn/gigaset: reset tty->receive_room when attaching ser_gigaset [2] Report from Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> [ 634.336761] ================================================================== [ 634.338226] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in x25_asy_open_tty+0x13d/0x490 at addr ffff8800a743efd0 [ 634.339558] Read of size 4 by task syzkaller_execu/8981 [ 634.340359] ============================================================================= [ 634.341598] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected ... [ 634.405018] Call Trace: [ 634.405277] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52) [ 634.405775] print_trailer (mm/slub.c:655) [ 634.406361] object_err (mm/slub.c:662) [ 634.406824] kasan_report_error (mm/kasan/report.c:138 mm/kasan/report.c:236) [ 634.409581] __asan_report_load4_noabort (mm/kasan/report.c:279) [ 634.411355] x25_asy_open_tty (drivers/net/wan/x25_asy.c:559 (discriminator 1)) [ 634.413997] tty_ldisc_open.isra.2 (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:447) [ 634.414549] tty_set_ldisc (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:567) [ 634.415057] tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2646 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2879) [ 634.423524] do_vfs_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:43 fs/ioctl.c:607) [ 634.427491] SyS_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:622 fs/ioctl.c:613) [ 634.427945] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:188) Cc: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Peter Zijlstra authored
commit 12ca6ad2 upstream. There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array while it can still have events on. This will result in a use-after-free which is BAD. Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing around and no use-after-free takes place. When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage will occur. Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Calvin Owens authored
commit f3951a37 upstream. In sg_common_write(), we free the block request and return -ENODEV if the device is detached in the middle of the SG_IO ioctl(). Unfortunately, sg_finish_rem_req() also tries to free srp->rq, so we end up freeing rq->cmd in the already free rq object, and then free the object itself out from under the current user. This ends up corrupting random memory via the list_head on the rq object. The most common crash trace I saw is this: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at block/blk-core.c:1420! Call Trace: [<ffffffff81281eab>] blk_put_request+0x5b/0x80 [<ffffffffa0069e5b>] sg_finish_rem_req+0x6b/0x120 [sg] [<ffffffffa006bcb9>] sg_common_write.isra.14+0x459/0x5a0 [sg] [<ffffffff8125b328>] ? selinux_file_alloc_security+0x48/0x70 [<ffffffffa006bf95>] sg_new_write.isra.17+0x195/0x2d0 [sg] [<ffffffffa006cef4>] sg_ioctl+0x644/0xdb0 [sg] [<ffffffff81170f80>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x90/0x520 [<ffffffff81258967>] ? file_has_perm+0x97/0xb0 [<ffffffff811714a1>] SyS_ioctl+0x91/0xb0 [<ffffffff81602afb>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2 RIP [<ffffffff81281e04>] __blk_put_request+0x154/0x1a0 The solution is straightforward: just set srp->rq to NULL in the failure branch so that sg_finish_rem_req() doesn't attempt to re-free it. Additionally, since sg_rq_end_io() will never be called on the object when this happens, we need to free memory backing ->cmd if it isn't embedded in the object itself. KASAN was extremely helpful in finding the root cause of this bug. Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com> Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - sg_finish_rem_req() would not free srp->rq->cmd so don't do it here either - Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Dan Carpenter authored
commit 93a97c50 upstream. If we can't allocate the resources in gigaset_initdriver() then we should return -ENOMEM instead of zero. Fixes: 2869b23e ("[PATCH] drivers/isdn/gigaset: new M101 driver (v2)") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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추지호 authored
commit b67d0dd7 upstream. Fix for bad memory access while disconnecting. netdev is freed before private data free, and dev is accessed after freeing netdev. This makes a slub problem, and it raise kernel oops with slub debugger config. Signed-off-by: Jiho Chu <jiho.chu@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Marc Kleine-Budde authored
commit 332b05ca upstream. This patch adds a check to limit the number of can_filters that can be set via setsockopt on CAN_RAW sockets. Otherwise allocations > MAX_ORDER are not prevented resulting in a warning. Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/12/2/230Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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John David Anglin authored
commit febe4296 upstream. We have four routines in pacache.S that use temporary alias pages: copy_user_page_asm(), clear_user_page_asm(), flush_dcache_page_asm() and flush_icache_page_asm(). copy_user_page_asm() and clear_user_page_asm() don't purge the TLB entry used for the operation. flush_dcache_page_asm() and flush_icache_page_asm do purge the entry. Presumably, this was thought to optimize TLB use. However, the operation is quite heavy weight on PA 1.X processors as we need to take the TLB lock and a TLB broadcast is sent to all processors. This patch removes the purges from flush_dcache_page_asm() and flush_icache_page_asm. Signed-off-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net> Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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John David Anglin authored
commit c78e710c upstream. The attached change interchanges the order of purging the TLB and setting the corresponding page table entry. TLB purges are strongly ordered. It occurred to me one night that setting the PTE first might have subtle ordering issues on SMP machines and cause random memory corruption. A TLB lock guards the insertion of user TLB entries. So after the TLB is purged, a new entry can't be inserted until the lock is released. This ensures that the new PTE value is used when the lock is released. Since making this change, no random segmentation faults have been observed on the Debian hppa buildd servers. Signed-off-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net> Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Miklos Szeredi authored
commit c01638f5 upstream. Basically, the pjdfstests set the ownership of a file to 06555, and then chowns it (as root) to a new uid/gid. Prior to commit a09f99ed ("fuse: fix killing s[ug]id in setattr"), fuse would send down a setattr with both the uid/gid change and a new mode. Now, it just sends down the uid/gid change. Technically this is NOTABUG, since POSIX doesn't _require_ that we clear these bits for a privileged process, but Linux (wisely) has done that and I think we don't want to change that behavior here. This is caused by the use of should_remove_suid(), which will always return 0 when the process has CAP_FSETID. In fact we really don't need to be calling should_remove_suid() at all, since we've already been indicated that we should remove the suid, we just don't want to use a (very) stale mode for that. This patch should fix the above as well as simplify the logic. Reported-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Fixes: a09f99ed ("fuse: fix killing s[ug]id in setattr") Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context, indentation] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Peter Zijlstra (Intel) authored
commit 7f612a7f upstream. Lukasz reported that perf stat counters overflow handling is broken on KNL/SLM. Both these parts have full_width_write set, and that does indeed have a problem. In order to deal with counter wrap, we must sample the counter at at least half the counter period (see also the sampling theorem) such that we can unambiguously reconstruct the count. However commit: 069e0c3c ("perf/x86/intel: Support full width counting") sets the sampling interval to the full period, not half. Fixing that exposes another issue, in that we must not sign extend the delta value when we shift it right; the counter cannot have decremented after all. With both these issues fixed, counter overflow functions correctly again. Reported-by: Lukasz Odzioba <lukasz.odzioba@intel.com> Tested-by: Liang, Kan <kan.liang@intel.com> Tested-by: Odzioba, Lukasz <lukasz.odzioba@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Fixes: 069e0c3c ("perf/x86/intel: Support full width counting") Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filenames] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Florian Fainelli authored
commit c823abac upstream. When we unload the ep93xx_eth, whether we have opened the network interface or not, we will either hit a kernel paging request error, or a simple NULL pointer de-reference because: - if ep93xx_open has been called, we have created a valid DMA mapping for ep->descs, when we call ep93xx_stop, we also call ep93xx_free_buffers, ep->descs now has a stale value - if ep93xx_open has not been called, we have a NULL pointer for ep->descs, so performing any operation against that address just won't work Fix this by adding a NULL pointer check for ep->descs which means that ep93xx_free_buffers() was able to successfully tear down the descriptors and free the DMA cookie as well. Fixes: 1d22e05d ("[PATCH] Cirrus Logic ep93xx ethernet driver") Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Kees Cook authored
commit 0eab121e upstream. Prior to commit c0371da6 ("put iov_iter into msghdr") in v3.19, there was no check that the iovec contained enough bytes for an ICMP header, and the read loop would walk across neighboring stack contents. Since the iov_iter conversion, bad arguments are noticed, but the returned error is EFAULT. Returning EINVAL is a clearer error and also solves the problem prior to v3.19. This was found using trinity with KASAN on v3.18: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy_fromiovec+0x60/0x114 at addr ffffffc071077da0 Read of size 8 by task trinity-c2/9623 page:ffffffbe034b9a08 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 flags: 0x0() page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected CPU: 0 PID: 9623 Comm: trinity-c2 Tainted: G BU 3.18.0-dirty #15 Hardware name: Google Tegra210 Smaug Rev 1,3+ (DT) Call trace: [<ffffffc000209c98>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1ac arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:90 [<ffffffc000209e54>] show_stack+0x10/0x1c arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:171 [< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [<ffffffc000f18dc4>] dump_stack+0x7c/0xd0 lib/dump_stack.c:50 [< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:147 [< inline >] kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:236 [<ffffffc000373dcc>] kasan_report+0x380/0x4b8 mm/kasan/report.c:259 [< inline >] check_memory_region mm/kasan/kasan.c:264 [<ffffffc00037352c>] __asan_load8+0x20/0x70 mm/kasan/kasan.c:507 [<ffffffc0005b9624>] memcpy_fromiovec+0x5c/0x114 lib/iovec.c:15 [< inline >] memcpy_from_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:2667 [<ffffffc000ddeba0>] ping_common_sendmsg+0x50/0x108 net/ipv4/ping.c:674 [<ffffffc000dded30>] ping_v4_sendmsg+0xd8/0x698 net/ipv4/ping.c:714 [<ffffffc000dc91dc>] inet_sendmsg+0xe0/0x12c net/ipv4/af_inet.c:749 [< inline >] __sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:624 [< inline >] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:632 [<ffffffc000cab61c>] sock_sendmsg+0x124/0x164 net/socket.c:643 [< inline >] SYSC_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [<ffffffc000cad270>] SyS_sendto+0x178/0x1d8 net/socket.c:1761 CVE-2016-8399 Reported-by: Qidan He <i@flanker017.me> Fixes: c319b4d7 ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Michal Kubeček authored
commit 3de81b75 upstream. Qian Zhang (张谦) reported a potential socket buffer overflow in tipc_msg_build() which is also known as CVE-2016-8632: due to insufficient checks, a buffer overflow can occur if MTU is too short for even tipc headers. As anyone can set device MTU in a user/net namespace, this issue can be abused by a regular user. As agreed in the discussion on Ben Hutchings' original patch, we should check the MTU at the moment a bearer is attached rather than for each processed packet. We also need to repeat the check when bearer MTU is adjusted to new device MTU. UDP case also needs a check to avoid overflow when calculating bearer MTU. Fixes: b97bf3fd ("[TIPC] Initial merge") Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Reported-by: Qian Zhang (张谦) <zhangqian-c@360.cn> Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - Adjust context - Duplicate macro definitions in bearer.h to avoid mutual inclusion - NETDEV_DOWN and NETDEV_CHANGEMTU cases in net notifier were combined - Drop changes in udp_media.c] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Chris Brandt authored
commit 33d446db upstream. When streaming a lot of data and the RZ/A1 can't keep up, some status bits will get set that are not being checked or cleared which cause the following messages and the Ethernet driver to stop working. This patch fixes that issue. irq 21: nobody cared (try booting with the "irqpoll" option) handlers: [<c036b71c>] sh_eth_interrupt Disabling IRQ #21 Fixes: db893473 ("sh_eth: Add support for r7s72100") Signed-off-by: Chris Brandt <chris.brandt@renesas.com> Acked-by: Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Florian Fainelli authored
commit 8c4799ac upstream. __bcmgenet_tx_reclaim() and bcmgenet_free_rx_buffers() are not using the same struct device during unmap that was used for the map operation, which makes DMA-API debugging warn about it. Fix this by always using &priv->pdev->dev throughout the driver, using an identical device reference for all map/unmap calls. Fixes: 1c1008c7 ("net: bcmgenet: add main driver file") Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - Adjust context - Also fix call from bcmgenet_desc_rx(), fixed upstream in commit d6707bec "net: bcmgenet: rewrite bcmgenet_rx_refill()"] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Eli Cooper authored
commit b4e479a9 upstream. When xfrm is applied to TSO/GSO packets, it follows this path: xfrm_output() -> xfrm_output_gso() -> skb_gso_segment() where skb_gso_segment() relies on skb->protocol to function properly. This patch sets skb->protocol to ETH_P_IPV6 before dst_output() is called, fixing a bug where GSO packets sent through an ipip6 tunnel are dropped when xfrm is involved. Signed-off-by: Eli Cooper <elicooper@gmx.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Eli Cooper authored
commit f4180439 upstream. When xfrm is applied to TSO/GSO packets, it follows this path: xfrm_output() -> xfrm_output_gso() -> skb_gso_segment() where skb_gso_segment() relies on skb->protocol to function properly. This patch sets skb->protocol to ETH_P_IP before dst_output() is called, fixing a bug where GSO packets sent through a sit tunnel are dropped when xfrm is involved. Signed-off-by: Eli Cooper <elicooper@gmx.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Philip Pettersson authored
commit 84ac7260 upstream. When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished. This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously initialized timer will not be deleted. The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start of packet_set_ring. Fixes: f6fb8f10 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.") Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit dbb26055 upstream. David reported a futex/rtmutex state corruption. It's caused by the following problem: CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 l->owner=T1 rt_mutex_lock(l) lock(l->wait_lock) l->owner = T1 | HAS_WAITERS; enqueue(T2) boost() unlock(l->wait_lock) schedule() rt_mutex_lock(l) lock(l->wait_lock) l->owner = T1 | HAS_WAITERS; enqueue(T3) boost() unlock(l->wait_lock) schedule() signal(->T2) signal(->T3) lock(l->wait_lock) dequeue(T2) deboost() unlock(l->wait_lock) lock(l->wait_lock) dequeue(T3) ===> wait list is now empty deboost() unlock(l->wait_lock) lock(l->wait_lock) fixup_rt_mutex_waiters() if (wait_list_empty(l)) { owner = l->owner & ~HAS_WAITERS; l->owner = owner ==> l->owner = T1 } lock(l->wait_lock) rt_mutex_unlock(l) fixup_rt_mutex_waiters() if (wait_list_empty(l)) { owner = l->owner & ~HAS_WAITERS; cmpxchg(l->owner, T1, NULL) ===> Success (l->owner = NULL) l->owner = owner ==> l->owner = T1 } That means the problem is caused by fixup_rt_mutex_waiters() which does the RMW to clear the waiters bit unconditionally when there are no waiters in the rtmutexes rbtree. This can be fatal: A concurrent unlock can release the rtmutex in the fastpath because the waiters bit is not set. If the cmpxchg() gets in the middle of the RMW operation then the previous owner, which just unlocked the rtmutex is set as the owner again when the write takes place after the successfull cmpxchg(). The solution is rather trivial: verify that the owner member of the rtmutex has the waiters bit set before clearing it. This does not require a cmpxchg() or other atomic operations because the waiters bit can only be set and cleared with the rtmutex wait_lock held. It's also safe against the fast path unlock attempt. The unlock attempt via cmpxchg() will either see the bit set and take the slowpath or see the bit cleared and release it atomically in the fastpath. It's remarkable that the test program provided by David triggers on ARM64 and MIPS64 really quick, but it refuses to reproduce on x86-64, while the problem exists there as well. That refusal might explain that this got not discovered earlier despite the bug existing from day one of the rtmutex implementation more than 10 years ago. Thanks to David for meticulously instrumenting the code and providing the information which allowed to decode this subtle problem. Reported-by: David Daney <ddaney@caviumnetworks.com> Tested-by: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sebastian Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Fixes: 23f78d4a ("[PATCH] pi-futex: rt mutex core") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161130210030.351136722@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: use ACCESS_ONCE() instead of {READ,WRITE}_ONCE()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Sven Eckelmann authored
commit c2d0f48a upstream. batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_local_data can fail to allocate the memory for the new TVLV block. The caller is informed about this problem with the returned length of 0. Not checking this value results in an invalid memory access when either tt_data or tt_change is accessed. Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Fixes: 7ea7b4a1 ("batman-adv: make the TT CRC logic VLAN specific") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org> Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Andrew Donnellan authored
commit 409bf7f8 upstream. In eeh_reset_device(), we take the pci_rescan_remove_lock immediately after after we call eeh_reset_pe() to reset the PCI controller. We then call eeh_clear_pe_frozen_state(), which can return an error. In this case, we bail out of eeh_reset_device() without calling pci_unlock_rescan_remove(). Add a call to pci_unlock_rescan_remove() in the eeh_clear_pe_frozen_state() error path so that we don't cause a deadlock later on. Reported-by: Pradipta Ghosh <pradghos@in.ibm.com> Fixes: 78954700 ("powerpc/eeh: Avoid I/O access during PE reset") Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Acked-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Hongxu Jia authored
commit 17a49cd5 upstream. Since 09d96860 ("netfilter: x_tables: do compat validation via translate_table"), it used compatr structure to assign newinfo structure. In translate_compat_table of ip_tables.c and ip6_tables.c, it used compatr->hook_entry to replace info->hook_entry and compatr->underflow to replace info->underflow, but not do the same replacement in arp_tables.c. It caused invoking 32-bit "arptbale -P INPUT ACCEPT" failed in 64bit kernel. -------------------------------------- root@qemux86-64:~# arptables -P INPUT ACCEPT root@qemux86-64:~# arptables -P INPUT ACCEPT ERROR: Policy for `INPUT' offset 448 != underflow 0 arptables: Incompatible with this kernel -------------------------------------- Fixes: 09d96860 ("netfilter: x_tables: do compat validation via translate_table") Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com> Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Johan Hovold authored
commit 0e1614ac upstream. Make sure to drop the reference to the parent device taken by class_find_device() after "unexporting" any children when deregistering a PWM chip. Fixes: 0733424c ("pwm: Unexport children before chip removal") Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Jack Morgenstein authored
net/mlx4: Fix uninitialized fields in rule when adding promiscuous mode to device managed flow steering commit 44b911e7 upstream. In procedure mlx4_flow_steer_promisc_add(), several fields were left uninitialized in the rule structure. Correctly initialize these fields. Fixes: 592e49dd ("net/mlx4: Implement promiscuous mode with device managed flow-steering") Signed-off-by: Jack Morgenstein <jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Andrew Lunn authored
commit 97db8afa upstream. The mvneta driver advertises it supports IFF_UNICAST_FLT. However, it actually does not. The hardware probably does support it, but there is no code to configure the filter. As a quick and simple fix, remove the flag. This will cause the core to fall back to promiscuous mode. Signed-off-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Fixes: b50b72de ("net: mvneta: enable features before registering the driver") Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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John David Anglin authored
commit 5035b230 upstream. This is the second issue I noticed in reviewing the parisc TLB code. The fic instruction may use either the instruction or data TLB in flushing the instruction cache. Thus, on machines with a split TLB, we should also flush the data TLB after setting up the temporary alias registers. Although this has no functional impact, I changed the pdtlb and pitlb instructions to consistently use the index register %r0. These instructions do not support integer displacements. Tested on rp3440 and c8000. Signed-off-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net> Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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John David Anglin authored
commit c0452fb9 upstream. We are still troubled by occasional random segmentation faults and memory memory corruption on SMP machines. The causes quite a few package builds to fail on the Debian buildd machines for parisc. When gcc-6 failed to build three times in a row, I looked again at the TLB related code. I found a couple of issues. This is the first. In general, we need to ensure page table updates and corresponding TLB purges are atomic. The attached patch fixes an instance in pci-dma.c where the page table update was not guarded by the TLB lock. Tested on rp3440 and c8000. So far, no further random segmentation faults have been observed. Signed-off-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net> Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Andrey Ryabinin authored
commit f5527fff upstream. This fixes CVE-2016-8650. If mpi_powm() is given a zero exponent, it wants to immediately return either 1 or 0, depending on the modulus. However, if the result was initalised with zero limb space, no limbs space is allocated and a NULL-pointer exception ensues. Fix this by allocating a minimal amount of limb space for the result when the 0-exponent case when the result is 1 and not touching the limb space when the result is 0. This affects the use of RSA keys and X.509 certificates that carry them. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 PGD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 3014 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.9.0-rc6-fscache+ #278 Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014 task: ffff8804011944c0 task.stack: ffff880401294000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8138ce5d>] [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 RSP: 0018:ffff880401297ad8 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88040868bec0 RCX: ffff88040868bba0 RDX: ffff88040868b260 RSI: ffff88040868bec0 RDI: ffff88040868bee0 RBP: ffff880401297ba8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000047 R11: ffffffff8183b210 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8804087c7600 R14: 000000000000001f R15: ffff880401297c50 FS: 00007f7a7918c700(0000) GS:ffff88041fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000401250000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 Stack: ffff88040868bec0 0000000000000020 ffff880401297b00 ffffffff81376cd4 0000000000000100 ffff880401297b10 ffffffff81376d12 ffff880401297b30 ffffffff81376f37 0000000000000100 0000000000000000 ffff880401297ba8 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81376cd4>] ? __sg_page_iter_next+0x43/0x66 [<ffffffff81376d12>] ? sg_miter_get_next_page+0x1b/0x5d [<ffffffff81376f37>] ? sg_miter_next+0x17/0xbd [<ffffffff8138ba3a>] ? mpi_read_raw_from_sgl+0xf2/0x146 [<ffffffff8132a95c>] rsa_verify+0x9d/0xee [<ffffffff8132acca>] ? pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf+0x2e/0xbb [<ffffffff8132af40>] pkcs1pad_verify+0xc0/0xe1 [<ffffffff8133cb5e>] public_key_verify_signature+0x1b0/0x228 [<ffffffff8133d974>] x509_check_for_self_signed+0xa1/0xc4 [<ffffffff8133cdde>] x509_cert_parse+0x167/0x1a1 [<ffffffff8133d609>] x509_key_preparse+0x21/0x1a1 [<ffffffff8133c3d7>] asymmetric_key_preparse+0x34/0x61 [<ffffffff812fc9f3>] key_create_or_update+0x145/0x399 [<ffffffff812fe227>] SyS_add_key+0x154/0x19e [<ffffffff81001c2b>] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x191 [<ffffffff816825e4>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Code: 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 81 ec a8 00 00 00 44 8b 71 04 8b 42 04 4c 8b 67 18 45 85 f6 89 45 80 0f 84 b4 06 00 00 85 c0 75 2f 41 ff ce <49> c7 04 24 01 00 00 00 b0 01 75 0b 48 8b 41 18 48 83 38 01 0f RIP [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 RSP <ffff880401297ad8> CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace d82015255d4a5d8d ]--- Basically, this is a backport of a libgcrypt patch: http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libgcrypt.git;a=patch;h=6e1adb05d290aeeb1c230c763970695f4a538526 Fixes: cdec9cb5 ("crypto: GnuPG based MPI lib - source files (part 1)") Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Radim Krčmář authored
commit 2117d539 upstream. em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64 bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees). Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack. We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator for this. Found by syzkaller: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [...] Call Trace: [...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51 [...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179 [...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542 [...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585 [...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 [...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227 [...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294 [...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545 [...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116 [...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870 [...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934 [...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978 [...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557 [...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43 [...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679 [...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694 [...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685 [...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Fixes: d1442d85 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps") Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Dan Carpenter authored
commit c4597fd7 upstream. 'm_io' is stored in 6 bits so it's a number in the 0-63 range. Static analysis tools complain that 1 << 63 will wrap so I have changed it to 1ULL << m_io. This code is over three years old so presumably the bug doesn't happen very frequently in real life or someone would have complained by now. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com> Cc: Dimitri Sivanich <sivanich@sgi.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Travis <travis@sgi.com> Cc: Nathan Zimmer <nzimmer@sgi.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b15cc4a1 ("x86, uv, uv3: Update x2apic Support for SGI UV3") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161123221908.GA23997@mwandaSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit 22a1e778 upstream. The commit 8dfbcc43 ("[media] xc2028: avoid use after free") tried to address the reported use-after-free by clearing the reference. However, it's clearing the wrong pointer; it sets NULL to priv->ctrl.fname, but it's anyway overwritten by the next line memcpy(&priv->ctrl, p, sizeof(priv->ctrl)). OTOH, the actual code accessing the freed string is the strcmp() call with priv->fname: if (!firmware_name[0] && p->fname && priv->fname && strcmp(p->fname, priv->fname)) free_firmware(priv); where priv->fname points to the previous file name, and this was already freed by kfree(). For fixing the bug properly, this patch does the following: - Keep the copy of firmware file name in only priv->fname, priv->ctrl.fname isn't changed; - The allocation is done only when the firmware gets loaded; - The kfree() is called in free_firmware() commonly Fixes: commit 8dfbcc43 ('[media] xc2028: avoid use after free') Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Chris Metcalf authored
commit e658a6f1 upstream. For large values of "mult" and long uptimes, the intermediate result of "cycles * mult" can overflow 64 bits. For example, the tile platform calls clocksource_cyc2ns with a 1.2 GHz clock; we have mult = 853, and after 208.5 days, we overflow 64 bits. Since clocksource_cyc2ns() is intended to be used for relative cycle counts, not absolute cycle counts, performance is more importance than accepting a wider range of cycle values. So, just use mult_frac() directly in tile's sched_clock(). Commit 4cecf6d4 ("sched, x86: Avoid unnecessary overflow in sched_clock") by Salman Qazi results in essentially the same generated code for x86 as this change does for tile. In fact, a follow-on change by Salman introduced mult_frac() and switched to using it, so the C code was largely identical at that point too. Peter Zijlstra then added mul_u64_u32_shr() and switched x86 to use it. This is, in principle, better; by optimizing the 64x64->64 multiplies to be 32x32->64 multiplies we can potentially save some time. However, the compiler piplines the 64x64->64 multiplies pretty well, and the conditional branch in the generic mul_u64_u32_shr() causes some bubbles in execution, with the result that it's pretty much a wash. If tilegx provided its own implementation of mul_u64_u32_shr() without the conditional branch, we could potentially save 3 cycles, but that seems like small gain for a fair amount of additional build scaffolding; no other platform currently provides a mul_u64_u32_shr() override, and tile doesn't currently have an <asm/div64.h> header to put the override in. Additionally, gcc currently has an optimization bug that prevents it from recognizing the opportunity to use a 32x32->64 multiply, and so the result would be no better than the existing mult_frac() until such time as the compiler is fixed. For now, just using mult_frac() seems like the right answer. Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Andy Lutomirski authored
commit fc0e81b2 upstream. On the 80486 DX, it seems that some exceptions may leave garbage in the high bits of CS. This causes sporadic failures in which early_fixup_exception() refuses to fix up an exception. As far as I can tell, this has been buggy for a long time, but the problem seems to have been exacerbated by commits: 1e02ce4c ("x86: Store a per-cpu shadow copy of CR4") e1bfc11c ("x86/init: Fix cr4_init_shadow() on CR4-less machines") This appears to have broken for as long as we've had early exception handling. [ This backport should apply to kernels from 3.4 - 4.5. ] Fixes: 4c5023a3 ("x86-32: Handle exception table entries during early boot") Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Matthew Whitehead <tedheadster@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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John Johansen authored
commit 3d40658c upstream. After a policy replacement, the task cred may be out of date and need to be updated. However change_hat is using the stale profiles from the out of date cred resulting in either: a stale profile being applied or, incorrect failure when searching for a hat profile as it has been migrated to the new parent profile. Fixes: 01e2b670 (failure to find hat) Fixes: 898127c3 (stale policy being applied) Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1000287Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Guillaume Nault authored
commit 32c23116 upstream. Lock socket before checking the SOCK_ZAPPED flag in l2tp_ip6_bind(). Without lock, a concurrent call could modify the socket flags between the sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) test and the lock_sock() call. This way, a socket could be inserted twice in l2tp_ip6_bind_table. Releasing it would then leave a stale pointer there, generating use-after-free errors when walking through the list or modifying adjacent entries. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 at addr ffff8800081b0ed8 Write of size 8 by task syz-executor/10987 CPU: 0 PID: 10987 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #39 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 ffff880031d97838 ffffffff829f835b ffff88001b5a1640 ffff8800081b0ec0 ffff8800081b15a0 ffff8800081b6d20 ffff880031d97860 ffffffff8174d3cc ffff880031d978f0 ffff8800081b0e80 ffff88001b5a1640 ffff880031d978e0 Call Trace: [<ffffffff829f835b>] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:15 [<ffffffff8174d3cc>] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:156 [< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:194 [<ffffffff8174d666>] kasan_report_error+0x1f6/0x4d0 mm/kasan/report.c:283 [< inline >] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:303 [<ffffffff8174db7e>] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:329 [< inline >] __write_once_size ./include/linux/compiler.h:249 [< inline >] __hlist_del ./include/linux/list.h:622 [< inline >] hlist_del_init ./include/linux/list.h:637 [<ffffffff8579047e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:239 [<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415 [<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422 [<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570 [<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017 [<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208 [<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244 [<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170 [<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00 [<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 [<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307 [<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0 [<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156 [< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190 [<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259 [<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6 Object at ffff8800081b0ec0, in cache L2TP/IPv6 size: 1448 Allocated: PID = 10987 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c9ad>] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cee2>] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 [ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:417 [ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708 [ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2716 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817476a8>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:2721 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4f6a9>] sk_prot_alloc+0x69/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:1326 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c58ac8>] sk_alloc+0x38/0xae0 net/core/sock.c:1388 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851ddf67>] inet6_create+0x2d7/0x1000 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:182 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4af7b>] __sock_create+0x37b/0x640 net/socket.c:1153 [ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sock_create net/socket.c:1193 [ 1116.897025] [< inline >] SYSC_socket net/socket.c:1223 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4b46f>] SyS_socket+0xef/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1203 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d685>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc6 Freed: PID = 10987 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cf61>] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xb0 [ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1352 [ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1374 [ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free mm/slub.c:2951 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81748b28>] kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x330 mm/slub.c:2973 [ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1369 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c541eb>] __sk_destruct+0x32b/0x4f0 net/core/sock.c:1444 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5aca4>] sk_destruct+0x44/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1452 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5ad33>] __sk_free+0x53/0x220 net/core/sock.c:1460 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5af23>] sk_free+0x23/0x30 net/core/sock.c:1471 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5cb6c>] sk_common_release+0x28c/0x3e0 ./include/net/sock.h:1589 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8579044e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x1fe/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:243 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156 [ 1116.897025] [< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259 [ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6 Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8800081b0d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff8800081b0e00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff8800081b0e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8800081b0f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8800081b0f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== The same issue exists with l2tp_ip_bind() and l2tp_ip_bind_table. Fixes: c51ce497 ("l2tp: fix oops in L2TP IP sockets for connect() AF_UNSPEC case") Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com> Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Tested-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Theodore Ts'o authored
commit 8cdf3372 upstream. If the block size or cluster size is insane, reject the mount. This is important for security reasons (although we shouldn't be just depending on this check). Ref: http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/539661 Ref: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1332506Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <kernel@kyup.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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