- 20 Aug, 2019 9 commits
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Christophe Leroy authored
We see warnings such as: kernel/futex.c: In function 'do_futex': kernel/futex.c:1676:17: warning: 'oldval' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized] return oldval == cmparg; ^ kernel/futex.c:1651:6: note: 'oldval' was declared here int oldval, ret; ^ This is because arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser() only sets *oval if ret is 0 and GCC doesn't see that it will only use it when ret is 0. Anyway, the non-zero ret path is an error path that won't suffer from setting *oval, and as *oval is a local var in futex_atomic_op_inuser() it will have no impact. Signed-off-by:Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> [mpe: reword change log slightly] Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/86b72f0c134367b214910b27b9a6dd3321af93bb.1565774657.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
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Christophe Leroy authored
When loading modules, from time to time an Oops is encountered during the init of shadow area for globals. This is due to the last page not always being mapped depending on the exact distance between the start and the end of the shadow area and the alignment with the page addresses. Fix this by aligning the starting address with the page address. Fixes: 2edb16ef ("powerpc/32: Add KASAN support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.2+ Reported-by:
Erhard F. <erhard_f@mailbox.org> Signed-off-by:
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Christophe Leroy authored
Parallel loading of modules may lead to bad setup of shadow page table entries. First, lets align modules so that two modules never share the same shadow page. Second, ensure that two modules cannot allocate two page tables for the same PMD entry at the same time. This is done by using init_mm.page_table_lock in the same way as __pte_alloc_kernel() Fixes: 2edb16ef ("powerpc/32: Add KASAN support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.2+ Signed-off-by:
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Christophe Leroy authored
On 8xx, breakpoints stop after executing the instruction, so stepping/emulation is not needed. Move it into a sub-function and remove the #ifdefs. Signed-off-by:
Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Christophe Leroy authored
hashpagetable.c is only compiled when CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 is defined, so drop the test and its 'else' branch. Use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES) instead of #ifdef, this allows the code to be checked at any build. It is still optimised out by GCC. Use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_64K_PAGES) instead of #ifdef. Use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPARSEMEN_VMEMMAP) instead of #ifdef. Signed-off-by:
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Christophe Leroy authored
When CONFIG_PPC_DEBUG_WX, note_prot_wx() is useless. Get out of it early and inconditionnally in that case, so that GCC can kick all the code out. Signed-off-by:
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Christophe Leroy authored
PPC32 doesn't have KERN_VIRT_START. Make PAGE_OFFSET the default starting address for the dump, and drop the dummy definition of KERN_VIRT_START. Only use KERN_VIRT_START for non radix PPC64. Signed-off-by:
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Christophe Leroy authored
walk_pagetables() always walk the entire pgdir from address 0 but considers PAGE_OFFSET or KERN_VIRT_START as the starting address of the walk, resulting in a possible mismatch in the displayed addresses. Ex: on PPC32, when KERN_VIRT_START was locally defined as PAGE_OFFSET, ptdump displayed 0x80000000 instead of 0xc0000000 for the first kernel page, because 0xc0000000 + 0xc0000000 = 0x80000000 Start the walk at st->start_address instead of starting at 0. Signed-off-by:
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Christophe Leroy authored
Commit 453d87f6 ("powerpc/mm: Warn if W+X pages found on boot") wrongly changed KERN_VIRT_START from 0 to PAGE_OFFSET, leading to a shift in the displayed addresses. Lets revert that change to resync walk_pagetables()'s addr val and pgd_t pointer for PPC32. Fixes: 453d87f6 ("powerpc/mm: Warn if W+X pages found on boot") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.2+ Signed-off-by:
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- 19 Aug, 2019 10 commits
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Cédric Le Goater authored
Modify the xmon 'dxi' command to query all interrupts if no IRQ number is specified. Signed-off-by:
Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Signed-off-by:
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Cédric Le Goater authored
The xmon 'dxi' command calls OPAL to query the XIVE configuration of a interrupt. This can only be done on baremetal (PowerNV) and it will crash a pseries machine. Introduce a new XIVE get_irq_config() operation which implements a different query depending on the platform, PowerNV or pseries, and modify xmon to use a top level wrapper. Signed-off-by:
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Cédric Le Goater authored
Currently, the xmon 'dx' command calls OPAL to dump the XIVE state in the OPAL logs and also outputs some of the fields of the internal XIVE structures in Linux. The OPAL calls can only be done on baremetal (PowerNV) and they crash a pseries machine. Fix by checking the hypervisor feature of the CPU. Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Kardashevskiy authored
At the moment we create a small window only for 32bit devices, the window maps 0..2GB of the PCI space only. For other devices we either use a sketchy bypass or hardware bypass but the former can only work if the amount of RAM is no bigger than the device's DMA mask and the latter requires devices to support at least 59bit DMA. This extends the default DMA window to the maximum size possible to allow a wider DMA mask than just 32bit. The default window size is now limited by the the iommu_table::it_map allocation bitmap which is a contiguous array, 1 bit per an IOMMU page. This increases the default IOMMU page size from hard coded 4K to the system page size to allow wider DMA masks. This increases the level number to not exceed the max order allocation limit per TCE level. By the same time, this keeps minimal levels number as 2 in order to save memory. As the extended window now overlaps the 32bit MMIO region, this adds an area reservation to iommu_init_table(). After this change the default window size is 0x80000000000==1<<43 so devices limited to DMA mask smaller than the amount of system RAM can still use more than just 2GB of memory for DMA. This is an optimization and not a bug fix for DMA API usage. With the on-demand allocation of indirect TCE table levels enabled and 2 levels, the first TCE level size is just 1<<ceil((log2(0x7ffffffffff+1)-16)/2)=16384 TCEs or 2 system pages. Signed-off-by:
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Kardashevskiy authored
We allocate only the first level of multilevel TCE tables for KVM already (alloc_userspace_copy==true), and the rest is allocated on demand. This is not enabled though for bare metal. This removes the KVM limitation (implicit, via the alloc_userspace_copy parameter) and always allocates just the first level. The on-demand allocation of missing levels is already implemented. As from now on DMA map might happen with disabled interrupts, this allocates TCEs with GFP_ATOMIC; otherwise lockdep reports errors 1]. In practice just a single page is allocated there so chances for failure are quite low. To save time when creating a new clean table, this skips non-allocated indirect TCE entries in pnv_tce_free just like we already do in the VFIO IOMMU TCE driver. This changes the default level number from 1 to 2 to reduce the amount of memory required for the default 32bit DMA window at the boot time. The default window size is up to 2GB which requires 4MB of TCEs which is unlikely to be used entirely or at all as most devices these days are 64bit capable so by switching to 2 levels by default we save 4032KB of RAM per a device. While at this, add __GFP_NOWARN to alloc_pages_node() as the userspace can trigger this path via VFIO, see the failure and try creating a table again with different parameters which might succeed. [1]: === BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/page_alloc.c:4596 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, pid: 1038, name: scsi_eh_1 2 locks held by scsi_eh_1/1038: #0: 000000005efd659a (&host->eh_mutex){+.+.}, at: ata_eh_acquire+0x34/0x80 #1: 0000000006cf56a6 (&(&host->lock)->rlock){....}, at: ata_exec_internal_sg+0xb0/0x5c0 irq event stamp: 500 hardirqs last enabled at (499): [<c000000000cb8a74>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x94/0xd0 hardirqs last disabled at (500): [<c000000000cb85c4>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x120 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<c000000000101120>] copy_process.isra.4.part.5+0x640/0x1a80 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 CPU: 73 PID: 1038 Comm: scsi_eh_1 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc6-le_nv2_aikATfstn1-p1 #634 Call Trace: [c000003d064cef50] [c000000000c8e6c4] dump_stack+0xe8/0x164 (unreliable) [c000003d064cefa0] [c00000000014ed78] ___might_sleep+0x2f8/0x310 [c000003d064cf020] [c0000000003ca084] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x2a4/0x1560 [c000003d064cf220] [c0000000000c2530] pnv_alloc_tce_level.isra.0+0x90/0x130 [c000003d064cf290] [c0000000000c2888] pnv_tce+0x128/0x3b0 [c000003d064cf360] [c0000000000c2c00] pnv_tce_build+0xb0/0xf0 [c000003d064cf3c0] [c0000000000bbd9c] pnv_ioda2_tce_build+0x3c/0xb0 [c000003d064cf400] [c00000000004cfe0] ppc_iommu_map_sg+0x210/0x550 [c000003d064cf510] [c00000000004b7a4] dma_iommu_map_sg+0x74/0xb0 [c000003d064cf530] [c000000000863944] ata_qc_issue+0x134/0x470 [c000003d064cf5b0] [c000000000863ec4] ata_exec_internal_sg+0x244/0x5c0 [c000003d064cf700] [c0000000008642d0] ata_exec_internal+0x90/0xe0 [c000003d064cf780] [c0000000008650ac] ata_dev_read_id+0x2ec/0x640 [c000003d064cf8d0] [c000000000878e28] ata_eh_recover+0x948/0x16d0 [c000003d064cfa10] [c00000000087d760] sata_pmp_error_handler+0x480/0xbf0 [c000003d064cfbc0] [c000000000884624] ahci_error_handler+0x74/0xe0 [c000003d064cfbf0] [c000000000879fa8] ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x2d8/0x7c0 [c000003d064cfca0] [c00000000087a544] ata_scsi_error+0xb4/0x100 [c000003d064cfd00] [c000000000802450] scsi_error_handler+0x120/0x510 [c000003d064cfdb0] [c000000000140c48] kthread+0x1b8/0x1c0 [c000003d064cfe20] [c00000000000bd8c] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x70 ata1: SATA link up 6.0 Gbps (SStatus 133 SControl 300) irq event stamp: 2305 ======================================================== hardirqs last enabled at (2305): [<c00000000000e4c8>] fast_exc_return_irq+0x28/0x34 hardirqs last disabled at (2303): [<c000000000cb9fd0>] __do_softirq+0x4a0/0x654 WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected 5.2.0-rc6-le_nv2_aikATfstn1-p1 #634 Tainted: G W softirqs last enabled at (2304): [<c000000000cba054>] __do_softirq+0x524/0x654 softirqs last disabled at (2297): [<c00000000010f278>] irq_exit+0x128/0x180 -------------------------------------------------------- swapper/0/0 just changed the state of lock: 0000000006cf56a6 (&(&host->lock)->rlock){-...}, at: ahci_single_level_irq_intr+0xac/0x120 but this lock took another, HARDIRQ-unsafe lock in the past: (fs_reclaim){+.+.} and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them. other info that might help us debug this: Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(fs_reclaim); local_irq_disable(); lock(&(&host->lock)->rlock); lock(fs_reclaim); <Interrupt> lock(&(&host->lock)->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** no locks held by swapper/0/0. the shortest dependencies between 2nd lock and 1st lock: -> (fs_reclaim){+.+.} ops: 167579 { HARDIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0xf8/0x2a0 fs_reclaim_acquire.part.23+0x44/0x60 kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0x80/0x590 alloc_desc+0x64/0x270 __irq_alloc_descs+0x2e4/0x3a0 irq_domain_alloc_descs+0xb0/0x150 irq_create_mapping+0x168/0x2c0 xics_smp_probe+0x2c/0x98 pnv_smp_probe+0x40/0x9c smp_prepare_cpus+0x524/0x6c4 kernel_init_freeable+0x1b4/0x650 kernel_init+0x2c/0x148 ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x70 SOFTIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0xf8/0x2a0 fs_reclaim_acquire.part.23+0x44/0x60 kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0x80/0x590 alloc_desc+0x64/0x270 __irq_alloc_descs+0x2e4/0x3a0 irq_domain_alloc_descs+0xb0/0x150 irq_create_mapping+0x168/0x2c0 xics_smp_probe+0x2c/0x98 pnv_smp_probe+0x40/0x9c smp_prepare_cpus+0x524/0x6c4 kernel_init_freeable+0x1b4/0x650 kernel_init+0x2c/0x148 ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x70 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire+0xf8/0x2a0 fs_reclaim_acquire.part.23+0x44/0x60 kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0x80/0x590 alloc_desc+0x64/0x270 __irq_alloc_descs+0x2e4/0x3a0 irq_domain_alloc_descs+0xb0/0x150 irq_create_mapping+0x168/0x2c0 xics_smp_probe+0x2c/0x98 pnv_smp_probe+0x40/0x9c smp_prepare_cpus+0x524/0x6c4 kernel_init_freeable+0x1b4/0x650 kernel_init+0x2c/0x148 ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x70 } === Signed-off-by:Alistair Popple <alistair@popple.id.au> Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Kardashevskiy authored
POWER8 and newer support a bypass mode which maps all host memory to PCI buses so an IOMMU table is not always required. However if we fail to create such a table, the DMA setup fails and the kernel does not boot. This skips the 32bit DMA setup check if the bypass is selected. Signed-off-by:
David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Signed-off-by:
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Alexey Kardashevskiy authored
pnv_tce() returns a pointer to a TCE entry and originally a TCE table would be pre-allocated. For the default case of 2GB window the table needs only a single level and that is fine. However if more levels are requested, it is possible to get a race when 2 threads want a pointer to a TCE entry from the same page of TCEs. This adds cmpxchg to handle the race. Note that once TCE is non-zero, it cannot become zero again. Fixes: a68bd126 ("powerpc/powernv/ioda: Allocate indirect TCE levels on demand") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+ Signed-off-by:
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Gautham R. Shenoy authored
The calls to arch_add_memory()/arch_remove_memory() are always made with the read-side cpu_hotplug_lock acquired via memory_hotplug_begin(). On pSeries, arch_add_memory()/arch_remove_memory() eventually call resize_hpt() which in turn calls stop_machine() which acquires the read-side cpu_hotplug_lock again, thereby resulting in the recursive acquisition of this lock. In the absence of CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING, we hadn't observed a system lockup during a memory hotplug operation because cpus_read_lock() is a per-cpu rwsem read, which, in the fast-path (in the absence of the writer, which in our case is a CPU-hotplug operation) simply increments the read_count on the semaphore. Thus a recursive read in the fast-path doesn't cause any problems. However, we can hit this problem in practice if there is a concurrent CPU-Hotplug operation in progress which is waiting to acquire the write-side of the lock. This will cause the second recursive read to block until the writer finishes. While the writer is blocked since the first read holds the lock. Thus both the reader as well as the writers fail to make any progress thereby blocking both CPU-Hotplug as well as Memory Hotplug operations. Memory-Hotplug CPU-Hotplug CPU 0 CPU 1 ------ ------ 1. down_read(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem) [memory_hotplug_begin] 2. down_write(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem) [cpu_up/cpu_down] 3. down_read(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem) [stop_machine()] Lockdep complains as follows in these code-paths. swapper/0/1 is trying to acquire lock: (____ptrval____) (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at: stop_machine+0x2c/0x60 but task is already holding lock: (____ptrval____) (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at: mem_hotplug_begin+0x20/0x50 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem); lock(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by swapper/0/1: #0: (____ptrval____) (&dev->mutex){....}, at: __driver_attach+0x12c/0x1b0 #1: (____ptrval____) (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at: mem_hotplug_begin+0x20/0x50 #2: (____ptrval____) (mem_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at: percpu_down_write+0x54/0x1a0 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc5-58373-gbc99402235f3-dirty #166 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe8/0x164 (unreliable) __lock_acquire+0x1110/0x1c70 lock_acquire+0x240/0x290 cpus_read_lock+0x64/0xf0 stop_machine+0x2c/0x60 pseries_lpar_resize_hpt+0x19c/0x2c0 resize_hpt_for_hotplug+0x70/0xd0 arch_add_memory+0x58/0xfc devm_memremap_pages+0x5e8/0x8f0 pmem_attach_disk+0x764/0x830 nvdimm_bus_probe+0x118/0x240 really_probe+0x230/0x4b0 driver_probe_device+0x16c/0x1e0 __driver_attach+0x148/0x1b0 bus_for_each_dev+0x90/0x130 driver_attach+0x34/0x50 bus_add_driver+0x1a8/0x360 driver_register+0x108/0x170 __nd_driver_register+0xd0/0xf0 nd_pmem_driver_init+0x34/0x48 do_one_initcall+0x1e0/0x45c kernel_init_freeable+0x540/0x64c kernel_init+0x2c/0x160 ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x68 Fix this issue by 1) Requiring all the calls to pseries_lpar_resize_hpt() be made with cpu_hotplug_lock held. 2) In pseries_lpar_resize_hpt() invoke stop_machine_cpuslocked() as a consequence of 1) 3) To satisfy 1), in hpt_order_set(), call mmu_hash_ops.resize_hpt() with cpu_hotplug_lock held. Fixes: dbcf929c ("powerpc/pseries: Add support for hash table resizing") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.11+ Reported-by:Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Gautham R. Shenoy <ego@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Michael Ellerman authored
Merge our ppc-kvm topic branch. This contains several fixes for the XIVE interrupt controller that we are sharing with the KVM tree.
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Michael Ellerman authored
Merge in our fixes branch, which brings in clone3() as well as some implicit fallthrough fixes we want in next.
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- 16 Aug, 2019 4 commits
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Paul Mackerras authored
Testing has revealed the existence of a race condition where a XIVE interrupt being shut down can be in one of the XIVE interrupt queues (of which there are up to 8 per CPU, one for each priority) at the point where free_irq() is called. If this happens, can return an interrupt number which has been shut down. This can lead to various symptoms: - irq_to_desc(irq) can be NULL. In this case, no end-of-interrupt function gets called, resulting in the CPU's elevated interrupt priority (numerically lowered CPPR) never gets reset. That then means that the CPU stops processing interrupts, causing device timeouts and other errors in various device drivers. - The irq descriptor or related data structures can be in the process of being freed as the interrupt code is using them. This typically leads to crashes due to bad pointer dereferences. This race is basically what commit 62e04686 ("genirq: Add optional hardware synchronization for shutdown", 2019-06-28) is intended to fix, given a get_irqchip_state() method for the interrupt controller being used. It works by polling the interrupt controller when an interrupt is being freed until the controller says it is not pending. With XIVE, the PQ bits of the interrupt source indicate the state of the interrupt source, and in particular the P bit goes from 0 to 1 at the point where the hardware writes an entry into the interrupt queue that this interrupt is directed towards. Normally, the code will then process the interrupt and do an end-of-interrupt (EOI) operation which will reset PQ to 00 (assuming another interrupt hasn't been generated in the meantime). However, there are situations where the code resets P even though a queue entry exists (for example, by setting PQ to 01, which disables the interrupt source), and also situations where the code leaves P at 1 after removing the queue entry (for example, this is done for escalation interrupts so they cannot fire again until they are explicitly re-enabled). The code already has a 'saved_p' flag for the interrupt source which indicates that a queue entry exists, although it isn't maintained consistently. This patch adds a 'stale_p' flag to indicate that P has been left at 1 after processing a queue entry, and adds code to set and clear saved_p and stale_p as necessary to maintain a consistent indication of whether a queue entry may or may not exist. With this, we can implement xive_get_irqchip_state() by looking at stale_p, saved_p and the ESB PQ bits for the interrupt. There is some additional code to handle escalation interrupts properly; because they are enabled and disabled in KVM assembly code, which does not have access to the xive_irq_data struct for the escalation interrupt. Hence, stale_p may be incorrect when the escalation interrupt is freed in kvmppc_xive_{,native_}cleanup_vcpu(). Fortunately, we can fix it up by looking at vcpu->arch.xive_esc_on, with some careful attention to barriers in order to ensure the correct result if xive_esc_irq() races with kvmppc_xive_cleanup_vcpu(). Finally, this adds code to make noise on the console (pr_crit and WARN_ON(1)) if we find an interrupt queue entry for an interrupt which does not have a descriptor. While this won't catch the race reliably, if it does get triggered it will be an indication that the race is occurring and needs to be debugged. Fixes: 243e2511 ("powerpc/xive: Native exploitation of the XIVE interrupt controller") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+ Signed-off-by:
Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by:
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Paul Mackerras authored
At present, when running a guest on POWER9 using HV KVM but not using an in-kernel interrupt controller (XICS or XIVE), for example if QEMU is run with the kernel_irqchip=off option, the guest entry code goes ahead and tries to load the guest context into the XIVE hardware, even though no context has been set up. To fix this, we check that the "CAM word" is non-zero before pushing it to the hardware. The CAM word is initialized to a non-zero value in kvmppc_xive_connect_vcpu() and kvmppc_xive_native_connect_vcpu(), and is now cleared in kvmppc_xive_{,native_}cleanup_vcpu. Fixes: 5af50993 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Native usage of the XIVE interrupt controller") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+ Reported-by: -
Paul Mackerras authored
Escalation interrupts are interrupts sent to the host by the XIVE hardware when it has an interrupt to deliver to a guest VCPU but that VCPU is not running anywhere in the system. Hence we disable the escalation interrupt for the VCPU being run when we enter the guest and re-enable it when the guest does an H_CEDE hypercall indicating it is idle. It is possible that an escalation interrupt gets generated just as we are entering the guest. In that case the escalation interrupt may be using a queue entry in one of the interrupt queues, and that queue entry may not have been processed when the guest exits with an H_CEDE. The existing entry code detects this situation and does not clear the vcpu->arch.xive_esc_on flag as an indication that there is a pending queue entry (if the queue entry gets processed, xive_esc_irq() will clear the flag). There is a comment in the code saying that if the flag is still set on H_CEDE, we have to abort the cede rather than re-enabling the escalation interrupt, lest we end up with two occurrences of the escalation interrupt in the interrupt queue. However, the exit code doesn't do that; it aborts the cede in the sense that vcpu->arch.ceded gets cleared, but it still enables the escalation interrupt by setting the source's PQ bits to 00. Instead we need to set the PQ bits to 10, indicating that an interrupt has been triggered. We also need to avoid setting vcpu->arch.xive_esc_on in this case (i.e. vcpu->arch.xive_esc_on seen to be set on H_CEDE) because xive_esc_irq() will run at some point and clear it, and if we race with that we may end up with an incorrect result (i.e. xive_esc_on set when the escalation interrupt has just been handled). It is extremely unlikely that having two queue entries would cause observable problems; theoretically it could cause queue overflow, but the CPU would have to have thousands of interrupts targetted to it for that to be possible. However, this fix will also make it possible to determine accurately whether there is an unhandled escalation interrupt in the queue, which will be needed by the following patch. Fixes: 9b9b13a6 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Keep XIVE escalation interrupt masked unless ceded") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.16+ Signed-off-by:
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Cédric Le Goater authored
When a vCPU is brought done, the XIVE VP (Virtual Processor) is first disabled and then the event notification queues are freed. When freeing the queues, we check for possible escalation interrupts and free them also. But when a XIVE VP is disabled, the underlying XIVE ENDs also are disabled in OPAL. When an END (Event Notification Descriptor) is disabled, its ESB pages (ESn and ESe) are disabled and loads return all 1s. Which means that any access on the ESB page of the escalation interrupt will return invalid values. When an interrupt is freed, the shutdown handler computes a 'saved_p' field from the value returned by a load in xive_do_source_set_mask(). This value is incorrect for escalation interrupts for the reason described above. This has no impact on Linux/KVM today because we don't make use of it but we will introduce in future changes a xive_get_irqchip_state() handler. This handler will use the 'saved_p' field to return the state of an interrupt and 'saved_p' being incorrect, softlockup will occur. Fix the vCPU cleanup sequence by first freeing the escalation interrupts if any, then disable the XIVE VP and last free the queues. Fixes: 90c73795 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add a new KVM device for the XIVE native exploitation mode") Fixes: 5af50993 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Native usage of the XIVE interrupt controller") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+ Signed-off-by:
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- 15 Aug, 2019 3 commits
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Nicholas Piggin authored
Radix boot looks like this: ----------------------------------------------------- phys_mem_size = 0x200000000 dcache_bsize = 0x80 icache_bsize = 0x80 cpu_features = 0x0000c06f8f5fb1a7 possible = 0x0000fbffcf5fb1a7 always = 0x00000003800081a1 cpu_user_features = 0xdc0065c2 0xaee00000 mmu_features = 0xbc006041 firmware_features = 0x0000000010000000 hash-mmu: ppc64_pft_size = 0x0 hash-mmu: kernel vmalloc start = 0xc008000000000000 hash-mmu: kernel IO start = 0xc00a000000000000 hash-mmu: kernel vmemmap start = 0xc00c000000000000 ----------------------------------------------------- Fix: ----------------------------------------------------- phys_mem_size = 0x200000000 dcache_bsize = 0x80 icache_bsize = 0x80 cpu_features = 0x0000c06f8f5fb1a7 possible = 0x0000fbffcf5fb1a7 always = 0x00000003800081a1 cpu_user_features = 0xdc0065c2 0xaee00000 mmu_features = 0xbc006041 firmware_features = 0x0000000010000000 vmalloc start = 0xc008000000000000 IO start = 0xc00a000000000000 vmemmap start = 0xc00c000000000000 ----------------------------------------------------- Signed-off-by:
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Christophe JAILLET authored
The result of this kzalloc is not checked. Add a check and corresponding error handling code. Signed-off-by:
Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> Reviewed-by:
Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Signed-off-by:
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Christophe JAILLET authored
There is no need to use GFP_ATOMIC here. GFP_KERNEL should be enough. GFP_KERNEL is also already used for another allocation just a few lines below. Signed-off-by:
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- 12 Aug, 2019 1 commit
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Christophe Leroy authored
Commit ebb9d30a ("powerpc/mm: any thread in one core can be the first to setup TLB1") removed the need to know the cpu_id in early_init_this_mmu(), but the call to smp_processor_id() which was marked __maybe_used remained. Since commit ed1cd6de ("powerpc: Activate CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK") thread_info cannot be reached before MMU is properly set up. Drop this stale call to smp_processor_id() which makes SMP hang when CONFIG_PREEMPT is set. Fixes: ebb9d30a ("powerpc/mm: any thread in one core can be the first to setup TLB1") Fixes: ed1cd6de ("powerpc: Activate CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.1+ Reported-by:
Chris Packham <Chris.Packham@alliedtelesis.co.nz> Signed-off-by:
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- 05 Aug, 2019 11 commits
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Leonardo Bras authored
I noticed these nested ifs can be easily replaced by switch-cases, which can improve readability. Signed-off-by:
Leonardo Bras <leonardo@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jordan Niethe authored
The comment above xive_esb_read() references magic loads from an ESB as described xive.h. This has been inaccurate since commit 12c1f339 ("powerpc/xive: Move definition of ESB bits") which moved the description. Update the comment to reference the new location of the description in xive-regs.h Signed-off-by:
Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Christophe Leroy authored
PPC32 also have flush_dcache_range() so it can also support ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API and ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_FLUSHCACHE without changes. Signed-off-by:
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Andrew Donnellan authored
Currently the OPAL symbol map is globally readable, which seems bad as it contains physical addresses. Restrict it to root. Fixes: c8742f85 ("powerpc/powernv: Expose OPAL firmware symbol map") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.19+ Suggested-by:
Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Andrew Donnellan authored
SCOM_DEBUGFS is really not needed for anything other than low-level hardware debugging. mpe: It also introduces a large and poorly documented/understood attack surface. Although the interface is only available to root, the kernel still aspires to restrict root to accessing hardware through well defined interfaces, which this is not. opal-prd uses its own interface (/dev/prd) for SCOM access, so it doesn't need SCOM_DEBUGFS. At some point in the future we'll introduce a debug config fragment where this can go instead. Signed-off-by:
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Andrew Donnellan authored
Signed-off-by:
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Andrew Donnellan authored
Once upon a time, the SCOM access code was used by the WSP platform as well as powernv. Thus it made sense to have a generic SCOM access interface to abstract between different platforms. Now that it's just powernv, with no other platforms currently on the horizon, let's rip out scom_controller and make everything much simpler and more direct. While we're here, fix up the comment block at the top. Signed-off-by:
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Andrew Donnellan authored
Nothing is using scom_map_device() or scom_find_parent(). Remove them. Also don't export scom_controller, there are no other users of it. Signed-off-by:
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Andrew Donnellan authored
The powernv platform is the only one that directly accesses SCOMs. Move the support code to platforms/powernv, and get rid of the PPC_SCOM Kconfig option, as SCOM support is always selected when compiling for powernv. This also means that the Kconfig item for CONFIG_SCOM_DEBUGFS will show up in menuconfig in the platform menu, rather than at the root, which is a much better location. Signed-off-by:
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Nathan Chancellor authored
When building with -Wsometimes-uninitialized, clang warns: drivers/pci/hotplug/rpaphp_core.c:243:14: warning: variable 'fndit' is used uninitialized whenever 'for' loop exits because its condition is false [-Wsometimes-uninitialized] for (j = 0; j < entries; j++) { ^~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/pci/hotplug/rpaphp_core.c:256:6: note: uninitialized use occurs here if (fndit) ^~~~~ drivers/pci/hotplug/rpaphp_core.c:243:14: note: remove the condition if it is always true for (j = 0; j < entries; j++) { ^~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/pci/hotplug/rpaphp_core.c:233:14: note: initialize the variable 'fndit' to silence this warning int j, fndit; ^ = 0 fndit is only used to gate a sprintf call, which can be moved into the loop to simplify the code and eliminate the local variable, which will fix this warning. Fixes: 2fcf3ae5 ("hotplug/drc-info: Add code to search ibm,drc-info property") Suggested-by:Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by:
Joel Savitz <jsavitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Nathan Lynch authored
These aren't used by modular code, nor should they be. Fixes: 120496ac ("powerpc: Bring all threads online prior to migration/hibernation") Signed-off-by:
Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 31 Jul, 2019 2 commits
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Michael Ellerman authored
This reverts commit 6c587584. It triggers a probable compiler bug on clang which leads to crashes. With GCC it allows the compiler to use a more efficient register allocation but current GCC versions never do that at any of the current call sites, so there's no benefit. Signed-off-by:
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Christophe Leroy authored
Due to commit 4a6d8cf9 ("powerpc/mm: don't use pte_alloc_kernel() until slab is available on PPC32"), pte_alloc_kernel() cannot be used during early KASAN init. Fix it by using memblock_alloc() instead. Fixes: 2edb16ef ("powerpc/32: Add KASAN support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.2+ Reported-by:
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