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  1. 04 Jul, 2018 1 commit
    • Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk's avatar
      x86/KVM: Warn user if KVM is loaded SMT and L1TF CPU bug being present · 26acfb66
      Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored 
      If the L1TF CPU bug is present we allow the KVM module to be loaded as the
major of users that use Linux and KVM have trusted guests and do not want a
broken setup.

Cloud vendors are the ones that are uncomfortable with CVE 2018-3620 and as
such they are the ones that should set nosmt to one.

Setting 'nosmt' means that the system administrator also needs to disable
SMT (Hyper-threading) in the BIOS, or via the 'nosmt' command line
parameter, or via the /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control. See commit
05736e4a ("cpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMT").

Other mitigations are to use task affinity, cpu sets, interrupt binding,
etc - anything to make sure that _only_ the same guests vCPUs are running
on sibling threads.
Signed-off-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      26acfb66
  3. 02 Jul, 2018 2 commits
    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once · 0cc3cd21
      Thomas Gleixner authored 
      Due to the way Machine Check Exceptions work on X86 hyperthreads it's
required to boot up _all_ logical cores at least once in order to set the
CR4.MCE bit.

So instead of ignoring the sibling threads right away, let them boot up
once so they can configure themselves. After they came out of the initial
boot stage check whether its a "secondary" sibling and cancel the operation
which puts the CPU back into offline state.
Reported-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: default avatarTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
      0cc3cd21
    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      Revert "x86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=force" · 506a66f3
      Thomas Gleixner authored 
      Dave Hansen reported, that it's outright dangerous to keep SMT siblings
disabled completely so they are stuck in the BIOS and wait for SIPI.

The reason is that Machine Check Exceptions are broadcasted to siblings and
the soft disabled sibling has CR4.MCE = 0. If a MCE is delivered to a
logical core with CR4.MCE = 0, it asserts IERR#, which shuts down or
reboots the machine. The MCE chapter in the SDM contains the following
blurb:

    Because the logical processors within a physical package are tightly
    coupled with respect to shared hardware resources, both logical
    processors are notified of machine check errors that occur within a
    given physical processor. If machine-check exceptions are enabled when
    a fatal error is reported, all the logical processors within a physical
    package are dispatched to the machine-check exception handler. If
    machine-check exceptions are disabled, the logical processors enter the
    shutdown state and assert the IERR# signal. When enabling machine-check
    exceptions, the MCE flag in control register CR4 should be set for each
    logical processor.

Reverting the commit which ignores siblings at enumeration time solves only
half of the problem. The core cpuhotplug logic needs to be adjusted as
well.

This thoughtful engineered mechanism also turns the boot process on all
Intel HT enabled systems into a MCE lottery. MCE is enabled on the boot CPU
before the secondary CPUs are brought up. Depending on the number of
physical cores the window in which this situation can happen is smaller or
larger. On a HSW-EX it's about 750ms:

MCE is enabled on the boot CPU:

[    0.244017] mce: CPU supports 22 MCE banks

The corresponding sibling #72 boots:

[    1.008005] .... node  #0, CPUs:    #72

That means if an MCE hits on physical core 0 (logical CPUs 0 and 72)
between these two points the machine is going to shutdown. At least it's a
known safe state.

It's obvious that the early boot can be hit by an MCE as well and then runs
into the same situation because MCEs are not yet enabled on the boot CPU.
But after enabling them on the boot CPU, it does not make any sense to
prevent the kernel from recovering.

Adjust the nosmt kernel parameter documentation as well.

Reverts: 2207def7 ("x86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=force")
Reported-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: default avatarTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
      506a66f3
  5. 29 Jun, 2018 1 commit
  7. 27 Jun, 2018 1 commit
    • Vlastimil Babka's avatar
      x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PAE swap entries against L1TF · 0d0f6249
      Vlastimil Babka authored 
      The PAE 3-level paging code currently doesn't mitigate L1TF by flipping the
offset bits, and uses the high PTE word, thus bits 32-36 for type, 37-63 for
offset. The lower word is zeroed, thus systems with less than 4GB memory are
safe. With 4GB to 128GB the swap type selects the memory locations vulnerable
to L1TF; with even more memory, also the swap offfset influences the address.
This might be a problem with 32bit PAE guests running on large 64bit hosts.

By continuing to keep the whole swap entry in either high or low 32bit word of
PTE we would limit the swap size too much. Thus this patch uses the whole PAE
PTE with the same layout as the 64bit version does. The macros just become a
bit tricky since they assume the arch-dependent swp_entry_t to be 32bit.
Signed-off-by: default avatarVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: default avatarMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
      0d0f6249
  9. 22 Jun, 2018 1 commit
  11. 21 Jun, 2018 17 commits
  13. 20 Jun, 2018 8 commits
    • Andi Kleen's avatar
      x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2 · 377eeaa8
      Andi Kleen authored 
      For the L1TF workaround its necessary to limit the swap file size to below
MAX_PA/2, so that the higher bits of the swap offset inverted never point
to valid memory.

Add a mechanism for the architecture to override the swap file size check
in swapfile.c and add a x86 specific max swapfile check function that
enforces that limit.

The check is only enabled if the CPU is vulnerable to L1TF.

In VMs with 42bit MAX_PA the typical limit is 2TB now, on a native system
with 46bit PA it is 32TB. The limit is only per individual swap file, so
it's always possible to exceed these limits with multiple swap files or
partitions.
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: default avatarMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      377eeaa8
    • Andi Kleen's avatar
      x86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappings · 42e4089c
      Andi Kleen authored 
      For L1TF PROT_NONE mappings are protected by inverting the PFN in the page
table entry. This sets the high bits in the CPU's address space, thus
making sure to point to not point an unmapped entry to valid cached memory.

Some server system BIOSes put the MMIO mappings high up in the physical
address space. If such an high mapping was mapped to unprivileged users
they could attack low memory by setting such a mapping to PROT_NONE. This
could happen through a special device driver which is not access
protected. Normal /dev/mem is of course access protected.

To avoid this forbid PROT_NONE mappings or mprotect for high MMIO mappings.

Valid page mappings are allowed because the system is then unsafe anyways.

It's not expected that users commonly use PROT_NONE on MMIO. But to
minimize any impact this is only enforced if the mapping actually refers to
a high MMIO address (defined as the MAX_PA-1 bit being set), and also skip
the check for root.

For mmaps this is straight forward and can be handled in vm_insert_pfn and
in remap_pfn_range().

For mprotect it's a bit trickier. At the point where the actual PTEs are
accessed a lot of state has been changed and it would be difficult to undo
on an error. Since this is a uncommon case use a separate early page talk
walk pass for MMIO PROT_NONE mappings that checks for this condition
early. For non MMIO and non PROT_NONE there are no changes.
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      42e4089c
    • Andi Kleen's avatar
      x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf · 17dbca11
      Andi Kleen authored 
      L1TF core kernel workarounds are cheap and normally always enabled, However
they still should be reported in sysfs if the system is vulnerable or
mitigated. Add the necessary CPU feature/bug bits.

- Extend the existing checks for Meltdowns to determine if the system is
  vulnerable. All CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown are also not
  vulnerable to L1TF

- Check for 32bit non PAE and emit a warning as there is no practical way
  for mitigation due to the limited physical address bits

- If the system has more than MAX_PA/2 physical memory the invert page
  workarounds don't protect the system against the L1TF attack anymore,
  because an inverted physical address will also point to valid
  memory. Print a warning in this case and report that the system is
  vulnerable.

Add a function which returns the PFN limit for the L1TF mitigation, which
will be used in follow up patches for sanity and range checks.

[ tglx: Renamed the CPU feature bit to L1TF_PTEINV ]
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      17dbca11
    • Andi Kleen's avatar
      x86/speculation/l1tf: Make sure the first page is always reserved · 10a70416
      Andi Kleen authored 
      The L1TF workaround doesn't make any attempt to mitigate speculate accesses
to the first physical page for zeroed PTEs. Normally it only contains some
data from the early real mode BIOS.

It's not entirely clear that the first page is reserved in all
configurations, so add an extra reservation call to make sure it is really
reserved. In most configurations (e.g.  with the standard reservations)
it's likely a nop.
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      10a70416
    • Andi Kleen's avatar
      x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PROT_NONE PTEs against speculation · 6b28baca
      Andi Kleen authored 
      When PTEs are set to PROT_NONE the kernel just clears the Present bit and
preserves the PFN, which creates attack surface for L1TF speculation
speculation attacks.

This is important inside guests, because L1TF speculation bypasses physical
page remapping. While the host has its own migitations preventing leaking
data from other VMs into the guest, this would still risk leaking the wrong
page inside the current guest.

This uses the same technique as Linus' swap entry patch: while an entry is
is in PROTNONE state invert the complete PFN part part of it. This ensures
that the the highest bit will point to non existing memory.

The invert is done by pte/pmd_modify and pfn/pmd/pud_pte for PROTNONE and
pte/pmd/pud_pfn undo it.

This assume that no code path touches the PFN part of a PTE directly
without using these primitives.

This doesn't handle the case that MMIO is on the top of the CPU physical
memory. If such an MMIO region was exposed by an unpriviledged driver for
mmap it would be possible to attack some real memory.  However this
situation is all rather unlikely.

For 32bit non PAE the inversion is not done because there are really not
enough bits to protect anything.

Q: Why does the guest need to be protected when the HyperVisor already has
   L1TF mitigations?

A: Here's an example:

   Physical pages 1 2 get mapped into a guest as
   GPA 1 -> PA 2
   GPA 2 -> PA 1
   through EPT.

   The L1TF speculation ignores the EPT remapping.

   Now the guest kernel maps GPA 1 to process A and GPA 2 to process B, and
   they belong to different users and should be isolated.

   A sets the GPA 1 PA 2 PTE to PROT_NONE to bypass the EPT remapping and
   gets read access to the underlying physical page. Which in this case
   points to PA 2, so it can read process B's data, if it happened to be in
   L1, so isolation inside the guest is broken.

   There's nothing the hypervisor can do about this. This mitigation has to
   be done in the guest itself.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: default avatarMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: default avatarVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      6b28baca
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect swap entries against L1TF · 2f22b4cd
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      With L1 terminal fault the CPU speculates into unmapped PTEs, and resulting
side effects allow to read the memory the PTE is pointing too, if its
values are still in the L1 cache.

For swapped out pages Linux uses unmapped PTEs and stores a swap entry into
them.

To protect against L1TF it must be ensured that the swap entry is not
pointing to valid memory, which requires setting higher bits (between bit
36 and bit 45) that are inside the CPUs physical address space, but outside
any real memory.

To do this invert the offset to make sure the higher bits are always set,
as long as the swap file is not too big.

Note there is no workaround for 32bit !PAE, or on systems which have more
than MAX_PA/2 worth of memory. The later case is very unlikely to happen on
real systems.

[AK: updated description and minor tweaks by. Split out from the original
     patch ]
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: default avatarAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: default avatarMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: default avatarVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      2f22b4cd
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      x86/speculation/l1tf: Change order of offset/type in swap entry · bcd11afa
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      If pages are swapped out, the swap entry is stored in the corresponding
PTE, which has the Present bit cleared. CPUs vulnerable to L1TF speculate
on PTE entries which have the present bit set and would treat the swap
entry as phsyical address (PFN). To mitigate that the upper bits of the PTE
must be set so the PTE points to non existent memory.

The swap entry stores the type and the offset of a swapped out page in the
PTE. type is stored in bit 9-13 and offset in bit 14-63. The hardware
ignores the bits beyond the phsyical address space limit, so to make the
mitigation effective its required to start 'offset' at the lowest possible
bit so that even large swap offsets do not reach into the physical address
space limit bits.

Move offset to bit 9-58 and type to bit 59-63 which are the bits that
hardware generally doesn't care about.

That, in turn, means that if you on desktop chip with only 40 bits of
physical addressing, now that the offset starts at bit 9, there needs to be
30 bits of offset actually *in use* until bit 39 ends up being set, which
means when inverted it will again point into existing memory.

So that's 4 terabyte of swap space (because the offset is counted in pages,
so 30 bits of offset is 42 bits of actual coverage). With bigger physical
addressing, that obviously grows further, until the limit of the offset is
hit (at 50 bits of offset - 62 bits of actual swap file coverage).

This is a preparatory change for the actual swap entry inversion to protect
against L1TF.

[ AK: Updated description and minor tweaks. Split into two parts ]
[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: default avatarAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: default avatarMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: default avatarVlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      bcd11afa
    • Andi Kleen's avatar
      x86/speculation/l1tf: Increase 32bit PAE __PHYSICAL_PAGE_SHIFT · 50896e18
      Andi Kleen authored 
      L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF) is a speculation related vulnerability. The CPU
speculates on PTE entries which do not have the PRESENT bit set, if the
content of the resulting physical address is available in the L1D cache.

The OS side mitigation makes sure that a !PRESENT PTE entry points to a
physical address outside the actually existing and cachable memory
space. This is achieved by inverting the upper bits of the PTE. Due to the
address space limitations this only works for 64bit and 32bit PAE kernels,
but not for 32bit non PAE.

This mitigation applies to both host and guest kernels, but in case of a
64bit host (hypervisor) and a 32bit PAE guest, inverting the upper bits of
the PAE address space (44bit) is not enough if the host has more than 43
bits of populated memory address space, because the speculation treats the
PTE content as a physical host address bypassing EPT.

The host (hypervisor) protects itself against the guest by flushing L1D as
needed, but pages inside the guest are not protected against attacks from
other processes inside the same guest.

For the guest the inverted PTE mask has to match the host to provide the
full protection for all pages the host could possibly map into the
guest. The hosts populated address space is not known to the guest, so the
mask must cover the possible maximal host address space, i.e. 52 bit.

On 32bit PAE the maximum PTE mask is currently set to 44 bit because that
is the limit imposed by 32bit unsigned long PFNs in the VMs. This limits
the mask to be below what the host could possible use for physical pages.

The L1TF PROT_NONE protection code uses the PTE masks to determine which
bits to invert to make sure the higher bits are set for unmapped entries to
prevent L1TF speculation attacks against EPT inside guests.

In order to invert all bits that could be used by the host, increase
__PHYSICAL_PAGE_SHIFT to 52 to match 64bit.

The real limit for a 32bit PAE kernel is still 44 bits because all Linux
PTEs are created from unsigned long PFNs, so they cannot be higher than 44
bits on a 32bit kernel. So these extra PFN bits should be never set. The
only users of this macro are using it to look at PTEs, so it's safe.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: default avatarMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      50896e18
  15. 16 Jun, 2018 8 commits
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Linux 4.18-rc1 · ce397d21
      Linus Torvalds authored
      ce397d21
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge tag 'for-linus-20180616' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block · 265c5596
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      Pull block fixes from Jens Axboe:
 "A collection of fixes that should go into -rc1. This contains:

   - bsg_open vs bsg_unregister race fix (Anatoliy)

   - NVMe pull request from Christoph, with fixes for regressions in
     this window, FC connect/reconnect path code unification, and a
     trace point addition.

   - timeout fix (Christoph)

   - remove a few unused functions (Christoph)

   - blk-mq tag_set reinit fix (Roman)"

* tag 'for-linus-20180616' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
  bsg: fix race of bsg_open and bsg_unregister
  block: remov blk_queue_invalidate_tags
  nvme-fabrics: fix and refine state checks in __nvmf_check_ready
  nvme-fabrics: handle the admin-only case properly in nvmf_check_ready
  nvme-fabrics: refactor queue ready check
  blk-mq: remove blk_mq_tagset_iter
  nvme: remove nvme_reinit_tagset
  nvme-fc: fix nulling of queue data on reconnect
  nvme-fc: remove reinit_request routine
  blk-mq: don't time out requests again that are in the timeout handler
  nvme-fc: change controllers first connect to use reconnect path
  nvme: don't rely on the changed namespace list log
  nvmet: free smart-log buffer after use
  nvme-rdma: fix error flow during mapping request data
  nvme: add bio remapping tracepoint
  nvme: fix NULL pointer dereference in nvme_init_subsystem
  blk-mq: reinit q->tag_set_list entry only after grace period
      265c5596
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge tag 'docs-broken-links' of git://linuxtv.org/mchehab/experimental · 5e7b9212
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      Pull documentation fixes from Mauro Carvalho Chehab:
 "This solves a series of broken links for files under Documentation,
  and improves a script meant to detect such broken links (see
  scripts/documentation-file-ref-check).

  The changes on this series are:

   - can.rst: fix a footnote reference;

   - crypto_engine.rst: Fix two parsing warnings;

   - Fix a lot of broken references to Documentation/*;

   - improve the scripts/documentation-file-ref-check script, in order
     to help detecting/fixing broken references, preventing
     false-positives.

  After this patch series, only 33 broken references to doc files are
  detected by scripts/documentation-file-ref-check"

* tag 'docs-broken-links' of git://linuxtv.org/mchehab/experimental: (26 commits)
  fix a series of Documentation/ broken file name references
  Documentation: rstFlatTable.py: fix a broken reference
  ABI: sysfs-devices-system-cpu: remove a broken reference
  devicetree: fix a series of wrong file references
  devicetree: fix name of pinctrl-bindings.txt
  devicetree: fix some bindings file names
  MAINTAINERS: fix location of DT npcm files
  MAINTAINERS: fix location of some display DT bindings
  kernel-parameters.txt: fix pointers to sound parameters
  bindings: nvmem/zii: Fix location of nvmem.txt
  docs: Fix more broken references
  scripts/documentation-file-ref-check: check tools/*/Documentation
  scripts/documentation-file-ref-check: get rid of false-positives
  scripts/documentation-file-ref-check: hint: dash or underline
  scripts/documentation-file-ref-check: add a fix logic for DT
  scripts/documentation-file-ref-check: accept more wildcards at filenames
  scripts/documentation-file-ref-check: fix help message
  media: max2175: fix location of driver's companion documentation
  media: v4l: fix broken video4linux docs locations
  media: dvb: point to the location of the old README.dvb-usb file
  ...
      5e7b9212
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge tag 'fsnotify_for_v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs · dbb2816f
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      Pull fsnotify updates from Jan Kara:
 "fsnotify cleanups unifying handling of different watch types.

  This is the shortened fsnotify series from Amir with the last five
  patches pulled out. Amir has modified those patches to not change
  struct inode but obviously it's too late for those to go into this
  merge window"

* tag 'fsnotify_for_v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs:
  fsnotify: add fsnotify_add_inode_mark() wrappers
  fanotify: generalize fanotify_should_send_event()
  fsnotify: generalize send_to_group()
  fsnotify: generalize iteration of marks by object type
  fsnotify: introduce marks iteration helpers
  fsnotify: remove redundant arguments to handle_event()
  fsnotify: use type id to identify connector object type
      dbb2816f
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge tag 'fbdev-v4.18' of git://github.com/bzolnier/linux · 644f2639
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      Pull fbdev updates from Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz:
 "There is nothing really major here, few small fixes, some cleanups and
  dead drivers removal:

   - mark omapfb drivers as orphans in MAINTAINERS file (Tomi Valkeinen)

   - add missing module license tags to omap/omapfb driver (Arnd
     Bergmann)

   - add missing GPIOLIB dependendy to omap2/omapfb driver (Arnd
     Bergmann)

   - convert savagefb, aty128fb & radeonfb drivers to use msleep & co.
     (Jia-Ju Bai)

   - allow COMPILE_TEST build for viafb driver (media part was reviewed
     by media subsystem Maintainer)

   - remove unused MERAM support from sh_mobile_lcdcfb and shmob-drm
     drivers (drm parts were acked by shmob-drm driver Maintainer)

   - remove unused auo_k190xfb drivers

   - misc cleanups (Souptick Joarder, Wolfram Sang, Markus Elfring, Andy
     Shevchenko, Colin Ian King)"

* tag 'fbdev-v4.18' of git://github.com/bzolnier/linux: (26 commits)
  fb_omap2: add gpiolib dependency
  video/omap: add module license tags
  MAINTAINERS: make omapfb orphan
  video: fbdev: pxafb: match_string() conversion fixup
  video: fbdev: nvidia: fix spelling mistake: "scaleing" -> "scaling"
  video: fbdev: fix spelling mistake: "frambuffer" -> "framebuffer"
  video: fbdev: pxafb: Convert to use match_string() helper
  video: fbdev: via: allow COMPILE_TEST build
  video: fbdev: remove unused sh_mobile_meram driver
  drm: shmobile: remove unused MERAM support
  video: fbdev: sh_mobile_lcdcfb: remove unused MERAM support
  video: fbdev: remove unused auo_k190xfb drivers
  video: omap: Improve a size determination in omapfb_do_probe()
  video: sm501fb: Improve a size determination in sm501fb_probe()
  video: fbdev-MMP: Improve a size determination in path_init()
  video: fbdev-MMP: Delete an error message for a failed memory allocation in two functions
  video: auo_k190x: Delete an error message for a failed memory allocation in auok190x_common_probe()
  video: sh_mobile_lcdcfb: Delete an error message for a failed memory allocation in two functions
  video: sh_mobile_meram: Delete an error message for a failed memory allocation in sh_mobile_meram_probe()
  video: fbdev: sh_mobile_meram: Drop SUPERH platform dependency
  ...
      644f2639
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge branch 'afs-proc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs · 35773c93
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      Pull AFS updates from Al Viro:
 "Assorted AFS stuff - ended up in vfs.git since most of that consists
  of David's AFS-related followups to Christoph's procfs series"

* 'afs-proc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  afs: Optimise callback breaking by not repeating volume lookup
  afs: Display manually added cells in dynamic root mount
  afs: Enable IPv6 DNS lookups
  afs: Show all of a server's addresses in /proc/fs/afs/servers
  afs: Handle CONFIG_PROC_FS=n
  proc: Make inline name size calculation automatic
  afs: Implement network namespacing
  afs: Mark afs_net::ws_cell as __rcu and set using rcu functions
  afs: Fix a Sparse warning in xdr_decode_AFSFetchStatus()
  proc: Add a way to make network proc files writable
  afs: Rearrange fs/afs/proc.c to remove remaining predeclarations.
  afs: Rearrange fs/afs/proc.c to move the show routines up
  afs: Rearrange fs/afs/proc.c by moving fops and open functions down
  afs: Move /proc management functions to the end of the file
      35773c93
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge branch 'work.compat' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs · 29d6849d
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      Pull compat updates from Al Viro:
 "Some biarch patches - getting rid of assorted (mis)uses of
  compat_alloc_user_space().

  Not much in that area this cycle..."

* 'work.compat' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  orangefs: simplify compat ioctl handling
  signalfd: lift sigmask copyin and size checks to callers of do_signalfd4()
  vmsplice(): lift importing iovec into vmsplice(2) and compat counterpart
      29d6849d
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge branch 'work.aio' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs · a5b729ea
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      Pull aio fixes from Al Viro:
 "Assorted AIO followups and fixes"

* 'work.aio' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  eventpoll: switch to ->poll_mask
  aio: only return events requested in poll_mask() for IOCB_CMD_POLL
  eventfd: only return events requested in poll_mask()
  aio: mark __aio_sigset::sigmask const
      a5b729ea
  17. 15 Jun, 2018 1 commit
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net · 9215310c
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      Pull networking fixes from David Miller:

 1) Various netfilter fixlets from Pablo and the netfilter team.

 2) Fix regression in IPVS caused by lack of PMTU exceptions on local
    routes in ipv6, from Julian Anastasov.

 3) Check pskb_trim_rcsum for failure in DSA, from Zhouyang Jia.

 4) Don't crash on poll in TLS, from Daniel Borkmann.

 5) Revert SO_REUSE{ADDR,PORT} change, it regresses various things
    including Avahi mDNS. From Bart Van Assche.

 6) Missing of_node_put in qcom/emac driver, from Yue Haibing.

 7) We lack checking of the TCP checking in one special case during SYN
    receive, from Frank van der Linden.

 8) Fix module init error paths of mac80211 hwsim, from Johannes Berg.

 9) Handle 802.1ad properly in stmmac driver, from Elad Nachman.

10) Must grab HW caps before doing quirk checks in stmmac driver, from
    Jose Abreu.

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (81 commits)
  net: stmmac: Run HWIF Quirks after getting HW caps
  neighbour: skip NTF_EXT_LEARNED entries during forced gc
  net: cxgb3: add error handling for sysfs_create_group
  tls: fix waitall behavior in tls_sw_recvmsg
  tls: fix use-after-free in tls_push_record
  l2tp: filter out non-PPP sessions in pppol2tp_tunnel_ioctl()
  l2tp: reject creation of non-PPP sessions on L2TPv2 tunnels
  mlxsw: spectrum_switchdev: Fix port_vlan refcounting
  mlxsw: spectrum_router: Align with new route replace logic
  mlxsw: spectrum_router: Allow appending to dev-only routes
  ipv6: Only emit append events for appended routes
  stmmac: added support for 802.1ad vlan stripping
  cfg80211: fix rcu in cfg80211_unregister_wdev
  mac80211: Move up init of TXQs
  mac80211_hwsim: fix module init error paths
  cfg80211: initialize sinfo in cfg80211_get_station
  nl80211: fix some kernel doc tag mistakes
  hv_netvsc: Fix the variable sizes in ipsecv2 and rsc offload
  rds: avoid unenecessary cong_update in loop transport
  l2tp: clean up stale tunnel or session in pppol2tp_connect's error path
  ...
      9215310c
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