- 19 May, 2014 3 commits
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Willy Tarreau authored
This reverts commit 4ed3bb08. As reported by Sven-Haegar Koch, this patch breaks make headers_check : CHECK include (0 files) CHECK include/asm (54 files) /home/haegar/src/2.6.32/linux/usr/include/asm/ptrace.h:5: included file 'linux/linkage.h' is not exported Signed-off-by:
Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Ben Greear authored
The stop machine logic can lock up if all but one of the migration threads make it through the disable-irq step and the one remaining thread gets stuck in __do_softirq. The reason __do_softirq can hang is that it has a bail-out based on jiffies timeout, but in the lockup case, jiffies itself is not incremented. To work around this, re-add the max_restart counter in __do_irq and stop processing irqs after 10 restarts. Thanks to Tejun Heo and Rusty Russell and others for helping me track this down. This was introduced in 3.9 by commit c10d7367 ("softirq: reduce latencies"). It may be worth looking into ath9k to see if it has issues with its irq handler at a later date. The hang stack traces look something like this: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: at kernel/watchdog.c:245 watchdog_overflow_callback+0x9c/0xa7() Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 2 Modules linked in: ath9k ath9k_common ath9k_hw ath mac80211 cfg80211 nfsv4 auth_rpcgss nfs fscache nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat veth 8021q garp stp mrp llc pktgen lockd sunrpc] Pid: 23, comm: migration/2 Tainted: G C 3.9.4+ #11 Call Trace: <NMI> warn_slowpath_common+0x85/0x9f warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x48 watchdog_overflow_callback+0x9c/0xa7 __perf_event_overflow+0x137/0x1cb perf_event_overflow+0x14/0x16 intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x2dc/0x359 perf_event_nmi_handler+0x19/0x1b nmi_handle+0x7f/0xc2 do_nmi+0xbc/0x304 end_repeat_nmi+0x1e/0x2e <<EOE>> cpu_stopper_thread+0xae/0x162 smpboot_thread_fn+0x258/0x260 kthread+0xc7/0xcf ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 ---[ end trace 4947dfa9b0a4cec3 ]--- BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 22s! [migration/1:17] Modules linked in: ath9k ath9k_common ath9k_hw ath mac80211 cfg80211 nfsv4 auth_rpcgss nfs fscache nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat veth 8021q garp stp mrp llc pktgen lockd sunrpc] irq event stamp: 835637905 hardirqs last enabled at (835637904): __do_softirq+0x9f/0x257 hardirqs last disabled at (835637905): apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80 softirqs last enabled at (5654720): __do_softirq+0x1ff/0x257 softirqs last disabled at (5654725): irq_exit+0x5f/0xbb CPU 1 Pid: 17, comm: migration/1 Tainted: G WC 3.9.4+ #11 To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./To be filled by O.E.M. RIP: tasklet_hi_action+0xf0/0xf0 Process migration/1 Call Trace: <IRQ> __do_softirq+0x117/0x257 irq_exit+0x5f/0xbb smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8a/0x98 apic_timer_interrupt+0x72/0x80 <EOI> printk+0x4d/0x4f stop_machine_cpu_stop+0x22c/0x274 cpu_stopper_thread+0xae/0x162 smpboot_thread_fn+0x258/0x260 kthread+0xc7/0xcf ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 Signed-off-by:
Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com> Acked-by:
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by:
Pekka Riikonen <priikone@iki.fi> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 34376a50) Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Bork authored
Thomas Bork reported that commit c6203cd4 ("scsi: use __uX types for headers exported to user space") caused a regression as now he's getting this warning : > /usr/src/linux-2.6.32-eisfair-1/usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink.h:108: > found __[us]{8,16,32,64} type without #include <linux/types.h> This issue was addressed later by commit 10db4e1e ("headers: include linux/types.h where appropriate"), so let's just pick the relevant part from it. Cc: Thomas Bork <tom@eisfair.net> Signed-off-by:
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- 10 Jun, 2013 37 commits
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Willy Tarreau authored
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Willy Tarreau authored
Christoph Biedl reported that 2.6.32 does not build with gcc 4.7 on i386 : CC arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.o arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:1472:17: error: conflicting types for 'syscall_trace_enter' In file included from /PKGBUILDDIR/arch/x86/include/asm/vm86.h:130:0, from /PKGBUILDDIR/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h:10, from /PKGBUILDDIR/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h:22, from include/linux/thread_info.h:56, from include/linux/preempt.h:9, from include/linux/spinlock.h:50, from include/linux/seqlock.h:29, from include/linux/time.h:8, from include/linux/timex.h:56, from include/linux/sched.h:56, from arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:11: /PKGBUILDDIR/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h:145:13: note: previous declaration of 'syscall_trace_enter' was here arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:1517:17: error: conflicting types for 'syscall_trace_leave' In file included from /PKGBUILDDIR/arch/x86/include/asm/vm86.h:130:0, from /PKGBUILDDIR/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h:10, from /PKGBUILDDIR/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h:22, from include/linux/thread_info.h:56, from include/linux/preempt.h:9, from include/linux/spinlock.h:50, from include/linux/seqlock.h:29, from include/linux/time.h:8, from include/linux/timex.h:56, from include/linux/sched.h:56, from arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:11: /PKGBUILDDIR/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h:146:13: note: previous declaration of 'syscall_trace_leave' was here make[4]: *** [arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.o] Error 1 make[3]: *** [arch/x86/kernel] Error 2 make[3]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs.... He also found that this issue did not appear in more recent kernels since this asmregparm disappeared in 3.0-rc1 with commit 1b4ac2a9 that was applied after some UM changes that we don't necessarily want in 2.6.32. Thus, the cleanest fix for older kernels is to make the declaration in ptrace.h match the one in ptrace.c by specifying asmregparm on these functions. They're only called from asm which explains why it used to work despite the inconsistency in the declaration. Reported-by:Christoph Biedl <linux-kernel.bfrz@manchmal.in-ulm.de> Tested-by:
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Kashyap, Desai authored
commit ebda4d38 upstream. RAID_SCSI_IO_PASSTHROUGH: Driver needs to be sending the default descriptor for RAID Passthru, currently its sending SCSI_IO descriptor. Signed-off-by:
Kashyap Desai <kashyap.desai@lsi.com> Signed-off-by:
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Mathias Krause authored
commit 60085c3d upstream. The code in set_orig_addr() does not initialize all of the members of struct sockaddr_tipc when filling the sockaddr info -- namely the union is only partly filled. This will make recv_msg() and recv_stream() -- the only users of this function -- leak kernel stack memory as the msg_name member is a local variable in net/socket.c. Additionally to that both recv_msg() and recv_stream() fail to update the msg_namelen member to 0 while otherwise returning with 0, i.e. "success". This is the case for, e.g., non-blocking sockets. This will lead to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c. Fix the first issue by initializing the memory of the union with memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early as it will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member. Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Cc: Allan Stephens <allan.stephens@windriver.com> Signed-off-by:
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [dannf: backported to Debian's 2.6.32] Signed-off-by:
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Mathias Krause authored
commit 5ae94c0d upstream. The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set. It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory. Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared about irda_recvmsg_dgram() not filling the msg_name in case it was set. Cc: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org> Signed-off-by:
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Mathias Krause authored
[ Upstream commit 4a184233 ] The code in rose_recvmsg() does not initialize all of the members of struct sockaddr_rose/full_sockaddr_rose when filling the sockaddr info. Nor does it initialize the padding bytes of the structure inserted by the compiler for alignment. This will lead to leaking uninitialized kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c. Fix the issue by initializing the memory used for sockaddr info with memset(0). Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Weiping Pan authored
commit 06b6a1cf upstream Jay Fenlason (fenlason@redhat.com) found a bug, that recvfrom() on an RDS socket can return the contents of random kernel memory to userspace if it was called with a address length larger than sizeof(struct sockaddr_in). rds_recvmsg() also fails to set the addr_len paramater properly before returning, but that's just a bug. There are also a number of cases wher recvfrom() can return an entirely bogus address. Anything in rds_recvmsg() that returns a non-negative value but does not go through the "sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;" code path at the end of the while(1) loop will return up to 128 bytes of kernel memory to userspace. And I write two test programs to reproduce this bug, you will see that in rds_server, fromAddr will be overwritten and the following sock_fd will be destroyed. Yes, it is the programmer's fault to set msg_namelen incorrectly, but it is better to make the kernel copy the real length of address to user space in such case. How to run the test programs ? I test them on 32bit x86 system, 3.5.0-rc7. 1 compile gcc -o rds_client rds_client.c gcc -o rds_server rds_server.c 2 run ./rds_server on one console 3 run ./rds_client on another console 4 you will see something like: server is waiting to receive data... old socket fd=3 server received data from client:data from client msg.msg_namelen=32 new socket fd=-1067277685 sendmsg() : Bad file descriptor /***************** rds_client.c ********************/ int main(void) { int sock_fd; struct sockaddr_in serverAddr; struct sockaddr_in toAddr; char recvBuffer[128] = "data from client"; struct msghdr msg; struct iovec iov; sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); if (sock_fd < 0) { perror("create socket error\n"); exit(1); } memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr)); serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET; serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1"); serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4001); if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) { perror("bind() error\n"); close(sock_fd); exit(1); } memset(&toAddr, 0, sizeof(toAddr)); toAddr.sin_family = AF_INET; toAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1"); toAddr.sin_port = htons(4000); msg.msg_name = &toAddr; msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr); msg.msg_iov = &iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer; msg.msg_iov->iov_len = strlen(recvBuffer) + 1; msg.msg_control = 0; msg.msg_controllen = 0; msg.msg_flags = 0; if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) { perror("sendto() error\n"); close(sock_fd); exit(1); } printf("client send data:%s\n", recvBuffer); memset(recvBuffer, '\0', 128); msg.msg_name = &toAddr; msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr); msg.msg_iov = &iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer; msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128; msg.msg_control = 0; msg.msg_controllen = 0; msg.msg_flags = 0; if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) { perror("recvmsg() error\n"); close(sock_fd); exit(1); } printf("receive data from server:%s\n", recvBuffer); close(sock_fd); return 0; } /***************** rds_server.c ********************/ int main(void) { struct sockaddr_in fromAddr; int sock_fd; struct sockaddr_in serverAddr; unsigned int addrLen; char recvBuffer[128]; struct msghdr msg; struct iovec iov; sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); if(sock_fd < 0) { perror("create socket error\n"); exit(0); } memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr)); serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET; serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1"); serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4000); if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) { perror("bind error\n"); close(sock_fd); exit(1); } printf("server is waiting to receive data...\n"); msg.msg_name = &fromAddr; /* * I add 16 to sizeof(fromAddr), ie 32, * and pay attention to the definition of fromAddr, * recvmsg() will overwrite sock_fd, * since kernel will copy 32 bytes to userspace. * * If you just use sizeof(fromAddr), it works fine. * */ msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr) + 16; /* msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr); */ msg.msg_iov = &iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer; msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128; msg.msg_control = 0; msg.msg_controllen = 0; msg.msg_flags = 0; while (1) { printf("old socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd); if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) { perror("recvmsg() error\n"); close(sock_fd); exit(1); } printf("server received data from client:%s\n", recvBuffer); printf("msg.msg_namelen=%d\n", msg.msg_namelen); printf("new socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd); strcat(recvBuffer, "--data from server"); if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) { perror("sendmsg()\n"); close(sock_fd); exit(1); } } close(sock_fd); return 0; } Signed-off-by:
Weiping Pan <wpan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mathias Krause authored
[ Upstream commit c77a4b9c ] For stream sockets the code misses to update the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory. The msg_namelen update is also missing for datagram sockets in case the socket is shutting down during receive. Fix both issues by setting msg_namelen to 0 early. It will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member. Signed-off-by:
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Mathias Krause authored
[ Upstream commit 3592aaeb ] The LLC code wrongly returns 0, i.e. "success", when the socket is zapped. Together with the uninitialized uaddrlen pointer argument from sys_getsockname this leads to an arbitrary memory leak of up to 128 bytes kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall. Return an error instead when the socket is zapped to prevent the info leak. Also remove the unnecessary memset(0). We don't directly write to the memory pointed by uaddr but memcpy() a local structure at the end of the function that is properly initialized. Signed-off-by:
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Mathias Krause authored
[ Upstream commit a5598bd9 ] The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set. It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory. Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set. Signed-off-by:
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Wu Fengguang authored
[ Upstream commit 77f00f63 ] Fix a buffer overflow bug by removing the revision and printk. [ 22.016214] isdnloop-ISDN-driver Rev 1.11.6.7 [ 22.097508] isdnloop: (loop0) virtual card added [ 22.174400] Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: ffffffff83244972 [ 22.174400] [ 22.436157] Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted 3.5.0-bisect-00018-gfa8bbb13-dirty #129 [ 22.624071] Call Trace: [ 22.720558] [<ffffffff832448c3>] ? CallcNew+0x56/0x56 [ 22.815248] [<ffffffff8222b623>] panic+0x110/0x329 [ 22.914330] [<ffffffff83244972>] ? isdnloop_init+0xaf/0xb1 [ 23.014800] [<ffffffff832448c3>] ? CallcNew+0x56/0x56 [ 23.090763] [<ffffffff8108e24b>] __stack_chk_fail+0x2b/0x30 [ 23.185748] [<ffffffff83244972>] isdnloop_init+0xaf/0xb1 Signed-off-by:
Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mathias Krause authored
[ Upstream commit ef3313e8 ] When msg_namelen is non-zero the sockaddr info gets filled out, as requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of struct sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Additionally the msg_namelen value is updated to sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_ax25) but is not always filled up to this size. Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c. Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0). Signed-off-by:
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Mathias Krause authored
commit e862f1a9 upstream. The ATM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct sockaddr_atmpvc inserted for alignment. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak. Signed-off-by:
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Mathias Krause authored
commit 3c0c5cfd upstream. The ATM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct sockaddr_atmpvc inserted for alignment. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak. Signed-off-by:
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Mathias Krause authored
[ Upstream commit 9b3e617f ] The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set. It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory. Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared about vcc_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set. Signed-off-by:
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Mathias Krause authored
commit 2d8a041b upstream. If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to __ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak. Signed-off-by:
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Jesper Dangaard Brouer authored
Cleaning up the IPv6 MTU checking in the IPVS xmit code, by using a common helper function __mtu_check_toobig_v6(). The MTU check for tunnel mode can also use this helper as ntohs(old_iph->payload_len) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) is qual to skb->len. And the 'mtu' variable have been adjusted before calling helper. Notice, this also fixes a bug, as the the MTU check in ip_vs_dr_xmit_v6() were missing a check for skb_is_gso(). This bug e.g. caused issues for KVM IPVS setups, where different Segmentation Offloading techniques are utilized, between guests, via the virtio driver. This resulted in very bad performance, due to the ICMPv6 "too big" messages didn't affect the sender. Signed-off-by:
Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by:
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> (cherry picked from commit 590e3f79) Signed-off-by:
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Simon Horman authored
Attempt at allowing LVS to transmit skbs of greater than MTU length that have been aggregated by GRO and can thus be deaggregated by GSO. Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by:
Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> (cherry picked from commit 8f1b03a4) Signed-off-by:
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Jozsef Kadlecsik authored
commit 07153c6e upstream. It was reported that the Linux kernel sometimes logs: klogd: [2629147.402413] kernel BUG at net / netfilter / nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c: 447! klogd: [1072212.887368] kernel BUG at net / netfilter / nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c: 392 ipv4_get_l4proto() in nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4.c and tcp_error() in nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c should catch malformed packets, so the errors at the indicated lines - TCP options parsing - should not happen. However, tcp_error() relies on the "dataoff" offset to the TCP header, calculated by ipv4_get_l4proto(). But ipv4_get_l4proto() does not check bogus ihl values in IPv4 packets, which then can slip through tcp_error() and get caught at the TCP options parsing routines. The patch fixes ipv4_get_l4proto() by invalidating packets with bogus ihl value. The patch closes netfilter bugzilla id 771. Signed-off-by:
Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Backport of upstream commit 87c48fa3 ] Fernando Gont reported current IPv6 fragment identification generation was not secure, because using a very predictable system-wide generator, allowing various attacks. IPv4 uses inetpeer cache to address this problem and to get good performance. We'll use this mechanism when IPv6 inetpeer is stable enough in linux-3.1 For the time being, we use jhash on destination address to provide less predictable identifications. Also remove a spinlock and use cmpxchg() to get better SMP performance. Reported-by:
Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar> Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> [bwh: Backport further to 2.6.32] Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Nicolas Dichtel authored
commit 70789d70 upstream RFC5722 prohibits reassembling fragments when some data overlaps. Bug spotted by Zhang Zuotao <zuotao.zhang@6wind.com>. Signed-off-by:
Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit 586c31f3 ] For sensitive data like keying material, it is common practice to zero out keys before returning the memory back to the allocator. Thus, use kzfree instead of kfree. Signed-off-by:
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by:
Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit b5c37fe6 ] On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do with e.g. auth keys when released. Signed-off-by:
Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit 6ba542a2 ] In sctp_setsockopt_auth_key, we create a temporary copy of the user passed shared auth key for the endpoint or association and after internal setup, we free it right away. Since it's sensitive data, we should zero out the key before returning the memory back to the allocator. Thus, use kzfree instead of kfree, just as we do in sctp_auth_key_put(). Signed-off-by:
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Tommi Rantala authored
[ Upstream commit be364c8c ] Trinity (the syscall fuzzer) discovered a memory leak in SCTP, reproducible e.g. with the sendto() syscall by passing invalid user space pointer in the second argument: #include <string.h> #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <sys/socket.h> int main(void) { int fd; struct sockaddr_in sa; fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 132 /*IPPROTO_SCTP*/); if (fd < 0) return 1; memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); sa.sin_family = AF_INET; sa.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1"); sa.sin_port = htons(11111); sendto(fd, NULL, 1, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa)); return 0; } As far as I can tell, the leak has been around since ~2003. Signed-off-by:
Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com> Acked-by:
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Mathias Krause authored
commit 29cd8ae0 upstream. The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places: * perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but copied completely, * no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand, so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes for ieee_pfc structs, etc., * the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole struct, Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the buffers/structures involved. Signed-off-by:
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Paul Moore authored
[ Upstream commit ded34e0f ] As reported by Jan, and others over the past few years, there is a race condition caused by unix_release setting the sock->sk pointer to NULL before properly marking the socket as dead/orphaned. This can cause a problem with the LSM hook security_unix_may_send() if there is another socket attempting to write to this partially released socket in between when sock->sk is set to NULL and it is marked as dead/orphaned. This patch fixes this by only setting sock->sk to NULL after the socket has been marked as dead; I also take the opportunity to make unix_release_sock() a void function as it only ever returned 0/success. Dave, I think this one should go on the -stable pile. Special thanks to Jan for coming up with a reproducer for this problem. Reported-by:
Jan Stancek <jan.stancek@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit f4541d60 ] A long standing problem with TSO is the fact that tcp_tso_should_defer() rearms the deferred timer, while it should not. Current code leads to following bad bursty behavior : 20:11:24.484333 IP A > B: . 297161:316921(19760) ack 1 win 119 20:11:24.484337 IP B > A: . ack 263721 win 1117 20:11:24.485086 IP B > A: . ack 265241 win 1117 20:11:24.485925 IP B > A: . ack 266761 win 1117 20:11:24.486759 IP B > A: . ack 268281 win 1117 20:11:24.487594 IP B > A: . ack 269801 win 1117 20:11:24.488430 IP B > A: . ack 271321 win 1117 20:11:24.489267 IP B > A: . ack 272841 win 1117 20:11:24.490104 IP B > A: . ack 274361 win 1117 20:11:24.490939 IP B > A: . ack 275881 win 1117 20:11:24.491775 IP B > A: . ack 277401 win 1117 20:11:24.491784 IP A > B: . 316921:332881(15960) ack 1 win 119 20:11:24.492620 IP B > A: . ack 278921 win 1117 20:11:24.493448 IP B > A: . ack 280441 win 1117 20:11:24.494286 IP B > A: . ack 281961 win 1117 20:11:24.495122 IP B > A: . ack 283481 win 1117 20:11:24.495958 IP B > A: . ack 285001 win 1117 20:11:24.496791 IP B > A: . ack 286521 win 1117 20:11:24.497628 IP B > A: . ack 288041 win 1117 20:11:24.498459 IP B > A: . ack 289561 win 1117 20:11:24.499296 IP B > A: . ack 291081 win 1117 20:11:24.500133 IP B > A: . ack 292601 win 1117 20:11:24.500970 IP B > A: . ack 294121 win 1117 20:11:24.501388 IP B > A: . ack 295641 win 1117 20:11:24.501398 IP A > B: . 332881:351881(19000) ack 1 win 119 While the expected behavior is more like : 20:19:49.259620 IP A > B: . 197601:202161(4560) ack 1 win 119 20:19:49.260446 IP B > A: . ack 154281 win 1212 20:19:49.261282 IP B > A: . ack 155801 win 1212 20:19:49.262125 IP B > A: . ack 157321 win 1212 20:19:49.262136 IP A > B: . 202161:206721(4560) ack 1 win 119 20:19:49.262958 IP B > A: . ack 158841 win 1212 20:19:49.263795 IP B > A: . ack 160361 win 1212 20:19:49.264628 IP B > A: . ack 161881 win 1212 20:19:49.264637 IP A > B: . 206721:211281(4560) ack 1 win 119 20:19:49.265465 IP B > A: . ack 163401 win 1212 20:19:49.265886 IP B > A: . ack 164921 win 1212 20:19:49.266722 IP B > A: . ack 166441 win 1212 20:19:49.266732 IP A > B: . 211281:215841(4560) ack 1 win 119 20:19:49.267559 IP B > A: . ack 167961 win 1212 20:19:49.268394 IP B > A: . ack 169481 win 1212 20:19:49.269232 IP B > A: . ack 171001 win 1212 20:19:49.269241 IP A > B: . 215841:221161(5320) ack 1 win 119 Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Van Jacobson <vanj@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit ae62ca7b ] commit 35f9c09f (tcp: tcp_sendpages() should call tcp_push() once) added an internal flag : MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST meant to be set on all frags but the last one for a splice() call. The condition used to set the flag in pipe_to_sendpage() relied on splice() user passing the exact number of bytes present in the pipe, or a smaller one. But some programs pass an arbitrary high value, and the test fails. The effect of this bug is a lack of tcp_push() at the end of a splice(pipe -> socket) call, and possibly very slow or erratic TCP sessions. We should both test sd->total_len and fact that another fragment is in the pipe (pipe->nrbufs > 1) Many thanks to Willy for providing very clear bug report, bisection and test programs. Reported-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ This combines upstream commit 2f533844 and the follow-on bug fix commit 35f9c09f ] vmsplice()/splice(pipe, socket) call do_tcp_sendpages() one page at a time, adding at most 4096 bytes to an skb. (assuming PAGE_SIZE=4096) The call to tcp_push() at the end of do_tcp_sendpages() forces an immediate xmit when pipe is not already filled, and tso_fragment() try to split these skb to MSS multiples. 4096 bytes are usually split in a skb with 2 MSS, and a remaining sub-mss skb (assuming MTU=1500) This makes slow start suboptimal because many small frames are sent to qdisc/driver layers instead of big ones (constrained by cwnd and packets in flight of course) In fact, applications using sendmsg() (adding an additional memory copy) instead of vmsplice()/splice()/sendfile() are a bit faster because of this anomaly, especially if serving small files in environments with large initial [c]wnd. Call tcp_push() only if MSG_MORE is not set in the flags parameter. This bit is automatically provided by splice() internals but for the last page, or on all pages if user specified SPLICE_F_MORE splice() flag. In some workloads, this can reduce number of sent logical packets by an order of magnitude, making zero-copy TCP actually faster than one-copy :) Reported-by:
Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Cc: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: H.K. Jerry Chu <hkchu@google.com> Cc: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Cc: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com> Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit f6d8bd05 upstream. We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options), without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt. Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us. Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt). Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying. We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new ip_options_rcu structure. Signed-off-by:
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Mathias Krause authored
commit 43da5f2e upstream. The implementation of dev_ifconf() for the compat ioctl interface uses an intermediate ifc structure allocated in userland for the duration of the syscall. Though, it fails to initialize the padding bytes inserted for alignment and that for leaks four bytes of kernel stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 3e10986d ] Its possible to use RAW sockets to get a crash in tcp_set_keepalive() / sk_reset_timer() Fix is to make sure socket is a SOCK_STREAM one. Reported-by:
Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jesper Dangaard Brouer authored
commit 8f363b77 upstream Reading TCP stats when using TCP Illinois congestion control algorithm can cause a divide by zero kernel oops. The division by zero occur in tcp_illinois_info() at: do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt); where ca->cnt_rtt can become zero (when rtt_reset is called) Steps to Reproduce: 1. Register tcp_illinois: # sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control=illinois 2. Monitor internal TCP information via command "ss -i" # watch -d ss -i 3. Establish new TCP conn to machine Either it fails at the initial conn, or else it needs to wait for a loss or a reset. This is only related to reading stats. The function avg_delay() also performs the same divide, but is guarded with a (ca->cnt_rtt > 0) at its calling point in update_params(). Thus, simply fix tcp_illinois_info(). Function tcp_illinois_info() / get_info() is called without socket lock. Thus, eliminate any race condition on ca->cnt_rtt by using a local stack variable. Simply reuse info.tcpv_rttcnt, as its already set to ca->cnt_rtt. Function avg_delay() is not affected by this race condition, as its called with the socket lock. Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com> Signed-off-by:
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Cong Wang authored
[ Upstream commit c9be4a5c ] A regression is introduced by the following commit: commit 4d52cfbe Author: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Date: Tue Jun 2 00:42:16 2009 -0700 net: ipv4/ip_sockglue.c cleanups Pure cleanups but it is not a pure cleanup... - if (val != -1 && (val < 1 || val>255)) + if (val != -1 && (val < 0 || val > 255)) Since there is no reason provided to allow ttl=0, change it back. Reported-by:
nitin padalia <padalia.nitin@gmail.com> Cc: nitin padalia <padalia.nitin@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Acked-by:
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Stefan Hasko authored
[ Upstream commit d2fe85da ] Fixed integer overflow in function htb_dequeue Signed-off-by:
Stefan Hasko <hasko.stevo@gmail.com> Acked-by:
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Hiroaki SHIMODA authored
[ Upstream commit 696ecdc1 ] gact_rand array is accessed by gact->tcfg_ptype whose value is assumed to less than MAX_RAND, but any range checks are not performed. So add a check in tcf_gact_init(). And in tcf_gact(), we can reduce a branch. Signed-off-by:
Hiroaki SHIMODA <shimoda.hiroaki@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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