- 29 Jan, 2016 40 commits
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Paolo Bonzini authored
commit e5e57e7a upstream. While setting the KVM PIT counters in 'kvm_pit_load_count', if 'hpet_legacy_start' is set, the function disables the timer on channel[0], instead of the respective index 'channel'. This is because channels 1-3 are not linked to the HPET. Fix the caller to only activate the special HPET processing for channel 0. Reported-by: P J P <pjp@fedoraproject.org> Fixes: 0185604cSigned-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit ef90cf3d) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Andrew Honig authored
commit 0185604c upstream. Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0 on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec. This is CVE-2015-7513. Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 08b8d1a6) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Andrew Banman authored
commit 5f0f2887 upstream. test_pages_in_a_zone() does not account for the possibility of missing sections in the given pfn range. pfn_valid_within always returns 1 when CONFIG_HOLES_IN_ZONE is not set, allowing invalid pfns from missing sections to pass the test, leading to a kernel oops. Wrap an additional pfn loop with PAGES_PER_SECTION granularity to check for missing sections before proceeding into the zone-check code. This also prevents a crash from offlining memory devices with missing sections. Despite this, it may be a good idea to keep the related patch '[PATCH 3/3] drivers: memory: prohibit offlining of memory blocks with missing sections' because missing sections in a memory block may lead to other problems not covered by the scope of this fix. Signed-off-by: Andrew Banman <abanman@sgi.com> Acked-by: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com> Cc: Russ Anderson <rja@sgi.com> Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjennings@variantweb.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 17f6a291) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Daniel Kiper authored
commit a539f353 upstream. Add SECTION_ALIGN_UP() and SECTION_ALIGN_DOWN() macro which aligns given pfn to upper section and lower section boundary accordingly. Required for the latest memory hotplug support for the Xen balloon driver. Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <dkiper@net-space.pl> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [wt: only needed for next patch] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Andrey Ryabinin authored
commit e459dfee upstream. ip6addrlbl_get() has never worked. If ip6addrlbl_hold() succeeded, ip6addrlbl_get() will exit with '-ESRCH'. If ip6addrlbl_hold() failed, ip6addrlbl_get() will use about to be free ip6addrlbl_entry pointer. Fix this by inverting ip6addrlbl_hold() check. Fixes: 2a8cc6c8 ("[IPV6] ADDRCONF: Support RFC3484 configurable address selection policy table.") Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com> Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 39b214ba) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Helge Deller authored
commit 71a71fb5 upstream. On parisc syscalls which are interrupted by signals sometimes failed to restart and instead returned -ENOSYS which in the worst case lead to userspace crashes. A similiar problem existed on MIPS and was fixed by commit e967ef02 ("MIPS: Fix restart of indirect syscalls"). On parisc the current syscall restart code assumes that all syscall callers load the syscall number in the delay slot of the ble instruction. That's how it is e.g. done in the unistd.h header file: ble 0x100(%sr2, %r0) ldi #syscall_nr, %r20 Because of that assumption the current code never restored %r20 before returning to userspace. This assumption is at least not true for code which uses the glibc syscall() function, which instead uses this syntax: ble 0x100(%sr2, %r0) copy regX, %r20 where regX depend on how the compiler optimizes the code and register usage. This patch fixes this problem by adding code to analyze how the syscall number is loaded in the delay branch and - if needed - copy the syscall number to regX prior returning to userspace for the syscall restart. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 9f2dcffe) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Ed Swierk authored
commit e967ef02 upstream. When 32-bit MIPS userspace invokes a syscall indirectly via syscall(number, arg1, ..., arg7), the kernel looks up the actual syscall based on the given number, shifts the other arguments to the left, and jumps to the syscall. If the syscall is interrupted by a signal and indicates it needs to be restarted by the kernel (by returning ERESTARTNOINTR for example), the syscall must be called directly, since the number is no longer the first argument, and the other arguments are now staged for a direct call. Before shifting the arguments, store the syscall number in pt_regs->regs[2]. This gets copied temporarily into pt_regs->regs[0] after the syscall returns. If the syscall needs to be restarted, handle_signal()/do_signal() copies the number back to pt_regs->reg[2], which ends up in $v0 once control returns to userspace. Signed-off-by: Ed Swierk <eswierk@skyportsystems.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/8929/Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 08f865bb) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Alan Stern authored
commit e50293ef upstream. Commit 8520f380 ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use. This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be done. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com> Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com> Fixes: 8520f380 ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work") Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: add prototype for hub_release() before first use] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 10037421) [wt: made a few changes : - adjusted context due to some autopm code being added only in 2.6.33 - no device_{lock,unlock}() in 2.6.32, use up/down(&->sem) instead] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Dan Carpenter authored
commit abdc9a3b upstream. The code expects the loop to end with "retries" set to zero but, because it is a post-op, it will end set to -1. I have fixed this by moving the decrement inside the loop. Fixes: 014aa2a3 ('USB: ipaq: minor ipaq_open() cleanup.') Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 53a68d3f) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Michael Holzheu authored
commit 272fa59c upstream. The print_insn() function returns strings like "lghi %r1,0". To escape the '%' character in sprintf() a second '%' is used. For example "lghi %%r1,0" is converted into "lghi %r1,0". After print_insn() the output string is passed to printk(). Because format specifiers like "%r" or "%f" are ignored by printk() this works by chance most of the time. But for instructions with control registers like "lctl %c6,%c6,780" this fails because printk() interprets "%c" as character format specifier. Fix this problem and escape the '%' characters twice. For example "lctl %%%%c6,%%%%c6,780" is then converted by sprintf() into "lctl %%c6,%%c6,780" and by printk() into "lctl %c6,%c6,780". Signed-off-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: drop the OPERAND_VR case] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 45f32e35) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Johan Hovold authored
commit 157f38f9 upstream. Fix parent-device reference leak due to SPI-core taking an unnecessary reference to the parent when allocating the master structure, a reference that was never released. Note that driver core takes its own reference to the parent when the master device is registered. Fixes: 49dce689 ("spi doesn't need class_device") Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 40ddf30c) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Tilman Schmidt authored
commit 4c5e354a upstream. When shutting down the device, the struct ser_cardstate must not be kfree()d immediately after the call to platform_device_unregister() since the embedded struct platform_device is still in use. Move the kfree() call to the release method instead. Signed-off-by: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc> Fixes: 2869b23e ("drivers/isdn/gigaset: new M101 driver (v2)") Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 521e4101) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Dan Carpenter authored
commit 40d24c4d upstream. There are two issue here. 1) cnt starts as maxloop + 1 so all these loops iterate one more time than intended. 2) At the end of the loop we test for "if (maxloop && !cnt)" but for the first two loops, we end with cnt equal to -1. Changing this to a pre-op means we end with cnt set to 0. Fixes: cae86d4a ('mISDN: Add driver for Infineon ISDN chipset family') Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 7eb2a015) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Peter Hurley authored
commit 9ce119f3 upstream. A line discipline which does not define a receive_buf() method can can cause a GPF if data is ever received [1]. Oddly, this was known to the author of n_tracesink in 2011, but never fixed. [1] GPF report BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [< (null)>] (null) PGD 3752d067 PUD 37a7b067 PMD 0 Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 2 PID: 148 Comm: kworker/u10:2 Not tainted 4.4.0-rc2+ #51 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc task: ffff88006da94440 ti: ffff88006db60000 task.ti: ffff88006db60000 RIP: 0010:[<0000000000000000>] [< (null)>] (null) RSP: 0018:ffff88006db67b50 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000102 RBX: ffff88003ab32f88 RCX: 0000000000000102 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88003ab330a6 RDI: ffff88003aabd388 RBP: ffff88006db67c48 R08: ffff88003ab32f9c R09: ffff88003ab31fb0 R10: ffff88003ab32fa8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff88006db67c20 R14: ffffffff863df820 R15: ffff88003ab31fb8 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88006dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000037938000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffffffff829f46f1 ffff88006da94bf8 ffff88006da94bf8 0000000000000000 ffff88003ab31fb0 ffff88003aabd438 ffff88003ab31ff8 ffff88006430fd90 ffff88003ab32f9c ffffed0007557a87 1ffff1000db6cf78 ffff88003ab32078 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8127cf91>] process_one_work+0x8f1/0x17a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2030 [<ffffffff8127df14>] worker_thread+0xd4/0x1180 kernel/workqueue.c:2162 [<ffffffff8128faaf>] kthread+0x1cf/0x270 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1302 [<ffffffff852a7c2f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468 Code: Bad RIP value. RIP [< (null)>] (null) RSP <ffff88006db67b50> CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace a587f8947e54d6ea ]--- Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit b23324ff) [wt: applied to drivers/char/tty_buffer.c instead] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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James Bottomley authored
commit 5e103356 upstream. KASAN found that our additional element processing scripts drop off the end of the VPD page into unallocated space. The reason is that not every element has additional information but our traversal routines think they do, leading to them expecting far more additional information than is present. Fix this by adding a gate to the traversal routine so that it only processes elements that are expected to have additional information (list is in SES-2 section 6.1.13.1: Additional Element Status diagnostic page overview) Reported-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com> Tested-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 344d6d02) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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James Bottomley authored
commit 3417c1b5 upstream. Simple enclosure implementations (mostly USB) are allowed to return only page 8 to every diagnostic query. That really confuses our implementation because we assume the return is the page we asked for and end up doing incorrect offsets based on bogus information leading to accesses outside of allocated ranges. Fix that by checking the page code of the return and giving an error if it isn't the one we asked for. This should fix reported bugs with USB storage by simply refusing to attach to enclosures that behave like this. It's also good defensive practise now that we're starting to see more USB enclosures. Reported-by: Andrea Gelmini <andrea.gelmini@gelma.net> Reviewed-by: Ewan D. Milne <emilne@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 25ef9385) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Johannes Berg authored
commit b7bb1100 upstream. Some users of rfkill, like NFC and cfg80211, use a dynamic name when allocating rfkill, in those cases dev_name(). Therefore, the pointer passed to rfkill_alloc() might not be valid forever, I specifically found the case that the rfkill name was quite obviously an invalid pointer (or at least garbage) when the wiphy had been renamed. Fix this by making a copy of the rfkill name in rfkill_alloc(). Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 6f23bc6f) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit 60bc851a upstream. Using bit fields is dangerous on ppc64/sparc64, as the compiler [1] uses 64bit instructions to manipulate them. If the 64bit word includes any atomic_t or spinlock_t, we can lose critical concurrent changes. This is happening in af_unix, where unix_sk(sk)->gc_candidate/ gc_maybe_cycle/lock share the same 64bit word. This leads to fatal deadlock, as one/several cpus spin forever on a spinlock that will never be available again. A safer way would be to use a long to store flags. This way we are sure compiler/arch wont do bad things. As we own unix_gc_lock spinlock when clearing or setting bits, we can use the non atomic __set_bit()/__clear_bit(). recursion_level can share the same 64bit location with the spinlock, as it is set only with this spinlock held. [1] bug fixed in gcc-4.8.0 : http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=52080Reported-by: Ambrose Feinstein <ambrose@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 2ee9cbe7) [wt: adjusted context] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Marcelo Ricardo Leitner authored
[ Upstream commit 01ce63c9 ] Dmitry Vyukov reported that SCTP was triggering a WARN on socket destroy related to disabling sock timestamp. When SCTP accepts an association or peel one off, it copies sock flags but forgot to call net_enable_timestamp() if a packet timestamping flag was copied, leading to extra calls to net_disable_timestamp() whenever such clones were closed. The fix is to call net_enable_timestamp() whenever we copy a sock with that flag on, like tcp does. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: SK_FLAGS_TIMESTAMP is newly defined] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit d85242d9) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit 6900317f ] David and HacKurx reported a following/similar size overflow triggered in a grsecurity kernel, thanks to PaX's gcc size overflow plugin: (Already fixed in later grsecurity versions by Brad and PaX Team.) [ 1002.296137] PAX: size overflow detected in function scm_detach_fds net/core/scm.c:314 cicus.202_127 min, count: 4, decl: msg_controllen; num: 0; context: msghdr; [ 1002.296145] CPU: 0 PID: 3685 Comm: scm_rights_recv Not tainted 4.2.3-grsec+ #7 [ 1002.296149] Hardware name: Apple Inc. MacBookAir5,1/Mac-66F35F19FE2A0D05, [...] [ 1002.296153] ffffffff81c27366 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27375 ffffc90007843aa8 [ 1002.296162] ffffffff818129ba 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c27366 ffffc90007843ad8 [ 1002.296169] ffffffff8121f838 fffffffffffffffc fffffffffffffffc ffffc90007843e60 [ 1002.296176] Call Trace: [ 1002.296190] [<ffffffff818129ba>] dump_stack+0x45/0x57 [ 1002.296200] [<ffffffff8121f838>] report_size_overflow+0x38/0x60 [ 1002.296209] [<ffffffff816a979e>] scm_detach_fds+0x2ce/0x300 [ 1002.296220] [<ffffffff81791899>] unix_stream_read_generic+0x609/0x930 [ 1002.296228] [<ffffffff81791c9f>] unix_stream_recvmsg+0x4f/0x60 [ 1002.296236] [<ffffffff8178dc00>] ? unix_set_peek_off+0x50/0x50 [ 1002.296243] [<ffffffff8168fac7>] sock_recvmsg+0x47/0x60 [ 1002.296248] [<ffffffff81691522>] ___sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1e0 [ 1002.296257] [<ffffffff81693496>] __sys_recvmsg+0x46/0x80 [ 1002.296263] [<ffffffff816934fc>] SyS_recvmsg+0x2c/0x40 [ 1002.296271] [<ffffffff8181a3ab>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x85 Further investigation showed that this can happen when an *odd* number of fds are being passed over AF_UNIX sockets. In these cases CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)) and CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)), where i is the number of successfully passed fds, differ by 4 bytes due to the extra CMSG_ALIGN() padding in CMSG_SPACE() to an 8 byte boundary on 64 bit. The padding is used to align subsequent cmsg headers in the control buffer. When the control buffer passed in from the receiver side *lacks* these 4 bytes (e.g. due to buggy/wrong API usage), then msg->msg_controllen will overflow in scm_detach_fds(): int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)); <--- cmlen w/o tail-padding err = put_user(SOL_SOCKET, &cm->cmsg_level); if (!err) err = put_user(SCM_RIGHTS, &cm->cmsg_type); if (!err) err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len); if (!err) { cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)); <--- cmlen w/ 4 byte extra tail-padding msg->msg_control += cmlen; msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen; <--- iff no tail-padding space here ... } ... wrap-around F.e. it will wrap to a length of 18446744073709551612 bytes in case the receiver passed in msg->msg_controllen of 20 bytes, and the sender properly transferred 1 fd to the receiver, so that its CMSG_LEN results in 20 bytes and CMSG_SPACE in 24 bytes. In case of MSG_CMSG_COMPAT (scm_detach_fds_compat()), I haven't seen an issue in my tests as alignment seems always on 4 byte boundary. Same should be in case of native 32 bit, where we end up with 4 byte boundaries as well. In practice, passing msg->msg_controllen of 20 to recvmsg() while receiving a single fd would mean that on successful return, msg->msg_controllen is being set by the kernel to 24 bytes instead, thus more than the input buffer advertised. It could f.e. become an issue if such application later on zeroes or copies the control buffer based on the returned msg->msg_controllen elsewhere. Maximum number of fds we can send is a hard upper limit SCM_MAX_FD (253). Going over the code, it seems like msg->msg_controllen is not being read after scm_detach_fds() in scm_recv() anymore by the kernel, good! Relevant recvmsg() handler are unix_dgram_recvmsg() (unix_seqpacket_recvmsg()) and unix_stream_recvmsg(). Both return back to their recvmsg() caller, and ___sys_recvmsg() places the updated length, that is, new msg_control - old msg_control pointer into msg->msg_controllen (hence the 24 bytes seen in the example). Long time ago, Wei Yongjun fixed something related in commit 1ac70e7a ("[NET]: Fix function put_cmsg() which may cause usr application memory overflow"). RFC3542, section 20.2. says: The fields shown as "XX" are possible padding, between the cmsghdr structure and the data, and between the data and the next cmsghdr structure, if required by the implementation. While sending an application may or may not include padding at the end of last ancillary data in msg_controllen and implementations must accept both as valid. On receiving a portable application must provide space for padding at the end of the last ancillary data as implementations may copy out the padding at the end of the control message buffer and include it in the received msg_controllen. When recvmsg() is called if msg_controllen is too small for all the ancillary data items including any trailing padding after the last item an implementation may set MSG_CTRUNC. Since we didn't place MSG_CTRUNC for already quite a long time, just do the same as in 1ac70e7a to avoid an overflow. Btw, even man-page author got this wrong :/ See db939c9b26e9 ("cmsg.3: Fix error in SCM_RIGHTS code sample"). Some people must have copied this (?), thus it got triggered in the wild (reported several times during boot by David and HacKurx). No Fixes tag this time as pre 2002 (that is, pre history tree). Reported-by: David Sterba <dave@jikos.cz> Reported-by: HacKurx <hackurx@gmail.com> Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 831a2a17) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 142a2e7e ] Dmitry provided a syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller) generated program that triggers the WARNING at net/ipv4/tcp.c:1729 in tcp_recvmsg() : WARN_ON(tp->copied_seq != tp->rcv_nxt && !(flags & (MSG_PEEK | MSG_TRUNC))); His program is specifically attempting a Cross SYN TCP exchange, that we support (for the pleasure of hackers ?), but it looks we lack proper tcp->copied_seq initialization. Thanks again Dmitry for your report and testings. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 6cfa9781) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Jan Stancek authored
commit 27f972d3 upstream. We encountered a panic on boot in ipmi_si on a dell per320 due to an uninitialized timer as follows. static int smi_start_processing(void *send_info, ipmi_smi_t intf) { /* Try to claim any interrupts. */ if (new_smi->irq_setup) new_smi->irq_setup(new_smi); --> IRQ arrives here and irq handler tries to modify uninitialized timer which triggers BUG_ON(!timer->function) in __mod_timer(). Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffffa0532617>] start_new_msg+0x47/0x80 [ipmi_si] [<ffffffffa053269e>] start_check_enables+0x4e/0x60 [ipmi_si] [<ffffffffa0532bd8>] smi_event_handler+0x1e8/0x640 [ipmi_si] [<ffffffff810f5584>] ? __rcu_process_callbacks+0x54/0x350 [<ffffffffa053327c>] si_irq_handler+0x3c/0x60 [ipmi_si] [<ffffffff810efaf0>] handle_IRQ_event+0x60/0x170 [<ffffffff810f245e>] handle_edge_irq+0xde/0x180 [<ffffffff8100fc59>] handle_irq+0x49/0xa0 [<ffffffff8154643c>] do_IRQ+0x6c/0xf0 [<ffffffff8100ba53>] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x11 /* Set up the timer that drives the interface. */ setup_timer(&new_smi->si_timer, smi_timeout, (long)new_smi); The following patch fixes the problem. To: Openipmi-developer@lists.sourceforge.net To: Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org> CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Camuso <tcamuso@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 207ffa8c) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Sasha Levin authored
commit 119d6f6a upstream. Because wakeups can (fundamentally) be late, a task might not be in the expected state. Therefore testing against a task's state is racy, and can yield false positives. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: oleg@redhat.com Fixes: 9067ac85 ("wake_up_process() should be never used to wakeup a TASK_STOPPED/TRACED task") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1448933660-23082-1-git-send-email-sasha.levin@oracle.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 0e796c1b) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Andrew Lunn authored
commit 4eba7bb1 upstream. When a multicast group is joined on a socket, a struct ip_mc_socklist is appended to the sockets mc_list containing information about the joined group. If the interface is hot unplugged, this entry becomes stale. Prior to commit 52ad353a ("igmp: fix the problem when mc leave group") it was possible to remove the stale entry by performing a IP_DROP_MEMBERSHIP, passing either the old ifindex or ip address on the interface. However, this fix enforces that the interface must still exist. Thus with time, the number of stale entries grows, until sysctl_igmp_max_memberships is reached and then it is not possible to join and more groups. The previous patch fixes an issue where a IP_DROP_MEMBERSHIP is performed without specifying the interface, either by ifindex or ip address. However here we do supply one of these. So loosen the restriction on device existence to only apply when the interface has not been specified. This then restores the ability to clean up the stale entries. Signed-off-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Fixes: 52ad353a "(igmp: fix the problem when mc leave group") Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit b1fa8526) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Peter Hurley authored
commit ee9159dd upstream. The N_X25 line discipline may access the previous line discipline's closed and already-freed private data on open [1]. The tty->disc_data field _never_ refers to valid data on entry to the line discipline's open() method. Rather, the ldisc is expected to initialize that field for its own use for the lifetime of the instance (ie. from open() to close() only). [1] [ 634.336761] ================================================================== [ 634.338226] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in x25_asy_open_tty+0x13d/0x490 at addr ffff8800a743efd0 [ 634.339558] Read of size 4 by task syzkaller_execu/8981 [ 634.340359] ============================================================================= [ 634.341598] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected ... [ 634.405018] Call Trace: [ 634.405277] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52) [ 634.405775] print_trailer (mm/slub.c:655) [ 634.406361] object_err (mm/slub.c:662) [ 634.406824] kasan_report_error (mm/kasan/report.c:138 mm/kasan/report.c:236) [ 634.409581] __asan_report_load4_noabort (mm/kasan/report.c:279) [ 634.411355] x25_asy_open_tty (drivers/net/wan/x25_asy.c:559 (discriminator 1)) [ 634.413997] tty_ldisc_open.isra.2 (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:447) [ 634.414549] tty_set_ldisc (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:567) [ 634.415057] tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2646 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2879) [ 634.423524] do_vfs_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:43 fs/ioctl.c:607) [ 634.427491] SyS_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:622 fs/ioctl.c:613) [ 634.427945] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:188) Reported-and-tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 485274cf) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Jeff Layton authored
commit c812012f upstream. If we pass in an empty nfs_fattr struct to nfs_update_inode, it will (correctly) not update any of the attributes, but it then clears the NFS_INO_INVALID_ATTR flag, which indicates that the attributes are up to date. Don't clear the flag if the fattr struct has no valid attrs to apply. Reviewed-by: Steve French <steve.french@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit ddab0155) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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David Turner authored
commit a4dad1ae upstream. In ext4, the bottom two bits of {a,c,m}time_extra are used to extend the {a,c,m}time fields, deferring the year 2038 problem to the year 2446. When decoding these extended fields, for times whose bottom 32 bits would represent a negative number, sign extension causes the 64-bit extended timestamp to be negative as well, which is not what's intended. This patch corrects that issue, so that the only negative {a,c,m}times are those between 1901 and 1970 (as per 32-bit signed timestamps). Some older kernels might have written pre-1970 dates with 1,1 in the extra bits. This patch treats those incorrectly-encoded dates as pre-1970, instead of post-2311, until kernel 4.20 is released. Hopefully by then e2fsck will have fixed up the bad data. Also add a comment explaining the encoding of ext4's extra {a,c,m}time bits. Signed-off-by: David Turner <novalis@novalis.org> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reported-by: Mark Harris <mh8928@yahoo.com> Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=23732Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 6dfd5f6a) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Jan Kara authored
commit c2489e07 upstream. The following test program from Dmitry can cause softlockups or RCU stalls as it copies 1GB from tmpfs into eventfd and we don't have any scheduling point at that path in sendfile(2) implementation: int r1 = eventfd(0, 0); int r2 = memfd_create("", 0); unsigned long n = 1<<30; fallocate(r2, 0, 0, n); sendfile(r1, r2, 0, n); Add cond_resched() into __splice_from_pipe() to fix the problem. CC: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 47ae562e) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Al Viro authored
commit 0ebf7f10 upstream. The thing got broken back in 2002 - sysvfs does *not* have inline symlinks; even short ones have bodies stored in the first block of file. sysv_symlink() handles that correctly; unfortunately, attempting to look an existing symlink up will end up confusing them for inline symlinks, and interpret the block number containing the body as the body itself. Nobody has noticed until now, which says something about the level of testing sysvfs gets ;-/ Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: - Adjust context - Also delete unused sysv_fast_symlink_inode_operations] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 081c7697) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Roman Gushchin authored
commit 3ca8138f upstream. I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages() function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call. Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to copy data from userspace. A similar problem is described in 124d3b70 ("fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend is followed by segment with invalid address, iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length), iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment. Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect invalid address. Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit description. Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Fixes: ea9b9907 ("fuse: implement perform_write") Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit a5b23416) [wt: adjusted context, as commit 478e0841 from 3.1 was never backported to call mark_page_accessed() eventhough it seems it should have been] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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lucien authored
commit ed5a377d upstream. now sctp auth cannot work well when setting a hmacid manually, which is caused by that we didn't use the network order for hmacid, so fix it by adding the transformation in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs. even we set hmacid with the network order in userspace, it still can't work, because of this condition in sctp_auth_ep_set_hmacs(): if (id > SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_MAX) return -EOPNOTSUPP; so this wasn't working before and thus it won't break compatibility. Fixes: 65b07e5d ("[SCTP]: API updates to suport SCTP-AUTH extensions.") Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 98d37e7f) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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David S. Miller authored
commit 5233252f upstream. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Hannes Frederic Sowa authored
commit 7bbadd2d upstream. Docbook does not like the definition of macros inside a field declaration and adds a warning. Move the definition out. Fixes: 79462ad0 ("net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument") Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: keep open-coding U8_MAX] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 35da6d62) [wt: adjusted context] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Hannes Frederic Sowa authored
commit 79462ad0 upstream. 郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by using a simple program: int socket_fd; struct sockaddr_in addr; addr.sin_port = 0; addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; addr.sin_family = 10; socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000); connect(socket_fd , &addr,16); AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly, thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and store a zero in the protocol fields. This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which is NULL for raw sockets. kernel: Call Trace: kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70 kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80 kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110 kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80 kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200 kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89 I found no particular commit which introduced this problem. CVE: CVE-2015-8543 Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com> Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 2.6.32: open-code U8_MAX; adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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David Howells authored
commit b4a1b4f5 upstream. This fixes CVE-2015-7550. There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key. This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key and doesn't check for a NULL pointer. Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking semaphore instead of before. I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code. This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller). Here's a cleaned up version: #include <sys/types.h> #include <keyutils.h> #include <pthread.h> void *thr0(void *arg) { key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg; keyctl_revoke(key); return 0; } void *thr1(void *arg) { key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg; char buffer[16]; keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16); return 0; } int main() { key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING); pthread_t th[5]; pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key); pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key); pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key); pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key); pthread_join(th[0], 0); pthread_join(th[1], 0); pthread_join(th[2], 0); pthread_join(th[3], 0); return 0; } Build as: cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread Run as: while keyctl-race; do :; done as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be summarised as: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3 ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7 [<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0 [<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> [bwh: Backported to 2.6.32: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit 197c949e upstream. Backport of this upstream commit into stable kernels : 89c22d8c ("net: Fix skb csum races when peeking") exposed a bug in udp stack vs MSG_PEEK support, when user provides a buffer smaller than skb payload. In this case, skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg->msg_iov); returns -EFAULT. This bug does not happen in upstream kernels since Al Viro did a great job to replace this into : skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg); This variant is safe vs short buffers. For the time being, instead reverting Herbert Xu patch and add back skb->ip_summed invalid changes, simply store the result of udp_lib_checksum_complete() so that we avoid computing the checksum a second time, and avoid the problematic skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec() call. This patch can be applied on recent kernels as it avoids a double checksumming, then backported to stable kernels as a bug fix. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 18a6eba2) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Willy Tarreau authored
This reverts commit c507639b. As reported by Michal Kubecek, this fix doesn't handle truncated reads correctly. Next patch from Eric fixes it better. Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Ben Hutchings authored
Fix failure paths in ext4_fill_super() that can lead to a null dereference. This was designated CVE-2015-8324. Mostly extracted from commit 744692dc ("ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write"). However there's one more incorrect goto to fix, removed upstream in commit cf40db13 ("ext4: remove failed journal checksum check"). Reference: https://bugs.openvz.org/browse/OVZ-6541Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Rainer Weikusat authored
commit 7d267278 upstream. Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes: An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a wait queue with epoll. Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring that no blocked writer sleeps forever. Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> Fixes: ec0d215f ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets") Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 2.6.32: - Access sk_sleep directly, not through sk_sleep() function - Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Quentin Casasnovas authored
commit 8c7188b2 upstream. Sasha's found a NULL pointer dereference in the RDS connection code when sending a message to an apparently unbound socket. The problem is caused by the code checking if the socket is bound in rds_sendmsg(), which checks the rs_bound_addr field without taking a lock on the socket. This opens a race where rs_bound_addr is temporarily set but where the transport is not in rds_bind(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to dereference 'trans' in __rds_conn_create(). Vegard wrote a reproducer for this issue, so kindly ask him to share if you're interested. I cannot reproduce the NULL pointer dereference using Vegard's reproducer with this patch, whereas I could without. Complete earlier incomplete fix to CVE-2015-6937: 74e98eb0 ("RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection") Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Reviewed-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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