- 13 Dec, 2014 6 commits
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H. Peter Anvin authored
commit 3891a04a upstream. The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state to user space. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which is not available in 64-bit mode. In checkin: b3b42ac2 x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels we "solved" this by forbidding 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels, with the logic that 16-bit support is crippled on 64-bit kernels anyway (no V86 support), but it turns out that people are doing stuff like running old Win16 binaries under Wine and expect it to work. This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped readonly, so if IRET faults we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF handler. (Making #GP an IST exception would make the msr_safe functions unsafe in NMI/MC context, and quite possibly have other effects.) Special thanks to: - Andy Lutomirski, for the suggestion of using very small stack slots and copy (as opposed to map) the IRET frame there, and for the suggestion to mark them readonly and let the fault promote to #DF. - Konrad Wilk for paravirt fixup and testing. - Borislav Petkov for testing help and useful comments. Reported-by:
Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andrew Lutomriski <amluto@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dirk Hohndel <dirk@hohndel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: comex <comexk@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> (cherry picked from 3.2 commit e7836514) [wt: backport notes for 2.6.32 differences : - use DECLARE_PER_CPU instead of DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY - replace this_cpu_read(foo) with per_cpu(foo, smp_processor_id()) - replace this_cpu_write(foo,bar) with per_cpu(foo,smp_processor_id())=bar /wt] Signed-off-by:
Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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H. Peter Anvin authored
commit 246f2d2e upstream. It is not safe to use LAR to filter when to go down the espfix path, because the LDT is per-process (rather than per-thread) and another thread might change the descriptors behind our back. Fortunately it is always *safe* (if a bit slow) to go down the espfix path, and a 32-bit LDT stack segment is extremely rare. Signed-off-by:
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H. Peter Anvin authored
commit b3b42ac2 upstream. The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which is not available in 32-bit mode. Since 16-bit support is somewhat crippled anyway on a 64-bit kernel (no V86 mode), and most (if not quite all) 64-bit processors support virtualization for the users who really need it, simply reject attempts at creating a 16-bit segment when running on top of a 64-bit kernel. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Jan Beulich authored
As this isn't an exception or interrupt entry point, it doesn't have any of the hardware provide frame layouts active. Signed-off-by:
Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Acked-by:
Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> LKML-Reference: <4C7FBAA80200007800013F67@vpn.id2.novell.com> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> (cherry picked from commit 1f130a78) [WT: only merged to minimize changes from mainline in entry_64.S] Signed-off-by:
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Brian Gerst authored
Move the handling of truncated %rip from an iret fault to the fault entry path. This allows x86-64 to use the standard search_extable() function. Signed-off-by:
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Willy Tarreau authored
Luis Henriques reported that while backporting commit 40eea803 ("net: sendmsg: fix NULL pointer dereference") and applying the diff by hand, I made a typo resulting in the same test being done twice, and msg_name not being tested. This fixes cf903573 ("net: sendmsg: fix NULL pointer dereference") which was merged into 2.6.32.64. Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Cc: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 23 Nov, 2014 34 commits
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Willy Tarreau authored
Signed-off-by: -
Zhu Yanjun authored
2.6.x kernels require a similar logic change as commit 2c0d6ac894a [sctp: not send SCTP_PEER_ADDR_CHANGE notifications with failed probe] introduces for newer kernels. Since the transport has always been in state SCTP_UNCONFIRMED, it therefore wasn't active before and hasn't been used before, and it always has been, so it is unnecessary to bug the user with a notification. Reported-by:
Deepak Khandelwal <khandelwal.deepak.1987@gmail.com> Suggested-by:
Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Suggested-by:
Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de> Suggested-by:
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Zhu Yanjun <Yanjun.Zhu@windriver.com> Acked-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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Jan Kara authored
We did not check relocated directory in any way when processing Rock Ridge 'CL' tag. Thus a corrupted isofs image can possibly have a CL entry pointing to another CL entry leading to possibly unbounded recursion in kernel code and thus stack overflow or deadlocks (if there is a loop created from CL entries). Fix the problem by not allowing CL entry to point to a directory entry with CL entry (such use makes no good sense anyway) and by checking whether CL entry doesn't point to itself. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by:
Chris Evans <cevans@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> (cherry picked from commit 410dd3cf) Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
futex_wait_requeue_pi() calls futex_wait_setup(). If futex_wait_setup() succeeds it returns with hb->lock held and preemption disabled. Now the sanity check after this does: if (match_futex(&q.key, &key2)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out_put_keys; } which releases the keys but does not release hb->lock. So we happily return to user space with hb->lock held and therefor preemption disabled. Unlock hb->lock before taking the exit route. Reported-by:Dave "Trinity" Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.10.1409112318500.4178@nanosSigned-off-by:
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Rui li authored
As ZTE have and will use more pid for new products this year, so we need to add some new zte 3g-dongle's pid on option.c , and delete one pid 0x0154 because it use for mass-storage port. Signed-off-by:
Rui li <li.rui27@zte.com.cn> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Willy Tarreau authored
This fix ensures that we never meet an integer overflow while adding 255 while parsing a variable length encoding. It works differently from commit 206a81c1 ("lzo: properly check for overruns") because instead of ensuring that we don't overrun the input, which is tricky to guarantee due to many assumptions in the code, it simply checks that the cumulated number of 255 read cannot overflow by bounding this number. The MAX_255_COUNT is the maximum number of times we can add 255 to a base count without overflowing an integer. The multiply will overflow when multiplying 255 by more than MAXINT/255. The sum will overflow earlier depending on the base count. Since the base count is taken from a u8 and a few bits, it is safe to assume that it will always be lower than or equal to 2*255, thus we can always prevent any overflow by accepting two less 255 steps. This patch also reduces the CPU overhead and actually increases performance by 1.1% compared to the initial code, while the previous fix costs 3.1% (measured on x86_64). The fix needs to be backported to all currently supported stable kernels. Reported-by:
Willem Pinckaers <willem@lekkertech.net> Cc: "Don A. Bailey" <donb@securitymouse.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Willy Tarreau authored
Add a complete description of the LZO format as processed by the decompressor. I have not found a public specification of this format hence this analysis, which will be used to better understand the code. Cc: Willem Pinckaers <willem@lekkertech.net> Cc: "Don A. Bailey" <donb@securitymouse.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer authored
This commit updates the kernel LZO code to the current upsteam version which features a significant speed improvement - benchmarking the Calgary and Silesia test corpora typically shows a doubled performance in both compression and decompression on modern i386/x86_64/powerpc machines. Signed-off-by:
Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer <markus@oberhumer.com> (cherry picked from commit 8b975bd3) [wt: this update was only needed to apply the following security fixes] Signed-off-by:
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Nicolas Pitre authored
Commit 455bd4c4 ("ARM: 7668/1: fix memset-related crashes caused by recent GCC (4.7.2) optimizations") attempted to fix a compliance issue with the memset return value. However the memset itself became broken by that patch for misaligned pointers. This fixes the above by branching over the entry code from the misaligned fixup code to avoid reloading the original pointer. Also, because the function entry alignment is wrong in the Thumb mode compilation, that fixup code is moved to the end. While at it, the entry instructions are slightly reworked to help dual issue pipelines. Signed-off-by:
Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Tested-by:
Alexander Holler <holler@ahsoftware.de> Signed-off-by:
Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 418df63a) Signed-off-by:
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Ivan Djelic authored
Recent GCC versions (e.g. GCC-4.7.2) perform optimizations based on assumptions about the implementation of memset and similar functions. The current ARM optimized memset code does not return the value of its first argument, as is usually expected from standard implementations. For instance in the following function: void debug_mutex_lock_common(struct mutex *lock, struct mutex_waiter *waiter) { memset(waiter, MUTEX_DEBUG_INIT, sizeof(*waiter)); waiter->magic = waiter; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&waiter->list); } compiled as: 800554d0 <debug_mutex_lock_common>: 800554d0: e92d4008 push {r3, lr} 800554d4: e1a00001 mov r0, r1 800554d8: e3a02010 mov r2, #16 ; 0x10 800554dc: e3a01011 mov r1, #17 ; 0x11 800554e0: eb04426e bl 80165ea0 <memset> 800554e4: e1a03000 mov r3, r0 800554e8: e583000c str r0, [r3, #12] 800554ec: e5830000 str r0, [r3] 800554f0: e5830004 str r0, [r3, #4] 800554f4: e8bd8008 pop {r3, pc} GCC assumes memset returns the value of pointer 'waiter' in register r0; causing register/memory corruptions. This patch fixes the return value of the assembly version of memset. It adds a 'mov' instruction and merges an additional load+store into existing load/store instructions. For ease of review, here is a breakdown of the patch into 4 simple steps: Step 1 ====== Perform the following substitutions: ip -> r8, then r0 -> ip, and insert 'mov ip, r0' as the first statement of the function. At this point, we have a memset() implementation returning the proper result, but corrupting r8 on some paths (the ones that were using ip). Step 2 ====== Make sure r8 is saved and restored when (! CALGN(1)+0) == 1: save r8: - str lr, [sp, #-4]! + stmfd sp!, {r8, lr} and restore r8 on both exit paths: - ldmeqfd sp!, {pc} @ Now <64 bytes to go. + ldmeqfd sp!, {r8, pc} @ Now <64 bytes to go. (...) tst r2, #16 stmneia ip!, {r1, r3, r8, lr} - ldr lr, [sp], #4 + ldmfd sp!, {r8, lr} Step 3 ====== Make sure r8 is saved and restored when (! CALGN(1)+0) == 0: save r8: - stmfd sp!, {r4-r7, lr} + stmfd sp!, {r4-r8, lr} and restore r8 on both exit paths: bgt 3b - ldmeqfd sp!, {r4-r7, pc} + ldmeqfd sp!, {r4-r8, pc} (...) tst r2, #16 stmneia ip!, {r4-r7} - ldmfd sp!, {r4-r7, lr} + ldmfd sp!, {r4-r8, lr} Step 4 ====== Rewrite register list "r4-r7, r8" as "r4-r8". Signed-off-by:Ivan Djelic <ivan.djelic@parrot.com> Reviewed-by:
Dirk Behme <dirk.behme@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Christoph Schulz authored
The PPP channel MTU is used with Multilink PPP when ppp_mp_explode() (see ppp_generic module) tries to determine how big a fragment might be. According to RFC 1661, the MTU excludes the 2-byte PPP protocol field, see the corresponding comment and code in ppp_mp_explode(): /* * hdrlen includes the 2-byte PPP protocol field, but the * MTU counts only the payload excluding the protocol field. * (RFC1661 Section 2) */ mtu = pch->chan->mtu - (hdrlen - 2); However, the pppoe module *does* include the PPP protocol field in the channel MTU, which is wrong as it causes the PPP payload to be 1-2 bytes too big under certain circumstances (one byte if PPP protocol compression is used, two otherwise), causing the generated Ethernet packets to be dropped. So the pppoe module has to subtract two bytes from the channel MTU. This error only manifests itself when using Multilink PPP, as otherwise the channel MTU is not used anywhere. In the following, I will describe how to reproduce this bug. We configure two pppd instances for multilink PPP over two PPPoE links, say eth2 and eth3, with a MTU of 1492 bytes for each link and a MRRU of 2976 bytes. (This MRRU is computed by adding the two link MTUs and subtracting the MP header twice, which is 4 bytes long.) The necessary pppd statements on both sides are "multilink mtu 1492 mru 1492 mrru 2976". On the client side, we additionally need "plugin rp-pppoe.so eth2" and "plugin rp-pppoe.so eth3", respectively; on the server side, we additionally need to start two pppoe-server instances to be able to establish two PPPoE sessions, one over eth2 and one over eth3. We set the MTU of the PPP network interface to the MRRU (2976) on both sides of the connection in order to make use of the higher bandwidth. (If we didn't do that, IP fragmentation would kick in, which we want to avoid.) Now we send a ICMPv4 echo request with a payload of 2948 bytes from client to server over the PPP link. This results in the following network packet: 2948 (echo payload) + 8 (ICMPv4 header) + 20 (IPv4 header) --------------------- 2976 (PPP payload) These 2976 bytes do not exceed the MTU of the PPP network interface, so the IP packet is not fragmented. Now the multilink PPP code in ppp_mp_explode() prepends one protocol byte (0x21 for IPv4), making the packet one byte bigger than the negotiated MRRU. So this packet would have to be divided in three fragments. But this does not happen as each link MTU is assumed to be two bytes larger. So this packet is diveded into two fragments only, one of size 1489 and one of size 1488. Now we have for that bigger fragment: 1489 (PPP payload) + 4 (MP header) + 2 (PPP protocol field for the MP payload (0x3d)) + 6 (PPPoE header) -------------------------- 1501 (Ethernet payload) This packet exceeds the link MTU and is discarded. If one configures the link MTU on the client side to 1501, one can see the discarded Ethernet frames with tcpdump running on the client. A ping -s 2948 -c 1 192.168.15.254 leads to the smaller fragment that is correctly received on the server side: (tcpdump -vvvne -i eth3 pppoes and ppp proto 0x3d) 52:54:00:ad:87:fd > 52:54:00:79:5c:d0, ethertype PPPoE S (0x8864), length 1514: PPPoE [ses 0x3] MLPPP (0x003d), length 1494: seq 0x000, Flags [end], length 1492 and to the bigger fragment that is not received on the server side: (tcpdump -vvvne -i eth2 pppoes and ppp proto 0x3d) 52:54:00:70:9e:89 > 52:54:00:5d:6f:b0, ethertype PPPoE S (0x8864), length 1515: PPPoE [ses 0x5] MLPPP (0x003d), length 1495: seq 0x000, Flags [begin], length 1493 With the patch below, we correctly obtain three fragments: 52:54:00:ad:87:fd > 52:54:00:79:5c:d0, ethertype PPPoE S (0x8864), length 1514: PPPoE [ses 0x1] MLPPP (0x003d), length 1494: seq 0x000, Flags [begin], length 1492 52:54:00:70:9e:89 > 52:54:00:5d:6f:b0, ethertype PPPoE S (0x8864), length 1514: PPPoE [ses 0x1] MLPPP (0x003d), length 1494: seq 0x000, Flags [none], length 1492 52:54:00:ad:87:fd > 52:54:00:79:5c:d0, ethertype PPPoE S (0x8864), length 27: PPPoE [ses 0x1] MLPPP (0x003d), length 7: seq 0x000, Flags [end], length 5 And the ICMPv4 echo request is successfully received at the server side: IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 21925, offset 0, flags [DF], proto ICMP (1), length 2976) 192.168.222.2 > 192.168.15.254: ICMP echo request, id 30530, seq 0, length 2956 The bug was introduced in commit c9aa6895 ("[PPPOE]: Advertise PPPoE MTU") from the very beginning. This patch applies to 3.10 upwards but the fix can be applied (with minor modifications) to kernels as old as 2.6.32. Signed-off-by:Christoph Schulz <develop@kristov.de> Signed-off-by:
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NeilBrown authored
During recovery of a double-degraded RAID6 it is possible for some blocks not to be recovered properly, leading to corruption. If a write happens to one block in a stripe that would be written to a missing device, and at the same time that stripe is recovering data to the other missing device, then that recovered data may not be written. This patch skips, in the double-degraded case, an optimisation that is only safe for single-degraded arrays. Bug was introduced in 2.6.32 and fix is suitable for any kernel since then. In an older kernel with separate handle_stripe5() and handle_stripe6() functions the patch must change handle_stripe6(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (2.6.32+) Fixes: 6c0069c0 Cc: Yuri Tikhonov <yur@emcraft.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reported-by:
"Manibalan P" <pmanibalan@amiindia.co.in> Tested-by:
NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Acked-by:
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> (cherry picked from commit 9c4bdf69) Signed-off-by:
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Steven Rostedt (Red Hat) authored
When performing a consuming read, the ring buffer swaps out a page from the ring buffer with a empty page and this page that was swapped out becomes the new reader page. The reader page is owned by the reader and since it was swapped out of the ring buffer, writers do not have access to it (there's an exception to that rule, but it's out of scope for this commit). When reading the "trace" file, it is a non consuming read, which means that the data in the ring buffer will not be modified. When the trace file is opened, a ring buffer iterator is allocated and writes to the ring buffer are disabled, such that the iterator will not have issues iterating over the data. Although the ring buffer disabled writes, it does not disable other reads, or even consuming reads. If a consuming read happens, then the iterator is reset and starts reading from the beginning again. My tests would sometimes trigger this bug on my i386 box: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5175 at kernel/trace/trace.c:1527 __trace_find_cmdline+0x66/0xaa() Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 5175 Comm: grep Not tainted 3.16.0-rc3-test+ #8 Hardware name: /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006 00000000 00000000 f09c9e1c c18796b3 c1b5d74c f09c9e4c c103a0e3 c1b5154b f09c9e78 00001437 c1b5d74c 000005f7 c10bd85a c10bd85a c1cac57c f09c9eb0 ed0e0000 f09c9e64 c103a185 00000009 f09c9e5c c1b5154b f09c9e78 f09c9e80^M Call Trace: [<c18796b3>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x75 [<c103a0e3>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7e/0x95 [<c10bd85a>] ? __trace_find_cmdline+0x66/0xaa [<c10bd85a>] ? __trace_find_cmdline+0x66/0xaa [<c103a185>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x33/0x35 [<c10bd85a>] __trace_find_cmdline+0x66/0xaa^M [<c10bed04>] trace_find_cmdline+0x40/0x64 [<c10c3c16>] trace_print_context+0x27/0xec [<c10c4360>] ? trace_seq_printf+0x37/0x5b [<c10c0b15>] print_trace_line+0x319/0x39b [<c10ba3fb>] ? ring_buffer_read+0x47/0x50 [<c10c13b1>] s_show+0x192/0x1ab [<c10bfd9a>] ? s_next+0x5a/0x7c [<c112e76e>] seq_read+0x267/0x34c [<c1115a25>] vfs_read+0x8c/0xef [<c112e507>] ? seq_lseek+0x154/0x154 [<c1115ba2>] SyS_read+0x54/0x7f [<c188488e>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb ---[ end trace 3f507febd6b4cc83 ]--- >>>> ##### CPU 1 buffer started #### Which was the __trace_find_cmdline() function complaining about the pid in the event record being negative. After adding more test cases, this would trigger more often. Strangely enough, it would never trigger on a single test, but instead would trigger only when running all the tests. I believe that was the case because it required one of the tests to be shutting down via delayed instances while a new test started up. After spending several days debugging this, I found that it was caused by the iterator becoming corrupted. Debugging further, I found out why the iterator became corrupted. It happened with the rb_iter_reset(). As consuming reads may not read the full reader page, and only part of it, there's a "read" field to know where the last read took place. The iterator, must also start at the read position. In the rb_iter_reset() code, if the reader page was disconnected from the ring buffer, the iterator would start at the head page within the ring buffer (where writes still happen). But the mistake there was that it still used the "read" field to start the iterator on the head page, where it should always start at zero because readers never read from within the ring buffer where writes occur. I originally wrote a patch to have it set the iter->head to 0 instead of iter->head_page->read, but then I questioned why it wasn't always setting the iter to point to the reader page, as the reader page is still valid. The list_empty(reader_page->list) just means that it was successful in swapping out. But the reader_page may still have data. There was a bug report a long time ago that was not reproducible that had something about trace_pipe (consuming read) not matching trace (iterator read). This may explain why that happened. Anyway, the correct answer to this bug is to always use the reader page an not reset the iterator to inside the writable ring buffer. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d769041f "ring_buffer: implement new locking" Signed-off-by:
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> (cherry picked from commit 651e22f2) [wt: 2.6.32 has no cache{,_read} member in struct ring_buffer_iter ] Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
don't try to queue payloads > 0xffff - NLA_HDRLEN, it does not work. The nla length includes the size of the nla struct, so anything larger results in u16 integer overflow. This patch is similar to 9cefbbc9 (netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: cleanup copy_range usage). Signed-off-by:
Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by:
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> (cherry picked from commit c1e7dc91) Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
We currently neither account for the nlattr size, nor do we consider the size of the trailing NLMSG_DONE when allocating nlmsg skb. This can result in nflog to stop working, as __nfulnl_send() re-tries sending forever if it failed to append NLMSG_DONE (which will never work if buffer is not large enough). Reported-by:
Houcheng Lin <houcheng@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Peter Hurley authored
Kernel oops can cause the tty to be unreleaseable (for example, if n_tty_read() crashes while on the read_wait queue). This will cause tty_release() to endlessly loop without sleeping. Use a killable sleep timeout which grows by 2n+1 jiffies over the interval [0, 120 secs.) and then jumps to forever (but still killable). NB: killable just allows for the task to be rewoken manually, not to be terminated. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
Commit 6f4c618d ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82b ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by:
Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
we used to check for "nobody else could start doing anything with that opened file" by checking that refcount was 2 or less - one for descriptor table and one we'd acquired in fget() on the way to wherever we are. That was race-prone (somebody else might have had a reference to descriptor table and do fget() just as we'd been checking) and it had become flat-out incorrect back when we switched to fget_light() on those codepaths - unlike fget(), it doesn't grab an extra reference unless the descriptor table is shared. The same change allowed a race-free check, though - we are safe exactly when refcount is less than 2. It was a long time ago; pre-2.6.12 for ioctl() (the codepath leading to ppp one) and 2.6.17 for sendmsg() (netlink one). OTOH, netlink hadn't grown that check until 3.9 and ppp used to live in drivers/net, not drivers/net/ppp until 3.1. The bug existed well before that, though, and the same fix used to apply in old location of file. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 24dff96a) [wt: apply to drivers/net/ppp_generic.c only] Signed-off-by:
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Johan Hovold authored
Write may be called from interrupt context so make sure to use GFP_ATOMIC for all allocations in write. Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 19125283) Signed-off-by:
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Zhu Yanjun authored
2.6.x kernels require a similar logic change as commit 51b8cbfc [gianfar: fix bug caused by e1653c3e] introduces for newer kernels. Gianfar driver originally enables vlan tag insertion by default. This will lead to unusable connections on some configurations. Since gianfar nic vlan tag insertion is disabled by default and it is not enabled any longer, it is not necessary to disable it again. Reported-by:
Xu Jianrong <roy.xu@huawei.com> Suggested-by:
Wang Feng <sky.wangfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mikulas Patocka authored
commit d49ec52f upstream The DM crypt target accesses memory beyond allocated space resulting in a crash on 32 bit x86 systems. This bug is very old (it dates back to 2.6.25 commit 3a7f6c99 "dm crypt: use async crypto"). However, this bug was masked by the fact that kmalloc rounds the size up to the next power of two. This bug wasn't exposed until 3.17-rc1 commit 298a9fa0 ("dm crypt: use per-bio data"). By switching to using per-bio data there was no longer any padding beyond the end of a dm-crypt allocated memory block. To minimize allocation overhead dm-crypt puts several structures into one block allocated with kmalloc. The block holds struct ablkcipher_request, cipher-specific scratch pad (crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(any_tfm(cc))), struct dm_crypt_request and an initialization vector. The variable dmreq_start is set to offset of struct dm_crypt_request within this memory block. dm-crypt allocates the block with this size: cc->dmreq_start + sizeof(struct dm_crypt_request) + cc->iv_size. When accessing the initialization vector, dm-crypt uses the function iv_of_dmreq, which performs this calculation: ALIGN((unsigned long)(dmreq + 1), crypto_ablkcipher_alignmask(any_tfm(cc)) + 1). dm-crypt allocated "cc->iv_size" bytes beyond the end of dm_crypt_request structure. However, when dm-crypt accesses the initialization vector, it takes a pointer to the end of dm_crypt_request, aligns it, and then uses it as the initialization vector. If the end of dm_crypt_request is not aligned on a crypto_ablkcipher_alignmask(any_tfm(cc)) boundary the alignment causes the initialization vector to point beyond the allocated space. Fix this bug by calculating the variable iv_size_padding and adding it to the allocated size. Also correct the alignment of dm_crypt_request. struct dm_crypt_request is specific to dm-crypt (it isn't used by the crypto subsystem at all), so it is aligned on __alignof__(struct dm_crypt_request). Signed-off-by:
Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> [wt: minor context adaptations, hopefully ok] Signed-off-by:
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Willy Tarreau authored
This reverts commit 63d059e7. On Wed, Sep 03, 2014 at 11:28:43AM +1000, NeilBrown wrote: > > 2.6.32.30 contains: > > commit 63d059e7 > Author: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> > Date: Wed Feb 16 13:08:35 2011 +1100 > > nfsd: correctly handle return value from nfsd_map_name_to_* > > commit 47c85291 upstream. > > These functions return an nfs status, not a host_err. So don't > try to convert before returning. > > This is a regression introduced by > 3c726023; I fixed up two of the callers, > but missed these two. > > Reported-by: Herbert Poetzl <herbert@13thfloor.at> > Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> > Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> > Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> > > > But it does *not* contain a backport of > 3c726023. > > So rather an fixing a regression, it introduces one. > > This patch should be reverted. > > See also https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=893787 > > NeilBrown Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 757efd32 ] Dave reported following splat, caused by improper use of IP_INC_STATS_BH() in process context. BUG: using __this_cpu_add() in preemptible [00000000] code: trinity-c117/14551 caller is __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20 CPU: 3 PID: 14551 Comm: trinity-c117 Not tainted 3.16.0+ #33 ffffffff9ec898f0 0000000047ea7e23 ffff88022d32f7f0 ffffffff9e7ee207 0000000000000003 ffff88022d32f818 ffffffff9e397eaa ffff88023ee70b40 ffff88022d32f970 ffff8801c026d580 ffff88022d32f828 ffffffff9e397ee3 Call Trace: [<ffffffff9e7ee207>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x7a [<ffffffff9e397eaa>] check_preemption_disabled+0xfa/0x100 [<ffffffff9e397ee3>] __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20 [<ffffffffc0839872>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x692/0x710 [sctp] [<ffffffffc082a7f2>] sctp_outq_flush+0x2a2/0xc30 [sctp] [<ffffffff9e0d985c>] ? mark_held_locks+0x7c/0xb0 [<ffffffff9e7f8c6d>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x5d/0x80 [<ffffffffc082b99a>] sctp_outq_uncork+0x1a/0x20 [sctp] [<ffffffffc081e112>] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.23+0x1142/0x13f0 [sctp] [<ffffffffc081c86b>] sctp_do_sm+0xdb/0x330 [sctp] [<ffffffff9e0b8f1b>] ? preempt_count_sub+0xab/0x100 [<ffffffffc083b350>] ? sctp_cname+0x70/0x70 [sctp] [<ffffffffc08389ca>] sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE+0x3a/0x50 [sctp] [<ffffffffc083358f>] sctp_sendmsg+0x88f/0xe30 [sctp] [<ffffffff9e0d673a>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.28+0x9a/0x160 [<ffffffff9e0d62ce>] ? put_lock_stats.isra.27+0xe/0x30 [<ffffffff9e73b624>] inet_sendmsg+0x104/0x220 [<ffffffff9e73b525>] ? inet_sendmsg+0x5/0x220 [<ffffffff9e68ac4e>] sock_sendmsg+0x9e/0xe0 [<ffffffff9e1c0c09>] ? might_fault+0xb9/0xc0 [<ffffffff9e1c0bae>] ? might_fault+0x5e/0xc0 [<ffffffff9e68b234>] SYSC_sendto+0x124/0x1c0 [<ffffffff9e0136b0>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x250/0x330 [<ffffffff9e68c3ce>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff9e7f9be4>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2 This is a followup of commits f1d8cba6 ("inet: fix possible seqlock deadlocks") and 7f88c6b2 ("ipv6: fix possible seqlock deadlock in ip6_finish_output2") Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Reported-by:
Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by:
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Sasha Levin authored
[ Upstream commit 06ebb06d ] Check for cases when the caller requests 0 bytes instead of running off and dereferencing potentially invalid iovecs. Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Vlad Yasevich authored
[ Upstream commit fcdfe3a7 ] When performing segmentation, the mac_len value is copied right out of the original skb. However, this value is not always set correctly (like when the packet is VLAN-tagged) and we'll end up copying a bad value. One way to demonstrate this is to configure a VM which tags packets internally and turn off VLAN acceleration on the forwarding bridge port. The packets show up corrupt like this: 16:18:24.985548 52:54:00:ab:be:25 > 52:54:00:26:ce:a3, ethertype 802.1Q (0x8100), length 1518: vlan 100, p 0, ethertype 0x05e0, 0x0000: 8cdb 1c7c 8cdb 0064 4006 b59d 0a00 6402 ...|...d@.....d. 0x0010: 0a00 6401 9e0d b441 0a5e 64ec 0330 14fa ..d....A.^d..0.. 0x0020: 29e3 01c9 f871 0000 0101 080a 000a e833)....q.........3 0x0030: 000f 8c75 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 ...unetperf.netp 0x0040: 6572 6600 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 erf.netperf.netp 0x0050: 6572 6600 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 erf.netperf.netp 0x0060: 6572 6600 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 erf.netperf.netp ... This also leads to awful throughput as GSO packets are dropped and cause retransmissions. The solution is to set the mac_len using the values already available in then new skb. We've already adjusted all of the header offset, so we might as well correctly figure out the mac_len using skb_reset_mac_len(). After this change, packets are segmented correctly and performance is restored. CC: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Vlad Yasevich authored
[ Upstream commit 081e83a7 ] Macvlan devices do not initialize vlan_features. As a result, any vlan devices configured on top of macvlans perform very poorly. Initialize vlan_features based on the vlan features of the lower-level device. Signed-off-by:
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Christoph Paasch authored
[ Upstream commit 1f74e613 ] In vegas we do a multiplication of the cwnd and the rtt. This may overflow and thus their result is stored in a u64. However, we first need to cast the cwnd so that actually 64-bit arithmetic is done. Then, we need to do do_div to allow this to be used on 32-bit arches. Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM> Cc: Doug Leith <doug.leith@nuim.ie> Fixes: 8d3a564d (tcp: tcp_vegas cong avoid fix) Signed-off-by:
Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be> Signed-off-by:
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Christoph Paasch authored
[ Upstream commit 45a07695 ] In veno we do a multiplication of the cwnd and the rtt. This may overflow and thus their result is stored in a u64. However, we first need to cast the cwnd so that actually 64-bit arithmetic is done. A first attempt at fixing 76f10177 ([TCP]: TCP Veno congestion control) was made by 15913114 (tcp: Overflow bug in Vegas), but it failed to add the required cast in tcp_veno_cong_avoid(). Fixes: 76f10177 ([TCP]: TCP Veno congestion control) Signed-off-by:
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Andrey Ryabinin authored
[ Upstream commit 40eea803 ] Sasha's report: > While fuzzing with trinity inside a KVM tools guest running the latest -next > kernel with the KASAN patchset, I've stumbled on the following spew: > > [ 4448.949424] ================================================================== > [ 4448.951737] AddressSanitizer: user-memory-access on address 0 > [ 4448.952988] Read of size 2 by thread T19638: > [ 4448.954510] CPU: 28 PID: 19638 Comm: trinity-c76 Not tainted 3.16.0-rc4-next-20140711-sasha-00046-g07d3099-dirty #813 > [ 4448.956823] ffff88046d86ca40 0000000000000000 ffff880082f37e78 ffff880082f37a40 > [ 4448.958233] ffffffffb6e47068 ffff880082f37a68 ffff880082f37a58 ffffffffb242708d > [ 4448.959552] 0000000000000000 ffff880082f37a88 ffffffffb24255b1 0000000000000000 > [ 4448.961266] Call Trace: > [ 4448.963158] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52) > [ 4448.964244] kasan_report_user_access (mm/kasan/report.c:184) > [ 4448.965507] __asan_load2 (mm/kasan/kasan.c:352) > [ 4448.966482] ? netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2339) > [ 4448.967541] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2339) > [ 4448.968537] ? get_parent_ip (kernel/sched/core.c:2555) > [ 4448.970103] sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:654) > [ 4448.971584] ? might_fault (mm/memory.c:3741) > [ 4448.972526] ? might_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14 mm/memory.c:3740) > [ 4448.973596] ? verify_iovec (net/core/iovec.c:64) > [ 4448.974522] ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2096) > [ 4448.975797] ? put_lock_stats.isra.13 (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:98 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:254) > [ 4448.977030] ? lock_release_holdtime (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:273) > [ 4448.978197] ? lock_release_non_nested (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3434 (discriminator 1)) > [ 4448.979346] ? check_chain_key (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2188) > [ 4448.980535] __sys_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2181) > [ 4448.981592] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2600) > [ 4448.982773] ? trace_hardirqs_on (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2607) > [ 4448.984458] ? syscall_trace_enter (arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:1500 (discriminator 2)) > [ 4448.985621] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2600) > [ 4448.986754] SyS_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2201) > [ 4448.987708] tracesys (arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:542) > [ 4448.988929] ================================================================== This reports means that we've come to netlink_sendmsg() with msg->msg_name == NULL and msg->msg_namelen > 0. After this report there was no usual "Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference" and this gave me a clue that address 0 is mapped and contains valid socket address structure in it. This bug was introduced in f3d33426 (net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic). Commit message states that: "Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the address." But in fact this affects sendto when address 0 is mapped and contains socket address structure in it. In such case copy-in address will succeed, verify_iovec() function will successfully exit with msg->msg_namelen > 0 and msg->msg_name == NULL. This patch fixes it by setting msg_namelen to 0 if msg_name == NULL. Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by:
Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com> Acked-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit 1be9a950 ] Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with SCTP authentication enabled: Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1 task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000 PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38 pc : [<c024bb80>] lr : [<c00f32dc>] psr: 40000013 sp : c6f538e8 ip : 00000000 fp : c6f53924 r10: c6f50d80 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00010000 r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7be4000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c6f56254 r3 : c00c8170 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000008 r0 : c6f1e660 Flags: nZcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user Control: 0005397f Table: 06f28000 DAC: 00000015 Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0) Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000) [...] Backtrace: [<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8) [<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844) [<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28) [<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220) [<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4) [<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160) [<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74) [<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888) While we already had various kind of bugs in that area ec0223ec ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878cc ("net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different kind. Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is needed can be found in RFC4895: SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against blind attackers. These values are not changed during the lifetime of an SCTP association. Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by the original peer that started the association and not by a malicious attacker. To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO parameters that are being negotiated among peers: ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ----------> <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] --------- -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random number and the peer's random number *after* the association has been established. The local and peer's random number along with the shared key are then part of the secret used for calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk. Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other, thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.: ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ----------> <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] --------- <--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ----------- -------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] --------> ... Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags, the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1: In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random Number and the peer's Random Number after the association has been established. In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B: B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an association at about the same time but the peer endpoint started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint. The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may running and send a COOKIE ACK. In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in Action B of section 5.2.4. Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b() case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created association to update the existing one. Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated. However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK). That in fact causes the server side when responding with ... <------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK ----------------- ... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(). Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key and dereferences it in ... crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len) ... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack() called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1 and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks in that case are not sent by the temporary association which are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the *updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state), since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init() was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually throw away each time. The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(), so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic. Fixes: 730fc3d0 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing") Reported-by:
Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 10ec9472 ] There is a benign buffer overflow in ip_options_compile spotted by AddressSanitizer[1] : Its benign because we always can access one extra byte in skb->head (because header is followed by struct skb_shared_info), and in this case this byte is not even used. [28504.910798] ================================================================== [28504.912046] AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow in ip_options_compile [28504.913170] Read of size 1 by thread T15843: [28504.914026] [<ffffffff81802f91>] ip_options_compile+0x121/0x9c0 [28504.915394] [<ffffffff81804a0d>] ip_options_get_from_user+0xad/0x120 [28504.916843] [<ffffffff8180dedf>] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.15+0x8df/0x1630 [28504.918175] [<ffffffff8180ec60>] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0 [28504.919490] [<ffffffff8181e59b>] tcp_setsockopt+0x5b/0x90 [28504.920835] [<ffffffff8177462f>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x5f/0x70 [28504.922208] [<ffffffff817729c2>] SyS_setsockopt+0xa2/0x140 [28504.923459] [<ffffffff818cfb69>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [28504.924722] [28504.925106] Allocated by thread T15843: [28504.925815] [<ffffffff81804995>] ip_options_get_from_user+0x35/0x120 [28504.926884] [<ffffffff8180dedf>] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.15+0x8df/0x1630 [28504.927975] [<ffffffff8180ec60>] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0 [28504.929175] [<ffffffff8181e59b>] tcp_setsockopt+0x5b/0x90 [28504.930400] [<ffffffff8177462f>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x5f/0x70 [28504.931677] [<ffffffff817729c2>] SyS_setsockopt+0xa2/0x140 [28504.932851] [<ffffffff818cfb69>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [28504.934018] [28504.934377] The buggy address ffff880026382828 is located 0 bytes to the right [28504.934377] of 40-byte region [ffff880026382800, ffff880026382828) [28504.937144] [28504.937474] Memory state around the buggy address: [28504.938430] ffff880026382300: ........ rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28504.939884] ffff880026382400: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28504.941294] ffff880026382500: .....rrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28504.942504] ffff880026382600: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28504.943483] ffff880026382700: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28504.944511] >ffff880026382800: .....rrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28504.945573] ^ [28504.946277] ffff880026382900: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28505.094949] ffff880026382a00: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28505.096114] ffff880026382b00: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28505.097116] ffff880026382c00: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28505.098472] ffff880026382d00: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28505.099804] Legend: [28505.100269] f - 8 freed bytes [28505.100884] r - 8 redzone bytes [28505.101649] . - 8 allocated bytes [28505.102406] x=1..7 - x allocated bytes + (8-x) redzone bytes [28505.103637] ================================================================== [1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernelSigned-off-by:
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Sowmini Varadhan authored
[ Upstream commit a4b70a07 ] Nothing cleans up the objects created by vnet_new(), they are completely leaked. vnet_exit(), after doing the vio_unregister_driver() to clean up ports, should call a helper function that iterates over vnet_list and cleans up those objects. This includes unregister_netdevice() as well as free_netdev(). Signed-off-by:
Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com> Acked-by:
Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Karl Volz <karl.volz@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit 8f2e5ae4 ] While working on some other SCTP code, I noticed that some structures shared with user space are leaking uninitialized stack or heap buffer. In particular, struct sctp_sndrcvinfo has a 2 bytes hole between .sinfo_flags and .sinfo_ppid that remains unfilled by us in sctp_ulpevent_read_sndrcvinfo() when putting this into cmsg. But also struct sctp_remote_error contains a 2 bytes hole that we don't fill but place into a skb through skb_copy_expand() via sctp_ulpevent_make_remote_error(). Both structures are defined by the IETF in RFC6458: * Section 5.3.2. SCTP Header Information Structure: The sctp_sndrcvinfo structure is defined below: struct sctp_sndrcvinfo { uint16_t sinfo_stream; uint16_t sinfo_ssn; uint16_t sinfo_flags; <-- 2 bytes hole --> uint32_t sinfo_ppid; uint32_t sinfo_context; uint32_t sinfo_timetolive; uint32_t sinfo_tsn; uint32_t sinfo_cumtsn; sctp_assoc_t sinfo_assoc_id; }; * 6.1.3. SCTP_REMOTE_ERROR: A remote peer may send an Operation Error message to its peer. This message indicates a variety of error conditions on an association. The entire ERROR chunk as it appears on the wire is included in an SCTP_REMOTE_ERROR event. Please refer to the SCTP specification [RFC4960] and any extensions for a list of possible error formats. An SCTP error notification has the following format: struct sctp_remote_error { uint16_t sre_type; uint16_t sre_flags; uint32_t sre_length; uint16_t sre_error; <-- 2 bytes hole --> sctp_assoc_t sre_assoc_id; uint8_t sre_data[]; }; Fix this by setting both to 0 before filling them out. We also have other structures shared between user and kernel space in SCTP that contains holes (e.g. struct sctp_paddrthlds), but we copy that buffer over from user space first and thus don't need to care about it in that cases. While at it, we can also remove lengthy comments copied from the draft, instead, we update the comment with the correct RFC number where one can look it up. Signed-off-by:
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Andrey Utkin authored
[ Upstream commit 36beddc2 ] Setting just skb->sk without taking its reference and setting a destructor is invalid. However, in the places where this was done, skb is used in a way not requiring skb->sk setting. So dropping the setting of skb->sk. Thanks to Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> for correct solution. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=79441Reported-by:
Ed Martin <edman007@edman007.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrey Utkin <andrey.krieger.utkin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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