- 03 May, 2017 22 commits
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Andrey Konovalov authored
[ Upstream commit bcc5364b ] When calculating po->tp_hdrlen + po->tp_reserve the result can overflow. Fix by checking that tp_reserve <= INT_MAX on assign. Signed-off-by:
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Acked-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Andrey Konovalov authored
[ Upstream commit 8f8d28e4 ] When calculating rb->frames_per_block * req->tp_block_nr the result can overflow. Add a check that tp_block_size * tp_block_nr <= UINT_MAX. Since frames_per_block <= tp_block_size, the expression would never overflow. Signed-off-by:
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Guillaume Nault authored
[ Upstream commit e91793bb ] The Rx path may grab the socket right before pppol2tp_release(), but nothing guarantees that it will enqueue packets before skb_queue_purge(). Therefore, the socket can be destroyed without its queues fully purged. Fix this by purging queues in pppol2tp_session_destruct() where we're guaranteed nothing is still referencing the socket. Fixes: 9e9cb622 ("l2tp: fix userspace reception on plain L2TP sockets") Signed-off-by:
Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr> Signed-off-by:
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Nathan Sullivan authored
[ Upstream commit 49d52e81 ] If the PHY is halted on stop, then do not set the state to PHY_UP. This ensures the phy will be restarted later in phy_start when the machine is started again. Fixes: 00db8189 ("This patch adds a PHY Abstraction Layer to the Linux Kernel, enabling ethernet drivers to remain as ignorant as is reasonable of the connected PHY's design and operation details.") Signed-off-by:
Nathan Sullivan <nathan.sullivan@ni.com> Signed-off-by:
Brad Mouring <brad.mouring@ni.com> Acked-by:
Xander Huff <xander.huff@ni.com> Acked-by:
Kyle Roeschley <kyle.roeschley@ni.com> Reviewed-by:
Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 48481c8f ] Dmitry posted a nice reproducer of a bug triggering in neigh_probe() when dereferencing a NULL neigh->ops->solicit method. This can happen for arp_direct_ops/ndisc_direct_ops and similar, which can be used for NUD_NOARP neighbours (created when dev->header_ops is NULL). Admin can then force changing nud_state to some other state that would fire neigh timer. Signed-off-by:
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Tom Hromatka authored
[ Upstream commit 9ae34dbd ] This commit moves sparc64's prototype of pmd_write() outside of the CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE ifdef. In 2013, commit a7b9403f ("sparc64: Encode huge PMDs using PTE encoding.") exposed a path where pmd_write() could be called without CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE defined. This can result in the panic below. The diff is awkward to read, but the changes are straightforward. pmd_write() was moved outside of #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE. Also, __HAVE_ARCH_PMD_WRITE was defined. kernel BUG at include/asm-generic/pgtable.h:576! \|/ ____ \|/ "@'/ .. \`@" /_| \__/ |_\ \__U_/ oracle_8114_cdb(8114): Kernel bad sw trap 5 [#1] CPU: 120 PID: 8114 Comm: oracle_8114_cdb Not tainted 4.1.12-61.7.1.el6uek.rc1.sparc64 #1 task: fff8400700a24d60 ti: fff8400700bc4000 task.ti: fff8400700bc4000 TSTATE: 0000004411e01607 TPC: 00000000004609f8 TNPC: 00000000004609fc Y: 00000005 Not tainted TPC: <gup_huge_pmd+0x198/0x1e0> g0: 000000000001c000 g1: 0000000000ef3954 g2: 0000000000000000 g3: 0000000000000001 g4: fff8400700a24d60 g5: fff8001fa5c10000 g6: fff8400700bc4000 g7: 0000000000000720 o0: 0000000000bc5058 o1: 0000000000000240 o2: 0000000000006000 o3: 0000000000001c00 o4: 0000000000000000 o5: 0000048000080000 sp: fff8400700bc6ab1 ret_pc: 00000000004609f0 RPC: <gup_huge_pmd+0x190/0x1e0> l0: fff8400700bc74fc l1: 0000000000020000 l2: 0000000000002000 l3: 0000000000000000 l4: fff8001f93250950 l5: 000000000113f800 l6: 0000000000000004 l7: 0000000000000000 i0: fff8400700ca46a0 i1: bd0000085e800453 i2: 000000026a0c4000 i3: 000000026a0c6000 i4: 0000000000000001 i5: fff800070c958de8 i6: fff8400700bc6b61 i7: 0000000000460dd0 I7: <gup_pud_range+0x170/0x1a0> Call Trace: [0000000000460dd0] gup_pud_range+0x170/0x1a0 [0000000000460e84] get_user_pages_fast+0x84/0x120 [00000000006f5a18] iov_iter_get_pages+0x98/0x240 [00000000005fa744] do_direct_IO+0xf64/0x1e00 [00000000005fbbc0] __blockdev_direct_IO+0x360/0x15a0 [00000000101f74fc] ext4_ind_direct_IO+0xdc/0x400 [ext4] [00000000101af690] ext4_ext_direct_IO+0x1d0/0x2c0 [ext4] [00000000101af86c] ext4_direct_IO+0xec/0x220 [ext4] [0000000000553bd4] generic_file_read_iter+0x114/0x140 [00000000005bdc2c] __vfs_read+0xac/0x100 [00000000005bf254] vfs_read+0x54/0x100 [00000000005bf368] SyS_pread64+0x68/0x80 Signed-off-by:
Tom Hromatka <tom.hromatka@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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bob picco authored
[ Upstream commit adfae8a5 ] I encountered this bug when using /proc/kcore to examine the kernel. Plus a coworker inquired about debugging tools. We computed pa but did not use it during the maximum physical address bits test. Instead we used the identity mapped virtual address which will always fail this test. I believe the defect came in here: [bpicco@zareason linus.git]$ git describe --contains bb4e6e85 v3.18-rc1~87^2~4 . Signed-off-by:
Bob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Stefano Stabellini authored
commit c06b6d70 upstream. On slow platforms with unreliable TSC, such as QEMU emulated machines, it is possible for the kernel to request the next event in the past. In that case, in the current implementation of xen_vcpuop_clockevent, we simply return -ETIME. To be precise the Xen returns -ETIME and we pass it on. However the result of this is a missed event, which simply causes the kernel to hang. Instead it is better to always ask the hypervisor for a timer event, even if the timeout is in the past. That way there are no lost interrupts and the kernel survives. To do that, remove the VCPU_SSHOTTMR_future flag. Signed-off-by:
Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Acked-by:
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by:
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Felipe F. Tonello authored
commit 03d27ade upstream. buflen by default (256) is smaller than wMaxPacketSize (512) in high-speed devices. That caused the OUT endpoint to freeze if the host send any data packet of length greater than 256 bytes. This is an example dump of what happended on that enpoint: HOST: [DATA][Length=260][...] DEVICE: [NAK] HOST: [PING] DEVICE: [NAK] HOST: [PING] DEVICE: [NAK] ... HOST: [PING] DEVICE: [NAK] This patch fixes this problem by setting the minimum usb_request's buffer size for the OUT endpoint as its wMaxPacketSize. Acked-by:
Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Signed-off-by:
Felipe F. Tonello <eu@felipetonello.com> Signed-off-by:
Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com> Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by:
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Jon Hunter authored
commit 8e5356a7 upstream. During the resolution of a regulator's supply, we may attempt to enable the supply if the regulator itself is already enabled. If enabling the supply fails, then we will call _regulator_put() for the supply. However, the pointer to the supply has not been cleared for the regulator and this will cause a crash if we then unregister the regulator and attempt to call regulator_put() a second time for the supply. Fix this by clearing the supply pointer if enabling the supply after fails when resolving the supply for a regulator. Signed-off-by:
Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by:
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by:
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santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com authored
commit e47db94e upstream. Two different threads with different rds sockets may be in rds_recv_rcvbuf_delta() via receive path. If their ports both map to the same word in the congestion map, then using non-atomic ops to update it could cause the map to be incorrect. Lets use atomics to avoid such an issue. Full credit to Wengang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com> for finding the issue, analysing it and also pointing out to offending code with spin lock based fix. Reviewed-by:
Leon Romanovsky <leon@leon.nu> Signed-off-by:
Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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WANG Cong authored
commit dc327f89 upstream. We saw the following extra refcount release on veth device: kernel: [7957821.463992] unregister_netdevice: waiting for mesos50284 to become free. Usage count = -1 Since we heavily use mirred action to redirect packets to veth, I think this is caused by the following race condition: CPU0: tcf_mirred_release(): (in RCU callback) struct net_device *dev = rcu_dereference_protected(m->tcfm_dev, 1); CPU1: mirred_device_event(): spin_lock_bh(&mirred_list_lock); list_for_each_entry(m, &mirred_list, tcfm_list) { if (rcu_access_pointer(m->tcfm_dev) == dev) { dev_put(dev); /* Note : no rcu grace period necessary, as * net_device are already rcu protected. */ RCU_INIT_POINTER(m->tcfm_dev, NULL); } } spin_unlock_bh(&mirred_list_lock); CPU0: tcf_mirred_release(): spin_lock_bh(&mirred_list_lock); list_del(&m->tcfm_list); spin_unlock_bh(&mirred_list_lock); if (dev) // <======== Stil refers to the old m->tcfm_dev dev_put(dev); // <======== dev_put() is called on it again The action init code path is good because it is impossible to modify an action that is being removed. So, fix this by moving everything under the spinlock. Fixes: 2ee22a90 ("net_sched: act_mirred: remove spinlock in fast path") Fixes: 6bd00b85 ("act_mirred: fix a race condition on mirred_list") Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by:
Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by:
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Florian Fainelli authored
commit 8e6ce7eb upstream. The label lio_xmit_failed is used 3 times through liquidio_xmit() but it always makes a call to dma_unmap_single() using potentially uninitialized variables from "ndata" variable. Out of the 3 gotos, 2 run after ndata has been initialized, and had a prior dma_map_single() call. Fix this by adding a new error label: lio_xmit_dma_failed which does this dma_unmap_single() and then processed with the lio_xmit_failed fallthrough. Fixes: f21fb3ed ("Add support of Cavium Liquidio ethernet adapters") Reported-by: coverity (CID 1309740) Signed-off-by:
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Corey Minyard authored
commit c80e1b62 upstream. As part of handling a crash on an SMP system, an IPI is send to all other CPUs to save their current registers and stop. It was using task_pt_regs(current) to get the registers, but that will only be accurate if the CPU was interrupted running in userland. Instead allow the architecture to pass in the registers (all pass NULL now, but allow for the future) and then use get_irq_regs() which should be accurate as we are in an interrupt. Fall back to task_pt_regs(current) if nothing else is available. Signed-off-by:
Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com> Cc: David Daney <ddaney@caviumnetworks.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/13050/Signed-off-by:
Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by:
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Wei Fang authored
commit 816b0acf upstream. If first_bad == this_sector when we get the WriteMostly disk in read_balance(), valid disk will be returned with zero max_sectors. It'll lead to a dead loop in make_request(), and OOM will happen because of endless allocation of struct bio. Since we can't get data from this disk in this case, so continue for another disk. Signed-off-by:
Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com> Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by:
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Theodore Ts'o authored
commit 9e92f48c upstream. We aren't checking to see if the in-inode extended attribute is corrupted before we try to expand the inode's extra isize fields. This can lead to potential crashes caused by the BUG_ON() check in ext4_xattr_shift_entries(). Signed-off-by:
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by:
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tom will authored
commit 484f689f upstream. When the initial value of i is greater than zero, it may cause endless loop, resulting in array out of bounds, fix it. This is a port of the radeon fix to amdgpu. Signed-off-by:
tom will <os@iscas.ac.cn> Signed-off-by:
Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by:
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Jerome Marchand authored
commit abfa7f43 upstream. __test_aead() reads MAX_IVLEN bytes from template[i].iv, but the actual length of the initialisation vector can be shorter. The length of the IV is already calculated earlier in the function. Let's just reuses that. Also the IV length is currently calculated several time for no reason. Let's fix that too. This fix an out-of-bound error detected by KASan. Signed-off-by:
Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by:
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Krzysztof Adamski authored
commit 6e17b418 upstream. This patch adds support for APB0 in H3. It seems to be compatible with earlier SOCs. apb0 gates controls R_ block peripherals (R_PIO, R_IR, etc). Since this gates behave just like any Allwinner clock gate, add a generic compatible that can be reused if we don't have any clock to protect. Signed-off-by:
Krzysztof Adamski <k@japko.eu> [Maxime: Removed the H3 compatible from the simple-gates driver, reworked the commit log a bit] Signed-off-by:
Maxime Ripard <maxime.ripard@free-electrons.com> Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by:
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Tero Kristo authored
commit 970f9091 upstream. A few platforms are currently missing clocksource_probe() completely in their time_init functionality. On OMAP3430 for example, this is causing cpuidle to be pretty much dead, as the counter32k is not going to be registered and instead a gptimer is used as a clocksource. This will tick in periodic mode, preventing any deeper idle states. While here, also drop one unnecessary check for populated DT before existing clocksource_probe() call. Signed-off-by:
Tero Kristo <t-kristo@ti.com> Signed-off-by:
Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
commit 210bd104 upstream. We have to unlock before returning -ENOMEM. Fixes: 8dfbcc43 ('[media] xc2028: avoid use after free') Signed-off-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by:
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Chao Yu authored
commit 9a59b62f upstream. Do more sanity check for superblock during ->mount. Signed-off-by:
Chao Yu <chao2.yu@samsung.com> Signed-off-by:
Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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- 30 Apr, 2017 18 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Peter Zijlstra authored
commit 321027c1 upstream. Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open() calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group into a hardware context. The problem is exactly that described in commit: f63a8daa ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking") ... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx relation can have changed under us. That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the established locking rules correctly. So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead). Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested() to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means we need to validate state after we acquire the locks. Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab) Tested-by:
John Dias <joaodias@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Fixes: f63a8daa ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.netSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> [bwh: Backported to 4.4: - Test perf_event::group_flags instead of group_caps - Adjust context] Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit 43a66845 upstream. We got a report of yet another bug in ping http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/03/24/6 ->disconnect() is not called with socket lock held. Fix this by acquiring ping rwlock earlier. Thanks to Daniel, Alexander and Andrey for letting us know this problem. Fixes: c319b4d7 ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind") Signed-off-by:
Daniel Jiang <danieljiang0415@gmail.com> Reported-by:
Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> Reported-by:
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EunTaik Lee authored
commit 9590232b upstream. There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver. This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl() function. A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously. cpu 0 cpu 1 ------------------------------------------------------- ion_handle_get_by_id() (ref == 2) ion_handle_get_by_id() (ref == 3) ion_free() (ref == 2) ion_handle_put() (ref == 1) ion_free() (ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is called and the handle is freed.) ion_handle_put() is called and it decreases the slub's next free pointer The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other hard-to-debug problems. This symptom is caused since the first member in the ion_handle structure is the reference count and the ion driver decrements the reference after it has been freed. To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended to protect all the codes that uses the handle. Signed-off-by:
Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com> Reviewed-by:
Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Vlad Tsyrklevich authored
commit 05692d70 upstream. The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set. VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl(). Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow and should prevent a similar occurrence. Signed-off-by:
Vlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net> Signed-off-by:
Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Michal Kubeček authored
commit 3de81b75 upstream. Qian Zhang (张谦) reported a potential socket buffer overflow in tipc_msg_build() which is also known as CVE-2016-8632: due to insufficient checks, a buffer overflow can occur if MTU is too short for even tipc headers. As anyone can set device MTU in a user/net namespace, this issue can be abused by a regular user. As agreed in the discussion on Ben Hutchings' original patch, we should check the MTU at the moment a bearer is attached rather than for each processed packet. We also need to repeat the check when bearer MTU is adjusted to new device MTU. UDP case also needs a check to avoid overflow when calculating bearer MTU. Fixes: b97bf3fd ("[TIPC] Initial merge") Signed-off-by:
Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Reported-by:
Qian Zhang (张谦) <zhangqian-c@360.cn> Acked-by:
Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by:
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Phil Turnbull authored
commit c58d6c93 upstream. If nlh->nlmsg_len is zero then an infinite loop is triggered because 'skb_pull(skb, msglen);' pulls zero bytes. The calculation in nlmsg_len() underflows if 'nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN' which bypasses the length validation and will later trigger an out-of-bound read. If the length validation does fail then the malformed batch message is copied back to userspace. However, we cannot do this because the nlh->nlmsg_len can be invalid. This leads to an out-of-bounds read in netlink_ack: [ 41.455421] ================================================================== [ 41.456431] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy+0x1d/0x40 at addr ffff880119e79340 [ 41.456431] Read of size 4294967280 by task a.out/987 [ 41.456431] ============================================================================= [ 41.456431] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected [ 41.456431] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ... [ 41.456431] Bytes b4 ffff880119e79310: 00 00 00 00 d5 03 00 00 b0 fb fe ff 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79320: 20 00 00 00 10 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............... [ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79330: 14 00 0a 00 01 03 fc 40 45 56 11 22 33 10 00 05 .......@EV."3... [ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79340: f0 ff ff ff 88 99 aa bb 00 14 00 0a 00 06 fe fb ................ ^^ start of batch nlmsg with nlmsg_len=4294967280 ... [ 41.456431] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 41.456431] ffff880119e79400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 41.456431] ffff880119e79480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 41.456431] >ffff880119e79500: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 41.456431] ^ [ 41.456431] ffff880119e79580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 41.456431] ffff880119e79600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 41.456431] ================================================================== Fix this with better validation of nlh->nlmsg_len and by setting NFNL_BATCH_FAILURE if any batch message fails length validation. CAP_NET_ADMIN is required to trigger the bugs. Fixes: 9ea2aa8b ("netfilter: nfnetlink: validate nfnetlink header from batch") Signed-off-by:
Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Mauro Carvalho Chehab authored
commit 8dfbcc43 upstream. If struct xc2028_config is passed without a firmware name, the following trouble may happen: [11009.907205] xc2028 5-0061: type set to XCeive xc2028/xc3028 tuner [11009.907491] ================================================================== [11009.907750] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in strcmp+0x96/0xb0 at addr ffff8803bd78ab40 [11009.907992] Read of size 1 by task modprobe/28992 [11009.907994] ============================================================================= [11009.907997] BUG kmalloc-16 (Tainted: G W ): kasan: bad access detected [11009.907999] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- [11009.908008] INFO: Allocated in xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd] age=0 cpu=3 pid=28992 [11009.908012] ___slab_alloc+0x581/0x5b0 [11009.908014] __slab_alloc+0x51/0x90 [11009.908017] __kmalloc+0x27b/0x350 [11009.908022] xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd] [11009.908026] usb_hcd_submit_urb+0x1e8/0x1c60 [11009.908029] usb_submit_urb+0xb0e/0x1200 [11009.908032] usb_serial_generic_write_start+0xb6/0x4c0 [11009.908035] usb_serial_generic_write+0x92/0xc0 [11009.908039] usb_console_write+0x38a/0x560 [11009.908045] call_console_drivers.constprop.14+0x1ee/0x2c0 [11009.908051] console_unlock+0x40d/0x900 [11009.908056] vprintk_emit+0x4b4/0x830 [11009.908061] vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30 [11009.908064] printk+0x99/0xb5 [11009.908067] kasan_report_error+0x10a/0x550 [11009.908070] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50 [11009.908074] INFO: Freed in xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] age=1 cpu=3 pid=28992 [11009.908077] __slab_free+0x2ec/0x460 [11009.908080] kfree+0x266/0x280 [11009.908083] xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] [11009.908086] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028] [11009.908090] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908094] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908098] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908101] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx] [11009.908105] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908108] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300 [11009.908111] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad [11009.908114] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0 [11009.908117] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130 [11009.908120] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76 [11009.908123] INFO: Slab 0xffffea000ef5e280 objects=25 used=25 fp=0x (null) flags=0x2ffff8000004080 [11009.908126] INFO: Object 0xffff8803bd78ab40 @offset=2880 fp=0x0000000000000001 [11009.908130] Bytes b4 ffff8803bd78ab30: 01 00 00 00 2a 07 00 00 9d 28 00 00 01 00 00 00 ....*....(...... [11009.908133] Object ffff8803bd78ab40: 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 b0 1d c3 6a 00 88 ff ff ...........j.... [11009.908137] CPU: 3 PID: 28992 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B W 4.5.0-rc1+ #43 [11009.908140] Hardware name: /NUC5i7RYB, BIOS RYBDWi35.86A.0350.2015.0812.1722 08/12/2015 [11009.908142] ffff8803bd78a000 ffff8802c273f1b8 ffffffff81932007 ffff8803c6407a80 [11009.908148] ffff8802c273f1e8 ffffffff81556759 ffff8803c6407a80 ffffea000ef5e280 [11009.908153] ffff8803bd78ab40 dffffc0000000000 ffff8802c273f210 ffffffff8155ccb4 [11009.908158] Call Trace: [11009.908162] [<ffffffff81932007>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x64 [11009.908165] [<ffffffff81556759>] print_trailer+0xf9/0x150 [11009.908168] [<ffffffff8155ccb4>] object_err+0x34/0x40 [11009.908171] [<ffffffff8155f260>] kasan_report_error+0x230/0x550 [11009.908175] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290 [11009.908179] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50 [11009.908182] [<ffffffff8155f5c3>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50 [11009.908185] [<ffffffff8155ea00>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x50/0xa0 [11009.908189] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] ? strcmp+0x96/0xb0 [11009.908192] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] strcmp+0x96/0xb0 [11009.908196] [<ffffffffa13ba4ac>] xc2028_set_config+0x15c/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] [11009.908200] [<ffffffffa13bac90>] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028] [11009.908203] [<ffffffff8155ea78>] ? memset+0x28/0x30 [11009.908206] [<ffffffffa13ba980>] ? xc2028_set_config+0x630/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] [11009.908211] [<ffffffffa157a59a>] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908215] [<ffffffffa157aa2a>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x37c/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908219] [<ffffffffa157a3a1>] ? hauppauge_hvr930c_init+0x487/0x487 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908222] [<ffffffffa01795ac>] ? lgdt330x_attach+0x1cc/0x370 [lgdt330x] [11009.908226] [<ffffffffa01793e0>] ? i2c_read_demod_bytes.isra.2+0x210/0x210 [lgdt330x] [11009.908230] [<ffffffff812e87d0>] ? ref_module.part.15+0x10/0x10 [11009.908233] [<ffffffff812e56e0>] ? module_assert_mutex_or_preempt+0x80/0x80 [11009.908238] [<ffffffffa157af92>] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908242] [<ffffffffa157a6ae>] ? em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x30d/0x30d [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908245] [<ffffffff8195222d>] ? string+0x14d/0x1f0 [11009.908249] [<ffffffff8195381f>] ? symbol_string+0xff/0x1a0 [11009.908253] [<ffffffff81953720>] ? uuid_string+0x6f0/0x6f0 [11009.908257] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0 [11009.908260] [<ffffffff8104b02f>] ? print_context_stack+0x7f/0xf0 [11009.908264] [<ffffffff812e9846>] ? __module_address+0xb6/0x360 [11009.908268] [<ffffffff8137fdc9>] ? is_ftrace_trampoline+0x99/0xe0 [11009.908271] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0 [11009.908275] [<ffffffff81240a70>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 [11009.908278] [<ffffffff8104a24b>] ? dump_trace+0x11b/0x300 [11009.908282] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx] [11009.908285] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290 [11009.908289] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590 [11009.908292] [<ffffffff812404dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [11009.908296] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx] [11009.908299] [<ffffffff822dcbb0>] ? mutex_trylock+0x400/0x400 [11009.908302] [<ffffffff810021a1>] ? do_one_initcall+0x131/0x300 [11009.908306] [<ffffffff81296dc7>] ? call_rcu_sched+0x17/0x20 [11009.908309] [<ffffffff8159e708>] ? put_object+0x48/0x70 [11009.908314] [<ffffffffa1579f11>] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908317] [<ffffffffa13e81f9>] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx] [11009.908320] [<ffffffffa0150000>] ? 0xffffffffa0150000 [11009.908324] [<ffffffffa0150010>] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908327] [<ffffffff810021b1>] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300 [11009.908330] [<ffffffff81002070>] ? try_to_run_init_process+0x40/0x40 [11009.908333] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590 [11009.908337] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50 [11009.908340] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50 [11009.908343] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50 [11009.908346] [<ffffffff8155ea37>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x87/0xa0 [11009.908350] [<ffffffff8144da7b>] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad [11009.908353] [<ffffffff812f2626>] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0 [11009.908356] [<ffffffff812e9c90>] ? symbol_put_addr+0x50/0x50 [11009.908361] [<ffffffffa1580037>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x5989/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908366] [<ffffffff812ebfc0>] ? module_frob_arch_sections+0x20/0x20 [11009.908369] [<ffffffff815bc940>] ? open_exec+0x50/0x50 [11009.908374] [<ffffffff811671bb>] ? ns_capable+0x5b/0xd0 [11009.908377] [<ffffffff812f5e58>] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130 [11009.908379] [<ffffffff812f5d50>] ? SyS_init_module+0x1f0/0x1f0 [11009.908383] [<ffffffff81004044>] ? lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x12/0x14 [11009.908394] [<ffffffff822e6936>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76 [11009.908396] Memory state around the buggy address: [11009.908398] ffff8803bd78aa00: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [11009.908401] ffff8803bd78aa80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [11009.908403] >ffff8803bd78ab00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc [11009.908405] ^ [11009.908407] ffff8803bd78ab80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [11009.908409] ffff8803bd78ac00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [11009.908411] ================================================================== In order to avoid it, let's set the cached value of the firmware name to NULL after freeing it. While here, return an error if the memory allocation fails. Signed-off-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
commit d2921684 upstream. CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace. mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2 mount --make-rshared / for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem as some people have managed to hit this by accident. As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned. Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users as follows: > The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of > the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance > problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less > than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired. > > Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that > have been triggered and not yet expired. > > The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common > case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've > not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries. > > The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large > number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat > more active mounts. So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and malfunctioning programs. For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl. Tested-by:
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> [bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust context] Signed-off-by:
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Jon Paul Maloy authored
commit f1d048f2 upstream. We sometimes observe a 'deadly embrace' type deadlock occurring between mutually connected sockets on the same node. This happens when the one-hour peer supervision timers happen to expire simultaneously in both sockets. The scenario is as follows: CPU 1: CPU 2: -------- -------- tipc_sk_timeout(sk1) tipc_sk_timeout(sk2) lock(sk1.slock) lock(sk2.slock) msg_create(probe) msg_create(probe) unlock(sk1.slock) unlock(sk2.slock) tipc_node_xmit_skb() tipc_node_xmit_skb() tipc_node_xmit() tipc_node_xmit() tipc_sk_rcv(sk2) tipc_sk_rcv(sk1) lock(sk2.slock) lock((sk1.slock) filter_rcv() filter_rcv() tipc_sk_proto_rcv() tipc_sk_proto_rcv() msg_create(probe_rsp) msg_create(probe_rsp) tipc_sk_respond() tipc_sk_respond() tipc_node_xmit_skb() tipc_node_xmit_skb() tipc_node_xmit() tipc_node_xmit() tipc_sk_rcv(sk1) tipc_sk_rcv(sk2) lock((sk1.slock) lock((sk2.slock) ===> DEADLOCK ===> DEADLOCK Further analysis reveals that there are three different locations in the socket code where tipc_sk_respond() is called within the context of the socket lock, with ensuing risk of similar deadlocks. We now solve this by passing a buffer queue along with all upcalls where sk_lock.slock may potentially be held. Response or rejected message buffers are accumulated into this queue instead of being sent out directly, and only sent once we know we are safely outside the slock context. Reported-by:
GUNA <gbalasun@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by:
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Parthasarathy Bhuvaragan authored
commit d2f394dc upstream. In a dual bearer configuration, if the second tipc link becomes active while the first link still has pending nametable "bulk" updates, it randomly leads to reset of the second link. When a link is established, the function named_distribute(), fills the skb based on node mtu (allows room for TUNNEL_PROTOCOL) with NAME_DISTRIBUTOR message for each PUBLICATION. However, the function named_distribute() allocates the buffer by increasing the node mtu by INT_H_SIZE (to insert NAME_DISTRIBUTOR). This consumes the space allocated for TUNNEL_PROTOCOL. When establishing the second link, the link shall tunnel all the messages in the first link queue including the "bulk" update. As size of the NAME_DISTRIBUTOR messages while tunnelling, exceeds the link mtu the transmission fails (-EMSGSIZE). Thus, the synch point based on the message count of the tunnel packets is never reached leading to link timeout. In this commit, we adjust the size of name distributor message so that they can be tunnelled. Reviewed-by:
Parthasarathy Bhuvaragan <parthasarathy.bhuvaragan@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
commit 67893f12 upstream. We get a bogus warning about a potential uninitialized variable use in gfs2, because the compiler does not figure out that we never use the leaf number if get_leaf_nr() returns an error: fs/gfs2/dir.c: In function 'get_first_leaf': fs/gfs2/dir.c:802:9: warning: 'leaf_no' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized] fs/gfs2/dir.c: In function 'dir_split_leaf': fs/gfs2/dir.c:1021:8: warning: 'leaf_no' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized] Changing the 'if (!error)' to 'if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(error))' is sufficient to let gcc understand that this is exactly the same condition as in IS_ERR() so it can optimize the code path enough to understand it. Signed-off-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by:
Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
commit 48dc5fb3 upstream. The driver reads a value from hfa384x_from_bap(), which may fail, and then assigns the value to a local variable. gcc detects that in in the failure case, the 'rlen' variable now contains uninitialized data: In file included from ../drivers/net/wireless/intersil/hostap/hostap_pci.c:220:0: drivers/net/wireless/intersil/hostap/hostap_hw.c: In function 'hfa384x_get_rid': drivers/net/wireless/intersil/hostap/hostap_hw.c:842:5: warning: 'rec' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized] if (le16_to_cpu(rec.len) == 0) { This restructures the function as suggested by Russell King, to make it more readable and get more reliable error handling, by handling each failure mode using a goto. Signed-off-by:
Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
commit a4f642a8 upstream. The nozomi wireless data driver has its own helper function to transfer data from a FIFO, doing an extra byte swap on big-endian architectures, presumably to bring the data back into byte-serial order after readw() or readl() perform their implicit byteswap. This helper function is used in the receive_data() function to first read the length into a 32-bit variable, which causes a compile-time warning: drivers/tty/nozomi.c: In function 'receive_data': drivers/tty/nozomi.c:857:9: warning: 'size' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized] The problem is that gcc is unsure whether the data was actually read or not. We know that it is at this point, so we can replace it with a single readl() to shut up that warning. I am leaving the byteswap in there, to preserve the existing behavior, even though this seems fishy: Reading the length of the data into a cpu-endian variable should normally not use a second byteswap on big-endian systems, unless the hardware is aware of the CPU endianess. There appears to be a lot more confusion about endianess in this driver, so it probably has not worked on big-endian systems in a long time, if ever, and I have no way to test it. It's well possible that this driver has not been used by anyone in a while, the last patch that looks like it was tested on the hardware is from 2008. Signed-off-by:
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Jon Paul Maloy authored
commit c4282ca7 upstream. commit 88e8ac70 ("tipc: reduce transmission rate of reset messages when link is down") revealed a flaw in the node FSM, as defined in the log of commit 66996b6c ("tipc: extend node FSM"). We see the following scenario: 1: Node B receives a RESET message from node A before its link endpoint is fully up, i.e., the node FSM is in state SELF_UP_PEER_COMING. This event will not change the node FSM state, but the (distinct) link FSM will move to state RESETTING. 2: As an effect of the previous event, the local endpoint on B will declare node A lost, and post the event SELF_DOWN to the its node FSM. This moves the FSM state to SELF_DOWN_PEER_LEAVING, meaning that no messages will be accepted from A until it receives another RESET message that confirms that A's endpoint has been reset. This is wasteful, since we know this as a fact already from the first received RESET, but worse is that the link instance's FSM has not wasted this information, but instead moved on to state ESTABLISHING, meaning that it repeatedly sends out ACTIVATE messages to the reset peer A. 3: Node A will receive one of the ACTIVATE messages, move its link FSM to state ESTABLISHED, and start repeatedly sending out STATE messages to node B. 4: Node B will consistently drop these messages, since it can only accept accept a RESET according to its node FSM. 5: After four lost STATE messages node A will reset its link and start repeatedly sending out RESET messages to B. 6: Because of the reduced send rate for RESET messages, it is very likely that A will receive an ACTIVATE (which is sent out at a much higher frequency) before it gets the chance to send a RESET, and A may hence quickly move back to state ESTABLISHED and continue sending out STATE messages, which will again be dropped by B. 7: GOTO 5. 8: After having repeated the cycle 5-7 a number of times, node A will by chance get in between with sending a RESET, and the situation is resolved. Unfortunately, we have seen that it may take a substantial amount of time before this vicious loop is broken, sometimes in the order of minutes. We correct this by making a small correction to the node FSM: When a node in state SELF_UP_PEER_COMING receives a SELF_DOWN event, it now moves directly back to state SELF_DOWN_PEER_DOWN, instead of as now SELF_DOWN_PEER_LEAVING. This is logically consistent, since we don't need to wait for RESET confirmation from of an endpoint that we alread know has been reset. It also means that node B in the scenario above will not be dropping incoming STATE messages, and the link can come up immediately. Finally, a symmetry comparison reveals that the FSM has a similar error when receiving the event PEER_DOWN in state PEER_UP_SELF_COMING. Instead of moving to PERR_DOWN_SELF_LEAVING, it should move directly to SELF_DOWN_PEER_DOWN. Although we have never seen any negative effect of this logical error, we choose fix this one, too. The node FSM looks as follows after those changes: +----------------------------------------+ | PEER_DOWN_EVT| | | +------------------------+----------------+ | |SELF_DOWN_EVT | | | | | | | | +-----------+ +-----------+ | | |NODE_ | |NODE_ | | | +----------|FAILINGOVER|<---------|SYNCHING |-----------+ | | |SELF_ +-----------+ FAILOVER_+-----------+ PEER_ | | | |DOWN_EVT | A BEGIN_EVT A | DOWN_EVT| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |FAILOVER_ |FAILOVER_ |SYNCH_ |SYNCH_ | | | | |END_EVT |BEGIN_EVT |BEGIN_EVT|END_EVT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +--------------+ | | | | | +-------->| SELF_UP_ |<-------+ | | | | +-----------------| PEER_UP |----------------+ | | | | |SELF_DOWN_EVT +--------------+ PEER_DOWN_EVT| | | | | | A A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | PEER_UP_EVT| |SELF_UP_EVT | | | | | | | | | | | V V V | | V V V +------------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +------------+ |SELF_DOWN_ | |SELF_UP_ | |PEER_UP_ | |PEER_DOWN | |PEER_LEAVING| |PEER_COMING| |SELF_COMING| |SELF_LEAVING| +------------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +------------+ | | A A | | | | | | | | | SELF_ | |SELF_ |PEER_ |PEER_ | | DOWN_EVT| |UP_EVT |UP_EVT |DOWN_EVT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +--------------+ | | |PEER_DOWN_EVT +--->| SELF_DOWN_ |<---+ SELF_DOWN_EVT| +------------------->| PEER_DOWN |<--------------------+ +--------------+ Acked-by:
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Jon Paul Maloy authored
commit 7c8bcfb1 upstream. In the refactoring commit d570d864 ("tipc: enqueue arrived buffers in socket in separate function") we did by accident replace the test if (sk->sk_backlog.len == 0) atomic_set(&tsk->dupl_rcvcnt, 0); with if (sk->sk_backlog.len) atomic_set(&tsk->dupl_rcvcnt, 0); This effectively disables the compensation we have for the double receive buffer accounting that occurs temporarily when buffers are moved from the backlog to the socket receive queue. Until now, this has gone unnoticed because of the large receive buffer limits we are applying, but becomes indispensable when we reduce this buffer limit later in this series. We now fix this by inverting the mentioned condition. Acked-by:
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Erik Hugne authored
commit 541726ab upstream. Nametable updates received from the network that cannot be applied immediately are placed on a defer queue. This queue is global to the TIPC module, which might cause problems when using TIPC in containers. To prevent nametable updates from escaping into the wrong namespace, we make the queue pernet instead. Signed-off-by:
Erik Hugne <erik.hugne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Richard Alpe authored
commit 9bd160bf upstream. Expand headroom further in order to be able to fit the larger IPv6 header. Prior to this patch this caused a skb under panic for certain tipc packets when using IPv6 UDP bearer(s). Signed-off-by:
Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com> Acked-by:
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