- 07 May, 2019 13 commits
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Eduardo Habkost authored
Months ago, we have added code to allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL to the guest, which makes STIBP available to guests. This was implemented by commits d28b387f ("KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL") and b2ac58f9 ("KVM/SVM: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL"). However, we never updated GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID to let userspace know that STIBP can be enabled in CPUID. Fix that by updating kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features and kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features. Signed-off-by:
Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> CVE-2018-12126 CVE-2018-12127 CVE-2018-12130 (backported from commit d7b09c82) [juergh: Adjusted context.] Signed-off-by:
Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Peter Zijlstra authored
Going primarily by: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Intel_Atom_microprocessors with additional information gleaned from other related pages; notably: - Bonnell shrink was called Saltwell - Moorefield is the Merriefield refresh which makes it Airmont The general naming scheme is: FAM6_ATOM_UARCH_SOCTYPE for i in `git grep -l FAM6_ATOM` ; do sed -i -e 's/ATOM_PINEVIEW/ATOM_BONNELL/g' \ -e 's/ATOM_LINCROFT/ATOM_BONNELL_MID/' \ -e 's/ATOM_PENWELL/ATOM_SALTWELL_MID/g' \ -e 's/ATOM_CLOVERVIEW/ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET/g' \ -e 's/ATOM_CEDARVIEW/ATOM_SALTWELL/g' \ -e 's/ATOM_SILVERMONT1/ATOM_SILVERMONT/g' \ -e 's/ATOM_SILVERMONT2/ATOM_SILVERMONT_X/g' \ -e 's/ATOM_MERRIFIELD/ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID/g' \ -e 's/ATOM_MOOREFIELD/ATOM_AIRMONT_MID/g' \ -e 's/ATOM_DENVERTON/ATOM_GOLDMONT_X/g' \ -e 's/ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE/ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS/g' ${i} done Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Cc: len.brown@intel.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> CVE-2018-12126 CVE-2018-12127 CVE-2018-12130 (backported from commit f2c4db1b) [juergh: - Adjusted context. - Dropped changes to non-existing files. - Fixed a few more places that only exist in Xenial 4.4. - Ran the loop above to verify that all the old macros where replaced.] Signed-off-by:
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Dominik Brodowski authored
Only CPUs which speculate can speculate. Therefore, it seems prudent to test for cpu_no_speculation first and only then determine whether a specific speculating CPU is susceptible to store bypass speculation. This is underlined by all CPUs currently listed in cpu_no_speculation were present in cpu_no_spec_store_bypass as well. Signed-off-by:
Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@suse.de Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180522090539.GA24668@light.dominikbrodowski.net CVE-2018-12126 CVE-2018-12127 CVE-2018-12130 (backported from commit 8ecc4979) [juergh: Adjusted context.] Signed-off-by:
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Kan Liang authored
Goldmont, Glodmont plus and Xeon Phi have MSR_SMI_COUNT as well. Signed-off-by:
Kan Liang <Kan.liang@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Juerg Haefliger authored
There are a few more places in Xenial 4.4 that still use open-coded magic numbers instead of the new model name macros. Fix that. CVE-2018-12126 CVE-2018-12127 CVE-2018-12130 Signed-off-by:
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Dave Hansen authored
This patch presumes that Kabylake and Skylake Server will be the same as the existing Skylake parts and adds them to the MSR events code. Also add handling for "WESTMERE2". Signed-off-by:
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: jacob.jun.pan@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160603001935.FE6B3847@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by:
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Dave Hansen authored
Use the new INTEL_MODEL_* macros for arch/x86/events/msr.c. This code appears to be missing handling for "WESTMERE2" and "SKYLAKE_X". Signed-off-by:
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Dave Hansen authored
Use the new model number macros instead of spelling things out in the comments. Note that this is missing a Nehalem model that is mentioned in intel_idle which is fixed up in a later patch. The resulting binary (arch/x86/events/intel/core.o) is exactly the same with and without this patch modulo some harmless changes to restoring %esi in the return path of functions, even those untouched by this patch. Signed-off-by:
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Andi Kleen authored
Everything the same as Skylake, just new model numbers. Signed-off-by:
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Andi Kleen authored
Everything the same as base Skylake, just a new model number. Signed-off-by:
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Salvatore Bonaccorso authored
Fix small typo (wiil -> will) in the "3.4. Nested virtual machines" section. Fixes: 5b76a3cf ("KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry") Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: trivial@kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Signed-off-by:
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> CVE-2018-12126 CVE-2018-12127 CVE-2018-12130 (cherry picked from commit 60ca05c3) Signed-off-by:
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Stefan Bader authored
Ignore: yes Signed-off-by: -
Stefan Bader authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1786013Signed-off-by:
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- 23 Apr, 2019 27 commits
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Connor Kuehl authored
Signed-off-by:Connor Kuehl <connor.kuehl@canonical.com>
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Connor Kuehl authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1826036Signed-off-by:
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Connor Kuehl authored
Ignore: yes Signed-off-by: -
Connor Kuehl authored
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1786013Signed-off-by:
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1820872 This reverts commit 6cfb521a. Turns out distros do not want to make retpoline as part of their "ABI", so this patch should not have been merged. Sorry Andi, this was my fault, I suggested it when your original patch was the "correct" way of doing this instead. Reported-by:
Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Fixes: 6cfb521a ("module: Add retpoline tag to VERMAGIC") Acked-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> (backported from commit 5132ede0) [juergh: Adjusted context.] Signed-off-by:
Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com> Acked-by:
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Juerg Haefliger authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1820872 Trivial changes to reduce the delta between Xenial 4.4 and upstream stable 4.9 so that future cherry-picking results in fewer conflicts. Signed-off-by:
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Juerg Haefliger authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1820872 Fixes: bb807b84 ("UBUNTU: SAUCE: x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation") Signed-off-by:
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Juerg Haefliger authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1820872 Add 'nosmt' which was omitted in the original backport. Fixes: df8ddbcb ("cpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMT") Signed-off-by:
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
dev is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c:626 snd_seq_oss_synth_make_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'dp->synths' [w] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing dev before using it to index dp->synths. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> CVE-2017-5753 (cherry picked from commit c709f14f) Signed-off-by:
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
info->stream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/core/rawmidi.c:604 __snd_rawmidi_info_select() warn: potential spectre issue 'rmidi->streams' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing info->stream before using it to index rmidi->streams. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Johannes Berg authored
It's possible that the caller of cfg80211_classify8021d() uses the value to index an array, like mac80211 in ieee80211_downgrade_queue(). Prevent speculation on the return value. Signed-off-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Breno Leitao authored
'regno' is directly controlled by user space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. On PTRACE_SETREGS and PTRACE_GETREGS requests, user space passes the register number that would be read or written. This register number is called 'regno' which is part of the 'addr' syscall parameter. This 'regno' value is checked against the maximum pt_regs structure size, and then used to dereference it, which matches the initial part of a Spectre v1 (and Spectre v1.1) attack. The dereferenced value, then, is returned to userspace in the GETREGS case. This patch sanitizes 'regno' before using it to dereference pt_reg. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2Signed-off-by:
Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> Acked-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> CVE-2017-5753 (backported from commit ebb0e13e) [juergh: Adjusted context.] Signed-off-by:
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
channel and addr->channel are indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. These issues were detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1381 ipmi_set_my_address() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [w] (local cap) drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1401 ipmi_get_my_address() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [r] (local cap) drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1421 ipmi_set_my_LUN() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [w] (local cap) drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:1441 ipmi_get_my_LUN() warn: potential spectre issue 'user->intf->addrinfo' [r] (local cap) drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c:2260 check_addr() warn: potential spectre issue 'intf->addrinfo' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing channel and addr->channel before using them to index user->intf->addrinfo and intf->addrinfo, correspondingly. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com> CVE-2017-5753 (backported from commit a7102c74) [juergh: Adjused context.] Signed-off-by:
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Masashi Honma authored
Use array_index_nospec() to sanitize ridx with respect to speculation. Signed-off-by:
Masashi Honma <masashi.honma@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jinbum Park authored
User controls @idx which to be used as index of hwsim_world_regdom_custom. So, It can be exploited via Spectre-like attack. (speculative execution) This kind of attack leaks address of hwsim_world_regdom_custom, It leads an attacker to bypass security mechanism such as KASLR. So sanitize @idx before using it to prevent attack. I leveraged strategy [1] to find and exploit this gadget. [1] https://github.com/jinb-park/linux-exploit/tree/master/exploit-remaining-spectre-gadget/Signed-off-by:
Jinbum Park <jinb.park7@gmail.com> [johannes: unwrap URL] Signed-off-by:
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
val can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: vers/hwmon/nct6775.c:2698 store_pwm_weight_temp_sel() warn: potential spectre issue 'data->temp_src' [r] Fix this by sanitizing val before using it to index data->temp_src Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> CVE-2017-5753 (backported from commit d49dbfad) [juergh: Adjusted context.] Signed-off-by:
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Jeremy Cline authored
req->sdiag_family is a user-controlled value that's used as an array index. Sanitize it after the bounds check to avoid speculative out-of-bounds array access. This also protects the sock_is_registered() call, so this removes the sanitize call there. Fixes: e978de7a ("net: socket: Fix potential spectre v1 gadget in sock_is_registered") Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com Cc: jamie.iles@oracle.com Cc: liran.alon@oracle.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CVE-2017-5753 (backported from commit 66b51b0a) [juergh: Adjusted for missing sock_is_registered().] Signed-off-by:
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Jeremy Cline authored
'family' can be a user-controlled value, so sanitize it after the bounds check to avoid speculative out-of-bounds access. Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Jinbum Park authored
User controls @dev_minor which to be used as index of pkt_devs. So, It can be exploited via Spectre-like attack. (speculative execution) This kind of attack leaks address of pkt_devs, [1] It leads an attacker to bypass security mechanism such as KASLR. So sanitize @dev_minor before using it to prevent attack. [1] https://github.com/jinb-park/linux-exploit/ tree/master/exploit-remaining-spectre-gadget/leak_pkt_devs.c Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> CVE-2017-5753 (backported from commit 55690c07) [juergh: Adjusted context.] Signed-off-by:
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Mark Rutland authored
It's possible for userspace to control idx. Sanitize idx when using it as an array index, to inhibit the potential spectre-v1 write gadget. Found by smatch. Signed-off-by:
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> CVE-2017-5753 (cherry picked from commit 14d6e289) Signed-off-by:
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Martin Schwidefsky authored
The kbd_ioctl uses two user controlled indexes for KDGKBENT/KDSKBENT. Use array_index_nospec to prevent any out of bounds speculation. Signed-off-by:
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> CVE-2017-5753 (cherry picked from commit 05473283) Signed-off-by:
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Mauro Carvalho Chehab authored
slot can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability, as warned by smatch: drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_ca_en50221.c:1479 dvb_ca_en50221_io_write() warn: potential spectre issue 'ca->slot_info' (local cap) Acked-by:
"Jasmin J." <jasmin@anw.at> Signed-off-by:
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> CVE-2017-5753 (backported from commit 4f5ab5d7) [juergh: - Adjusted context. - Folded in a24e6348 ("media: dvb_ca_en50221: sanity check slot number from userspace").] Signed-off-by:
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Peter Zijlstra authored
> kernel/sched/autogroup.c:230 proc_sched_autogroup_set_nice() warn: potential spectre issue 'sched_prio_to_weight' Userspace controls @nice, sanitize the array index. Reported-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mark Rutland authored
It's possible for userspace to control idx. Sanitize idx when using it as an array index. Found by smatch. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
The clockid argument of clockid_to_kclock() comes straight from user space via various syscalls and is used as index into the posix_clocks array. Protect it against spectre v1 array out of bounds speculation. Remove the redundant check for !posix_clock[id] as this is another source for speculation and does not provide any advantage over the return posix_clock[id] path which returns NULL in that case anyway. Signed-off-by:
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1802151718320.1296@nanos.tec.linutronix.de CVE-2017-5753 (backported from commit 19b558db) [juergh: Context adjustments.] Signed-off-by:
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Xin Long authored
sk_forward_alloc's updating is also done on rx path, but to be consistent we change to use sk_mem_charge() in sctp_skb_set_owner_r(). In sctp_eat_data(), it's not enough to check sctp_memory_pressure only, which doesn't work for mem_cgroup_sockets_enabled, so we change to use sk_under_memory_pressure(). When it's under memory pressure, sk_mem_reclaim() and sk_rmem_schedule() should be called on both RENEGE or CHUNK DELIVERY path exit the memory pressure status as soon as possible. Note that sk_rmem_schedule() is using datalen to make things easy there. Reported-by:
Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Tested-by:
Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by:
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Xin Long authored
Now when sending packets, sk_mem_charge() and sk_mem_uncharge() have been used to set sk_forward_alloc. We just need to call sk_wmem_schedule() to check if the allocated should be raised, and call sk_mem_reclaim() to check if the allocated should be reduced when it's under memory pressure. If sk_wmem_schedule() returns false, which means no memory is allowed to allocate, it will block and wait for memory to become available. Note different from tcp, sctp wait_for_buf happens before allocating any skb, so memory accounting check is done with the whole msg_len before it too. Reported-by:
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