1. 25 Nov, 2015 1 commit
    • Christoph Biedl's avatar
      isdn: Partially revert debug format string usage clean up · 19cebbcb
      Christoph Biedl authored
      Commit 35a4a573 ("isdn: clean up debug format string usage") introduced
      a safeguard to avoid accidential format string interpolation of data
      when calling debugl1 or HiSax_putstatus. This did however not take into
      account VHiSax_putstatus (called by HiSax_putstatus) does *not* call
      vsprintf if the head parameter is NULL - the format string is treated
      as plain text then instead. As a result, the string "%s" is processed
      literally, and the actual information is lost. This affects the isdnlog
      userspace program which stopped logging information since that commit.
      
      So revert the HiSax_putstatus invocations to the previous state.
      
      Fixes: 35a4a573 ("isdn: clean up debug format string usage")
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarChristoph Biedl <linux-kernel.bfrz@manchmal.in-ulm.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      19cebbcb
  2. 24 Nov, 2015 11 commits
    • Quentin Casasnovas's avatar
      RDS: fix race condition when sending a message on unbound socket · 8c7188b2
      Quentin Casasnovas authored
      Sasha's found a NULL pointer dereference in the RDS connection code when
      sending a message to an apparently unbound socket.  The problem is caused
      by the code checking if the socket is bound in rds_sendmsg(), which checks
      the rs_bound_addr field without taking a lock on the socket.  This opens a
      race where rs_bound_addr is temporarily set but where the transport is not
      in rds_bind(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to
      dereference 'trans' in __rds_conn_create().
      
      Vegard wrote a reproducer for this issue, so kindly ask him to share if
      you're interested.
      
      I cannot reproduce the NULL pointer dereference using Vegard's reproducer
      with this patch, whereas I could without.
      
      Complete earlier incomplete fix to CVE-2015-6937:
      
        74e98eb0 ("RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection")
      
      Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Reviewed-by: default avatarVegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarSasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarSantosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarQuentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      8c7188b2
    • Aaron Conole's avatar
      net: openvswitch: Remove invalid comment · 20f79566
      Aaron Conole authored
      During pre-upstream development, the openvswitch datapath used a custom
      hashtable to store vports that could fail on delete due to lack of
      memory. However, prior to upstream submission, this code was reworked to
      use an hlist based hastable with flexible-array based buckets. As such
      the failure condition was eliminated from the vport_del path, rendering
      this comment invalid.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAaron Conole <aconole@bytheb.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      20f79566
    • Nikolay Aleksandrov's avatar
      net: ipmr, ip6mr: fix vif/tunnel failure race condition · fbdd29bf
      Nikolay Aleksandrov authored
      Since (at least) commit b17a7c17 ("[NET]: Do sysfs registration as
      part of register_netdevice."), netdev_run_todo() deals only with
      unregistration, so we don't need to do the rtnl_unlock/lock cycle to
      finish registration when failing pimreg or dvmrp device creation. In
      fact that opens a race condition where someone can delete the device
      while rtnl is unlocked because it's fully registered. The problem gets
      worse when netlink support is introduced as there are more points of entry
      that can cause it and it also makes reusing that code correctly impossible.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarCong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      fbdd29bf
    • David Howells's avatar
      rxrpc: Correctly handle ack at end of client call transmit phase · 33c40e24
      David Howells authored
      Normally, the transmit phase of a client call is implicitly ack'd by the
      reception of the first data packet of the response being received.
      However, if a security negotiation happens, the transmit phase, if it is
      entirely contained in a single packet, may get an ack packet in response
      and then may get aborted due to security negotiation failure.
      
      Because the client has shifted state to RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_REPLY due
      to having transmitted all the data, the code that handles processing of the
      received ack packet doesn't note the hard ack the data packet.
      
      The following abort packet in the case of security negotiation failure then
      incurs an assertion failure when it tries to drain the Tx queue because the
      hard ack state is out of sync (hard ack means the packets have been
      processed and can be discarded by the sender; a soft ack means that the
      packets are received but could still be discarded and rerequested by the
      receiver).
      
      To fix this, we should record the hard ack we received for the ack packet.
      
      The assertion failure looks like:
      
      	RxRPC: Assertion failed
      	1 <= 0 is false
      	0x1 <= 0x0 is false
      	------------[ cut here ]------------
      	kernel BUG at ../net/rxrpc/ar-ack.c:431!
      	...
      	RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa006857b>]  [<ffffffffa006857b>] rxrpc_rotate_tx_window+0xbc/0x131 [af_rxrpc]
      	...
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      33c40e24
    • Michal Kubeček's avatar
      ipv6: distinguish frag queues by device for multicast and link-local packets · 264640fc
      Michal Kubeček authored
      If a fragmented multicast packet is received on an ethernet device which
      has an active macvlan on top of it, each fragment is duplicated and
      received both on the underlying device and the macvlan. If some
      fragments for macvlan are processed before the whole packet for the
      underlying device is reassembled, the "overlapping fragments" test in
      ip6_frag_queue() discards the whole fragment queue.
      
      To resolve this, add device ifindex to the search key and require it to
      match reassembling multicast packets and packets to link-local
      addresses.
      
      Note: similar patch has been already submitted by Yoshifuji Hideaki in
      
        http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/220979/
      
      but got lost and forgotten for some reason.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMichal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      264640fc
    • Iyappan Subramanian's avatar
      drivers: net: xgene: fix: ifconfig up/down crash · aeb20b6b
      Iyappan Subramanian authored
      Fixing kernel crash when doing ifconfig down and up in a loop,
      
      [ 124.028237] Call trace:
      [ 124.030670] [<ffffffc000367ce0>] memcpy+0x20/0x180
      [ 124.035436] [<ffffffc00053c250>] skb_clone+0x3c/0xa8
      [ 124.040374] [<ffffffc00053ffa4>] __skb_tstamp_tx+0xc0/0x118
      [ 124.045918] [<ffffffc00054000c>] skb_tstamp_tx+0x10/0x1c
      [ 124.051203] [<ffffffc00049bc84>] xgene_enet_start_xmit+0x2e4/0x33c
      [ 124.057352] [<ffffffc00054fc20>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x2e8/0x400
      [ 124.063327] [<ffffffc00056cb14>] sch_direct_xmit+0x90/0x1d4
      [ 124.068870] [<ffffffc000550100>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28c/0x498
      [ 124.074585] [<ffffffc00055031c>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x10/0x1c
      [ 124.080216] [<ffffffc0005c3f14>] ip_finish_output2+0x3d0/0x438
      [ 124.086017] [<ffffffc0005c5794>] ip_finish_output+0x198/0x1ac
      [ 124.091732] [<ffffffc0005c61d4>] ip_output+0xec/0x164
      [ 124.096755] [<ffffffc0005c5910>] ip_local_out_sk+0x38/0x48
      [ 124.102211] [<ffffffc0005c5d84>] ip_queue_xmit+0x288/0x330
      [ 124.107668] [<ffffffc0005da8bc>] tcp_transmit_skb+0x908/0x964
      [ 124.113383] [<ffffffc0005dc0d4>] tcp_send_ack+0x128/0x138
      [ 124.118753] [<ffffffc0005d1580>] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x5c/0x94
      [ 124.124555] [<ffffffc0005d7a0c>] tcp_rcv_established+0x554/0x68c
      [ 124.130530] [<ffffffc0005df0d4>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0xa4/0x37c
      [ 124.135900] [<ffffffc000539430>] release_sock+0xb4/0x150
      [ 124.141184] [<ffffffc0005cdf88>] tcp_recvmsg+0x448/0x9e0
      [ 124.146468] [<ffffffc0005f2f3c>] inet_recvmsg+0xa0/0xc0
      [ 124.151666] [<ffffffc000533660>] sock_recvmsg+0x10/0x1c
      [ 124.156863] [<ffffffc0005370d4>] SyS_recvfrom+0xa4/0xf8
      [ 124.162061] Code: f2400c84 540001c0 cb040042 36000064 (38401423)
      [ 124.168133] ---[ end trace 7ab2550372e8a65b ]---
      
      The fix was to reorder napi_enable, napi_disable, request_irq and
      free_irq calls, move register_netdev after dma_coerce_mask_and_coherent.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarIyappan Subramanian <isubramanian@apm.com>
      Tested-by: default avatarKhuong Dinh <kdinh@apm.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      aeb20b6b
    • Bjørn Mork's avatar
      net: cdc_ncm: fix NULL pointer deref in cdc_ncm_bind_common · 6527f833
      Bjørn Mork authored
      Commit 77b0a099 ("cdc-ncm: use common parser") added a dangerous
      new trust in the CDC functional descriptors presented by the device,
      unconditionally assuming that any device handled by the driver has
      a CDC Union descriptor.
      
      This descriptor is required by the NCM and MBIM specs, but crashing
      on non-compliant devices is still unacceptable. Not only will that
      allow malicious devices to crash the kernel, but in this case it is
      also well known that there are non-compliant real devices on the
      market - as shown by the comment accompanying the IAD workaround
      in the same function.
      
      The Sierra Wireless EM7305 is an example of such device, having
      a CDC header and a CDC MBIM descriptor but no CDC Union:
      
          Interface Descriptor:
            bLength                 9
            bDescriptorType         4
            bInterfaceNumber       12
            bAlternateSetting       0
            bNumEndpoints           1
            bInterfaceClass         2 Communications
            bInterfaceSubClass     14
            bInterfaceProtocol      0
            iInterface              0
            CDC Header:
              bcdCDC               1.10
            CDC MBIM:
              bcdMBIMVersion       1.00
              wMaxControlMessage   4096
              bNumberFilters       16
              bMaxFilterSize       128
              wMaxSegmentSize      4064
              bmNetworkCapabilities 0x20
                8-byte ntb input size
            Endpoint Descriptor:
      	..
      
      The conversion to a common parser also left the local cdc_union
      variable untouched.  This caused the IAD workaround code to be applied
      to all devices with an IAD descriptor, which was never intended.  Finish
      the conversion by testing for hdr.usb_cdc_union_desc instead.
      
      Cc: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
      Fixes: 77b0a099 ("cdc-ncm: use common parser")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarBjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      6527f833
    • David S. Miller's avatar
      Merge tag 'linux-can-fixes-for-4.4-20151123' of... · 90bb81f3
      David S. Miller authored
      Merge tag 'linux-can-fixes-for-4.4-20151123' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mkl/linux-can
      
      Marc Kleine-Budde says:
      
      ====================
      pull-request: can 2015-11-23
      
      this is a pull request of three patches for the upcoming v4.4 release.
      
      The first patch is by Mirza Krak, it fixes a problem with the sja1000 driver
      after resuming from suspend to disk, by clearing all outstanding interrupts.
      Oliver Hartkopp contributes two patches targeting almost all driver, they fix
      the assignment of the error location in CAN error messages.
      ====================
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      90bb81f3
    • Ying Xue's avatar
      tipc: fix error handling of expanding buffer headroom · 7098356b
      Ying Xue authored
      Coverity says:
      
      *** CID 1338065:  Error handling issues  (CHECKED_RETURN)
      /net/tipc/udp_media.c: 162 in tipc_udp_send_msg()
      156     	struct udp_media_addr *dst = (struct udp_media_addr *)&dest->value;
      157     	struct udp_media_addr *src = (struct udp_media_addr *)&b->addr.value;
      158     	struct sk_buff *clone;
      159     	struct rtable *rt;
      160
      161     	if (skb_headroom(skb) < UDP_MIN_HEADROOM)
      >>>     CID 1338065:  Error handling issues  (CHECKED_RETURN)
      >>>     Calling "pskb_expand_head" without checking return value (as is done elsewhere 51 out of 56 times).
      162     		pskb_expand_head(skb, UDP_MIN_HEADROOM, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
      163
      164     	clone = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
      165     	skb_set_inner_protocol(clone, htons(ETH_P_TIPC));
      166     	ub = rcu_dereference_rtnl(b->media_ptr);
      167     	if (!ub) {
      
      When expanding buffer headroom over udp tunnel with pskb_expand_head(),
      it's unfortunate that we don't check its return value. As a result, if
      the function returns an error code due to the lack of memory, it may
      cause unpredictable consequence as we unconditionally consider that
      it's always successful.
      
      Fixes: e5356794 ("tipc: conditionally expand buffer headroom over udp tunnel")
      Reported-by: <scan-admin@coverity.com>
      Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarYing Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      7098356b
    • Ying Xue's avatar
      tipc: avoid packets leaking on socket receive queue · f4195d1e
      Ying Xue authored
      Even if we drain receive queue thoroughly in tipc_release() after tipc
      socket is removed from rhashtable, it is possible that some packets
      are in flight because some CPU runs receiver and did rhashtable lookup
      before we removed socket. They will achieve receive queue, but nobody
      delete them at all. To avoid this leak, we register a private socket
      destructor to purge receive queue, meaning releasing packets pending
      on receive queue will be delayed until the last reference of tipc
      socket will be released.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarYing Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f4195d1e
    • Aaro Koskinen's avatar
      broadcom: fix PHY_ID_BCM5481 entry in the id table · 3c25a860
      Aaro Koskinen authored
      Commit fcb26ec5 ("broadcom: move all PHY_ID's to header")
      updated broadcom_tbl to use PHY_IDs, but incorrectly replaced 0x0143bca0
      with PHY_ID_BCM5482 (making a duplicate entry, and completely omitting
      the original). Fix that.
      
      Fixes: fcb26ec5 ("broadcom: move all PHY_ID's to header")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      3c25a860
  3. 23 Nov, 2015 13 commits
    • Nikolay Aleksandrov's avatar
      vrf: fix double free and memory corruption on register_netdevice failure · 7f109f7c
      Nikolay Aleksandrov authored
      When vrf's ->newlink is called, if register_netdevice() fails then it
      does free_netdev(), but that's also done by rtnl_newlink() so a second
      free happens and memory gets corrupted, to reproduce execute the
      following line a couple of times (1 - 5 usually is enough):
      $ for i in `seq 1 5`; do ip link add vrf: type vrf table 1; done;
      This works because we fail in register_netdevice() because of the wrong
      name "vrf:".
      
      And here's a trace of one crash:
      [   28.792157] ------------[ cut here ]------------
      [   28.792407] kernel BUG at fs/namei.c:246!
      [   28.792608] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
      [   28.793240] Modules linked in: vrf nfsd auth_rpcgss oid_registry
      nfs_acl nfs lockd grace sunrpc crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul
      crc32c_intel qxl drm_kms_helper ttm drm aesni_intel aes_x86_64 psmouse
      glue_helper lrw evdev gf128mul i2c_piix4 ablk_helper cryptd ppdev
      parport_pc parport serio_raw pcspkr virtio_balloon virtio_console
      i2c_core acpi_cpufreq button 9pnet_virtio 9p 9pnet fscache ipv6 autofs4
      ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 virtio_blk virtio_net sg sr_mod cdrom
      ata_generic ehci_pci uhci_hcd ehci_hcd e1000 usbcore usb_common ata_piix
      libata virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio scsi_mod floppy
      [   28.796016] CPU: 0 PID: 1148 Comm: ld-linux-x86-64 Not tainted
      4.4.0-rc1+ #24
      [   28.796016] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
      BIOS 1.8.1-20150318_183358- 04/01/2014
      [   28.796016] task: ffff8800352561c0 ti: ffff88003592c000 task.ti:
      ffff88003592c000
      [   28.796016] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812187b3>]  [<ffffffff812187b3>]
      putname+0x43/0x60
      [   28.796016] RSP: 0018:ffff88003592fe88  EFLAGS: 00010246
      [   28.796016] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8800352561c0 RCX:
      0000000000000001
      [   28.796016] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI:
      ffff88003784f000
      [   28.796016] RBP: ffff88003592ff08 R08: 0000000000000001 R09:
      0000000000000000
      [   28.796016] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12:
      0000000000000000
      [   28.796016] R13: 000000000000047c R14: ffff88003784f000 R15:
      ffff8800358c4a00
      [   28.796016] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88003fc00000(0000)
      knlGS:0000000000000000
      [   28.796016] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
      [   28.796016] CR2: 00007ffd583bc2d9 CR3: 0000000035a99000 CR4:
      00000000000406f0
      [   28.796016] Stack:
      [   28.796016]  ffffffff8121045d ffffffff812102d3 ffff8800352561c0
      ffff880035a91660
      [   28.796016]  ffff8800008a9880 0000000000000000 ffffffff81a49940
      00ffffff81218684
      [   28.796016]  ffff8800352561c0 000000000000047c 0000000000000000
      ffff880035b36d80
      [   28.796016] Call Trace:
      [   28.796016]  [<ffffffff8121045d>] ?
      do_execveat_common.isra.34+0x74d/0x930
      [   28.796016]  [<ffffffff812102d3>] ?
      do_execveat_common.isra.34+0x5c3/0x930
      [   28.796016]  [<ffffffff8121066c>] do_execve+0x2c/0x30
      [   28.796016]  [<ffffffff810939a0>]
      call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0xf0/0x140
      [   28.796016]  [<ffffffff810938b0>] ? umh_complete+0x40/0x40
      [   28.796016]  [<ffffffff815cb1af>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
      [   28.796016] Code: 48 8d 47 1c 48 89 e5 53 48 8b 37 48 89 fb 48 39 c6
      74 1a 48 8b 3d 7e e9 8f 00 e8 49 fa fc ff 48 89 df e8 f1 01 fd ff 5b 5d
      f3 c3 <0f> 0b 48 89 fe 48 8b 3d 61 e9 8f 00 e8 2c fa fc ff 5b 5d eb e9
      [   28.796016] RIP  [<ffffffff812187b3>] putname+0x43/0x60
      [   28.796016]  RSP <ffff88003592fe88>
      
      Fixes: 193125db ("net: Introduce VRF device driver")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarDavid Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      7f109f7c
    • Dan Carpenter's avatar
      net/hsr: fix a warning message · 3d1a54e8
      Dan Carpenter authored
      WARN_ON_ONCE() takes a condition, it doesn't take an error message.  I
      have converted this to WARN() instead.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      3d1a54e8
    • Rainer Weikusat's avatar
      unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue · 7d267278
      Rainer Weikusat authored
      Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes:
      An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
      some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
      receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
      datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
      to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
      receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
      woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
      routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
      of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
      up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
      problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
      for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
      connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
      in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
      polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
      corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
      wait queue with epoll.
      
      Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
      that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
      peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
      condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
      peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
      socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
      dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
      socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
      itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
      unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
      that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarRainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
      Fixes: ec0d215f ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
      Reviewed-by: default avatarJason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      7d267278
    • Nina Schiff's avatar
      cgroups: Allow dynamically changing net_classid · 3b13758f
      Nina Schiff authored
      The classid of a process is changed either when a process is moved to
      or from a cgroup or when the net_cls.classid file is updated.
      Previously net_cls only supported propogating these changes to the
      cgroup's related sockets when a process was added or removed from the
      cgroup. This means it was neccessary to remove and re-add all processes
      to a cgroup in order to update its classid. This change introduces
      support for doing this dynamically - i.e. when the value is changed in
      the net_cls_classid file, this will also trigger an update to the
      classid associated with all sockets controlled by the cgroup.
      This mimics the behaviour of other cgroup subsystems.
      net_prio circumvents this issue by storing an index into a table with
      each socket (and so any updates to the table, don't require updating
      the value associated with the socket). net_cls, however, passes the
      socket the classid directly, and so this additional step is needed.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarNina Schiff <ninasc@fb.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      3b13758f
    • Shaohui Xie's avatar
      net: fsl: expands dependencies of NET_VENDOR_FREESCALE · fe761bcb
      Shaohui Xie authored
      Freescale hosts some ARMv8 based SoCs, and a generic convention
      ARCH_LAYERSCAPE is used to cover such SoCs. Adding ARCH_LAYERSCAPE
      to dependencies of NET_VENDOR_FREESCALE to support networking on those
      SoCs.
      
      The ARCH_LAYERSCAPE is introduced by:
      commit: 53a5fde0 arm64: Use generic Layerscape SoC family naming
      Signed-off-by: default avatarShaohui Xie <Shaohui.Xie@freescale.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      fe761bcb
    • Oliver Hartkopp's avatar
      can: remove obsolete assignment for CAN protocol error type · a2ec19f8
      Oliver Hartkopp authored
      The assignment 'cf->data[2] |= CAN_ERR_PROT_UNSPEC' used at CAN error message
      creation time is obsolete as CAN_ERR_PROT_UNSPEC is zero and cf->data[2] is
      initialized with zero in alloc_can_err_skb() anyway.
      
      So we could either assign 'cf->data[2] = CAN_ERR_PROT_UNSPEC' correctly or we
      can remove the obsolete OR operation entirely.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarOliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMarc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
      a2ec19f8
    • Oliver Hartkopp's avatar
      can: fix assignment of error location in CAN error messages · ffd461f8
      Oliver Hartkopp authored
      As Dan Carpenter reported in http://marc.info/?l=linux-can&m=144793696016187
      the assignment of the error location in CAN error messages had some bit wise
      overlaps. Indeed the value to be assigned in data[3] is no bitfield but defines
      a single value which points to a location inside the CAN frame on the wire.
      
      This patch fixes the assignments for the error locations in error messages.
      Reported-by: default avatarDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarOliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMarc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
      ffd461f8
    • Mirza Krak's avatar
      can: sja1000: clear interrupts on start · 7cecd9ab
      Mirza Krak authored
      According to SJA1000 data sheet error-warning (EI) interrupt is not
      cleared by setting the controller in to reset-mode.
      
      Then if we have the following case:
      - system is suspended (echo mem > /sys/power/state) and SJA1000 is left
        in operating state
      - A bus error condition occurs which activates EI interrupt, system is
        still suspended which means EI interrupt will be not be handled nor
        cleared.
      
      If the above two events occur, on resume there is no way to return the
      SJA1000 to operating state, except to cycle power to it.
      
      By simply reading the IR register on start we will clear any previous
      conditions that could be present.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMirza Krak <mirza.krak@hostmobility.com>
      Reported-by: default avatarChristian Magnusson <Christian.Magnusson@semcon.com>
      Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMarc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
      7cecd9ab
    • Nikolay Aleksandrov's avatar
      net: ip6mr: fix static mfc/dev leaks on table destruction · 4c698046
      Nikolay Aleksandrov authored
      Similar to ipv4, when destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and
      the static devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be
      destroyed (because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory. Make sure that
      everything is cleaned up on netns destruction.
      
      Fixes: 8229efda ("netns: ip6mr: enable namespace support in ipv6 multicast forwarding code")
      CC: Benjamin Thery <benjamin.thery@bull.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarCong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      4c698046
    • Nikolay Aleksandrov's avatar
      net: ipmr: fix static mfc/dev leaks on table destruction · 0e615e96
      Nikolay Aleksandrov authored
      When destroying an mrt table the static mfc entries and the static
      devices are kept, which leads to devices that can never be destroyed
      (because of refcnt taken) and leaked memory, for example:
      unreferenced object 0xffff880034c144c0 (size 192):
        comm "mfc-broken", pid 4777, jiffies 4320349055 (age 46001.964s)
        hex dump (first 32 bytes):
          98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff 98 53 f0 34 00 88 ff ff  .S.4.....S.4....
          ef 0a 0a 14 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00  ................
        backtrace:
          [<ffffffff815c1b9e>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
          [<ffffffff811ea6e0>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x190/0x300
          [<ffffffff815931cb>] ip_mroute_setsockopt+0x5cb/0x910
          [<ffffffff8153d575>] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.11+0x105/0xff0
          [<ffffffff8153e490>] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0
          [<ffffffff81564e13>] raw_setsockopt+0x33/0x90
          [<ffffffff814d1e14>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
          [<ffffffff814d0b51>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xc0
          [<ffffffff815cdbf6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
          [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
      
      Make sure that everything is cleaned on netns destruction.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarCong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      0e615e96
    • David S. Miller's avatar
      Merge tag 'wireless-drivers-for-davem-2015-11-20' of... · f96c9285
      David S. Miller authored
      Merge tag 'wireless-drivers-for-davem-2015-11-20' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvalo/wireless-drivers
      
      Kalle Valo says:
      
      ====================
      iwlwifi
      
      * bump API to firmware 19 - not released yet.
      * fix D3 flows (Luca)
      * new device IDs (Oren)
      * fix NULL pointer dereference (Avri)
      
      ath10k
      
      * fix invalid NSS for 4x4 devices
      * add QCA9377 hw1.0 support
      * fix QCA6174 regression with CE5 usage
      
      wil6210
      
      * new maintainer - Maya Erez
      
      rtlwifi
      
      * rtl8821ae: Fix lockups on boot
      ====================
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f96c9285
    • Grant Grundler's avatar
      net: tulip: update MAINTAINER status to Orphan · cf869eb1
      Grant Grundler authored
      I haven't had any PCI tulip HW for the past ~5 years. I have
      been reviewing tulip patches and can continue doing that.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGrant Grundler <grundler@parisc-linux.org>
      Acked-by: default avatarHelge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      cf869eb1
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      net, scm: fix PaX detected msg_controllen overflow in scm_detach_fds · 6900317f
      Daniel Borkmann authored
      David and HacKurx reported a following/similar size overflow triggered
      in a grsecurity kernel, thanks to PaX's gcc size overflow plugin:
      
      (Already fixed in later grsecurity versions by Brad and PaX Team.)
      
      [ 1002.296137] PAX: size overflow detected in function scm_detach_fds net/core/scm.c:314
                     cicus.202_127 min, count: 4, decl: msg_controllen; num: 0; context: msghdr;
      [ 1002.296145] CPU: 0 PID: 3685 Comm: scm_rights_recv Not tainted 4.2.3-grsec+ #7
      [ 1002.296149] Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookAir5,1/Mac-66F35F19FE2A0D05, [...]
      [ 1002.296153]  ffffffff81c27366 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27375 ffffc90007843aa8
      [ 1002.296162]  ffffffff818129ba 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27366 ffffc90007843ad8
      [ 1002.296169]  ffffffff8121f838 fffffffffffffffc fffffffffffffffc ffffc90007843e60
      [ 1002.296176] Call Trace:
      [ 1002.296190]  [<ffffffff818129ba>] dump_stack+0x45/0x57
      [ 1002.296200]  [<ffffffff8121f838>] report_size_overflow+0x38/0x60
      [ 1002.296209]  [<ffffffff816a979e>] scm_detach_fds+0x2ce/0x300
      [ 1002.296220]  [<ffffffff81791899>] unix_stream_read_generic+0x609/0x930
      [ 1002.296228]  [<ffffffff81791c9f>] unix_stream_recvmsg+0x4f/0x60
      [ 1002.296236]  [<ffffffff8178dc00>] ? unix_set_peek_off+0x50/0x50
      [ 1002.296243]  [<ffffffff8168fac7>] sock_recvmsg+0x47/0x60
      [ 1002.296248]  [<ffffffff81691522>] ___sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1e0
      [ 1002.296257]  [<ffffffff81693496>] __sys_recvmsg+0x46/0x80
      [ 1002.296263]  [<ffffffff816934fc>] SyS_recvmsg+0x2c/0x40
      [ 1002.296271]  [<ffffffff8181a3ab>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x85
      
      Further investigation showed that this can happen when an *odd* number of
      fds are being passed over AF_UNIX sockets.
      
      In these cases CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)) and CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)),
      where i is the number of successfully passed fds, differ by 4 bytes due
      to the extra CMSG_ALIGN() padding in CMSG_SPACE() to an 8 byte boundary
      on 64 bit. The padding is used to align subsequent cmsg headers in the
      control buffer.
      
      When the control buffer passed in from the receiver side *lacks* these 4
      bytes (e.g. due to buggy/wrong API usage), then msg->msg_controllen will
      overflow in scm_detach_fds():
      
        int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int));  <--- cmlen w/o tail-padding
        err = put_user(SOL_SOCKET, &cm->cmsg_level);
        if (!err)
          err = put_user(SCM_RIGHTS, &cm->cmsg_type);
        if (!err)
          err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len);
        if (!err) {
          cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int));  <--- cmlen w/ 4 byte extra tail-padding
          msg->msg_control += cmlen;
          msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen;         <--- iff no tail-padding space here ...
        }                                            ... wrap-around
      
      F.e. it will wrap to a length of 18446744073709551612 bytes in case the
      receiver passed in msg->msg_controllen of 20 bytes, and the sender
      properly transferred 1 fd to the receiver, so that its CMSG_LEN results
      in 20 bytes and CMSG_SPACE in 24 bytes.
      
      In case of MSG_CMSG_COMPAT (scm_detach_fds_compat()), I haven't seen an
      issue in my tests as alignment seems always on 4 byte boundary. Same
      should be in case of native 32 bit, where we end up with 4 byte boundaries
      as well.
      
      In practice, passing msg->msg_controllen of 20 to recvmsg() while receiving
      a single fd would mean that on successful return, msg->msg_controllen is
      being set by the kernel to 24 bytes instead, thus more than the input
      buffer advertised. It could f.e. become an issue if such application later
      on zeroes or copies the control buffer based on the returned msg->msg_controllen
      elsewhere.
      
      Maximum number of fds we can send is a hard upper limit SCM_MAX_FD (253).
      
      Going over the code, it seems like msg->msg_controllen is not being read
      after scm_detach_fds() in scm_recv() anymore by the kernel, good!
      
      Relevant recvmsg() handler are unix_dgram_recvmsg() (unix_seqpacket_recvmsg())
      and unix_stream_recvmsg(). Both return back to their recvmsg() caller,
      and ___sys_recvmsg() places the updated length, that is, new msg_control -
      old msg_control pointer into msg->msg_controllen (hence the 24 bytes seen
      in the example).
      
      Long time ago, Wei Yongjun fixed something related in commit 1ac70e7a
      ("[NET]: Fix function put_cmsg() which may cause usr application memory
      overflow").
      
      RFC3542, section 20.2. says:
      
        The fields shown as "XX" are possible padding, between the cmsghdr
        structure and the data, and between the data and the next cmsghdr
        structure, if required by the implementation. While sending an
        application may or may not include padding at the end of last
        ancillary data in msg_controllen and implementations must accept both
        as valid. On receiving a portable application must provide space for
        padding at the end of the last ancillary data as implementations may
        copy out the padding at the end of the control message buffer and
        include it in the received msg_controllen. When recvmsg() is called
        if msg_controllen is too small for all the ancillary data items
        including any trailing padding after the last item an implementation
        may set MSG_CTRUNC.
      
      Since we didn't place MSG_CTRUNC for already quite a long time, just do
      the same as in 1ac70e7a to avoid an overflow.
      
      Btw, even man-page author got this wrong :/ See db939c9b26e9 ("cmsg.3: Fix
      error in SCM_RIGHTS code sample"). Some people must have copied this (?),
      thus it got triggered in the wild (reported several times during boot by
      David and HacKurx).
      
      No Fixes tag this time as pre 2002 (that is, pre history tree).
      Reported-by: default avatarDavid Sterba <dave@jikos.cz>
      Reported-by: default avatarHacKurx <hackurx@gmail.com>
      Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
      Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
      Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
      Cc: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
      Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      6900317f
  4. 20 Nov, 2015 8 commits
  5. 19 Nov, 2015 4 commits
    • Eric Dumazet's avatar
      tcp: md5: fix lockdep annotation · 1b8e6a01
      Eric Dumazet authored
      When a passive TCP is created, we eventually call tcp_md5_do_add()
      with sk pointing to the child. It is not owner by the user yet (we
      will add this socket into listener accept queue a bit later anyway)
      
      But we do own the spinlock, so amend the lockdep annotation to avoid
      following splat :
      
      [ 8451.090932] net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:923 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
      [ 8451.090932]
      [ 8451.090932] other info that might help us debug this:
      [ 8451.090932]
      [ 8451.090934]
      [ 8451.090934] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1
      [ 8451.090936] 3 locks held by socket_sockopt_/214795:
      [ 8451.090936]  #0:  (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff855c6ac1>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x151/0xe90
      [ 8451.090947]  #1:  (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff85618143>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0
      [ 8451.090952]  #2:  (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff855acda5>] sk_clone_lock+0x1c5/0x500
      [ 8451.090958]
      [ 8451.090958] stack backtrace:
      [ 8451.090960] CPU: 7 PID: 214795 Comm: socket_sockopt_
      
      [ 8451.091215] Call Trace:
      [ 8451.091216]  <IRQ>  [<ffffffff856fb29c>] dump_stack+0x55/0x76
      [ 8451.091229]  [<ffffffff85123b5b>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xeb/0x110
      [ 8451.091235]  [<ffffffff8564544f>] tcp_md5_do_add+0x1bf/0x1e0
      [ 8451.091239]  [<ffffffff85645751>] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x1f1/0x4c0
      [ 8451.091242]  [<ffffffff85642b27>] ? tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb+0x167/0x190
      [ 8451.091246]  [<ffffffff85647c78>] tcp_check_req+0x3c8/0x500
      [ 8451.091249]  [<ffffffff856451ae>] ? tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash+0x11e/0x190
      [ 8451.091253]  [<ffffffff85647170>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x3c0/0x9f0
      [ 8451.091256]  [<ffffffff85618143>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0
      [ 8451.091260]  [<ffffffff856181b6>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xb6/0x2b0
      [ 8451.091263]  [<ffffffff85618143>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0
      [ 8451.091267]  [<ffffffff85618d38>] ip_local_deliver+0x48/0x80
      [ 8451.091270]  [<ffffffff85618510>] ip_rcv_finish+0x160/0x700
      [ 8451.091273]  [<ffffffff8561900e>] ip_rcv+0x29e/0x3d0
      [ 8451.091277]  [<ffffffff855c74b7>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0xb47/0xe90
      
      Fixes: a8afca03 ("tcp: md5: protects md5sig_info with RCU")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Reported-by: default avatarWillem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      1b8e6a01
    • Bjørn Mork's avatar
      net: qmi_wwan: add XS Stick W100-2 from 4G Systems · 68242a5a
      Bjørn Mork authored
      Thomas reports
      "
      4gsystems sells two total different LTE-surfsticks under the same name.
      ..
      The newer version of XS Stick W100 is from "omega"
      ..
      Under windows the driver switches to the same ID, and uses MI03\6 for
      network and MI01\6 for modem.
      ..
      echo "1c9e 9b01" > /sys/bus/usb/drivers/qmi_wwan/new_id
      echo "1c9e 9b01" > /sys/bus/usb-serial/drivers/option1/new_id
      
      T:  Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=03 Cnt=01 Dev#=  4 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
      D:  Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs=  1
      P:  Vendor=1c9e ProdID=9b01 Rev=02.32
      S:  Manufacturer=USB Modem
      S:  Product=USB Modem
      S:  SerialNumber=
      C:  #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=80 MxPwr=500mA
      I:  If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
      I:  If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
      I:  If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option
      I:  If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=qmi_wwan
      I:  If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=08(stor.) Sub=06 Prot=50 Driver=usb-storage
      
      Now all important things are there:
      
      wwp0s29f7u2i3 (net), ttyUSB2 (at), cdc-wdm0 (qmi), ttyUSB1 (at)
      
      There is also ttyUSB0, but it is not usable, at least not for at.
      
      The device works well with qmi and ModemManager-NetworkManager.
      "
      Reported-by: default avatarThomas Schäfer <tschaefer@t-online.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarBjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      68242a5a
    • Zi Shen Lim's avatar
      arm64: bpf: fix buffer pointer · f4b16fce
      Zi Shen Lim authored
      During code review, I noticed we were passing a bad buffer pointer
      to bpf_load_pointer helper function called by jitted code.
      
      Point to the buffer allocated by JIT, so we don't silently corrupt
      other parts of the stack.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarZi Shen Lim <zlim.lnx@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarYang Shi <yang.shi@linaro.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f4b16fce
    • Sergei Shtylyov's avatar
      ravb: fix WARNING in __free_irq() · 508dc064
      Sergei Shtylyov authored
      When the R8A7795 support was  added to the driver, little attention was paid
      to the ravb_open() error path: free_irq()  for the EMAC interrupt was called
      uncoditionally, unlike request_irq(), and in  a wrong order as well...
      As a result, on the R-Car gen2 SoCs I started getting the following in case
      of a device  opening error:
      
      WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at kernel/irq/manage.c:1448 __free_irq+0x8c/0x228()
      Trying to free already-free IRQ 0
      Modules linked in:
      CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.4.0-rc1-dirty #1005
      Hardware name: Generic R8A7791 (Flattened Device Tree)
      Backtrace:
      [<c0013818>] (dump_backtrace) from [<c00139b4>] (show_stack+0x18/0x1c)
       r6:c063cdd6 r5:00000009 r4:00000000 r3:00204140
      [<c001399c>] (show_stack) from [<c022a578>] (dump_stack+0x74/0x90)
      [<c022a504>] (dump_stack) from [<c0025f04>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x8c/0xb8)
       r4:ef04fd38 r3:c0714770
      [<c0025e78>] (warn_slowpath_common) from [<c0025fd4>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x38/0x40)
       r8:ee8ad800 r7:ef0030a0 r6:00000000 r5:00000000 r4:ef003040
      [<c0025fa0>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c0064cc0>] (__free_irq+0x8c/0x228)
       r3:00000000 r2:c063ce9f
      [<c0064c34>] (__free_irq) from [<c0064ecc>] (free_irq+0x70/0xa4)
       r10:0000016b r8:00000000 r7:00000000 r6:ee8ad800 r5:00000000 r4:ef003040
      [<c0064e5c>] (free_irq) from [<c033472c>] (ravb_open+0x224/0x274)
       r7:fffffffe r6:00000000 r5:fffffffe r4:ee8ad800
      [<c0334508>] (ravb_open) from [<c041ac78>] (__dev_open+0x84/0x104)
       r7:ee8ad830 r6:c0566334 r5:00000000 r4:ee8ad800
      [<c041abf4>] (__dev_open) from [<c041af08>] (__dev_change_flags+0x94/0x13c)
       r7:00001002 r6:00000001 r5:00001003 r4:ee8ad800
      [<c041ae74>] (__dev_change_flags) from [<c041afe8>] (dev_change_flags+0x20/0x50)
       r7:c072e6e0 r6:00000138 r5:00001002 r4:ee8ad800
      [<c041afc8>] (dev_change_flags) from [<c06ec06c>] (ip_auto_config+0x174/0xfb8)
       r8:00001002 r7:c072e6e0 r6:c0703344 r5:00000001 r4:ee8ad800 r3:00000101
      [<c06ebef8>] (ip_auto_config) from [<c000a810>] (do_one_initcall+0x100/0x1cc)
       r10:c06fb83c r9:00000000 r8:c06ebef8 r7:c0736000 r6:c0710918 r5:c0710918
       r4:ef2f8f80
      [<c000a710>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c06ccddc>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x11c/0x1
      ec)
       r10:c06fb83c r9:00000000 r8:0000009a r7:c0736000 r6:c0706bf0 r5:c06fb834
       r4:00000007
      [<c06cccc0>] (kernel_init_freeable) from [<c0514c54>] (kernel_init+0x14/0xec)
       r10:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:00000000 r6:00000000 r5:c0514c40 r4:c0736000
      [<c0514c40>] (kernel_init) from [<c0010458>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
       r4:00000000 r3:ef04e000
      
      Fix up the free_irq() call order and add a new label on the error path.
      
      Fixes: 22d4df8f ("ravb: Add support for r8a7795 SoC")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarSergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarSimon Horman <horms+renesas@verge.net.au>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      508dc064
  6. 18 Nov, 2015 3 commits