- 08 Oct, 2018 40 commits
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Stefano Brivio authored
Introduce and use a function that checks PMTU values against expected values and logs error messages, to remove some clutter. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
Notice that in this particular case, I replaced the "--v-- fall through --v--" comment with a proper "fall through", which is what GCC is expecting to find. This fix is part of the ongoing efforts to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David S. Miller authored
David Ahern says: ==================== rtnetlink: Add support for rigid checking of data in dump request There are many use cases where a user wants to influence what is returned in a dump for some rtnetlink command: one is wanting data for a different namespace than the one the request is received and another is limiting the amount of data returned in the dump to a specific set of interest to userspace, reducing the cpu overhead of both kernel and userspace. Unfortunately, the kernel has historically not been strict with checking for the proper header or checking the values passed in the header. This lenient implementation has allowed iproute2 and other packages to pass any struct or data in the dump request as long as the family is the first byte. For example, ifinfomsg struct is used by iproute2 for all generic dump requests - links, addresses, routes and rules when it is really only valid for link requests. There is 1 is example where the kernel deals with the wrong struct: link dumps after VF support was added. Older iproute2 was sending rtgenmsg as the header instead of ifinfomsg so a patch was added to try and detect old userspace vs new: e5eca6d4 ("rtnetlink: fix userspace API breakage for iproute2 < v3.9.0") The latest example is Christian's patch set wanting to return addresses for a target namespace. It guesses the header struct is an ifaddrmsg and if it guesses wrong a netlink warning is generated in the kernel log on every address dump which is unacceptable. Another example where the kernel is a bit lenient is route dumps: iproute2 can send either a request with either ifinfomsg or a rtmsg as the header struct, yet the kernel always treats the header as an rtmsg (see inet_dump_fib and rtm_flags check). The header inconsistency impacts the ability to add kernel side filters for route dumps - a necessary feature for scale setups with 100k+ routes. How to resolve the problem of not breaking old userspace yet be able to move forward with new features such as kernel side filtering which are crucial for efficient operation at high scale? This patch set addresses the problem by adding a new socket flag, NETLINK_DUMP_STRICT_CHK, that userspace can use with setsockopt to request strict checking of headers and attributes on dump requests and hence unlock the ability to use kernel side filters as they are added. Kernel side, the dump handlers are updated to verify the message contains at least the expected header struct: RTM_GETLINK: ifinfomsg RTM_GETADDR: ifaddrmsg RTM_GETMULTICAST: ifaddrmsg RTM_GETANYCAST: ifaddrmsg RTM_GETADDRLABEL: ifaddrlblmsg RTM_GETROUTE: rtmsg RTM_GETSTATS: if_stats_msg RTM_GETNEIGH: ndmsg RTM_GETNEIGHTBL: ndtmsg RTM_GETNSID: rtgenmsg RTM_GETRULE: fib_rule_hdr RTM_GETNETCONF: netconfmsg RTM_GETMDB: br_port_msg And then every field in the header struct should be 0 with the exception of the family. There are a few exceptions to this rule where the kernel already influences the data returned by values in the struct. Next the message should not contain attributes unless the kernel implements filtering for it. Any unexpected data causes the dump to fail with EINVAL. If the new flag is honored by the kernel and the dump contents adjusted by any data passed in the request, the dump handler can set the NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED flag in the netlink message header. For old userspace on new kernel there is no impact as all checks are wrapped in a check on the new strict flag. For new userspace on old kernel, the data in the headers and any appended attributes are silently ignored though the setsockopt failing is the clue to userspace the feature is not supported. New userspace on new kernel gets the requested data dump. iproute2 patches can be found here: https://github.com/dsahern/iproute2 dump-enhancements Major changes since v1 - inner header is supposed to be 4-bytes aligned. So for dumps that should not have attributes appended changed the check to use: if (nlmsg_attrlen(nlh, sizeof(hdr))) Only impacts patches with headers that are not multiples of 4-bytes (rtgenmsg, netconfmsg), but applied the change to all patches not calling nlmsg_parse for consistency. - Added nlmsg_parse_strict and nla_parse_strict for tighter control on attribute parsing. There should be no unknown attribute types or extra bytes. - Moved validation to a helper in most cases Changes since rfc-v2 - dropped the NLM_F_DUMP_FILTERED flag from target nsid dumps per Jiri's objections - changed the opt-in uapi from a netlink message flag to a socket flag. setsockopt provides an api for userspace to definitively know if the kernel supports strict checking on dumps. - re-ordered patches to peel off the extack on dumps if needed to keep this set size within limits - misc cleanups in patches based on testing ==================== Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Update rtnl_fdb_dump for strict data checking. If the flag is set, the dump request is expected to have an ndmsg struct as the header potentially followed by one or more attributes. Any data passed in the header or as an attribute is taken as a request to influence the data returned. Only values supported by the dump handler are allowed to be non-0 or set in the request. At the moment only the NDA_IFINDEX and NDA_MASTER attributes are supported. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Move the existing input checking for rtnl_fdb_dump into a helper, valid_fdb_dump_legacy. This function will retain the current logic that works around the 2 headers that userspace has been allowed to send up to this point. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Update br_mdb_dump for strict data checking. If the flag is set, the dump request is expected to have a br_port_msg struct as the header. All elements of the struct are expected to be 0 and no attributes can be appended. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Update inet_netconf_dump_devconf, inet6_netconf_dump_devconf, and mpls_netconf_dump_devconf for strict data checking. If the flag is set, the dump request is expected to have an netconfmsg struct as the header. The struct only has the family member and no attributes can be appended. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Update ip6addrlbl_dump for strict data checking. If the flag is set, the dump request is expected to have an ifaddrlblmsg struct as the header. All elements of the struct are expected to be 0 and no attributes can be appended. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Update fib_nl_dumprule for strict data checking. If the flag is set, the dump request is expected to have fib_rule_hdr struct as the header. All elements of the struct are expected to be 0 and no attributes can be appended. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Update rtnl_net_dumpid for strict data checking. If the flag is set, the dump request is expected to have an rtgenmsg struct as the header which has the family as the only element. No data may be appended. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Update neightbl_dump_info for strict data checking. If the flag is set, the dump request is expected to have an ndtmsg struct as the header. All elements of the struct are expected to be 0 and no attributes can be appended. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Update neigh_dump_info for strict data checking. If the flag is set, the dump request is expected to have an ndmsg struct as the header potentially followed by one or more attributes. Any data passed in the header or as an attribute is taken as a request to influence the data returned. Only values supported by the dump handler are allowed to be non-0 or set in the request. At the moment only the NDA_IFINDEX and NDA_MASTER attributes are supported. Existing code does not fail the dump if nlmsg_parse fails. That behavior is kept for non-strict checking. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Add helper to check netlink message for route dumps. If the strict flag is set the dump request is expected to have an rtmsg struct as the header. All elements of the struct are expected to be 0 with the exception of rtm_flags (which is used by both ipv4 and ipv6 dumps) and no attributes can be appended. rtm_flags can only have RTM_F_CLONED and RTM_F_PREFIX set. Update inet_dump_fib, inet6_dump_fib, mpls_dump_routes, ipmr_rtm_dumproute, and ip6mr_rtm_dumproute to call this helper if strict data checking is enabled. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Update ipmr_rtm_dumplink for strict data checking. If the flag is set, the dump request is expected to have an ifinfomsg struct as the header. All elements of the struct are expected to be 0 and no attributes can be appended. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Update inet6_dump_ifinfo for strict data checking. If the flag is set, the dump request is expected to have an ifinfomsg struct as the header. All elements of the struct are expected to be 0 and no attributes can be appended. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Update rtnl_stats_dump for strict data checking. If the flag is set, the dump request is expected to have an if_stats_msg struct as the header. All elements of the struct are expected to be 0 except filter_mask which must be non-0 (legacy behavior). No attributes are supported. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Update rtnl_bridge_getlink for strict data checking. If the flag is set, the dump request is expected to have an ifinfomsg struct as the header potentially followed by one or more attributes. Any data passed in the header or as an attribute is taken as a request to influence the data returned. Only values supported by the dump handler are allowed to be non-0 or set in the request. At the moment only the IFLA_EXT_MASK attribute is supported. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Update rtnl_dump_ifinfo for strict data checking. If the flag is set, the dump request is expected to have an ifinfomsg struct as the header potentially followed by one or more attributes. Any data passed in the header or as an attribute is taken as a request to influence the data returned. Only values supported by the dump handler are allowed to be non-0 or set in the request. At the moment only the IFA_TARGET_NETNSID, IFLA_EXT_MASK, IFLA_MASTER, and IFLA_LINKINFO attributes are supported. Existing code does not fail the dump if nlmsg_parse fails. That behavior is kept for non-strict checking. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Update inet6_dump_addr for strict data checking. If the flag is set, the dump request is expected to have an ifaddrmsg struct as the header potentially followed by one or more attributes. Any data passed in the header or as an attribute is taken as a request to influence the data returned. Only values suppored by the dump handler are allowed to be non-0 or set in the request. At the moment only the IFA_TARGET_NETNSID attribute is supported. Follow on patches can add support for other fields (e.g., honor ifa_index and only return data for the given device index). Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Update inet_dump_ifaddr for strict data checking. If the flag is set, the dump request is expected to have an ifaddrmsg struct as the header potentially followed by one or more attributes. Any data passed in the header or as an attribute is taken as a request to influence the data returned. Only values supported by the dump handler are allowed to be non-0 or set in the request. At the moment only the IFA_TARGET_NETNSID attribute is supported. Follow on patches can support for other fields (e.g., honor ifa_index and only return data for the given device index). Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Add a new socket option, NETLINK_DUMP_STRICT_CHK, that userspace can use via setsockopt to request strict checking of headers and attributes on dump requests. To get dump features such as kernel side filtering based on data in the header or attributes appended to the dump request, userspace must call setsockopt() for NETLINK_DUMP_STRICT_CHK and a non-zero value. Since the netlink sock and its flags are private to the af_netlink code, the strict checking flag is passed to dump handlers via a flag in the netlink_callback struct. For old userspace on new kernel there is no impact as all of the data checks in later patches are wrapped in a check on the new strict flag. For new userspace on old kernel, the setsockopt will fail and even if new userspace sets data in the headers and appended attributes the kernel will silently ignore it. Moving forward when the setsockopt succeeds, the new userspace on old kernel means the dump request can pass an attribute the kernel does not understand. The dump will then fail as the older kernel does not understand it. New userspace on new kernel setting the socket option gets the benefit of the improved data dump. Kernel side the NETLINK_DUMP_STRICT_CHK uapi is converted to a generic NETLINK_F_STRICT_CHK flag which can potentially be leveraged for tighter checking on the NEW, DEL, and SET commands. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Pull the inet6_fill_args arg up to in6_dump_addrs and move netnsid into it. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
nla_parse is currently lenient on message parsing, allowing type to be 0 or greater than max expected and only logging a message "netlink: %d bytes leftover after parsing attributes in process `%s'." if the netlink message has unknown data at the end after parsing. What this could mean is that the header at the front of the attributes is actually wrong and the parsing is shifted from what is expected. Add a new strict version that actually fails with EINVAL if there are any bytes remaining after the parsing loop completes, if the atttrbitue type is 0 or greater than max expected. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Make sure extack is passed to nlmsg_parse where easy to do so. Most of these are dump handlers and leveraging the extack in the netlink_callback. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Give a user a reason why EINVAL is returned in nlmsg_parse. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David Ahern authored
Declare extack in netlink_dump and pass to dump handlers via netlink_callback. Add any extack message after the dump_done_errno allowing error messages to be returned. This will be useful when strict checking is done on dump requests, returning why the dump fails EINVAL. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
Replace "--v-- fall through --v--" with a proper "fall through" annotation. Also, change "bad cid: fall through" to "fall through - bad cid". This fix is part of the ongoing efforts to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David S. Miller authored
Jamal Hadi Salim says: ==================== net: sched: cls_u32 Various improvements Various improvements from Al. Changes from version 1: Add missing commit ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Al Viro authored
Now that we have the knode count, we can instantly check if any hnodes are non-empty. And that kills the check for extra references to root hnode - those could happen only if there was a knode to carry such a link. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Al Viro authored
allows to simplify u32_delete() considerably Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Al Viro authored
Both hnode ->tp_c and tp_c argument of u32_set_parms() the latter is redundant, the former - never read... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Al Viro authored
It must be tc_u_common associated with that tp (i.e. tp->data). Proof: * both ->ht_up and ->tp_c are assign-once * ->tp_c of anything inserted into tp_c->hlist is tp_c * hnodes never get reinserted into the lists or moved between those, so anything found by u32_lookup_ht(tp->data, ...) will have ->tp_c equal to tp->data. * tp->root->tp_c == tp->data. * ->ht_up of anything inserted into hnode->ht[...] is equal to hnode. * knodes never get reinserted into hash chains or moved between those, so anything returned by u32_lookup_key(ht, ...) will have ->ht_up equal to ht. * any knode returned by u32_get(tp, ...) will have ->ht_up->tp_c point to tp->data Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Al Viro authored
the only thing we used ht for was ht->tp_c and callers can get that without going through ->tp_c at all; start with lifting that into the callers, next commits will massage those, eventually removing ->tp_c altogether. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Al Viro authored
* calculate key *once*, not for each hash chain element * let tc_u_hash() return the pointer to chain head rather than index - callers are cleaner that way. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Al Viro authored
unused Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Al Viro authored
not used anymore Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Al Viro authored
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Al Viro authored
Tested by modifying iproute2 to allow sending a divisor > 255 Tested-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Al Viro authored
Operation makes no sense. Nothing will actually break if we do so (depth limit in u32_classify() will prevent infinite loops), but according to maintainers it's best prohibited outright. NOTE: doing so guarantees that u32_destroy() will trigger the call of u32_destroy_hnode(); we might want to make that unconditional. Test: tc qdisc add dev eth0 ingress tc filter add dev eth0 parent ffff: protocol ip prio 100 u32 \ link 800: offset at 0 mask 0f00 shift 6 plus 0 eat match ip protocol 6 ff should fail with Error: cls_u32: Not linking to root node Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Al Viro authored
... and produce consistent error on attempt to delete such. Existing check in u32_delete() is inconsistent - after tc qdisc add dev eth0 ingress tc filter add dev eth0 parent ffff: protocol ip prio 100 handle 1: u32 \ divisor 1 tc filter add dev eth0 parent ffff: protocol ip prio 200 handle 2: u32 \ divisor 1 both tc filter delete dev eth0 parent ffff: protocol ip prio 100 handle 801: u32 and tc filter delete dev eth0 parent ffff: protocol ip prio 100 handle 800: u32 will fail (at least with refcounting fixes), but the former will complain about an attempt to remove a busy table, while the latter will recognize it as root and yield "Not allowed to delete root node" instead. The problem with the existing check is that several tcf_proto instances might share the same tp->data and handle-to-hnode lookup will be the same for all of them. So comparing an hnode to be deleted with tp->root won't catch the case when one tp is used to try deleting the root of another. Solution is trivial - mark the root hnodes explicitly upon allocation and check for that. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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