1. 15 Jul, 2015 12 commits
  2. 09 Jul, 2015 22 commits
  3. 06 Jul, 2015 6 commits
    • Alexander Sverdlin's avatar
      sctp: Fix race between OOTB responce and route removal · 59a2d77b
      Alexander Sverdlin authored
      commit 29c4afc4 upstream.
      
      There is NULL pointer dereference possible during statistics update if the route
      used for OOTB responce is removed at unfortunate time. If the route exists when
      we receive OOTB packet and we finally jump into sctp_packet_transmit() to send
      ABORT, but in the meantime route is removed under our feet, we take "no_route"
      path and try to update stats with IP_INC_STATS(sock_net(asoc->base.sk), ...).
      
      But sctp_ootb_pkt_new() used to prepare responce packet doesn't call
      sctp_transport_set_owner() and therefore there is no asoc associated with this
      packet. Probably temporary asoc just for OOTB responces is overkill, so just
      introduce a check like in all other places in sctp_packet_transmit(), where
      "asoc" is dereferenced.
      
      To reproduce this, one needs to
      0. ensure that sctp module is loaded (otherwise ABORT is not generated)
      1. remove default route on the machine
      2. while true; do
           ip route del [interface-specific route]
           ip route add [interface-specific route]
         done
      3. send enough OOTB packets (i.e. HB REQs) from another host to trigger ABORT
         responce
      
      On x86_64 the crash looks like this:
      
      BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
      IP: [<ffffffffa05ec9ac>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x63c/0x730 [sctp]
      PGD 0
      Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
      Modules linked in: ...
      CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G           O    4.0.5-1-ARCH #1
      Hardware name: ...
      task: ffffffff818124c0 ti: ffffffff81800000 task.ti: ffffffff81800000
      RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa05ec9ac>]  [<ffffffffa05ec9ac>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x63c/0x730 [sctp]
      RSP: 0018:ffff880127c037b8  EFLAGS: 00010296
      RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000015ff66b480
      RDX: 00000015ff66b400 RSI: ffff880127c17200 RDI: ffff880123403700
      RBP: ffff880127c03888 R08: 0000000000017200 R09: ffffffff814625af
      R10: ffffea00047e4680 R11: 00000000ffffff80 R12: ffff8800b0d38a28
      R13: ffff8800b0d38a28 R14: ffff8800b3e88000 R15: ffffffffa05f24e0
      FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880127c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
      CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
      CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 00000000c855b000 CR4: 00000000000007f0
      Stack:
       ffff880127c03910 ffff8800b0d38a28 ffffffff8189d240 ffff88011f91b400
       ffff880127c03828 ffffffffa05c94c5 0000000000000000 ffff8800baa1c520
       0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
      Call Trace:
       <IRQ>
       [<ffffffffa05c94c5>] ? sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8.isra.20+0x85/0x140 [sctp]
       [<ffffffffa05d6b42>] ? sctp_transport_put+0x52/0x80 [sctp]
       [<ffffffffa05d0bfc>] sctp_do_sm+0xb8c/0x19a0 [sctp]
       [<ffffffff810b0e00>] ? trigger_load_balance+0x90/0x210
       [<ffffffff810e0329>] ? update_process_times+0x59/0x60
       [<ffffffff812c7a40>] ? timerqueue_add+0x60/0xb0
       [<ffffffff810e0549>] ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x29/0xa0
       [<ffffffff8101f599>] ? read_tsc+0x9/0x10
       [<ffffffff8116d4b5>] ? put_page+0x55/0x60
       [<ffffffff810ee1ad>] ? clockevents_program_event+0x6d/0x100
       [<ffffffff81462b68>] ? skb_free_head+0x58/0x80
       [<ffffffffa029a10b>] ? chksum_update+0x1b/0x27 [crc32c_generic]
       [<ffffffff81283f3e>] ? crypto_shash_update+0xce/0xf0
       [<ffffffffa05d3993>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x113/0x280 [sctp]
       [<ffffffffa05dd4e6>] sctp_inq_push+0x46/0x60 [sctp]
       [<ffffffffa05ed7a0>] sctp_rcv+0x880/0x910 [sctp]
       [<ffffffffa05ecb50>] ? sctp_packet_transmit_chunk+0xb0/0xb0 [sctp]
       [<ffffffffa05ecb70>] ? sctp_csum_update+0x20/0x20 [sctp]
       [<ffffffff814b05a5>] ? ip_route_input_noref+0x235/0xd30
       [<ffffffff81051d6b>] ? ack_ioapic_level+0x7b/0x150
       [<ffffffff814b27be>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xae/0x210
       [<ffffffff814b2e15>] ip_local_deliver+0x35/0x90
       [<ffffffff814b2a15>] ip_rcv_finish+0xf5/0x370
       [<ffffffff814b3128>] ip_rcv+0x2b8/0x3a0
       [<ffffffff81474193>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x763/0xa50
       [<ffffffff81476c28>] __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x60
       [<ffffffff81476cb0>] netif_receive_skb_internal+0x40/0xd0
       [<ffffffff814776c8>] napi_gro_receive+0xe8/0x120
       [<ffffffffa03946aa>] rtl8169_poll+0x2da/0x660 [r8169]
       [<ffffffff8147896a>] net_rx_action+0x21a/0x360
       [<ffffffff81078dc1>] __do_softirq+0xe1/0x2d0
       [<ffffffff8107912d>] irq_exit+0xad/0xb0
       [<ffffffff8157d158>] do_IRQ+0x58/0xf0
       [<ffffffff8157b06d>] common_interrupt+0x6d/0x6d
       <EOI>
       [<ffffffff810e1218>] ? hrtimer_start+0x18/0x20
       [<ffffffffa05d65f9>] ? sctp_transport_destroy_rcu+0x29/0x30 [sctp]
       [<ffffffff81020c50>] ? mwait_idle+0x60/0xa0
       [<ffffffff810216ef>] arch_cpu_idle+0xf/0x20
       [<ffffffff810b731c>] cpu_startup_entry+0x3ec/0x480
       [<ffffffff8156b365>] rest_init+0x85/0x90
       [<ffffffff818eb035>] start_kernel+0x48b/0x4ac
       [<ffffffff818ea120>] ? early_idt_handlers+0x120/0x120
       [<ffffffff818ea339>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c
       [<ffffffff818ea49c>] x86_64_start_kernel+0x161/0x184
      Code: 90 48 8b 80 b8 00 00 00 48 89 85 70 ff ff ff 48 83 bd 70 ff ff ff 00 0f 85 cd fa ff ff 48 89 df 31 db e8 18 63 e7 e0 48 8b 45 80 <48> 8b 40 20 48 8b 40 30 48 8b 80 68 01 00 00 65 48 ff 40 78 e9
      RIP  [<ffffffffa05ec9ac>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x63c/0x730 [sctp]
       RSP <ffff880127c037b8>
      CR2: 0000000000000020
      ---[ end trace 5aec7fd2dc983574 ]---
      Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
      Kernel Offset: 0x0 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff9fffffff)
      drm_kms_helper: panic occurred, switching back to text console
      ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nokia.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarMarcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLuis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
      59a2d77b
    • Mugunthan V N's avatar
      net: phy: fix phy link up when limiting speed via device tree · f56605a7
      Mugunthan V N authored
      commit eb686231 upstream.
      
      When limiting phy link speed using "max-speed" to 100mbps or less on a
      giga bit phy, phy never completes auto negotiation and phy state
      machine is held in PHY_AN. Fixing this issue by comparing the giga
      bit advertise though phydev->supported doesn't have it but phy has
      BMSR_ESTATEN set. So that auto negotiation is restarted as old and
      new advertise are different and link comes up fine.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMugunthan V N <mugunthanvnm@ti.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarFlorian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLuis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
      f56605a7
    • Christoph Paasch's avatar
      tcp: Do not call tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher from interrupt context · c55f3e35
      Christoph Paasch authored
      commit dfea2aa6 upstream.
      
      tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher really cannot be called from interrupt
      context. It allocates the tcp_fastopen_context with GFP_KERNEL and
      calls crypto_alloc_cipher, which allocates all kind of stuff with
      GFP_KERNEL.
      
      Thus, we might sleep when the key-generation is triggered by an
      incoming TFO cookie-request which would then happen in interrupt-
      context, as shown by enabling CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP:
      
      [   36.001813] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slub.c:1266
      [   36.003624] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1016, name: packetdrill
      [   36.004859] CPU: 1 PID: 1016 Comm: packetdrill Not tainted 4.1.0-rc7 #14
      [   36.006085] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
      [   36.008250]  00000000000004f2 ffff88007f8838a8 ffffffff8171d53a ffff880075a084a8
      [   36.009630]  ffff880075a08000 ffff88007f8838c8 ffffffff810967d3 ffff88007f883928
      [   36.011076]  0000000000000000 ffff88007f8838f8 ffffffff81096892 ffff88007f89be00
      [   36.012494] Call Trace:
      [   36.012953]  <IRQ>  [<ffffffff8171d53a>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x6d
      [   36.014085]  [<ffffffff810967d3>] ___might_sleep+0x103/0x170
      [   36.015117]  [<ffffffff81096892>] __might_sleep+0x52/0x90
      [   36.016117]  [<ffffffff8118e887>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x47/0x190
      [   36.017266]  [<ffffffff81680d82>] ? tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher+0x42/0x130
      [   36.018485]  [<ffffffff81680d82>] tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher+0x42/0x130
      [   36.019679]  [<ffffffff81680f01>] tcp_fastopen_init_key_once+0x61/0x70
      [   36.020884]  [<ffffffff81680f2c>] __tcp_fastopen_cookie_gen+0x1c/0x60
      [   36.022058]  [<ffffffff816814ff>] tcp_try_fastopen+0x58f/0x730
      [   36.023118]  [<ffffffff81671788>] tcp_conn_request+0x3e8/0x7b0
      [   36.024185]  [<ffffffff810e3872>] ? __module_text_address+0x12/0x60
      [   36.025327]  [<ffffffff8167b2e1>] tcp_v4_conn_request+0x51/0x60
      [   36.026410]  [<ffffffff816727e0>] tcp_rcv_state_process+0x190/0xda0
      [   36.027556]  [<ffffffff81661f97>] ? __inet_lookup_established+0x47/0x170
      [   36.028784]  [<ffffffff8167c2ad>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x16d/0x3d0
      [   36.029832]  [<ffffffff812e6806>] ? security_sock_rcv_skb+0x16/0x20
      [   36.030936]  [<ffffffff8167cc8a>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x77a/0x7b0
      [   36.031875]  [<ffffffff816af8c3>] ? iptable_filter_hook+0x33/0x70
      [   36.032953]  [<ffffffff81657d22>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x92/0x1f0
      [   36.034065]  [<ffffffff81657f1a>] ip_local_deliver+0x9a/0xb0
      [   36.035069]  [<ffffffff81657c90>] ? ip_rcv+0x3d0/0x3d0
      [   36.035963]  [<ffffffff81657569>] ip_rcv_finish+0x119/0x330
      [   36.036950]  [<ffffffff81657ba7>] ip_rcv+0x2e7/0x3d0
      [   36.037847]  [<ffffffff81610652>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x552/0x930
      [   36.038994]  [<ffffffff81610a57>] __netif_receive_skb+0x27/0x70
      [   36.040033]  [<ffffffff81610b72>] process_backlog+0xd2/0x1f0
      [   36.041025]  [<ffffffff81611482>] net_rx_action+0x122/0x310
      [   36.042007]  [<ffffffff81076743>] __do_softirq+0x103/0x2f0
      [   36.042978]  [<ffffffff81723e3c>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30
      
      This patch moves the call to tcp_fastopen_init_key_once to the places
      where a listener socket creates its TFO-state, which always happens in
      user-context (either from the setsockopt, or implicitly during the
      listen()-call)
      
      Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
      Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
      Fixes: 222e83d2 ("tcp: switch tcp_fastopen key generation to net_get_random_once")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarChristoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLuis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
      c55f3e35
    • Julian Anastasov's avatar
      neigh: do not modify unlinked entries · 550ee910
      Julian Anastasov authored
      commit 2c51a97f upstream.
      
      The lockless lookups can return entry that is unlinked.
      Sometimes they get reference before last neigh_cleanup_and_release,
      sometimes they do not need reference. Later, any
      modification attempts may result in the following problems:
      
      1. entry is not destroyed immediately because neigh_update
      can start the timer for dead entry, eg. on change to NUD_REACHABLE
      state. As result, entry lives for some time but is invisible
      and out of control.
      
      2. __neigh_event_send can run in parallel with neigh_destroy
      while refcnt=0 but if timer is started and expired refcnt can
      reach 0 for second time leading to second neigh_destroy and
      possible crash.
      
      Thanks to Eric Dumazet and Ying Xue for their work and analyze
      on the __neigh_event_send change.
      
      Fixes: 767e97e1 ("neigh: RCU conversion of struct neighbour")
      Fixes: a263b309 ("ipv4: Make neigh lookups directly in output packet path.")
      Fixes: 6fd6ce20 ("ipv6: Do not depend on rt->n in ip6_finish_output2().")
      Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
      Cc: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJulian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
      Acked-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLuis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
      550ee910
    • Willem de Bruijn's avatar
      packet: avoid out of bounds read in round robin fanout · c5e79731
      Willem de Bruijn authored
      commit 468479e6 upstream.
      
      PACKET_FANOUT_LB computes f->rr_cur such that it is modulo
      f->num_members. It returns the old value unconditionally, but
      f->num_members may have changed since the last store. Ensure
      that the return value is always < num.
      
      When modifying the logic, simplify it further by replacing the loop
      with an unconditional atomic increment.
      
      Fixes: dc99f600 ("packet: Add fanout support.")
      Suggested-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarWillem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLuis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
      c5e79731
    • Eric Dumazet's avatar
      packet: read num_members once in packet_rcv_fanout() · 95e32b4e
      Eric Dumazet authored
      commit f98f4514 upstream.
      
      We need to tell compiler it must not read f->num_members multiple
      times. Otherwise testing if num is not zero is flaky, and we could
      attempt an invalid divide by 0 in fanout_demux_cpu()
      
      Note bug was present in packet_rcv_fanout_hash() and
      packet_rcv_fanout_lb() but final 3.1 had a simple location
      after commit 95ec3eb4 ("packet: Add 'cpu' fanout policy.")
      
      Fixes: dc99f600 ("packet: Add fanout support.")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      [ luis: backported to 3.16: used davem's backport to 3.14 ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLuis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
      95e32b4e