Allow the FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY and FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY
ioctls to be used by non-root users to add and remove encryption keys
from the filesystem-level crypto keyrings, subject to limitations.

Motivation: while privileged fscrypt key management is sufficient for
some users (e.g. Android and Chromium OS, where a privileged process
manages all keys), the old API by design also allows non-root users to
set up and use encrypted directories, and we don't want to regress on
that.  Especially, we don't want to force users to continue using the
old API, running into the visibility mismatch between files and keyrings
and being unable to "lock" encrypted directories.

Intuitively, the ioctls have to be privileged since they manipulate
filesystem-level state.  However, it's actually safe to make them
unprivileged if we very carefully enforce some specific limitations.

First, each key must be identified by a cryptographic hash so that a
user can't add the wrong key for another user's files.  For v2
encryption policies, we use the key_identifier for this.  v1 policies
don't have this, so managing keys for them remains privileged.

Second, each key a user adds is charged to their quota for the keyrings
service.  Thus, a user can't exhaust memory by adding a huge number of
keys.  By default each non-root user is allowed up to 200 keys; this can
be changed using the existing sysctl 'kernel.keys.maxkeys'.

Third, if multiple users add the same key, we keep track of those users
of the key (of which there remains a single copy), and won't really
remove the key, i.e. "lock" the encrypted files, until all those users
have removed it.  This prevents denial of service attacks that would be
possible under simpler schemes, such allowing the first user who added a
key to remove it -- since that could be a malicious user who has
compromised the key.  Of course, encryption keys should be kept secret,
but the idea is that using encryption should never be *less* secure than
not using encryption, even if your key was compromised.

We tolerate that a user will be unable to really remove a key, i.e.
unable to "lock" their encrypted files, if another user has added the
same key.  But in a sense, this is actually a good thing because it will
avoid providing a false notion of security where a key appears to have
been removed when actually it's still in memory, available to any
attacker who compromises the operating system kernel.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2".  It has the following changes
from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*):

- Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as
  input to HKDF-SHA512.  This is more flexible and less error-prone, and
  it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF.
  Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined:

    - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF.

    - Per-mode keys.  These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY
      flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly.
      These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when
      support for it is added.

    - Key identifiers (see below).

- Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier,
  which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512.  This prevents
  users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or
  directory.  This was easily possible with v1 policies, which
  identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor.

- The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a
  process-subscribed keyring.

The following UAPI additions are made:

- The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a
  fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy.  It's disambiguated
  from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix.

- A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added.  It allows
  getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or
  directory.  The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not
  be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which
  policy structure is expected.  The new ioctl includes a size field, so
  it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions.

- The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
  and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2
  encryption policies.  Such keys are kept logically separate from keys
  for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather
  than by 'descriptor'.  The 'identifier' need not be provided when
  adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway.

This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the
same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys:
capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN).  However, the next patch will carefully take
advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow
non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full
replacement for v1 policies.

(*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk
    fscrypt_context::format is 1.  But I believe it makes the most sense
    to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the
    numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk.
Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Add an implementation of HKDF (RFC 5869) to fscrypt, for the purpose of
deriving additional key material from the fscrypt master keys for v2
encryption policies.  HKDF is a key derivation function built on top of
HMAC.  We choose SHA-512 for the underlying unkeyed hash, and use an
"hmac(sha512)" transform allocated from the crypto API.

We'll be using this to replace the AES-ECB based KDF currently used to
derive the per-file encryption keys.  While the AES-ECB based KDF is
believed to meet the original security requirements, it is nonstandard
and has problems that don't exist in modern KDFs such as HKDF:

1. It's reversible.  Given a derived key and nonce, an attacker can
   easily compute the master key.  This is okay if the master key and
   derived keys are equally hard to compromise, but now we'd like to be
   more robust against threats such as a derived key being compromised
   through a timing attack, or a derived key for an in-use file being
   compromised after the master key has already been removed.

2. It doesn't evenly distribute the entropy from the master key; each 16
   input bytes only affects the corresponding 16 output bytes.

3. It isn't easily extensible to deriving other values or keys, such as
   a public hash for securely identifying the key, or per-mode keys.
   Per-mode keys will be immediately useful for Adiantum encryption, for
   which fscrypt currently uses the master key directly, introducing
   unnecessary usage constraints.  Per-mode keys will also be useful for
   hardware inline encryption, which is currently being worked on.

HKDF solves all the above problems.
Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS.  Given a key
specified by 'struct fscrypt_key_specifier' (the same way a key is
specified for the other fscrypt key management ioctls), it returns
status information in a 'struct fscrypt_get_key_status_arg'.

The main motivation for this is that applications need to be able to
check whether an encrypted directory is "unlocked" or not, so that they
can add the key if it is not, and avoid adding the key (which may
involve prompting the user for a passphrase) if it already is.

It's possible to use some workarounds such as checking whether opening a
regular file fails with ENOKEY, or checking whether the filenames "look
like gibberish" or not.  However, no workaround is usable in all cases.

Like the other key management ioctls, the keyrings syscalls may seem at
first to be a good fit for this.  Unfortunately, they are not.  Even if
we exposed the keyring ID of the ->s_master_keys keyring and gave
everyone Search permission on it (note: currently the keyrings
permission system would also allow everyone to "invalidate" the keyring
too), the fscrypt keys have an additional state that doesn't map cleanly
to the keyrings API: the secret can be removed, but we can be still
tracking the files that were using the key, and the removal can be
re-attempted or the secret added again.

After later patches, some applications will also need a way to determine
whether a key was added by the current user vs. by some other user.
Reserved fields are included in fscrypt_get_key_status_arg for this and
other future extensions.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY.  This ioctl
removes an encryption key that was added by FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY.
It wipes the secret key itself, then "locks" the encrypted files and
directories that had been unlocked using that key -- implemented by
evicting the relevant dentries and inodes from the VFS caches.

The problem this solves is that many fscrypt users want the ability to
remove encryption keys, causing the corresponding encrypted directories
to appear "locked" (presented in ciphertext form) again.  Moreover,
users want removing an encryption key to *really* remove it, in the
sense that the removed keys cannot be recovered even if kernel memory is
compromised, e.g. by the exploit of a kernel security vulnerability or
by a physical attack.  This is desirable after a user logs out of the
system, for example.  In many cases users even already assume this to be
the case and are surprised to hear when it's not.

It is not sufficient to simply unlink the master key from the keyring
(or to revoke or invalidate it), since the actual encryption transform
objects are still pinned in memory by their inodes.  Therefore, to
really remove a key we must also evict the relevant inodes.

Currently one workaround is to run 'sync && echo 2 >
/proc/sys/vm/drop_caches'.  But, that evicts all unused inodes in the
system rather than just the inodes associated with the key being
removed, causing severe performance problems.  Moreover, it requires
root privileges, so regular users can't "lock" their encrypted files.

Another workaround, used in Chromium OS kernels, is to add a new
VFS-level ioctl FS_IOC_DROP_CACHE which is a more restricted version of
drop_caches that operates on a single super_block.  It does:

        shrink_dcache_sb(sb);
        invalidate_inodes(sb, false);

But it's still a hack.  Yet, the major users of filesystem encryption
want this feature badly enough that they are actually using these hacks.

To properly solve the problem, start maintaining a list of the inodes
which have been "unlocked" using each master key.  Originally this
wasn't possible because the kernel didn't keep track of in-use master
keys at all.  But, with the ->s_master_keys keyring it is now possible.

Then, add an ioctl FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY.  It finds the specified
master key in ->s_master_keys, then wipes the secret key itself, which
prevents any additional inodes from being unlocked with the key.  Then,
it syncs the filesystem and evicts the inodes in the key's list.  The
normal inode eviction code will free and wipe the per-file keys (in
->i_crypt_info).  Note that freeing ->i_crypt_info without evicting the
inodes was also considered, but would have been racy.

Some inodes may still be in use when a master key is removed, and we
can't simply revoke random file descriptors, mmap's, etc.  Thus, the
ioctl simply skips in-use inodes, and returns -EBUSY to indicate that
some inodes weren't evicted.  The master key *secret* is still removed,
but the fscrypt_master_key struct remains to keep track of the remaining
inodes.  Userspace can then retry the ioctl to evict the remaining
inodes.  Alternatively, if userspace adds the key again, the refreshed
secret will be associated with the existing list of inodes so they
remain correctly tracked for future key removals.

The ioctl doesn't wipe pagecache pages.  Thus, we tolerate that after a
kernel compromise some portions of plaintext file contents may still be
recoverable from memory.  This can be solved by enabling page poisoning
system-wide, which security conscious users may choose to do.  But it's
very difficult to solve otherwise, e.g. note that plaintext file
contents may have been read in other places than pagecache pages.

Like FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY is
initially restricted to privileged users only.  This is sufficient for
some use cases, but not all.  A later patch will relax this restriction,
but it will require introducing key hashes, among other changes.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY.  This ioctl adds an
encryption key to the filesystem's fscrypt keyring ->s_master_keys,
making any files encrypted with that key appear "unlocked".

Why we need this
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The main problem is that the "locked/unlocked" (ciphertext/plaintext)
status of encrypted files is global, but the fscrypt keys are not.
fscrypt only looks for keys in the keyring(s) the process accessing the
filesystem is subscribed to: the thread keyring, process keyring, and
session keyring, where the session keyring may contain the user keyring.

Therefore, userspace has to put fscrypt keys in the keyrings for
individual users or sessions.  But this means that when a process with a
different keyring tries to access encrypted files, whether they appear
"unlocked" or not is nondeterministic.  This is because it depends on
whether the files are currently present in the inode cache.

Fixing this by consistently providing each process its own view of the
filesystem depending on whether it has the key or not isn't feasible due
to how the VFS caches work.  Furthermore, while sometimes users expect
this behavior, it is misguided for two reasons.  First, it would be an
OS-level access control mechanism largely redundant with existing access
control mechanisms such as UNIX file permissions, ACLs, LSMs, etc.
Encryption is actually for protecting the data at rest.

Second, almost all users of fscrypt actually do need the keys to be
global.  The largest users of fscrypt, Android and Chromium OS, achieve
this by having PID 1 create a "session keyring" that is inherited by
every process.  This works, but it isn't scalable because it prevents
session keyrings from being used for any other purpose.

On general-purpose Linux distros, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool [1] can't
similarly abuse the session keyring, so to make 'sudo' work on all
systems it has to link all the user keyrings into root's user keyring
[2].  This is ugly and raises security concerns.  Moreover it can't make
the keys available to system services, such as sshd trying to access the
user's '~/.ssh' directory (see [3], [4]) or NetworkManager trying to
read certificates from the user's home directory (see [5]); or to Docker
containers (see [6], [7]).

By having an API to add a key to the *filesystem* we'll be able to fix
the above bugs, remove userspace workarounds, and clearly express the
intended semantics: the locked/unlocked status of an encrypted directory
is global, and encryption is orthogonal to OS-level access control.

Why not use the add_key() syscall
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

We use an ioctl for this API rather than the existing add_key() system
call because the ioctl gives us the flexibility needed to implement
fscrypt-specific semantics that will be introduced in later patches:

- Supporting key removal with the semantics such that the secret is
  removed immediately and any unused inodes using the key are evicted;
  also, the eviction of any in-use inodes can be retried.

- Calculating a key-dependent cryptographic identifier and returning it
  to userspace.

- Allowing keys to be added and removed by non-root users, but only keys
  for v2 encryption policies; and to prevent denial-of-service attacks,
  users can only remove keys they themselves have added, and a key is
  only really removed after all users who added it have removed it.

Trying to shoehorn these semantics into the keyrings syscalls would be
very difficult, whereas the ioctls make things much easier.

However, to reuse code the implementation still uses the keyrings
service internally.  Thus we get lockless RCU-mode key lookups without
having to re-implement it, and the keys automatically show up in
/proc/keys for debugging purposes.

References:

    [1] https://github.com/google/fscrypt
    [2] https://goo.gl/55cCrI#heading=h.vf09isp98isb
    [3] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/111#issuecomment-444347939
    [4] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/116
    [5] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/fscrypt/+bug/1770715
    [6] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/128
    [7] https://askubuntu.com/questions/1130306/cannot-run-docker-on-an-encrypted-filesystemReviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Rename keyinfo.c to keysetup.c since this better describes what the file
does (sets up the key), and it matches the new file keysetup_v1.c.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

In preparation for introducing v2 encryption policies which will find
and derive encryption keys differently from the current v1 encryption
policies, move the v1 policy-specific key setup code from keyinfo.c into
keysetup_v1.c.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Do some more refactoring of the key setup code, in preparation for
introducing a filesystem-level keyring and v2 encryption policies:

- Now that ci_inode exists, don't pass around the inode unnecessarily.

- Define a function setup_file_encryption_key() which handles the crypto
  key setup given an under-construction fscrypt_info.  Don't pass the
  fscrypt_context, since everything is in the fscrypt_info.
  [This will be extended for v2 policies and the fs-level keyring.]

- Define a function fscrypt_set_derived_key() which sets the per-file
  key, without depending on anything specific to v1 policies.
  [This will also be used for v2 policies.]

- Define a function fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key() which takes the raw
  master key, thus separating finding the key from using it.
  [This will also be used if the key is found in the fs-level keyring.]
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

In preparation for introducing a filesystem-level keyring which will
contain fscrypt master keys, rename the existing 'struct
fscrypt_master_key' to 'struct fscrypt_direct_key'.  This is the
structure in the existing table of master keys that's maintained to
deduplicate the crypto transforms for v1 DIRECT_KEY policies.

I've chosen to keep this table as-is rather than make it automagically
add/remove the keys to/from the filesystem-level keyring, since that
would add a lot of extra complexity to the filesystem-level keyring.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Add an inode back-pointer to 'struct fscrypt_info', such that
inode->i_crypt_info->ci_inode == inode.

This will be useful for:

1. Evicting the inodes when a fscrypt key is removed, since we'll track
   the inodes using a given key by linking their fscrypt_infos together,
   rather than the inodes directly.  This avoids bloating 'struct inode'
   with a new list_head.

2. Simplifying the per-file key setup, since the inode pointer won't
   have to be passed around everywhere just in case something goes wrong
   and it's needed for fscrypt_warn().
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Update fs/crypto/ to use the new names for the UAPI constants rather
than the old names, then make the old definitions conditional on
!__KERNEL__.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Prefix all filesystem encryption UAPI constants except the ioctl numbers
with "FSCRYPT_" rather than with "FS_".  This namespaces the constants
more appropriately and makes it clear that they are related specifically
to the filesystem encryption feature, and to the 'fscrypt_*' structures.
With some of the old names like "FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID", it was not
immediately clear that the constant had anything to do with encryption.

This is also useful because we'll be adding more encryption-related
constants, e.g. for the policy version, and we'd otherwise have to
choose whether to use unclear names like FS_POLICY_V1 or inconsistent
names like FS_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_V1.

For source compatibility with existing userspace programs, keep the old
names defined as aliases to the new names.

Finally, as long as new names are being defined anyway, I skipped
defining new names for the fscrypt mode numbers that aren't actually
used: INVALID (0), AES_256_GCM (2), AES_256_CBC (3), SPECK128_256_XTS
(7), and SPECK128_256_CTS (8).
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

More fscrypt definitions are being added, and we shouldn't use a
disproportionate amount of space in <linux/fs.h> for fscrypt stuff.
So move the fscrypt definitions to a new header <linux/fscrypt.h>.

For source compatibility with existing userspace programs, <linux/fs.h>
still includes the new header.
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Return ENOPKG rather than ENOENT when trying to open a file that's
encrypted using algorithms not available in the kernel's crypto API.

This avoids an ambiguity, since ENOENT is also returned when the file
doesn't exist.

Note: this is the same approach I'm taking for fs-verity.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Users of fscrypt with non-default algorithms will encounter an error
like the following if they fail to include the needed algorithms into
the crypto API when configuring the kernel (as per the documentation):

    Error allocating 'adiantum(xchacha12,aes)' transform: -2

This requires that the user figure out what the "-2" error means.
Make it more friendly by printing a warning like the following instead:

    Missing crypto API support for Adiantum (API name: "adiantum(xchacha12,aes)")

Also upgrade the log level for *other* errors to KERN_ERR.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

When fs/crypto/ encounters an inode with an invalid encryption context,
currently it prints a warning if the pair of encryption modes are
unrecognized, but it's silent if there are other problems such as
unsupported context size, format, or flags.  To help people debug such
situations, add more warning messages.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Most of the warning and error messages in fs/crypto/ are for situations
related to a specific inode, not merely to a super_block.  So to make
things easier, make fscrypt_msg() take an inode rather than a
super_block, and make it print the inode number.

Note: This is the same approach I'm taking for fsverity_msg().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Some minor cleanups for the code that base64 encodes and decodes
encrypted filenames and long name digests:

- Rename "digest_{encode,decode}()" => "base64_{encode,decode}()" since
  they are used for filenames too, not just for long name digests.
- Replace 'while' loops with more conventional 'for' loops.
- Use 'u8' for binary data.  Keep 'char' for string data.
- Fully constify the lookup table (pointer was not const).
- Improve comment.

No actual change in behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Since commit 643fa961 ("fscrypt: remove filesystem specific build
config option"), fs/crypto/ can no longer be built as a loadable module.
Thus it no longer needs a module_exit function, nor a MODULE_LICENSE.
So remove them, and change module_init to late_initcall.
Reviewed-by: Chandan Rajendra <chandan@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Pull tpm fixes from Jarkko Sakkinen:
 "Two bug fixes that did not make into my first pull request"

* tag 'tpmdd-next-20190805' of git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/linux-tpmdd:
  tpm: tpm_ibm_vtpm: Fix unallocated banks
  tpm: Fix null pointer dereference on chip register error path

Pull MTD fixes from Miquel Raynal:
 "NAND:

   - Fix Micron driver as some chips enable internal ECC correction
     during their discovery while they advertize they do not have any.

  Hyperbus:

   - Restrict the build to only ARM64 SoCs (and compile testing) which
     is what should have been done since the beginning.

   - Fix Kconfig issue by selection something instead of implying it"

* tag 'mtd/fixes-for-5.3-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mtd/linux:
  mtd: hyperbus: Add hardware dependency to AM654 driver
  mtd: hyperbus: Kconfig: Fix HBMC_AM654 dependencies
  mtd: rawnand: micron: handle on-die "ECC-off" devices correctly

The nr_allocated_banks and allocated banks are initialized as part of
tpm_chip_register. Currently, this is done as part of auto startup
function. However, some drivers, like the ibm vtpm driver, do not run
auto startup during initialization. This results in uninitialized memory
issue and causes a kernel panic during boot.

This patch moves the pcr allocation outside the auto startup function
into tpm_chip_register. This ensures that allocated banks are initialized
in any case.

Fixes: 879b5892 ("tpm: retrieve digest size of unknown algorithms with PCR read")
Reported-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>

If clk_enable is not defined and chip initialization
is canceled code hits null dereference.

Easily reproducible with vTPM init fail:
  swtpm chardev --tpmstate dir=nonexistent_dir --tpm2 --vtpm-proxy

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000
...
Call Trace:
 tpm_chip_start+0x9d/0xa0 [tpm]
 tpm_chip_register+0x10/0x1a0 [tpm]
 vtpm_proxy_work+0x11/0x30 [tpm_vtpm_proxy]
 process_one_work+0x214/0x5a0
 worker_thread+0x134/0x3e0
 ? process_one_work+0x5a0/0x5a0
 kthread+0xd4/0x100
 ? process_one_work+0x5a0/0x5a0
 ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90
 ret_from_fork+0x19/0x24

Fixes: 719b7d81 ("tpm: introduce tpm_chip_start() and tpm_chip_stop()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.1+
Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>

Pull powerpc fixes from Michael Ellerman:
 "Some more powerpc fixes for 5.3:

   - Wire up the new clone3 syscall.

   - A fix for the PAPR SCM nvdimm driver, to fix a crash when firmware
     gives us a device that's attached to a non-online NUMA node.

   - A fix for a boot failure on 32-bit with KASAN enabled.

   - Three fixes for implicit fall through warnings, some of which are
     errors for us due to -Werror.

  Thanks to: Aneesh Kumar K.V, Christophe Leroy, Kees Cook, Santosh
  Sivaraj, Stephen Rothwell"

* tag 'powerpc-5.3-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux:
  powerpc/kasan: fix early boot failure on PPC32
  drivers/macintosh/smu.c: Mark expected switch fall-through
  powerpc/spe: Mark expected switch fall-throughs
  powerpc/nvdimm: Pick nearby online node if the device node is not online
  powerpc/kvm: Fall through switch case explicitly
  powerpc: Wire up clone3 syscall

At the end of the v5.3 upstream kernel development cycle, Simon will be
stepping down from his role as Renesas SoC maintainer.  Starting with
the v5.4 development cycle, Geert is taking over this role.

Add Geert as a co-maintainer, and add his git repository and branch.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Reviewed-by: Niklas Söderlund <niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se>
Acked-by: Simon Horman <horms+renesas@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Merge tag 'kbuild-fixes-v5.3-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild

Pull Kbuild fixes from Masahiro Yamada:

 - detect missing missing "WITH Linux-syscall-note" for uapi headers

 - fix needless rebuild when using Clang

 - fix false-positive cc-option in Kconfig when using Clang

 - avoid including corrupted .*.cmd files in the modpost stage

 - fix warning of 'make vmlinux'

 - fix {m,n,x,g}config to not generate the broken .config on the second
   save operation.

 - some trivial Makefile fixes

* tag 'kbuild-fixes-v5.3-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild:
  kconfig: Clear "written" flag to avoid data loss
  kbuild: Check for unknown options with cc-option usage in Kconfig and clang
  lib/raid6: fix unnecessary rebuild of vpermxor*.c
  kbuild: modpost: do not parse unnecessary rules for vmlinux modpost
  kbuild: modpost: remove unnecessary dependency for __modpost
  kbuild: modpost: handle KBUILD_EXTRA_SYMBOLS only for external modules
  kbuild: modpost: include .*.cmd files only when targets exist
  kbuild: initialize CLANG_FLAGS correctly in the top Makefile
  kbuild: detect missing "WITH Linux-syscall-note" for uapi headers

Pull SafeSetID maintainer update from Micah Morton:
 "Add entry in MAINTAINERS file for SafeSetID LSM"

* tag 'safesetid-maintainers-correction-5.3-rc2' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux:
  Add entry in MAINTAINERS file for SafeSetID LSM

Prior to this commit, starting nconfig, xconfig or gconfig, and saving
the .config file more than once caused data loss, where a .config file
that contained only comments would be written to disk starting from the
second save operation.

This bug manifests itself because the SYMBOL_WRITTEN flag is never
cleared after the first call to conf_write, and subsequent calls to
conf_write then skip all of the configuration symbols due to the
SYMBOL_WRITTEN flag being set.

This commit resolves this issue by clearing the SYMBOL_WRITTEN flag
from all symbols before conf_write returns.

Fixes: 8e2442a5 ("kconfig: fix missing choice values in auto.conf")
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: M. Vefa Bicakci <m.v.b@runbox.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>

Pull Xtensa fix from Max Filippov:
 "Fix build for xtensa cores with coprocessors that was broken by
  entry/return abstraction patch"

* tag 'xtensa-20190803' of git://github.com/jcmvbkbc/linux-xtensa:
  xtensa: fix build for cores with coprocessors

Pull i2c fixes from Wolfram Sang:
 "A set of driver fixes for the I2C subsystem"

* 'i2c/for-current-fixed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wsa/linux:
  i2c: s3c2410: Mark expected switch fall-through
  i2c: at91: fix clk_offset for sama5d2
  i2c: at91: disable TXRDY interrupt after sending data
  i2c: iproc: Fix i2c master read more than 63 bytes
  eeprom: at24: make spd world-readable again

Pull perf tooling fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A set of updates for perf tools and documentation:

  perf header:
    - Prevent a division by zero
    - Deal with an uninitialized warning proper

  libbpf:
    - Fix the missiong __WORDSIZE definition for musl & al

  UAPI headers:
    - Synchronize kernel headers

  Documentation:
    - Fix the memory units for perf.data size"

* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  libbpf: fix missing __WORDSIZE definition
  perf tools: Fix perf.data documentation units for memory size
  perf header: Fix use of unitialized value warning
  perf header: Fix divide by zero error if f_header.attr_size==0
  tools headers UAPI: Sync if_link.h with the kernel
  tools headers UAPI: Sync sched.h with the kernel
  tools headers UAPI: Sync usbdevice_fs.h with the kernels to get new ioctl
  tools perf beauty: Fix usbdevfs_ioctl table generator to handle _IOC()
  tools headers UAPI: Update tools's copy of drm.h headers
  tools headers UAPI: Update tools's copy of mman.h headers
  tools headers UAPI: Update tools's copy of kvm.h headers
  tools include UAPI: Sync x86's syscalls_64.tbl and generic unistd.h to pick up clone3 and pidfd_open

Pull vdso timer fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A series of commits to deal with the regression caused by the generic
  VDSO implementation.

  The usage of clock_gettime64() for 32bit compat fallback syscalls
  caused seccomp filters to kill innocent processes because they only
  allow clock_gettime().

  Handle the compat syscalls with clock_gettime() as before, which is
  not a functional problem for the VDSO as the legacy compat application
  interface is not y2038 safe anyway. It's just extra fallback code
  which needs to be implemented on every architecture.

  It's opt in for now so that it does not break the compile of already
  converted architectures in linux-next. Once these are fixed, the
  #ifdeffery goes away.

  So much for trying to be smart and reuse code..."

* 'timers-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  arm64: compat: vdso: Use legacy syscalls as fallback
  x86/vdso/32: Use 32bit syscall fallback
  lib/vdso/32: Provide legacy syscall fallbacks
  lib/vdso: Move fallback invocation to the callers
  lib/vdso/32: Remove inconsistent NULL pointer checks

Pull irq fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A small bunch of fixes from the irqchip department:

   - Fix a couple of UAF on error paths (RZA1, GICv3 ITS)

   - Fix iMX GPCv2 trigger setting

   - Add missing of_node_put() on error path in MBIGEN

   - Add another bunch of /* fall-through */ to silence warnings"

* 'irq-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  irqchip/renesas-rza1: Fix an use-after-free in rza1_irqc_probe()
  irqchip/irq-imx-gpcv2: Forward irq type to parent
  irqchip/irq-mbigen: Add of_node_put() before return
  irqchip/gic-v3-its: Free unused vpt_page when alloc vpe table fail
  irqchip/gic-v3: Mark expected switch fall-through

Pull xfs fixes from Darrick Wong:

 - Avoid leaking kernel stack contents to userspace

 - Fix a potential null pointer dereference in the dabtree scrub code

* tag 'xfs-5.3-fixes-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/xfs/xfs-linux:
  xfs: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in xchk_da_btree_block_check_sibling()
  xfs: fix stack contents leakage in the v1 inumber ioctls

Merge misc fixes from Andrew Morton:
 "17 fixes"

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>:
  drivers/acpi/scan.c: document why we don't need the device_hotplug_lock
  memremap: move from kernel/ to mm/
  lib/test_meminit.c: use GFP_ATOMIC in RCU critical section
  asm-generic: fix -Wtype-limits compiler warnings
  cgroup: kselftest: relax fs_spec checks
  mm/memory_hotplug.c: remove unneeded return for void function
  mm/migrate.c: initialize pud_entry in migrate_vma()
  coredump: split pipe command whitespace before expanding template
  page flags: prioritize kasan bits over last-cpuid
  ubsan: build ubsan.c more conservatively
  kasan: remove clang version check for KASAN_STACK
  mm: compaction: avoid 100% CPU usage during compaction when a task is killed
  mm: migrate: fix reference check race between __find_get_block() and migration
  mm: vmscan: check if mem cgroup is disabled or not before calling memcg slab shrinker
  ocfs2: remove set but not used variable 'last_hash'
  Revert "kmemleak: allow to coexist with fault injection"
  kernel/signal.c: fix a kernel-doc markup

Pull RISC-V fixes from Paul Walmsley:
 "Three minor RISC-V-related changes for v5.3-rc3:

   - Add build ID to VDSO builds to avoid a double-free in perf when
     libelf isn't used

   - Align the RV64 defconfig to the output of "make savedefconfig" so
     subsequent defconfig patches don't get out of hand

   - Drop a superfluous DT property from the FU540 SoC DT data (since it
     must be already set in board data that includes it)"

* tag 'riscv/for-v5.3-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux:
  riscv: defconfig: align RV64 defconfig to the output of "make savedefconfig"
  riscv: dts: fu540-c000: drop "timebase-frequency"
  riscv: Fix perf record without libelf support

Let's document why the lock is not needed in acpi_scan_init(), right now
this is not really obvious.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix tpyo]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190731135306.31524-1-david@redhat.comSigned-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

memremap.c implements MM functionality for ZONE_DEVICE, so it really
should be in the mm/ directory, not the kernel/ one.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190722094143.18387-1-hch@lst.deSigned-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>