- 21 Mar, 2016 40 commits
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Neil Brown authored
commit 29807318 upstream. If the sending queue has a task without ->rq_cong set at the front, and then a number of tasks with ->rq_cong set such that they use the entire congestion window, then the queue deadlocks. The first entry cannot be processed until later entries complete. This scenario has been seen with a client using UDP to access a server, and the network connection breaking for a period of time - it doesn't recover. It never really makes sense for an ->rq_cong request to be on the ->sending queue, but it can happen when a request is being retried, and finds the transport if locked (XPRT_LOCKED). In this case we simple call __xprt_put_cong() and the deadlock goes away. Signed-off-by:
NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by:
Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
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Sasha Levin authored
commit 34f5b006 upstream. If we didn't call ATMARP_MKIP before ATMARP_ENCAP the VCC descriptor is non-existant and we'll end up dereferencing a NULL ptr: [1033173.491930] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory accessirq event stamp: 123386 [1033173.493678] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN [1033173.493689] Modules linked in: [1033173.493697] CPU: 9 PID: 23815 Comm: trinity-c64 Not tainted 4.2.0-next-20150911-sasha-00043-g353d875-dirty #2545 [1033173.493706] task: ffff8800630c4000 ti: ffff880063110000 task.ti: ffff880063110000 [1033173.493823] RIP: clip_ioctl (net/atm/clip.c:320 net/atm/clip.c:689) [1033173.493826] RSP: 0018:ffff880063117a88 EFLAGS: 00010203 [1033173.493828] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000000c [1033173.493830] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffffb3f10720 RDI: 0000000000000014 [1033173.493832] RBP: ffff880063117b80 R08: ffff88047574d9a4 R09: 0000000000000000 [1033173.493834] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 1ffff1000c622f53 [1033173.493836] R13: ffff8800cb905500 R14: ffff8808d6da2000 R15: 00000000fffffdfd [1033173.493840] FS: 00007fa56b92d700(0000) GS:ffff880478000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [1033173.493843] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [1033173.493845] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000630e8000 CR4: 00000000000006a0 [1033173.493855] Stack: [1033173.493862] ffffffffb0b60444 000000000000eaea 0000000041b58ab3 ffffffffb3c3ce32 [1033173.493867] ffffffffb0b6f3e0 ffffffffb0b60444 ffffffffb5ea2e50 1ffff1000c622f5e [1033173.493873] ffff8800630c4cd8 00000000000ee09a ffffffffb3ec4888 ffffffffb5ea2de8 [1033173.493874] Call Trace: [1033173.494108] do_vcc_ioctl (net/atm/ioctl.c:170) [1033173.494113] vcc_ioctl (net/atm/ioctl.c:189) [1033173.494116] svc_ioctl (net/atm/svc.c:605) [1033173.494200] sock_do_ioctl (net/socket.c:874) [1033173.494204] sock_ioctl (net/socket.c:958) [1033173.494244] do_vfs_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:43 fs/ioctl.c:607) [1033173.494290] SyS_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:622 fs/ioctl.c:613) [1033173.494295] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:186) [1033173.494362] Code: fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 50 09 00 00 49 8b 9e 60 06 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d 7b 14 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 48 89 fa 83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 14 09 00 All code ======== 0: fa cli 1: 48 c1 ea 03 shr $0x3,%rdx 5: 80 3c 02 00 cmpb $0x0,(%rdx,%rax,1) 9: 0f 85 50 09 00 00 jne 0x95f f: 49 8b 9e 60 06 00 00 mov 0x660(%r14),%rbx 16: 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 movabs $0xdffffc0000000000,%rax 1d: fc ff df 20: 48 8d 7b 14 lea 0x14(%rbx),%rdi 24: 48 89 fa mov %rdi,%rdx 27: 48 c1 ea 03 shr $0x3,%rdx 2b:* 0f b6 04 02 movzbl (%rdx,%rax,1),%eax <-- trapping instruction 2f: 48 89 fa mov %rdi,%rdx 32: 83 e2 07 and $0x7,%edx 35: 38 d0 cmp %dl,%al 37: 7f 08 jg 0x41 39: 84 c0 test %al,%al 3b: 0f 85 14 09 00 00 jne 0x955 Code starting with the faulting instruction =========================================== 0: 0f b6 04 02 movzbl (%rdx,%rax,1),%eax 4: 48 89 fa mov %rdi,%rdx 7: 83 e2 07 and $0x7,%edx a: 38 d0 cmp %dl,%al c: 7f 08 jg 0x16 e: 84 c0 test %al,%al 10: 0f 85 14 09 00 00 jne 0x92a [1033173.494366] RIP clip_ioctl (net/atm/clip.c:320 net/atm/clip.c:689) [1033173.494368] RSP <ffff880063117a88> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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Andrey Vagin authored
commit c6825c09 upstream. Lets look at destroy_conntrack: hlist_nulls_del_rcu(&ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].hnnode); ... nf_conntrack_free(ct) kmem_cache_free(net->ct.nf_conntrack_cachep, ct); net->ct.nf_conntrack_cachep is created with SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU. The hash is protected by rcu, so readers look up conntracks without locks. A conntrack is removed from the hash, but in this moment a few readers still can use the conntrack. Then this conntrack is released and another thread creates conntrack with the same address and the equal tuple. After this a reader starts to validate the conntrack: * It's not dying, because a new conntrack was created * nf_ct_tuple_equal() returns true. But this conntrack is not initialized yet, so it can not be used by two threads concurrently. In this case BUG_ON may be triggered from nf_nat_setup_info(). Florian Westphal suggested to check the confirm bit too. I think it's right. task 1 task 2 task 3 nf_conntrack_find_get ____nf_conntrack_find destroy_conntrack hlist_nulls_del_rcu nf_conntrack_free kmem_cache_free __nf_conntrack_alloc kmem_cache_alloc memset(&ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_MAX], if (nf_ct_is_dying(ct)) if (!nf_ct_tuple_equal() I'm not sure, that I have ever seen this race condition in a real life. Currently we are investigating a bug, which is reproduced on a few nodes. In our case one conntrack is initialized from a few tasks concurrently, we don't have any other explanation for this. <2>[46267.083061] kernel BUG at net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c:322! ... <4>[46267.083951] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e00a4>] [<ffffffffa01e00a4>] nf_nat_setup_info+0x564/0x590 [nf_nat] ... <4>[46267.085549] Call Trace: <4>[46267.085622] [<ffffffffa023421b>] alloc_null_binding+0x5b/0xa0 [iptable_nat] <4>[46267.085697] [<ffffffffa02342bc>] nf_nat_rule_find+0x5c/0x80 [iptable_nat] <4>[46267.085770] [<ffffffffa0234521>] nf_nat_fn+0x111/0x260 [iptable_nat] <4>[46267.085843] [<ffffffffa0234798>] nf_nat_out+0x48/0xd0 [iptable_nat] <4>[46267.085919] [<ffffffff814841b9>] nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 <4>[46267.085991] [<ffffffff81494e70>] ? ip_finish_output+0x0/0x2f0 <4>[46267.086063] [<ffffffff81484374>] nf_hook_slow+0x74/0x110 <4>[46267.086133] [<ffffffff81494e70>] ? ip_finish_output+0x0/0x2f0 <4>[46267.086207] [<ffffffff814b5890>] ? dst_output+0x0/0x20 <4>[46267.086277] [<ffffffff81495204>] ip_output+0xa4/0xc0 <4>[46267.086346] [<ffffffff814b65a4>] raw_sendmsg+0x8b4/0x910 <4>[46267.086419] [<ffffffff814c10fa>] inet_sendmsg+0x4a/0xb0 <4>[46267.086491] [<ffffffff814459aa>] ? sock_update_classid+0x3a/0x50 <4>[46267.086562] [<ffffffff81444d67>] sock_sendmsg+0x117/0x140 <4>[46267.086638] [<ffffffff8151997b>] ? _spin_unlock_bh+0x1b/0x20 <4>[46267.086712] [<ffffffff8109d370>] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x40 <4>[46267.086785] [<ffffffff81495e80>] ? do_ip_setsockopt+0x90/0xd80 <4>[46267.086858] [<ffffffff8100be0e>] ? call_function_interrupt+0xe/0x20 <4>[46267.086936] [<ffffffff8118cb10>] ? ub_slab_ptr+0x20/0x90 <4>[46267.087006] [<ffffffff8118cb10>] ? ub_slab_ptr+0x20/0x90 <4>[46267.087081] [<ffffffff8118f2e8>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xd8/0x1e0 <4>[46267.087151] [<ffffffff81445599>] sys_sendto+0x139/0x190 <4>[46267.087229] [<ffffffff81448c0d>] ? sock_setsockopt+0x16d/0x6f0 <4>[46267.087303] [<ffffffff810efa47>] ? audit_syscall_entry+0x1d7/0x200 <4>[46267.087378] [<ffffffff810ef795>] ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x265/0x290 <4>[46267.087454] [<ffffffff81474885>] ? compat_sys_setsockopt+0x75/0x210 <4>[46267.087531] [<ffffffff81474b5f>] compat_sys_socketcall+0x13f/0x210 <4>[46267.087607] [<ffffffff8104dea3>] ia32_sysret+0x0/0x5 <4>[46267.087676] Code: 91 20 e2 01 75 29 48 89 de 4c 89 f7 e8 56 fa ff ff 85 c0 0f 84 68 fc ff ff 0f b6 4d c6 41 8b 45 00 e9 4d fb ff ff e8 7c 19 e9 e0 <0f> 0b eb fe f6 05 17 91 20 e2 80 74 ce 80 3d 5f 2e 00 00 00 74 <1>[46267.088023] RIP [<ffffffffa01e00a4>] nf_nat_setup_info+0x564/0x590 Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Cc: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Signed-off-by:
Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Acked-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by:
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Hannes Frederic Sowa authored
commit c2f17e82 upstream. Routes need to be probed asynchronous otherwise the call stack gets exhausted when the kernel attemps to deliver another skb inline, like e.g. xt_TEE does, and we probe at the same time. We update neigh->updated still at once, otherwise we would send to many probes. Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by:
Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by:
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bingtian.ly@taobao.com authored
commit cdda8891 upstream. I found if we write a larger than 4GB value to some sysctl variables, the sending syscall will hang up forever, because these variables are 32 bits, such large values make them overflow to 0 or negative. This patch try to fix overflow or prevent from zero value setup of below sysctl variables: net.core.wmem_default net.core.rmem_default net.core.rmem_max net.core.wmem_max net.ipv4.udp_rmem_min net.ipv4.udp_wmem_min net.ipv4.tcp_wmem net.ipv4.tcp_rmem Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Li Yu <raise.sail@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Linus Torvalds authored
commit b9a53227 upstream. As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work, that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen. We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f: "ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we clearly forgot about msg and shm. Reported-by:
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [lizf: Backported to 3.4: adjust context] Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit eee5cc27 upstream. The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o) and these days we can do just as well without going through the list of files. Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> [lizf: Backported to 3.4: adjust context] Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
commit cbdb967a upstream. This is needed to avoid the possibility that the guest triggers an infinite stream of #DB exceptions (CVE-2015-8104). VMX is not affected: because it does not save DR6 in the VMCS, it already intercepts #DB unconditionally. Reported-by:
Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2, with thanks to Paolo: - update_db_bp_intercept() was called update_db_intercept() - The remaining call is in svm_guest_debug() rather than through svm_x86_ops] Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Northup authored
commit 54a20552 upstream. It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the effects (CVE-2015-5307). Signed-off-by:
Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Marcelo Leitner authored
commit 77751427 upstream. Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet drops. If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values too small, but not for too big ones.) The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU. Note that similar check is already performed at ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA. Signed-off-by:
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
commit f05819df upstream. The following sequence of commands: i=`keyctl add user a a @s` keyctl request2 keyring foo bar @t keyctl unlink $i @s tries to invoke an upcall to instantiate a keyring if one doesn't already exist by that name within the user's keyring set. However, if the upcall fails, the code sets keyring->type_data.reject_error to -ENOKEY or some other error code. When the key is garbage collected, the key destroy function is called unconditionally and keyring_destroy() uses list_empty() on keyring->type_data.link - which is in a union with reject_error. Subsequently, the kernel tries to unlink the keyring from the keyring names list - which oopses like this: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a IP: [<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88 ... Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector ... RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88 RSP: 0018:ffff88003e2f3d30 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: ffff88003bf1a900 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000003bfc6901 RDI: ffffffff81a73a40 RBP: ffff88003e2f3d38 R08: 0000000000000152 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff88003e2f3c18 R11: 000000000000865b R12: ffff88003bf1a900 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003bf1a908 R15: ffff88003e2f4000 ... CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000003e3ec000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff8126c756>] key_gc_unused_keys.constprop.1+0x5d/0x10f [<ffffffff8126ca71>] key_garbage_collector+0x1fa/0x351 [<ffffffff8105ec9b>] process_one_work+0x28e/0x547 [<ffffffff8105fd17>] worker_thread+0x26e/0x361 [<ffffffff8105faa9>] ? rescuer_thread+0x2a8/0x2a8 [<ffffffff810648ad>] kthread+0xf3/0xfb [<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2 [<ffffffff815f2ccf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2 Note the value in RAX. This is a 32-bit representation of -ENOKEY. The solution is to only call ->destroy() if the key was successfully instantiated. Reported-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by:
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David Howells authored
commit 94c4554b upstream. There appears to be a race between: (1) key_gc_unused_keys() which frees key->security and then calls keyring_destroy() to unlink the name from the name list (2) find_keyring_by_name() which calls key_permission(), thus accessing key->security, on a key before checking to see whether the key usage is 0 (ie. the key is dead and might be cleaned up). Fix this by calling ->destroy() before cleaning up the core key data - including key->security. Reported-by:
Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Johan Hovold authored
commit cbb4be65 upstream. Fix potential null-pointer dereference at probe by making sure that the required endpoints are present. The whiteheat driver assumes there are at least five pairs of bulk endpoints, of which the final pair is used for the "command port". An attempt to bind to an interface with fewer bulk endpoints would currently lead to an oops. Fixes CVE-2015-5257. Reported-by:
Moein Ghasemzadeh <moein@istuary.com> Signed-off-by:
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Ben Hutchings authored
commit 4ab42d78 upstream. Currently slhc_init() treats out-of-range values of rslots and tslots as equivalent to 0, except that if tslots is too large it will dereference a null pointer (CVE-2015-7799). Add a range-check at the top of the function and make it return an ERR_PTR() on error instead of NULL. Change the callers accordingly. Compile-tested only. Reported-by:
郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn> References: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.oss.general/17908Signed-off-by:
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Ben Hutchings authored
commit 0baa57d8 upstream. Compile-tested only. Signed-off-by:
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Jason Wang authored
commit 48900cb6 upstream. virtio declares support for NETIF_F_FRAGLIST, but assumes that there are at most MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2 fragments which isn't always true with a fraglist. A longer fraglist in the skb will make the call to skb_to_sgvec overflow the sg array, leading to memory corruption. Drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST so we only get what we can handle. Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit 451a2886 upstream. unfortunately, allowing an arbitrary 16bit value means a possibility of overflow in the calculation of total number of pages in bio_map_user_iov() - we rely on there being no more than PAGE_SIZE members of sum in the first loop there. If that sum wraps around, we end up allocating too small array of pointers to pages and it's easy to overflow it in the second loop. X-Coverup: TINC (and there's no lumber cartel either) Signed-off-by:
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Quentin Casasnovas authored
commit 8c7188b2 upstream. Sasha's found a NULL pointer dereference in the RDS connection code when sending a message to an apparently unbound socket. The problem is caused by the code checking if the socket is bound in rds_sendmsg(), which checks the rs_bound_addr field without taking a lock on the socket. This opens a race where rs_bound_addr is temporarily set but where the transport is not in rds_bind(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to dereference 'trans' in __rds_conn_create(). Vegard wrote a reproducer for this issue, so kindly ask him to share if you're interested. I cannot reproduce the NULL pointer dereference using Vegard's reproducer with this patch, whereas I could without. Complete earlier incomplete fix to CVE-2015-6937: 74e98eb0 ("RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection") Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Reviewed-by:
Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sasha Levin authored
commit 74e98eb0 upstream. There was no verification that an underlying transport exists when creating a connection, this would cause dereferencing a NULL ptr. It might happen on sockets that weren't properly bound before attempting to send a message, which will cause a NULL ptr deref: [135546.047719] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory accessgeneral protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN [135546.051270] Modules linked in: [135546.051781] CPU: 4 PID: 15650 Comm: trinity-c4 Not tainted 4.2.0-next-20150902-sasha-00041-gbaa1222-dirty #2527 [135546.053217] task: ffff8800835bc000 ti: ffff8800bc708000 task.ti: ffff8800bc708000 [135546.054291] RIP: __rds_conn_create (net/rds/connection.c:194) [135546.055666] RSP: 0018:ffff8800bc70fab0 EFLAGS: 00010202 [135546.056457] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000f2c RCX: ffff8800835bc000 [135546.057494] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: ffff8800835bccd8 RDI: 0000000000000038 [135546.058530] RBP: ffff8800bc70fb18 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [135546.059556] R10: ffffed014d7a3a23 R11: ffffed014d7a3a21 R12: 0000000000000000 [135546.060614] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8801ec3d0000 R15: 0000000000000000 [135546.061668] FS: 00007faad4ffb700(0000) GS:ffff880252000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [135546.062836] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [135546.063682] CR2: 000000000000846a CR3: 000000009d137000 CR4: 00000000000006a0 [135546.064723] Stack: [135546.065048] ffffffffafe2055c ffffffffafe23fc1 ffffed00493097bf ffff8801ec3d0008 [135546.066247] 0000000000000000 00000000000000d0 0000000000000000 ac194a24c0586342 [135546.067438] 1ffff100178e1f78 ffff880320581b00 ffff8800bc70fdd0 ffff880320581b00 [135546.068629] Call Trace: [135546.069028] ? __rds_conn_create (include/linux/rcupdate.h:856 net/rds/connection.c:134) [135546.069989] ? rds_message_copy_from_user (net/rds/message.c:298) [135546.071021] rds_conn_create_outgoing (net/rds/connection.c:278) [135546.071981] rds_sendmsg (net/rds/send.c:1058) [135546.072858] ? perf_trace_lock (include/trace/events/lock.h:38) [135546.073744] ? lockdep_init (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3298) [135546.074577] ? rds_send_drop_to (net/rds/send.c:976) [135546.075508] ? __might_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14 mm/memory.c:3795) [135546.076349] ? __might_fault (mm/memory.c:3795) [135546.077179] ? rds_send_drop_to (net/rds/send.c:976) [135546.078114] sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:611 net/socket.c:620) [135546.078856] SYSC_sendto (net/socket.c:1657) [135546.079596] ? SYSC_connect (net/socket.c:1628) [135546.080510] ? trace_dump_stack (kernel/trace/trace.c:1926) [135546.081397] ? ring_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2479 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2558 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2674) [135546.082390] ? trace_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/trace.c:1749) [135546.083410] ? trace_event_raw_event_sys_enter (include/trace/events/syscalls.h:16) [135546.084481] ? do_audit_syscall_entry (include/trace/events/syscalls.h:16) [135546.085438] ? trace_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/trace.c:1749) [135546.085515] rds_ib_laddr_check(): addr 36.74.25.172 ret -99 node type -1 Acked-by:
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Hannes Frederic Sowa authored
commit 79462ad0 upstream. 郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by using a simple program: int socket_fd; struct sockaddr_in addr; addr.sin_port = 0; addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; addr.sin_family = 10; socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000); connect(socket_fd , &addr,16); AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly, thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and store a zero in the protocol fields. This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which is NULL for raw sockets. kernel: Call Trace: kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70 kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80 kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110 kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80 kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200 kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89 I found no particular commit which introduced this problem. CVE: CVE-2015-8543 Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com> Reported-by:
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WANG Cong authored
commit 09ccfd23 upstream. Reported-by:
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Rainer Weikusat authored
commit 7d267278 upstream. Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes: An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a wait queue with epoll. Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring that no blocked writer sleeps forever. Signed-off-by:
Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> Fixes: ec0d215f ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets") Reviewed-by:
Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Signed-off-by:
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lucien authored
commit f648f807 upstream. Commit f8d96052 ("sctp: Enforce retransmission limit during shutdown") fixed a problem with excessive retransmissions in the SHUTDOWN_PENDING by not resetting the association overall_error_count. This allowed the association to better enforce assoc.max_retrans limit. However, the same issue still exists when the association is in SHUTDOWN_RECEIVED state. In this state, HB-ACKs will continue to reset the overall_error_count for the association would extend the lifetime of association unnecessarily. This patch solves this by resetting the overall_error_count whenever the current state is small then SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING. As a small side-effect, we end up also handling SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_ACK_SENT and SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_SENT states, but they are not really impacted because we disable Heartbeats in those states. Fixes: Commit f8d96052 ("sctp: Enforce retransmission limit during shutdown") Signed-off-by:
Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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David Ahern authored
commit ba51b6be upstream. Hit the following splat testing VRF change for ipsec: [ 113.475692] =============================== [ 113.476194] [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] [ 113.476667] 4.2.0-rc6-1+deb7u2+clUNRELEASED #3.2.65-1+deb7u2+clUNRELEASED Not tainted [ 113.477545] ------------------------------- [ 113.478013] /work/monster-14/dsa/kernel.git/include/linux/rcupdate.h:568 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section! [ 113.479288] [ 113.479288] other info that might help us debug this: [ 113.479288] [ 113.480207] [ 113.480207] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1 [ 113.480931] 2 locks held by setkey/6829: [ 113.481371] #0: (&net->xfrm.xfrm_cfg_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff814e9887>] pfkey_sendmsg+0xfb/0x213 [ 113.482509] #1: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff814e767f>] rcu_read_lock+0x0/0x6e [ 113.483509] [ 113.483509] stack backtrace: [ 113.484041] CPU: 0 PID: 6829 Comm: setkey Not tainted 4.2.0-rc6-1+deb7u2+clUNRELEASED #3.2.65-1+deb7u2+clUNRELEASED [ 113.485422] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5.1-0-g8936dbb-20141113_115728-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014 [ 113.486845] 0000000000000001 ffff88001d4c7a98 ffffffff81518af2 ffffffff81086962 [ 113.487732] ffff88001d538480 ffff88001d4c7ac8 ffffffff8107ae75 ffffffff8180a154 [ 113.488628] 0000000000000b30 0000000000000000 00000000000000d0 ffff88001d4c7ad8 [ 113.489525] Call Trace: [ 113.489813] [<ffffffff81518af2>] dump_stack+0x4c/0x65 [ 113.490389] [<ffffffff81086962>] ? console_unlock+0x3d6/0x405 [ 113.491039] [<ffffffff8107ae75>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfa/0x103 [ 113.491735] [<ffffffff81064032>] rcu_preempt_sleep_check+0x45/0x47 [ 113.492442] [<ffffffff8106404d>] ___might_sleep+0x19/0x1c8 [ 113.493077] [<ffffffff81064268>] __might_sleep+0x6c/0x82 [ 113.493681] [<ffffffff81133190>] cache_alloc_debugcheck_before.isra.50+0x1d/0x24 [ 113.494508] [<ffffffff81134876>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x31/0x18f [ 113.495149] [<ffffffff814012b5>] skb_clone+0x64/0x80 [ 113.495712] [<ffffffff814e6f71>] pfkey_broadcast_one+0x3d/0xff [ 113.496380] [<ffffffff814e7b84>] pfkey_broadcast+0xb5/0x11e [ 113.497024] [<ffffffff814e82d1>] pfkey_register+0x191/0x1b1 [ 113.497653] [<ffffffff814e9770>] pfkey_process+0x162/0x17e [ 113.498274] [<ffffffff814e9895>] pfkey_sendmsg+0x109/0x213 In pfkey_sendmsg the net mutex is taken and then pfkey_broadcast takes the RCU lock. Since pfkey_broadcast takes the RCU lock the allocation argument is pointless since GFP_ATOMIC must be used between the rcu_read_{,un}lock. The one call outside of rcu can be done with GFP_KERNEL. Fixes: 7f6b9dbd ("af_key: locking change") Signed-off-by:
David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> Acked-by:
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Herton R. Krzesinski authored
commit 602b8593 upstream. The current semaphore code allows a potential use after free: in exit_sem we may free the task's sem_undo_list while there is still another task looping through the same semaphore set and cleaning the sem_undo list at freeary function (the task called IPC_RMID for the same semaphore set). For example, with a test program [1] running which keeps forking a lot of processes (which then do a semop call with SEM_UNDO flag), and with the parent right after removing the semaphore set with IPC_RMID, and a kernel built with CONFIG_SLAB, CONFIG_SLAB_DEBUG and CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK, you can easily see something like the following in the kernel log: Slab corruption (Not tainted): kmalloc-64 start=ffff88003b45c1c0, len=64 000: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkk.kkkkkkk 010: ff ff ff ff 6b 6b 6b 6b ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ....kkkk........ Prev obj: start=ffff88003b45c180, len=64 000: 00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ff ff ff ff 5a 5a 5a 5a .....N......ZZZZ 010: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c0 fb 01 37 00 88 ff ff ...........7.... Next obj: start=ffff88003b45c200, len=64 000: 00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ff ff ff ff 5a 5a 5a 5a .....N......ZZZZ 010: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 68 29 a7 3c 00 88 ff ff ........h).<.... BUG: spinlock wrong CPU on CPU#2, test/18028 general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: 8021q mrp garp stp llc nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables binfmt_misc ppdev input_leds joydev parport_pc parport floppy serio_raw virtio_balloon virtio_rng virtio_console virtio_net iosf_mbi crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcspkr qxl ttm drm_kms_helper drm snd_hda_codec_generic i2c_piix4 snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm snd_timer snd soundcore crc32c_intel virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio pata_acpi ata_generic [last unloaded: speedstep_lib] CPU: 2 PID: 18028 Comm: test Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.8.1-20150318_183358- 04/01/2014 RIP: spin_dump+0x53/0xc0 Call Trace: spin_bug+0x30/0x40 do_raw_spin_unlock+0x71/0xa0 _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x10 freeary+0x82/0x2a0 ? _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x10 semctl_down.clone.0+0xce/0x160 ? __do_page_fault+0x19a/0x430 ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa8/0x100 SyS_semctl+0x236/0x2c0 ? syscall_trace_leave+0xde/0x130 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x71 Code: 8b 80 88 03 00 00 48 8d 88 60 05 00 00 48 c7 c7 a0 2c a4 81 31 c0 65 8b 15 eb 40 f3 7e e8 08 31 68 00 4d 85 e4 44 8b 4b 08 74 5e <45> 8b 84 24 88 03 00 00 49 8d 8c 24 60 05 00 00 8b 53 04 48 89 RIP [<ffffffff810d6053>] spin_dump+0x53/0xc0 RSP <ffff88003750fd68> ---[ end trace 783ebb76612867a0 ]--- NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 22s! [test:18053] Modules linked in: 8021q mrp garp stp llc nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables binfmt_misc ppdev input_leds joydev parport_pc parport floppy serio_raw virtio_balloon virtio_rng virtio_console virtio_net iosf_mbi crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcspkr qxl ttm drm_kms_helper drm snd_hda_codec_generic i2c_piix4 snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm snd_timer snd soundcore crc32c_intel virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio pata_acpi ata_generic [last unloaded: speedstep_lib] CPU: 3 PID: 18053 Comm: test Tainted: G D 4.2.0-rc5+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.8.1-20150318_183358- 04/01/2014 RIP: native_read_tsc+0x0/0x20 Call Trace: ? delay_tsc+0x40/0x70 __delay+0xf/0x20 do_raw_spin_lock+0x96/0x140 _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x10 sem_lock_and_putref+0x11/0x70 SYSC_semtimedop+0x7bf/0x960 ? handle_mm_fault+0xbf6/0x1880 ? dequeue_task_fair+0x79/0x4a0 ? __do_page_fault+0x19a/0x430 ? kfree_debugcheck+0x16/0x40 ? __do_page_fault+0x19a/0x430 ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa8/0x100 ? do_audit_syscall_entry+0x66/0x70 ? syscall_trace_enter_phase1+0x139/0x160 SyS_semtimedop+0xe/0x10 SyS_semop+0x10/0x20 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x71 Code: 47 10 83 e8 01 85 c0 89 47 10 75 08 65 48 89 3d 1f 74 ff 7e c9 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 e8 87 17 04 00 66 90 c9 c3 0f 1f 00 <55> 48 89 e5 0f 31 89 c1 48 89 d0 48 c1 e0 20 89 c9 48 09 c8 c9 Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks I wasn't able to trigger any badness on a recent kernel without the proper config debugs enabled, however I have softlockup reports on some kernel versions, in the semaphore code, which are similar as above (the scenario is seen on some servers running IBM DB2 which uses semaphore syscalls). The patch here fixes the race against freeary, by acquiring or waiting on the sem_undo_list lock as necessary (exit_sem can race with freeary, while freeary sets un->semid to -1 and removes the same sem_undo from list_proc or when it removes the last sem_undo). After the patch I'm unable to reproduce the problem using the test case [1]. [1] Test case used below: #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/ipc.h> #include <sys/sem.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <time.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <errno.h> #define NSEM 1 #define NSET 5 int sid[NSET]; void thread() { struct sembuf op; int s; uid_t pid = getuid(); s = rand() % NSET; op.sem_num = pid % NSEM; op.sem_op = 1; op.sem_flg = SEM_UNDO; semop(sid[s], &op, 1); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } void create_set() { int i, j; pid_t p; union { int val; struct semid_ds *buf; unsigned short int *array; struct seminfo *__buf; } un; /* Create and initialize semaphore set */ for (i = 0; i < NSET; i++) { sid[i] = semget(IPC_PRIVATE , NSEM, 0644 | IPC_CREAT); if (sid[i] < 0) { perror("semget"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } } un.val = 0; for (i = 0; i < NSET; i++) { for (j = 0; j < NSEM; j++) { if (semctl(sid[i], j, SETVAL, un) < 0) perror("semctl"); } } /* Launch threads that operate on semaphore set */ for (i = 0; i < NSEM * NSET * NSET; i++) { p = fork(); if (p < 0) perror("fork"); if (p == 0) thread(); } /* Free semaphore set */ for (i = 0; i < NSET; i++) { if (semctl(sid[i], NSEM, IPC_RMID)) perror("IPC_RMID"); } /* Wait for forked processes to exit */ while (wait(NULL)) { if (errno == ECHILD) break; }; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { pid_t p; srand(time(NULL)); while (1) { p = fork(); if (p < 0) { perror("fork"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } if (p == 0) { create_set(); goto end; } /* Wait for forked processes to exit */ while (wait(NULL)) { if (errno == ECHILD) break; }; } end: return 0; } [akpm@linux-foundation.org: use normal comment layout] Signed-off-by:
Herton R. Krzesinski <herton@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com> CC: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com> Cc: David Jeffery <djeffery@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Michael Walle authored
commit 5c16179b upstream. The commit de3910eb ("edac: change the mem allocation scheme to make Documentation/kobject.txt happy") changed the memory allocation for the csrows member. But ppc4xx_edac was forgotten in the patch. Fix it. Signed-off-by:
Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1437469253-8611-1-git-send-email-michael@walle.ccSigned-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Bart Van Assche authored
commit 8f2777f5 upstream. Since fc_fcp_cleanup_cmd() can sleep this function must not be called while holding a spinlock. This patch avoids that fc_fcp_cleanup_each_cmd() triggers the following bug: BUG: scheduling while atomic: sg_reset/1512/0x00000202 1 lock held by sg_reset/1512: #0: (&(&fsp->scsi_pkt_lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffc0225cd5>] fc_fcp_cleanup_each_cmd.isra.21+0xa5/0x150 [libfc] Preemption disabled at:[<ffffffffc0225cd5>] fc_fcp_cleanup_each_cmd.isra.21+0xa5/0x150 [libfc] Call Trace: [<ffffffff816c612c>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7b [<ffffffff810828bc>] __schedule_bug+0x6c/0xd0 [<ffffffff816c87aa>] __schedule+0x71a/0xa10 [<ffffffff816c8ad2>] schedule+0x32/0x80 [<ffffffffc0217eac>] fc_seq_set_resp+0xac/0x100 [libfc] [<ffffffffc0218b11>] fc_exch_done+0x41/0x60 [libfc] [<ffffffffc0225cff>] fc_fcp_cleanup_each_cmd.isra.21+0xcf/0x150 [libfc] [<ffffffffc0225f43>] fc_eh_device_reset+0x1c3/0x270 [libfc] [<ffffffff814a2cc9>] scsi_try_bus_device_reset+0x29/0x60 [<ffffffff814a3908>] scsi_ioctl_reset+0x258/0x2d0 [<ffffffff814a2650>] scsi_ioctl+0x150/0x440 [<ffffffff814b3a9d>] sd_ioctl+0xad/0x120 [<ffffffff8132f266>] blkdev_ioctl+0x1b6/0x810 [<ffffffff811da608>] block_ioctl+0x38/0x40 [<ffffffff811b4e08>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x2f8/0x530 [<ffffffff811b50c1>] SyS_ioctl+0x81/0xa0 [<ffffffff816cf8b2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x7a Signed-off-by:
Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com> Signed-off-by:
Vasu Dev <vasu.dev@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
James Bottomley <JBottomley@Odin.com> Signed-off-by:
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John Soni Jose authored
commit 660d0831 upstream. In case of hw iscsi offload, an host can have N-number of active connections. There can be IO's running on some connections which make host->host_busy always TRUE. Now if logout from a connection is tried then the code gets into an infinite loop as host->host_busy is always TRUE. iscsi_conn_teardown(....) { ......... /* * Block until all in-progress commands for this connection * time out or fail. */ for (;;) { spin_lock_irqsave(session->host->host_lock, flags); if (!atomic_read(&session->host->host_busy)) { /* OK for ERL == 0 */ spin_unlock_irqrestore(session->host->host_lock, flags); break; } spin_unlock_irqrestore(session->host->host_lock, flags); msleep_interruptible(500); iscsi_conn_printk(KERN_INFO, conn, "iscsi conn_destroy(): " "host_busy %d host_failed %d\n", atomic_read(&session->host->host_busy), session->host->host_failed); ................ ............... } } This is not an issue with software-iscsi/iser as each cxn is a separate host. Fix: Acquiring eh_mutex in iscsi_conn_teardown() before setting session->state = ISCSI_STATE_TERMINATE. Signed-off-by:
John Soni Jose <sony.john@avagotech.com> Reviewed-by:
Mike Christie <michaelc@cs.wisc.edu> Reviewed-by:
Chris Leech <cleech@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Joe Thornber authored
commit b0dc3c8b upstream. When using nested btrees, the top leaves of the top levels contain block addresses for the root of the next tree down. If we shadow a shared leaf node the leaf values (sub tree roots) should be incremented accordingly. This is only an issue if there is metadata sharing in the top levels. Which only occurs if metadata snapshots are being used (as is possible with dm-thinp). And could result in a block from the thinp metadata snap being reused early, thus corrupting the thinp metadata snap. Signed-off-by:
Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> [lizf: Backported to 3.4: - drop const - drop changes to remove_one()] Signed-off-by:
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Richard Weinberger authored
commit c0ddc8c7 upstream. In kbuild it is allowed to define objects in files named "Makefile" and "Kbuild". Currently localmodconfig reads objects only from "Makefile"s and misses modules like nouveau. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1437948415-16290-1-git-send-email-richard@nod.atReported-and-tested-by:
Leonidas Spyropoulos <artafinde@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by:
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by:
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Juergen Gross authored
commit 4809146b upstream. Commit 37868fe1 ("x86/ldt: Make modify_ldt synchronous") introduced a new struct ldt_struct anchored at mm->context.ldt. Adapt the x86 fpu emulation code to use that new structure. Signed-off-by:
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by:
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: billm@melbpc.org.au Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1438883674-1240-1-git-send-email-jgross@suse.comSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Juergen Gross authored
commit 136d9d83 upstream. Commit 37868fe1 ("x86/ldt: Make modify_ldt synchronous") introduced a new struct ldt_struct anchored at mm->context.ldt. convert_ip_to_linear() was changed to reflect this, but indexing into the ldt has to be changed as the pointer is no longer void *. Signed-off-by:
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Joseph Qi authored
commit 209f7512 upstream. The "BUG_ON(list_empty(&osb->blocked_lock_list))" in ocfs2_downconvert_thread_do_work can be triggered in the following case: ocfs2dc has firstly saved osb->blocked_lock_count to local varibale processed, and then processes the dentry lockres. During the dentry put, it calls iput and then deletes rw, inode and open lockres from blocked list in ocfs2_mark_lockres_freeing. And this causes the variable `processed' to not reflect the number of blocked lockres to be processed, which triggers the BUG. Signed-off-by:
Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Signed-off-by:
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David Daney authored
commit 46011e6e upstream. On MIPS the GLOBAL bit of the PTE must have the same value in any aligned pair of PTEs. These pairs of PTEs are referred to as "buddies". In a SMP system is is possible for two CPUs to be calling set_pte() on adjacent PTEs at the same time. There is a race between setting the PTE and a different CPU setting the GLOBAL bit in its buddy PTE. This race can be observed when multiple CPUs are executing vmap()/vfree() at the same time. Make setting the buddy PTE's GLOBAL bit an atomic operation to close the race condition. The case of CONFIG_64BIT_PHYS_ADDR && CONFIG_CPU_MIPS32 is *not* handled. Signed-off-by:
David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/10835/Signed-off-by:
Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Signed-off-by:
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Peter Zijlstra authored
commit fed66e2c upstream. Vince reported that the fasync signal stuff doesn't work proper for inherited events. So fix that. Installing fasync allocates memory and sets filp->f_flags |= FASYNC, which upon the demise of the file descriptor ensures the allocation is freed and state is updated. Now for perf, we can have the events stick around for a while after the original FD is dead because of references from child events. So we cannot copy the fasync pointer around. We can however consistently use the parent's fasync, as that will be updated. Reported-and-Tested-by:
Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho deMelo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: eranian@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1434011521.1495.71.camel@twinsSigned-off-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
commit 468b732b upstream. "len" is a signed integer. We check that len is not negative, so it goes from zero to INT_MAX. PAGE_SIZE is unsigned long so the comparison is type promoted to unsigned long. ULONG_MAX - 4095 is a higher than INT_MAX so the condition can never be true. I don't know if this is harmful but it seems safe to limit "len" to INT_MAX - 4095. Fixes: a8c879a7 ('RDS: Info and stats') Signed-off-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mathias Nyman authored
commit 7895086a upstream. We need to check that a TRB is part of the current segment before calculating its DMA address. Previously a ring segment didn't use a full memory page, and every new ring segment got a new memory page, so the off by one error in checking the upper bound was never seen. Now that we use a full memory page, 256 TRBs (4096 bytes), the off by one didn't catch the case when a TRB was the first element of the next segment. This is triggered if the virtual memory pages for a ring segment are next to each in increasing order where the ring buffer wraps around and causes errors like: [ 106.398223] xhci_hcd 0000:00:14.0: ERROR Transfer event TRB DMA ptr not part of current TD ep_index 0 comp_code 1 [ 106.398230] xhci_hcd 0000:00:14.0: Looking for event-dma fffd3000 trb-start fffd4fd0 trb-end fffd5000 seg-start fffd4000 seg-end fffd4ff0 The trb-end address is one outside the end-seg address. Tested-by:
Arkadiusz Miśkiewicz <arekm@maven.pl> Signed-off-by:
Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Felix Fietkau authored
commit 1d62d737 upstream. p->thread.user_cpus_allowed is zero-initialized and is only filled on the first sched_setaffinity call. To avoid adding overhead in the task initialization codepath, simply OR the returned mask in sched_getaffinity with p->cpus_allowed. Signed-off-by:
Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/10740/Signed-off-by:
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NeilBrown authored
commit 423f04d6 upstream. raid1_end_read_request() assumes that the In_sync bits are consistent with the ->degaded count. raid1_spare_active updates the In_sync bit before the ->degraded count and so exposes an inconsistency, as does error() So extend the spinlock in raid1_spare_active() and error() to hide those inconsistencies. This should probably be part of Commit: 34cab6f4 ("md/raid1: fix test for 'was read error from last working device'.") as it addresses the same issue. It fixes the same bug and should go to -stable for same reasons. Fixes: 76073054 ("md/raid1: clean up read_balance.") Signed-off-by:
NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> [lizf: Backported to 3.4: adjust context] Signed-off-by:
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