1. 14 Apr, 2014 9 commits
    • Linus Lüssing's avatar
      bridge: multicast: add sanity check for query source addresses · 47c04466
      Linus Lüssing authored
      [ Upstream commit 6565b9ee ]
      
      MLD queries are supposed to have an IPv6 link-local source address
      according to RFC2710, section 4 and RFC3810, section 5.1.14. This patch
      adds a sanity check to ignore such broken MLD queries.
      
      Without this check, such malformed MLD queries can result in a
      denial of service: The queries are ignored by any MLD listener
      therefore they will not respond with an MLD report. However,
      without this patch these malformed MLD queries would enable the
      snooping part in the bridge code, potentially shutting down the
      according ports towards these hosts for multicast traffic as the
      bridge did not learn about these listeners.
      Reported-by: default avatarJan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Lüssing <linus.luessing@web.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      47c04466
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      net: sctp: fix skb leakage in COOKIE ECHO path of chunk->auth_chunk · ec494e10
      Daniel Borkmann authored
      [ Upstream commit c485658b ]
      
      While working on ec0223ec ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to
      verify if we/peer is AUTH capable"), we noticed that there's a skb
      memory leakage in the error path.
      
      Running the same reproducer as in ec0223ec and by unconditionally
      jumping to the error label (to simulate an error condition) in
      sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() receive path lets kmemleak detector bark about
      the unfreed chunk->auth_chunk skb clone:
      
      Unreferenced object 0xffff8800b8f3a000 (size 256):
        comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294769856 (age 110.757s)
        hex dump (first 32 bytes):
          00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
          89 ab 75 5e d4 01 58 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ..u^..X.........
        backtrace:
          [<ffffffff816660be>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
          [<ffffffff8119f328>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x210
          [<ffffffff81566929>] skb_clone+0x49/0xb0
          [<ffffffffa0467459>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1d9/0x230 [sctp]
          [<ffffffffa046fdbc>] sctp_inq_push+0x4c/0x70 [sctp]
          [<ffffffffa047e8de>] sctp_rcv+0x82e/0x9a0 [sctp]
          [<ffffffff815abd38>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xa8/0x210
          [<ffffffff815a64af>] nf_reinject+0xbf/0x180
          [<ffffffffa04b4762>] nfqnl_recv_verdict+0x1d2/0x2b0 [nfnetlink_queue]
          [<ffffffffa04aa40b>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x14b/0x250 [nfnetlink]
          [<ffffffff815a3269>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa9/0xc0
          [<ffffffffa04aa7cf>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x23f/0x408 [nfnetlink]
          [<ffffffff815a2bd8>] netlink_unicast+0x168/0x250
          [<ffffffff815a2fa1>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2e1/0x3f0
          [<ffffffff8155cc6b>] sock_sendmsg+0x8b/0xc0
          [<ffffffff8155d449>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x369/0x380
      
      What happens is that commit bbd0d598 clones the skb containing
      the AUTH chunk in sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv() when having the edge case
      that an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be authenticated:
      
        ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
        <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
        ------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ECHO ---------------->
        <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
      
      When we enter sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and before we actually get to
      the point where we process (and subsequently free) a non-NULL
      chunk->auth_chunk, we could hit the "goto nomem_init" path from
      an error condition and thus leave the cloned skb around w/o
      freeing it.
      
      The fix is to centrally free such clones in sctp_chunk_destroy()
      handler that is invoked from sctp_chunk_free() after all refs have
      dropped; and also move both kfree_skb(chunk->auth_chunk) there,
      so that chunk->auth_chunk is either NULL (since sctp_chunkify()
      allocs new chunks through kmem_cache_zalloc()) or non-NULL with
      a valid skb pointer. chunk->skb and chunk->auth_chunk are the
      only skbs in the sctp_chunk structure that need to be handeled.
      
      While at it, we should use consume_skb() for both. It is the same
      as dev_kfree_skb() but more appropriately named as we are not
      a device but a protocol. Also, this effectively replaces the
      kfree_skb() from both invocations into consume_skb(). Functions
      are the same only that kfree_skb() assumes that the frame was
      being dropped after a failure (e.g. for tools like drop monitor),
      usage of consume_skb() seems more appropriate in function
      sctp_chunk_destroy() though.
      
      Fixes: bbd0d598 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Vlad Yasevich <yasevich@gmail.com>
      Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      ec494e10
    • Nikolay Aleksandrov's avatar
      net: fix for a race condition in the inet frag code · f7a2e253
      Nikolay Aleksandrov authored
      [ Upstream commit 24b9bf43 ]
      
      I stumbled upon this very serious bug while hunting for another one,
      it's a very subtle race condition between inet_frag_evictor,
      inet_frag_intern and the IPv4/6 frag_queue and expire functions
      (basically the users of inet_frag_kill/inet_frag_put).
      
      What happens is that after a fragment has been added to the hash chain
      but before it's been added to the lru_list (inet_frag_lru_add) in
      inet_frag_intern, it may get deleted (either by an expired timer if
      the system load is high or the timer sufficiently low, or by the
      fraq_queue function for different reasons) before it's added to the
      lru_list, then after it gets added it's a matter of time for the
      evictor to get to a piece of memory which has been freed leading to a
      number of different bugs depending on what's left there.
      
      I've been able to trigger this on both IPv4 and IPv6 (which is normal
      as the frag code is the same), but it's been much more difficult to
      trigger on IPv4 due to the protocol differences about how fragments
      are treated.
      
      The setup I used to reproduce this is: 2 machines with 4 x 10G bonded
      in a RR bond, so the same flow can be seen on multiple cards at the
      same time. Then I used multiple instances of ping/ping6 to generate
      fragmented packets and flood the machines with them while running
      other processes to load the attacked machine.
      
      *It is very important to have the _same flow_ coming in on multiple CPUs
      concurrently. Usually the attacked machine would die in less than 30
      minutes, if configured properly to have many evictor calls and timeouts
      it could happen in 10 minutes or so.
      
      An important point to make is that any caller (frag_queue or timer) of
      inet_frag_kill will remove both the timer refcount and the
      original/guarding refcount thus removing everything that's keeping the
      frag from being freed at the next inet_frag_put.  All of this could
      happen before the frag was ever added to the LRU list, then it gets
      added and the evictor uses a freed fragment.
      
      An example for IPv6 would be if a fragment is being added and is at
      the stage of being inserted in the hash after the hash lock is
      released, but before inet_frag_lru_add executes (or is able to obtain
      the lru lock) another overlapping fragment for the same flow arrives
      at a different CPU which finds it in the hash, but since it's
      overlapping it drops it invoking inet_frag_kill and thus removing all
      guarding refcounts, and afterwards freeing it by invoking
      inet_frag_put which removes the last refcount added previously by
      inet_frag_find, then inet_frag_lru_add gets executed by
      inet_frag_intern and we have a freed fragment in the lru_list.
      
      The fix is simple, just move the lru_add under the hash chain locked
      region so when a removing function is called it'll have to wait for
      the fragment to be added to the lru_list, and then it'll remove it (it
      works because the hash chain removal is done before the lru_list one
      and there's no window between the two list adds when the frag can get
      dropped). With this fix applied I couldn't kill the same machine in 24
      hours with the same setup.
      
      Fixes: 3ef0eb0d ("net: frag, move LRU list maintenance outside of
      rwlock")
      
      CC: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
      CC: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
      CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarJesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      f7a2e253
    • Daniel Fu's avatar
      cpuidle: Check the result of cpuidle_get_driver() against NULL · 6ae69a80
      Daniel Fu authored
      commit 3b9c10e9 upstream.
      
      If the current CPU has no cpuidle driver, drv will be NULL in
      cpuidle_driver_ref().  Check if that is the case before trying
      to bump up the driver's refcount to prevent the kernel from
      crashing.
      
      [rjw: Subject and changelog]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Fu <danifu@nvidia.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      6ae69a80
    • Nicolas Dichtel's avatar
      kbuild: fix make headers_install when path is too long · 3246a035
      Nicolas Dichtel authored
      commit c0ff68f1 upstream.
      
      If headers_install is executed from a deep/long directory structure, the
      shell's maximum argument length can be execeeded, which breaks the operation
      with:
      
      | make[2]: execvp: /bin/sh: Argument list too long
      | make[2]: ***
      
      Instead of passing each files name with the entire path, I give only the file
      name without the source path and give this path as a new argument to
      headers_install.pl.
      
      Because there is three possible paths, I have tree input-files list, one per
      path.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarNicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
      Tested-by: default avatarBruce Ashfield <bruce.ashfield@windriver.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMichal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
      Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      3246a035
    • Mikulas Patocka's avatar
      powernow-k6: reorder frequencies · 45deaa3b
      Mikulas Patocka authored
      commit 22c73795 upstream.
      
      This patch reorders reported frequencies from the highest to the lowest,
      just like in other frequency drivers.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarViresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      
      45deaa3b
    • Mikulas Patocka's avatar
      powernow-k6: correctly initialize default parameters · 59b61f4d
      Mikulas Patocka authored
      commit d82b922a upstream.
      
      The powernow-k6 driver used to read the initial multiplier from the
      powernow register. However, there is a problem with this:
      
      * If there was a frequency transition before, the multiplier read from the
        register corresponds to the current multiplier.
      * If there was no frequency transition since reset, the field in the
        register always reads as zero, regardless of the current multiplier that
        is set using switches on the mainboard and that the CPU is running at.
      
      The zero value corresponds to multiplier 4.5, so as a consequence, the
      powernow-k6 driver always assumes multiplier 4.5.
      
      For example, if we have 550MHz CPU with bus frequency 100MHz and
      multiplier 5.5, the powernow-k6 driver thinks that the multiplier is 4.5
      and bus frequency is 122MHz. The powernow-k6 driver then sets the
      multiplier to 4.5, underclocking the CPU to 450MHz, but reports the
      current frequency as 550MHz.
      
      There is no reliable way how to read the initial multiplier. I modified
      the driver so that it contains a table of known frequencies (based on
      parameters of existing CPUs and some common overclocking schemes) and sets
      the multiplier according to the frequency. If the frequency is unknown
      (because of unusual overclocking or underclocking), the user must supply
      the bus speed and maximum multiplier as module parameters.
      
      This patch should be backported to all stable kernels. If it doesn't
      apply cleanly, change it, or ask me to change it.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      
      59b61f4d
    • Mikulas Patocka's avatar
      powernow-k6: disable cache when changing frequency · cfc83ee6
      Mikulas Patocka authored
      commit e20e1d0a upstream.
      
      I found out that a system with k6-3+ processor is unstable during network
      server load. The system locks up or the network card stops receiving. The
      reason for the instability is the CPU frequency scaling.
      
      During frequency transition the processor is in "EPM Stop Grant" state.
      The documentation says that the processor doesn't respond to inquiry
      requests in this state. Consequently, coherency of processor caches and
      bus master devices is not maintained, causing the system instability.
      
      This patch flushes the cache during frequency transition. It fixes the
      instability.
      
      Other minor changes:
      * u64 invalue changed to unsigned long because the variable is 32-bit
      * move the logic to set the multiplier to a separate function
        powernow_k6_set_cpu_multiplier
      * preserve lower 5 bits of the powernow port instead of 4 (the voltage
        field has 5 bits)
      * mask interrupts when reading the multiplier, so that the port is not
        open during other activity (running other kernel code with the port open
        shouldn't cause any misbehavior, but we should better be safe and keep
        the port closed)
      
      This patch should be backported to all stable kernels. If it doesn't
      apply cleanly, change it, or ask me to change it.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      cfc83ee6
    • Paul Moore's avatar
      selinux: correctly label /proc inodes in use before the policy is loaded · 913a13b6
      Paul Moore authored
      commit f64410ec upstream.
      
      This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Paris, he describes
      the problem below:
      
        "If an inode is accessed before policy load it will get placed on a
         list of inodes to be initialized after policy load.  After policy
         load we call inode_doinit() which calls inode_doinit_with_dentry()
         on all inodes accessed before policy load.  In the case of inodes
         in procfs that means we'll end up at the bottom where it does:
      
           /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
           isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
      
           if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
                   if (opt_dentry) {
                           isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(...)
                           rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
                                                     isec->sclass,
                                                     &sid);
                           if (rc)
                                   goto out_unlock;
                           isec->sid = sid;
                   }
           }
      
         Since opt_dentry is null, we'll never call selinux_proc_get_sid()
         and will leave the inode labeled with the label on the superblock.
         I believe a fix would be to mimic the behavior of xattrs.  Look
         for an alias of the inode.  If it can't be found, just leave the
         inode uninitialized (and pick it up later) if it can be found, we
         should be able to call selinux_proc_get_sid() ..."
      
      On a system exhibiting this problem, you will notice a lot of files in
      /proc with the generic "proc_t" type (at least the ones that were
      accessed early in the boot), for example:
      
         # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
         system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax
      
      However, with this patch in place we see the expected result:
      
         # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
         system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax
      
      Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      913a13b6
  2. 03 Apr, 2014 10 commits
  3. 31 Mar, 2014 21 commits