- 19 Jan, 2022 6 commits
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Wei Wang authored
vm_xsave_req_perm() is currently defined and used by x86_64 only. Make it compiled into vm_create_with_vcpus() only when on x86_64 machines. Otherwise, it would cause linkage errors, e.g. on s390x. Fixes: 415a3c33 ("kvm: selftests: Add support for KVM_CAP_XSAVE2") Reported-by:
Janis Schoetterl-Glausch <scgl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com> Tested-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Like Xu authored
According to Intel extended feature disable (XFD) spec, the sub-function i (i > 1) of CPUID function 0DH enumerates "details for state component i. ECX[2] enumerates support for XFD support for this state component." If KVM does not report F(XFD) feature (e.g. due to CONFIG_X86_64), then the corresponding XFD support for any state component i should also be removed. Translate this dependency into KVM terms. Fixes: 690a757d ("kvm: x86: Add CPUID support for Intel AMX") Signed-off-by:
Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com> Message-Id: <20220117074531.76925-1-likexu@tencent.com> Signed-off-by:
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David Matlack authored
Rewrite the comment in kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access() that explains why it is safe to flush TLBs outside of the MMU lock after write-protecting SPTEs for dirty logging. The current comment is a long run-on sentence that was difficult to understand. In addition it was specific to the shadow MMU (mentioning mmu_spte_update()) when the TDP MMU has to handle this as well. The new comment explains: - Why the TLB flush is necessary at all. - Why it is desirable to do the TLB flush outside of the MMU lock. - Why it is safe to do the TLB flush outside of the MMU lock. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by:
David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Message-Id: <20220113233020.3986005-5-dmatlack@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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David Matlack authored
SPTEs are tagged with software-only bits to indicate if it is "MMU-writable" and "Host-writable". These bits are used to determine why KVM has marked an SPTE as read-only. Document these bits and their invariants, and enforce the invariants with new WARNs in spte_can_locklessly_be_made_writable() to ensure they are not accidentally violated in the future. Opportunistically move DEFAULT_SPTE_{MMU,HOST}_WRITABLE next to EPT_SPTE_{MMU,HOST}_WRITABLE since the new documentation applies to both. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: -
David Matlack authored
When handling the changed_pte notifier and the new PTE is read-only, clear both the Host-writable and MMU-writable bits in the SPTE. This preserves the invariant that MMU-writable is set if-and-only-if Host-writable is set. No functional change intended. Nothing currently relies on the aforementioned invariant and technically the changed_pte notifier is dead code. Signed-off-by:
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David Matlack authored
When the TDP MMU is write-protection GFNs for page table protection (as opposed to for dirty logging, or due to the HVA not being writable), it checks if the SPTE is already write-protected and if so skips modifying the SPTE and the TLB flush. This behavior is incorrect because it fails to check if the SPTE is write-protected for page table protection, i.e. fails to check that MMU-writable is '0'. If the SPTE was write-protected for dirty logging but not page table protection, the SPTE could locklessly be made writable, and vCPUs could still be running with writable mappings cached in their TLB. Fix this by only skipping setting the SPTE if the SPTE is already write-protected *and* MMU-writable is already clear. Technically, checking only MMU-writable would suffice; a SPTE cannot be writable without MMU-writable being set. But check both to be paranoid and because it arguably yields more readable code. Fixes: 46044f72 ("kvm: x86/mmu: Support write protection for nesting in tdp MMU") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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- 17 Jan, 2022 6 commits
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Like Xu authored
The new module parameter to control PMU virtualization should apply to Intel as well as AMD, for situations where userspace is not trusted. If the module parameter allows PMU virtualization, there could be a new KVM_CAP or guest CPUID bits whereby userspace can enable/disable PMU virtualization on a per-VM basis. If the module parameter does not allow PMU virtualization, there should be no userspace override, since we have no precedent for authorizing that kind of override. If it's false, other counter-based profiling features (such as LBR including the associated CPUID bits if any) will not be exposed. Change its name from "pmu" to "enable_pmu" as we have temporary variables with the same name in our code like "struct kvm_pmu *pmu". Fixes: b1d66dad ("KVM: x86/svm: Add module param to control PMU virtualization") Suggested-by : Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
KVM forbids KVM_SET_CPUID2 after KVM_RUN was performed on a vCPU unless the supplied CPUID data is equal to what was previously set. Test this. Signed-off-by:
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20220117150542.2176196-5-vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
In preparation to reusing the existing 'get_cpuid_test' for testing "KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} after KVM_RUN" rename it to 'cpuid_test' to avoid the confusion. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: -
Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
Commit feb627e8 ("KVM: x86: Forbid KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} after KVM_RUN") forbade changing CPUID altogether but unfortunately this is not fully compatible with existing VMMs. In particular, QEMU reuses vCPU fds for CPU hotplug after unplug and it calls KVM_SET_CPUID2. Instead of full ban, check whether the supplied CPUID data is equal to what was previously set. Reported-by:
Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com> Fixes: feb627e8 ("KVM: x86: Forbid KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} after KVM_RUN") Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
kvm_update_cpuid_runtime() mangles CPUID data coming from userspace VMM after updating 'vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries', this makes it impossible to compare an update with what was previously supplied. Introduce __kvm_update_cpuid_runtime() version which can be used to tweak the input before it goes to 'vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries' so the upcoming update check can compare tweaked data. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by:
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Like Xu authored
According to CPUID 0x0A.EBX bit vector, the event [7] should be the unrealized event "Topdown Slots" instead of the *kernel* generalized common hardware event "REF_CPU_CYCLES", so we need to skip the cpuid unavaliblity check in the intel_pmc_perf_hw_id() for the last REF_CPU_CYCLES event and update the confusing comment. If the event is marked as unavailable in the Intel guest CPUID 0AH.EBX leaf, we need to avoid any perf_event creation, whether it's a gp or fixed counter. To distinguish whether it is a rejected event or an event that needs to be programmed with PERF_TYPE_RAW type, a new special returned value of "PERF_COUNT_HW_MAX + 1" is introduced. Fixes: 62079d8a ("KVM: PMU: add proper support for fixed counter 2") Signed-off-by:
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- 14 Jan, 2022 21 commits
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Yang Zhong authored
Fix sparse warnings in xstate and remove inline prefix. Fixes: 980fe2fd ("x86/fpu: Extend fpu_xstate_prctl() with guest permissions") Signed-off-by:
Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com> Reported-by:
kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Message-Id: <20220113180825.322333-1-yang.zhong@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Yang Zhong authored
This selftest covers two aspects of AMX. The first is triggering #NM exception and checking the MSR XFD_ERR value. The second case is loading tile config and tile data into guest registers and trapping to the host side for a complete save/load of the guest state. TMM0 is also checked against memory data after save/restore. Signed-off-by:
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Yang Zhong authored
Those changes can avoid dereferencing pointer compile issue when amx_test.c reference state->xsave. Move struct kvm_x86_state definition to processor.h. Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
For AMX support it is recommended to load XCR0 after XFD, so that KVM does not see XFD=0, XCR=1 for a save state that will eventually be disabled (which would lead to premature allocation of the space required for that save state). It is also required to load XSAVE data after XCR0 and XFD, so that KVM can trigger allocation of the extra space required to store AMX state. Adjust vcpu_load_state to obey these new requirements. Signed-off-by:
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Kevin Tian authored
Always intercepting IA32_XFD causes non-negligible overhead when this register is updated frequently in the guest. Disable r/w emulation after intercepting the first WRMSR(IA32_XFD) with a non-zero value. Disable WRMSR emulation implies that IA32_XFD becomes out-of-sync with the software states in fpstate and the per-cpu xfd cache. This leads to two additional changes accordingly: - Call fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state() after vm-exit to bring software states back in-sync with the MSR, before handle_exit_irqoff() is called. - Always trap #NM once write interception is disabled for IA32_XFD. The #NM exception is rare if the guest doesn't use dynamic features. Otherwise, there is at most one exception per guest task given a dynamic feature. p.s. We have confirmed that SDM is being revised to say that when setting IA32_XFD[18] the AMX register state is not guaranteed to be preserved. This clarification avoids adding mess for a creative guest which sets IA32_XFD[18]=1 before saving active AMX state to its own storage. Signed-off-by:Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
KVM can disable the write emulation for the XFD MSR when the vCPU's fpstate is already correctly sized to reduce the overhead. When write emulation is disabled the XFD MSR state after a VMEXIT is unknown and therefore not in sync with the software states in fpstate and the per CPU XFD cache. Provide fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state() which has to be invoked after a VMEXIT before enabling interrupts when write emulation is disabled for the XFD MSR. It could be invoked unconditionally even when write emulation is enabled for the price of a pointless MSR read. Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
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Wei Wang authored
When KVM_CAP_XSAVE2 is supported, userspace is expected to allocate buffer for KVM_GET_XSAVE2 and KVM_SET_XSAVE using the size returned by KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_XSAVE2). Signed-off-by:
Guang Zeng <guang.zeng@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Guang Zeng authored
With KVM_CAP_XSAVE, userspace uses a hardcoded 4KB buffer to get/set xstate data from/to KVM. This doesn't work when dynamic xfeatures (e.g. AMX) are exposed to the guest as they require a larger buffer size. Introduce a new capability (KVM_CAP_XSAVE2). Userspace VMM gets the required xstate buffer size via KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION(KVM_CAP_XSAVE2). KVM_SET_XSAVE is extended to work with both legacy and new capabilities by doing properly-sized memdup_user() based on the guest fpu container. KVM_GET_XSAVE is kept for backward-compatible reason. Instead, KVM_GET_XSAVE2 is introduced under KVM_CAP_XSAVE2 as the preferred interface for getting xstate buffer (4KB or larger size) from KVM (Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/12/15/510) Also, update the api doc with the new KVM_GET_XSAVE2 ioctl. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
Userspace needs to inquire KVM about the buffer size to work with the new KVM_SET_XSAVE and KVM_GET_XSAVE2. Add the size info to guest_fpu for KVM to access. Signed-off-by:
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Jing Liu authored
Extend CPUID emulation to support XFD, AMX_TILE, AMX_INT8 and AMX_BF16. Adding those bits into kvm_cpu_caps finally activates all previous logics in this series. Hide XFD on 32bit host kernels. Otherwise it leads to a weird situation where KVM tells userspace to migrate MSR_IA32_XFD and then rejects attempts to read/write the MSR. Signed-off-by:
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Jing Liu authored
Two XCR0 bits are defined for AMX to support XSAVE mechanism. Bit 17 is for tilecfg and bit 18 is for tiledata. The value of XCR0[17:18] is always either 00b or 11b. Also, SDM recommends that only 64-bit operating systems enable Intel AMX by setting XCR0[18:17]. 32-bit host kernel never sets the tile bits in vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0. Signed-off-by:
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Jing Liu authored
This saves one unnecessary VM-exit in guest #NM handler, given that the MSR is already restored with the guest value before the guest is resumed. Suggested-by:
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Jing Liu authored
Emulate read/write to IA32_XFD_ERR MSR. Only the saved value in the guest_fpu container is touched in the emulation handler. Actual MSR update is handled right before entering the guest (with preemption disabled) Signed-off-by:
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Jing Liu authored
Guest IA32_XFD_ERR is generally modified in two places: - Set by CPU when #NM is triggered; - Cleared by guest in its #NM handler; Intercept #NM for the first case when a nonzero value is written to IA32_XFD. Nonzero indicates that the guest is willing to do dynamic fpstate expansion for certain xfeatures, thus KVM needs to manage and virtualize guest XFD_ERR properly. The vcpu exception bitmap is updated in XFD write emulation according to guest_fpu::xfd. Save the current XFD_ERR value to the guest_fpu container in the #NM VM-exit handler. This must be done with interrupt disabled, otherwise the unsaved MSR value may be clobbered by host activity. The saving operation is conducted conditionally only when guest_fpu:xfd includes a non-zero value. Doing so also avoids misread on a platform which doesn't support XFD but #NM is triggered due to L1 interception. Queueing #NM to the guest is postponed to handle_exception_nmi(). This goes through the nested_vmx check so a virtual vmexit is queued instead when #NM is triggered in L2 but L1 wants to intercept it. Restore the host value (always ZERO outside of the host #NM handler) before enabling interrupt. Restore the guest value from the guest_fpu container right before entering the guest (with interrupt disabled). Suggested-by:
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Jing Liu authored
When XFD causes an instruction to generate #NM, IA32_XFD_ERR contains information about which disabled state components are being accessed. The #NM handler is expected to check this information and then enable the state components by clearing IA32_XFD for the faulting task (if having permission). If the XFD_ERR value generated in guest is consumed/clobbered by the host before the guest itself doing so, it may lead to non-XFD-related #NM treated as XFD #NM in host (due to non-zero value in XFD_ERR), or XFD-related #NM treated as non-XFD #NM in guest (XFD_ERR cleared by the host #NM handler). Introduce a new field in fpu_guest to save the guest xfd_err value. KVM is expected to save guest xfd_err before interrupt is enabled and restore it right before entering the guest (with interrupt disabled). Signed-off-by:
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Jing Liu authored
Intel's eXtended Feature Disable (XFD) feature allows the software to dynamically adjust fpstate buffer size for XSAVE features which have large state. Because guest fpstate has been expanded for all possible dynamic xstates at KVM_SET_CPUID2, emulation of the IA32_XFD MSR is straightforward. For write just call fpu_update_guest_xfd() to update the guest fpu container once all the sanity checks are passed. For read simply return the cached value in the container. Signed-off-by:
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Kevin Tian authored
Guest XFD can be updated either in the emulation path or in the restore path. Provide a wrapper to update guest_fpu::fpstate::xfd. If the guest fpstate is currently in-use, also update the per-cpu xfd cache and the actual MSR. Signed-off-by:
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Jing Liu authored
KVM can request fpstate expansion in two approaches: 1) When intercepting guest updates to XCR0 and XFD MSR; 2) Before vcpu runs (e.g. at KVM_SET_CPUID2); The first option doesn't waste memory for legacy guest if it doesn't support XFD. However doing so introduces more complexity and also imposes an order requirement in the restoring path, i.e. XCR0/XFD must be restored before XSTATE. Given that the agreement is to do the static approach. This is considered a better tradeoff though it does waste 8K memory for legacy guest if its CPUID includes dynamically-enabled xfeatures. Successful fpstate expansion requires userspace VMM to acquire guest xstate permissions before calling KVM_SET_CPUID2. Also take the chance to adjust the indent in kvm_set_cpuid(). Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Provide a wrapper for expanding the guest fpstate buffer according to requested xfeatures. KVM wants to call this wrapper to manage any dynamic xstate used by the guest. Suggested-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
Guest support for dynamically enabled FPU features requires a few modifications to the enablement function which is currently invoked from the #NM handler: 1) Use guest permissions and sizes for the update 2) Update fpu_guest state accordingly 3) Take into account that the enabling can be triggered either from a running guest via XSETBV and MSR_IA32_XFD write emulation or from a guest restore. In the latter case the guests fpstate is not the current tasks active fpstate. Split the function and implement the guest mechanics throughout the callchain. Signed-off-by: -
Jing Liu authored
vCPU threads are different from native tasks regarding to the initial XFD value. While all native tasks follow a fixed value (init_fpstate::xfd) established by the FPU core at boot, vCPU threads need to obey the reset value (i.e. ZERO) defined by the specification, to meet the expectation of the guest. Let the caller supply an argument and adjust the host and guest related invocations accordingly. Signed-off-by:
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- 07 Jan, 2022 7 commits
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Jing Liu authored
KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID should not include any dynamic xstates in CPUID[0xD] if they have not been requested with prctl. Otherwise a process which directly passes KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID to KVM_SET_CPUID2 would now fail even if it doesn't intend to use a dynamically enabled feature. Userspace must know that prctl is required and allocate >4K xstate buffer before setting any dynamic bit. Suggested-by:
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Jing Liu authored
CPUID.0xD.1.EBX enumerates the size of the XSAVE area (in compacted format) required by XSAVES. If CPUID.0xD.i.ECX[1] is set for a state component (i), this state component should be located on the next 64-bytes boundary following the preceding state component in the compacted layout. Fix xstate_required_size() to follow the alignment rule. AMX is the first state component with 64-bytes alignment to catch this bug. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
To support dynamically enabled FPU features for guests prepare the guest pseudo FPU container to keep track of the currently enabled xfeatures and the guest permissions. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
KVM requires a clear separation of host user space and guest permissions for dynamic XSTATE components. Add a guest permissions member to struct fpu and a separate set of prctl() arguments: ARCH_GET_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM and ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM. The semantics are equivalent to the host user space permission control except for the following constraints: 1) Permissions have to be requested before the first vCPU is created 2) Permissions are frozen when the first vCPU is created to ensure consistency. Any attempt to expand permissions via the prctl() after that point is rejected. Signed-off-by: -
Michael Roth authored
Now that core kvm_util declarations have special home in kvm_util_base.h, move ucall-related declarations out into a separate header. Signed-off-by:
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Message-Id: <20211210164620.11636-3-michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
Between helper macros and interfaces that will be introduced in subsequent patches, much of kvm_util.h would end up being declarations specific to ucall. Ideally these could be separated out into a separate header since they are not strictly required for writing guest tests and are mostly self-contained interfaces other than a reliance on a few core declarations like struct kvm_vm. This doesn't make a big difference as far as how tests will be compiled/written since all these interfaces will still be packaged up into a single/common libkvm.a used by all tests, but it is still nice to be able to compartmentalize to improve readabilty and reduce merge conflicts in the future for common tasks like adding new interfaces to kvm_util.h. Furthermore, some of the ucall declarations will be arch-specific, requiring various #ifdef'ery in kvm_util.h. Ideally these declarations could live in separate arch-specific headers, e.g. include/<arch>/ucall.h, which would handle arch-specific declarations as well as pulling in common ucall-related declarations shared by all archs. One simple way to do this would be to #include ucall.h at the bottom of kvm_util.h, after declarations it relies upon like struct kvm_vm. This is brittle however, and doesn't scale easily to other sets of interfaces that may be added in the future. Instead, move all declarations currently in kvm_util.h into kvm_util_base.h, then have kvm_util.h #include it. With this change, non-base declarations can be selectively moved/introduced into separate headers, which can then be included in kvm_util.h so that individual tests don't need to be touched. Subsequent patches will then move ucall-related declarations into a separate header to meet the above goals. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
Normally guests will set up CR3 themselves, but some guests, such as kselftests, and potentially CONFIG_PVH guests, rely on being booted with paging enabled and CR3 initialized to a pre-allocated page table. Currently CR3 updates via KVM_SET_SREGS* are not loaded into the guest VMCB until just prior to entering the guest. For SEV-ES/SEV-SNP, this is too late, since it will have switched over to using the VMSA page prior to that point, with the VMSA CR3 copied from the VMCB initial CR3 value: 0. Address this by sync'ing the CR3 value into the VMCB save area immediately when KVM_SET_SREGS* is issued so it will find it's way into the initial VMSA. Suggested-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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