- 03 Feb, 2012 11 commits
-
-
Peter Korsgaard authored
commit 55f13aea upstream. Port A for JTAG, port B for serial. Signed-off-by:
Peter Korsgaard <jacmet@sunsite.dk> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-
Johan Hovold authored
commit eb833a9e upstream. Return EINVAL if new baud_base does not match the current one. The baud_base is device specific and can not be changed. This restores the old (pre-2005) behaviour which was changed due to a misunderstanding regarding this fact (see https://lkml.org/lkml/2005/1/20/84). Reported-by:
Torbjörn Lofterud <torbjorn@pi.nxs.se> Signed-off-by:
Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Paolo Bonzini authored
commit ec8013be upstream. A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume. In this case, it must be treated like a partition. Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon. Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com> Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [bwh: Backport to 2.6.32 - drop change to drivers/md/dm-flakey.c] Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
-
Paolo Bonzini authored
commit 0bfc96cb upstream. [ Changes with respect to 3.3: return -ENOTTY from scsi_verify_blk_ioctl and -ENOIOCTLCMD from sd_compat_ioctl. ] Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user needs to be granted access only to part of the disk. This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls; others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred. Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs. In principle, this restriction should include programs running with CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and /dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the ioctls. Their actions will still be logged. This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO. Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski authored
This reverts commit c8cdf3f9, applied on linux 2.6.32.53 stable release, as it can introduce the following build error while building 2.6.32.y on armel: linux-2.6.32/drivers/mmc/host/mmci.c: In function 'mmci_cmd_irq': linux-2.6.32/drivers/mmc/host/mmci.c:237: error: implicit declaration of function 'dma_inprogress' linux-2.6.32/drivers/mmc/host/mmci.c:238: error: implicit declaration of function 'mmci_dma_data_error' Aparently the commit was wrongly pushed into 2.6.32, since it depends on commit c8ebae37 ("ARM: mmci: add dmaengine-based DMA support"), not present on 2.6.32. Signed-off-by:
Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski <herton.krzesinski@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Alexey Dobriyan authored
commit 51fc6dc8 upstream. For rounds 16--79, W[i] only depends on W[i - 2], W[i - 7], W[i - 15] and W[i - 16]. Consequently, keeping all W[80] array on stack is unnecessary, only 16 values are really needed. Using W[16] instead of W[80] greatly reduces stack usage (~750 bytes to ~340 bytes on x86_64). Line by line explanation: * BLEND_OP array is "circular" now, all indexes have to be modulo 16. Round number is positive, so remainder operation should be without surprises. * initial full message scheduling is trimmed to first 16 values which come from data block, the rest is calculated before it's needed. * original loop body is unrolled version of new SHA512_0_15 and SHA512_16_79 macros, unrolling was done to not do explicit variable renaming. Otherwise it's the very same code after preprocessing. See sha1_transform() code which does the same trick. Patch survives in-tree crypto test and original bugreport test (ping flood with hmac(sha512). See FIPS 180-2 for SHA-512 definition http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2withchangenotice.pdfSigned-off-by:
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by:
-
Alexey Dobriyan authored
commit 84e31fdb upstream. commit f9e2bca6 aka "crypto: sha512 - Move message schedule W[80] to static percpu area" created global message schedule area. If sha512_update will ever be entered twice, hash will be silently calculated incorrectly. Probably the easiest way to notice incorrect hashes being calculated is to run 2 ping floods over AH with hmac(sha512): #!/usr/sbin/setkey -f flush; spdflush; add IP1 IP2 ah 25 -A hmac-sha512 0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000025; add IP2 IP1 ah 52 -A hmac-sha512 0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000052; spdadd IP1 IP2 any -P out ipsec ah/transport//require; spdadd IP2 IP1 any -P in ipsec ah/transport//require; XfrmInStateProtoError will start ticking with -EBADMSG being returned from ah_input(). This never happens with, say, hmac(sha1). With patch applied (on BOTH sides), XfrmInStateProtoError does not tick with multiple bidirectional ping flood streams like it doesn't tick with SHA-1. After this patch sha512_transform() will start using ~750 bytes of stack on x86_64. This is OK for simple loads, for something more heavy, stack reduction will be done separatedly. Signed-off-by:
-
Thomas Hellstrom authored
commit 598781d7 upstream. If the master tries to authenticate a client using drm_authmagic and that client has already closed its drm file descriptor, either wilfully or because it was terminated, the call to drm_authmagic will dereference a stale pointer into kmalloc'ed memory and corrupt it. Typically this results in a hard system hang. This patch fixes that problem by removing any authentication tokens (struct drm_magic_entry) open for a file descriptor when that file descriptor is closed. Signed-off-by:
Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> Reviewed-by:
Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Signed-off-by:
Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Tyler Hicks authored
commit 5e6f0d76 upstream. ecryptfs_write() handles the truncation of eCryptfs inodes. It grabs a page, zeroes out the appropriate portions, and then encrypts the page before writing it to the lower filesystem. It was unkillable and due to the lack of sparse file support could result in tying up a large portion of system resources, while encrypting pages of zeros, with no way for the truncate operation to be stopped from userspace. This patch adds the ability for ecryptfs_write() to detect a pending fatal signal and return as gracefully as possible. The intent is to leave the lower file in a useable state, while still allowing a user to break out of the encryption loop. If a pending fatal signal is detected, the eCryptfs inode size is updated to reflect the modified inode size and then -EINTR is returned. Signed-off-by:
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Tim Gardner authored
commit 30373dc0 upstream. Print inode on metadata read failure. The only real way of dealing with metadata read failures is to delete the underlying file system file. Having the inode allows one to 'find . -inum INODE`. [tyhicks@canonical.com: Removed some minor not-for-stable parts] Signed-off-by:
Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com> Reviewed-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Tyler Hicks authored
commit db10e556 upstream. A malicious count value specified when writing to /dev/ecryptfs may result in a a very large kernel memory allocation. This patch peeks at the specified packet payload size, adds that to the size of the packet headers and compares the result with the write count value. The resulting maximum memory allocation size is approximately 532 bytes. Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
-
- 25 Jan, 2012 28 commits
-
-
Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
-
Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli authored
commit d496aab5 upstream. Commit ef53d9c5 ("kprobes: improve kretprobe scalability with hashed locking") introduced a bug where we can potentially leak kretprobe_instances since we initialize a hlist head after having used it. Initialize the hlist head before using it. Reported by: Jim Keniston <jkenisto@us.ibm.com> Acked-by:
Jim Keniston <jkenisto@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Acked-by:
Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Cc: Srinivasa D S <srinivasa@in.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
-
Dan Rosenberg authored
commit c25a785d upstream. If the provided system call number is equal to __NR_syscalls, the current check will pass and a function pointer just after the system call table may be called, since sys_call_table is an array with total size __NR_syscalls. Whether or not this is a security bug depends on what the compiler puts immediately after the system call table. It's likely that this won't do anything bad because there is an additional NULL check on the syscall entry, but if there happens to be a non-NULL value immediately after the system call table, this may result in local privilege escalation. Signed-off-by:
Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Cc: Chen Liqin <liqin.chen@sunplusct.com> Cc: Lennox Wu <lennox.wu@gmail.com> Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by:
-
Stratos Psomadakis authored
commit cced5041 upstream. sym53c8xx_slave_destroy unconditionally assumes that sym53c8xx_slave_alloc has succesesfully allocated a sym_lcb. This can lead to a NULL pointer dereference (exposed by commit 4e6c82b3). Signed-off-by:
Stratos Psomadakis <psomas@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by:
James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com> Signed-off-by:
-
David Henningsson authored
commit ffe535ed upstream. More than one user reports that changing the model from "both" to "dmic" makes their Internal Mic work. Tested-by:
Martin Ling <martin-launchpad@earth.li> BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/795823Signed-off-by:
David Henningsson <david.henningsson@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
-
Joe Perches authored
commit 8a64f336 upstream. Add a printk_ratelimited statement expression macro that uses a per-call ratelimit_state so that multiple subsystems output messages are not suppressed by a global __ratelimit state. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/_rl/_ratelimited/g] Signed-off-by:
Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Naohiro Ooiwa <nooiwa@miraclelinux.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by:
-
Paolo Bonzini authored
commit 577ebb37 upstream. Introduce a wrapper around scsi_cmd_ioctl that takes a block device. The function will then be enhanced to detect partition block devices and, in that case, subject the ioctls to whitelisting. Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Robert Lukassen authored
commit 878b753e upstream. [ changed s/usb_free_coherent/usb_buffer_free/ for 2.6.32.x] In the WDM class driver a disconnect event leads to calls to usb_free_coherent to put back two USB DMA buffers allocated earlier. The call to usb_free_coherent uses a different size parameter (desc->wMaxCommand) than the corresponding call to usb_alloc_coherent (desc->bMaxPacketSize0). When a disconnect event occurs, this leads to 'bad dma' complaints from usb core because the USB DMA buffer is being pushed back to the 'buffer-2048' pool from which it has not been allocated. This patch against the most recent linux-2.6 kernel ensures that the parameters used by usb_alloc_coherent & usb_free_coherent calls in cdc-wdm.c match. Signed-off-by:
Robert Lukassen <robert.lukassen@tomtom.com> Signed-off-by:
Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
-
Martin Schwidefsky authored
commit c3e0ef9a upstream. For 32-bit architectures using standard jiffies the idletime calculation in uptime_proc_show will quickly overflow. It takes (2^32 / HZ) seconds of idle-time, or e.g. 12.45 days with no load on a quad-core with HZ=1000. Switch to 64-bit calculations. Cc: Michael Abbott <michael.abbott@diamond.ac.uk> Signed-off-by:
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
-
David Sterba authored
commit 0cdfb819 upstream. CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> CC: Oliver Neukum <oliver@neukum.org> CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by:
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
-
Sasha Levin authored
commit b2ea70af upstream. expkey_parse() oopses when handling a 0 length export. This is easily triggerable from usermode by writing 0 bytes into '/proc/[proc id]/net/rpc/nfsd.fh/channel'. Below is the log: [ 1402.286893] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff880077c49fff [ 1402.287632] IP: [<ffffffff812b4b99>] expkey_parse+0x28/0x2e1 [ 1402.287632] PGD 2206063 PUD 1fdfd067 PMD 1ffbc067 PTE 8000000077c49160 [ 1402.287632] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC [ 1402.287632] CPU 1 [ 1402.287632] Pid: 20198, comm: trinity Not tainted 3.2.0-rc2-sasha-00058-gc65cd37 #6 [ 1402.287632] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812b4b99>] [<ffffffff812b4b99>] expkey_parse+0x28/0x2e1 [ 1402.287632] RSP: 0018:ffff880077f0fd68 EFLAGS: 00010292 [ 1402.287632] RAX: ffff880077c49fff RBX: 00000000ffffffea RCX: 0000000001043400 [ 1402.287632] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880077c4a000 RDI: ffffffff82283de0 [ 1402.287632] RBP: ffff880077f0fe18 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff880000000000 [ 1402.287632] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff880077c4a000 [ 1402.287632] R13: ffffffff82283de0 R14: 0000000001043400 R15: ffffffff82283de0 [ 1402.287632] FS: 00007f25fec3f700(0000) GS:ffff88007d400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1402.287632] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 1402.287632] CR2: ffff880077c49fff CR3: 0000000077e1d000 CR4: 00000000000406e0 [ 1402.287632] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 1402.287632] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 1402.287632] Process trinity (pid: 20198, threadinfo ffff880077f0e000, task ffff880077db17b0) [ 1402.287632] Stack: [ 1402.287632] ffff880077db17b0 ffff880077c4a000 ffff880077f0fdb8 ffffffff810b411e [ 1402.287632] ffff880000000000 ffff880077db17b0 ffff880077c4a000 ffffffff82283de0 [ 1402.287632] 0000000001043400 ffffffff82283de0 ffff880077f0fde8 ffffffff81111f63 [ 1402.287632] Call Trace: [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff810b411e>] ? lock_release+0x1af/0x1bc [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81111f63>] ? might_fault+0x97/0x9e [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81111f1a>] ? might_fault+0x4e/0x9e [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81a8bcf2>] cache_do_downcall+0x3e/0x4f [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81a8c950>] cache_write.clone.16+0xbb/0x130 [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81a8c9df>] ? cache_write_pipefs+0x1a/0x1a [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81a8c9f8>] cache_write_procfs+0x19/0x1b [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff8118dc54>] proc_reg_write+0x8e/0xad [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff8113fe81>] vfs_write+0xaa/0xfd [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff8114142d>] ? fget_light+0x35/0x9e [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff8113ff8b>] sys_write+0x48/0x6f [ 1402.287632] [<ffffffff81bbdb92>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 1402.287632] Code: c0 c9 c3 55 48 63 d2 48 89 e5 48 8d 44 32 ff 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 bb ea ff ff ff 48 81 ec 88 00 00 00 48 89 b5 58 ff ff ff [ 1402.287632] 38 0a 0f 85 89 02 00 00 c6 00 00 48 8b 3d 44 4a e5 01 48 85 [ 1402.287632] RIP [<ffffffff812b4b99>] expkey_parse+0x28/0x2e1 [ 1402.287632] RSP <ffff880077f0fd68> [ 1402.287632] CR2: ffff880077c49fff [ 1402.287632] ---[ end trace 368ef53ff773a5e3 ]--- Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
-
J. Bruce Fields authored
commit 2fefb8a0 upstream. There's no reason I can see that we need to call sv_shutdown between closing the two lists of sockets. Signed-off-by:
-
J. Bruce Fields authored
commit 61c8504c upstream. The pool_to and to_pool fields of the global svc_pool_map are freed on shutdown, but are initialized in nfsd startup only in the SVC_POOL_PERCPU and SVC_POOL_PERNODE cases. They *are* initialized to zero on kernel startup. So as long as you use only SVC_POOL_GLOBAL (the default), this will never be a problem. You're also OK if you only ever use SVC_POOL_PERCPU or SVC_POOL_PERNODE. However, the following sequence events leads to a double-free: 1. set SVC_POOL_PERCPU or SVC_POOL_PERNODE 2. start nfsd: both fields are initialized. 3. shutdown nfsd: both fields are freed. 4. set SVC_POOL_GLOBAL 5. start nfsd: the fields are left untouched. 6. shutdown nfsd: now we try to free them again. Step 4 is actually unnecessary, since (for some bizarre reason), nfsd automatically resets the pool mode to SVC_POOL_GLOBAL on shutdown. Signed-off-by:
-
Dan Carpenter authored
commit 6c06108b upstream. If ctrls->count is too high the multiplication could overflow and array_size would be lower than expected. Mauro and Hans Verkuil suggested that we cap it at 1024. That comes from the maximum number of controls with lots of room for expantion. $ grep V4L2_CID include/linux/videodev2.h | wc -l 211 Signed-off-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Jean Delvare authored
commit 7c1f59c9 upstream. When adding checks for ACPI resource conflicts to many bus drivers, not enough attention was paid to the error paths, and for several drivers this causes 0 to be returned on error in some cases. Fix this by properly returning a non-zero value on every error. Signed-off-by:
Jean Delvare <khali@linux-fr.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Richard Weinberger authored
commit 4a59c797 upstream. Currently it's possible to create a volume without a name. E.g: ubimkvol -n 32 -s 2MiB -t static /dev/ubi0 -N "" After that vtbl_check() will always fail because it does not permit empty strings. Signed-off-by:
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by:
Artem Bityutskiy <Artem.Bityutskiy@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Ludwig Nussel authored
commit 9af0c7a6 upstream. On x86_32 casting the unsigned int result of get_random_int() to long may result in a negative value. On x86_32 the range of mmap_rnd() therefore was -255 to 255. The 32bit mode on x86_64 used 0 to 255 as intended. The bug was introduced by 675a0813 ("x86: unify mmap_{32|64}.c") in January 2008. Signed-off-by:
Ludwig Nussel <ludwig.nussel@suse.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: harvey.harrison@gmail.com Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by:
-
Bjorn Helgaas authored
commit eb31aae8 upstream. Some Dell BIOSes have MCFG tables that don't report the entire MMCONFIG area claimed by the chipset. If we move PCI devices into that claimed-but-unreported area, they don't work. This quirk reads the AMD MMCONFIG MSRs and adds PNP0C01 resources as needed to cover the entire area. Example problem scenario: BIOS-e820: 00000000cfec5400 - 00000000d4000000 (reserved) Fam 10h mmconf [d0000000, dfffffff] PCI: MMCONFIG for domain 0000 [bus 00-3f] at [mem 0xd0000000-0xd3ffffff] (base 0xd0000000) pnp 00:0c: [mem 0xd0000000-0xd3ffffff] pci 0000:00:12.0: reg 10: [mem 0xffb00000-0xffb00fff] pci 0000:00:12.0: no compatible bridge window for [mem 0xffb00000-0xffb00fff] pci 0000:00:12.0: BAR 0: assigned [mem 0xd4000000-0xd40000ff] Reported-by:
Lisa Salimbas <lisa.salimbas@canonical.com> Reported-by: <thuban@singularity.fr> Tested-by:
dann frazier <dann.frazier@canonical.com> References: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=31602 References: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/647043 References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=770308Signed-off-by:
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Roberto Sassu authored
commit 45fae749 upstream. Info about new measurements are cached in the iint for performance. When the inode is flushed from cache, the associated iint is flushed as well. Subsequent access to the inode will cause the inode to be re-measured and will attempt to add a duplicate entry to the measurement list. This patch frees the duplicate measurement memory, fixing a memory leak. Signed-off-by:
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by:
Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Ian Campbell authored
commit 9e7860ce upstream. Haogang Chen found out that: There is a potential integer overflow in process_msg() that could result in cross-domain attack. body = kmalloc(msg->hdr.len + 1, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH); When a malicious guest passes 0xffffffff in msg->hdr.len, the subsequent call to xb_read() would write to a zero-length buffer. The other end of this connection is always the xenstore backend daemon so there is no guest (malicious or otherwise) which can do this. The xenstore daemon is a trusted component in the system. However this seem like a reasonable robustness improvement so we should have it. And Ian when read the API docs found that: The payload length (len field of the header) is limited to 4096 (XENSTORE_PAYLOAD_MAX) in both directions. If a client exceeds the limit, its xenstored connection will be immediately killed by xenstored, which is usually catastrophic from the client's point of view. Clients (particularly domains, which cannot just reconnect) should avoid this. so this patch checks against that instead. This also avoids a potential integer overflow pointed out by Haogang Chen. Signed-off-by:
Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Cc: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Eric W. Biederman authored
commit a776c491 upstream. I traced a nasty kexec on panic boot failure to the fact that we had screaming msi interrupts and we were not disabling the msi messages at kernel startup. The booting kernel had not enabled those interupts so was not prepared to handle them. I can see no reason why we would ever want to leave the msi interrupts enabled at boot if something else has enabled those interrupts. The pci spec specifies that msi interrupts should be off by default. Drivers are expected to enable the msi interrupts if they want to use them. Our interrupt handling code reprograms the interrupt handlers at boot and will not be be able to do anything useful with an unexpected interrupt. This patch applies cleanly all of the way back to 2.6.32 where I noticed the problem. Signed-off-by:
Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Alex Williamson authored
commit 1830ea91 upstream. Spec shows this as 1010b = 0xa Signed-off-by:
Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Artem Bityutskiy authored
commit e57e0d8e upstream. When we fail to erase a PEB, we free the corresponding erase entry object, but then re-schedule this object if the error code was something like -EAGAIN. Obviously, it is a bug to use the object after we have freed it. Reported-by:
Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Chase Douglas authored
commit e46e927b upstream. This allows the latest N-Trig devices to function properly. BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/724831Signed-off-by:
Chase Douglas <chase.douglas@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
-
Takashi Iwai authored
commit 3a90274d upstream. When an invalid NID is given, get_wcaps() returns zero as the error, but get_wcaps_type() takes it as the normal value and returns a bogus AC_WID_AUD_OUT value. This confuses the parser. With this patch, get_wcaps_type() returns -1 when value 0 is given, i.e. an invalid NID is passed to get_wcaps(). Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=740118Signed-off-by:
-
Pavel Hofman authored
commit e7848163 upstream. Cards with identical PCI ids but no AC97 config in EEPROM do not have the ac97 field initialized. We must check for this case to avoid kernel oops. Signed-off-by:
Pavel Hofman <pavel.hofman@ivitera.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Karsten Wiese authored
commit d0f3a2eb upstream. They are not needed here. Signed-off-by:
Karsten Wiese <fzu@wemgehoertderstaat.de> Signed-off-by:
-
Xi Wang authored
commit d50f2ab6 upstream. Commit 503358ae ("ext4: avoid divide by zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307 by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be set to a bogus value by an attacker. sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex; groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex; if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... } This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit. 1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC. On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36 is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check, leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent. 2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift. A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex is unsigned for simplicity. groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex; if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) { We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same. Signed-off-by:
Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by:
-
- 12 Jan, 2012 1 commit
-
-
Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
-
