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  1. 06 Aug, 2015 24 commits
  3. 05 Aug, 2015 14 commits
    • Grigori Goronzy's avatar
      drm/radeon: fix HDP flushing · 8b72decc
      Grigori Goronzy authored 
      commit 54e03986 upstream.

This was regressed by commit 39e7f6f8, although I don't know of any
actual issues caused by it.

The storage domain is read without TTM locking now, but the lock
never helped to prevent any races.
Reviewed-by: default avatarChristian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGrigori Goronzy <greg@chown.ath.cx>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      8b72decc
    • Ian Munsie's avatar
      cxl: Fix off by one error allowing subsequent mmap page to be accessed · 8c980662
      Ian Munsie authored 
      commit 10a5894f upstream.

It was discovered that if a process mmaped their problem state area they
were able to access one page more than expected, potentially allowing
them to access the problem state area of an unrelated process.

This was due to a simple off by one error in the mmap fault handler
introduced in 0712dc7e ("cxl: Fix issues
when unmapping contexts"), which is fixed in this patch.

Fixes: 0712dc7e ("cxl: Fix issues when unmapping contexts")
Signed-off-by: default avatarIan Munsie <imunsie@au1.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      8c980662
    • Shreyas B. Prabhu's avatar
      powerpc/powernv: Fix race in updating core_idle_state · 55fbd98c
      Shreyas B. Prabhu authored 
      commit b32aadc1 upstream.

core_idle_state is maintained for each core. It uses 0-7 bits to track
whether a thread in the core has entered fastsleep or winkle. 8th bit is
used as a lock bit.
The lock bit is set in these 2 scenarios-
 - The thread is first in subcore to wakeup from sleep/winkle.
 - If its the last thread in the core about to enter sleep/winkle

While the lock bit is set, if any other thread in the core wakes up, it
loops until the lock bit is cleared before proceeding in the wakeup
path. This helps prevent race conditions w.r.t fastsleep workaround and
prevents threads from switching to process context before core/subcore
resources are restored.

But, in the path to sleep/winkle entry, we currently don't check for
lock-bit. This exposes us to following race when running with subcore
on-

First thread in the subcorea		Another thread in the same
waking up		   		core entering sleep/winkle

lwarx   r15,0,r14
ori     r15,r15,PNV_CORE_IDLE_LOCK_BIT
stwcx.  r15,0,r14
[Code to restore subcore state]

						lwarx   r15,0,r14
						[clear thread bit]
						stwcx.  r15,0,r14

andi.   r15,r15,PNV_CORE_IDLE_THREAD_BITS
stw     r15,0(r14)

Here, after the thread entering sleep clears its thread bit in
core_idle_state, the value is overwritten by the thread waking up.
In such cases when the core enters fastsleep, code mistakes an idle
thread as running. Because of this, the first thread waking up from
fastsleep which is supposed to resync timebase skips it. So we can
end up having a core with stale timebase value.

This patch fixes the above race by looping on the lock bit even while
entering the idle states.
Signed-off-by: default avatarShreyas B. Prabhu <shreyas@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Fixes: 7b54e9f213f76 'powernv/powerpc: Add winkle support for offline cpus'
Signed-off-by: default avatarMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      55fbd98c
    • Rafael J. Wysocki's avatar
      ACPI / PNP: Reserve ACPI resources at the fs_initcall_sync stage · 39893e3b
      Rafael J. Wysocki authored 
      commit 0294112e upstream.

This effectively reverts the following three commits:

 7bc10388 ACPI / resources: free memory on error in add_region_before()
 0f1b414d ACPI / PNP: Avoid conflicting resource reservations
 b9a5e5e1 ACPI / init: Fix the ordering of acpi_reserve_resources()

(commit b9a5e5e1 introduced regressions some of which, but not
all, were addressed by commit 0f1b414d and commit 7bc10388
was a fixup on top of the latter) and causes ACPI fixed hardware
resources to be reserved at the fs_initcall_sync stage of system
initialization.

The story is as follows.  First, a boot regression was reported due
to an apparent resource reservation ordering change after a commit
that shouldn't lead to such changes.  Investigation led to the
conclusion that the problem happened because acpi_reserve_resources()
was executed at the device_initcall() stage of system initialization
which wasn't strictly ordered with respect to driver initialization
(and with respect to the initialization of the pcieport driver in
particular), so a random change causing the device initcalls to be
run in a different order might break things.

The response to that was to attempt to run acpi_reserve_resources()
as soon as we knew that ACPI would be in use (commit b9a5e5e1).
However, that turned out to be too early, because it caused resource
reservations made by the PNP system driver to fail on at least one
system and that failure was addressed by commit 0f1b414d.

That fix still turned out to be insufficient, though, because
calling acpi_reserve_resources() before the fs_initcall stage of
system initialization caused a boot regression to happen on the
eCAFE EC-800-H20G/S netbook.  That meant that we only could call
acpi_reserve_resources() at the fs_initcall initialization stage
or later, but then we might just as well call it after the PNP
initalization in which case commit 0f1b414d wouldn't be
necessary any more.

For this reason, the changes made by commit 0f1b414d are reverted
(along with a memory leak fixup on top of that commit), the changes
made by commit b9a5e5e1 that went too far are reverted too and
acpi_reserve_resources() is changed into fs_initcall_sync, which
will cause it to be executed after the PNP subsystem initialization
(which is an fs_initcall) and before device initcalls (including
the pcieport driver initialization) which should avoid the initial
issue.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100581
Link: http://marc.info/?t=143092384600002&r=1&w=2
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=99831
Link: http://marc.info/?t=143389402600001&r=1&w=2
Fixes: b9a5e5e1 "ACPI / init: Fix the ordering of acpi_reserve_resources()"
Reported-by: default avatarRoland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      39893e3b
    • Roger Quadros's avatar
      ARM: dts: am57xx-beagle-x15: Provide supply for usb2_phy2 · 934ab6eb
      Roger Quadros authored 
      commit 9ab402ae upstream.

Without this USB2 breaks if USB1 is disabled or USB1
initializes after USB2 e.g. due to deferred probing.

Fixes: 5a0f93c6 ("ARM: dts: Add am57xx-beagle-x15")
Signed-off-by: default avatarRoger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarTony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      934ab6eb
    • Michal Hocko's avatar
      ext4: replace open coded nofail allocation in ext4_free_blocks() · ef505188
      Michal Hocko authored 
      commit 7444a072 upstream.

ext4_free_blocks is looping around the allocation request and mimics
__GFP_NOFAIL behavior without any allocation fallback strategy. Let's
remove the open coded loop and replace it with __GFP_NOFAIL. Without the
flag the allocator has no way to find out never-fail requirement and
cannot help in any way.
Signed-off-by: default avatarMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: default avatarTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      ef505188
    • Eryu Guan's avatar
      ext4: correctly migrate a file with a hole at the beginning · 47eb4b36
      Eryu Guan authored 
      commit 8974fec7 upstream.

Currently ext4_ind_migrate() doesn't correctly handle a file which
contains a hole at the beginning of the file.  This caused the migration
to be done incorrectly, and then if there is a subsequent following
delayed allocation write to the "hole", this would reclaim the same data
blocks again and results in fs corruption.

  # assmuing 4k block size ext4, with delalloc enabled
  # skip the first block and write to the second block
  xfs_io -fc "pwrite 4k 4k" -c "fsync" /mnt/ext4/testfile

  # converting to indirect-mapped file, which would move the data blocks
  # to the beginning of the file, but extent status cache still marks
  # that region as a hole
  chattr -e /mnt/ext4/testfile

  # delayed allocation writes to the "hole", reclaim the same data block
  # again, results in i_blocks corruption
  xfs_io -c "pwrite 0 4k" /mnt/ext4/testfile
  umount /mnt/ext4
  e2fsck -nf /dev/sda6
  ...
  Inode 53, i_blocks is 16, should be 8.  Fix? no
  ...
Signed-off-by: default avatarEryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      47eb4b36
    • Eryu Guan's avatar
      ext4: be more strict when migrating to non-extent based file · ca842bc9
      Eryu Guan authored 
      commit d6f123a9 upstream.

Currently the check in ext4_ind_migrate() is not enough before doing the
real conversion:

a) delayed allocated extents could bypass the check on eh->eh_entries
   and eh->eh_depth

This can be demonstrated by this script

  xfs_io -fc "pwrite 0 4k" -c "pwrite 8k 4k" /mnt/ext4/testfile
  chattr -e /mnt/ext4/testfile

where testfile has two extents but still be converted to non-extent
based file format.

b) only extent length is checked but not the offset, which would result
   in data lose (delalloc) or fs corruption (nodelalloc), because
   non-extent based file only supports at most (12 + 2^10 + 2^20 + 2^30)
   blocks

This can be demostrated by

  xfs_io -fc "pwrite 5T 4k" /mnt/ext4/testfile
  chattr -e /mnt/ext4/testfile
  sync

If delalloc is enabled, dmesg prints
  EXT4-fs warning (device dm-4): ext4_block_to_path:105: block 1342177280 > max in inode 53
  EXT4-fs (dm-4): Delayed block allocation failed for inode 53 at logical offset 1342177280 with max blocks 1 with error 5
  EXT4-fs (dm-4): This should not happen!! Data will be lost

If delalloc is disabled, e2fsck -nf shows corruption
  Inode 53, i_size is 5497558142976, should be 4096.  Fix? no

Fix the two issues by

a) forcing all delayed allocation blocks to be allocated before checking
   eh->eh_depth and eh->eh_entries
b) limiting the last logical block of the extent is within direct map
Signed-off-by: default avatarEryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      ca842bc9
    • Lukas Czerner's avatar
      ext4: fix reservation release on invalidatepage for delalloc fs · bbc80299
      Lukas Czerner authored 
      commit 9705acd6 upstream.

On delalloc enabled file system on invalidatepage operation
in ext4_da_page_release_reservation() we want to clear the delayed
buffer and remove the extent covering the delayed buffer from the extent
status tree.

However currently there is a bug where on the systems with page size >
block size we will always remove extents from the start of the page
regardless where the actual delayed buffers are positioned in the page.
This leads to the errors like this:

EXT4-fs warning (device loop0): ext4_da_release_space:1225:
ext4_da_release_space: ino 13, to_free 1 with only 0 reserved data
blocks

This however can cause data loss on writeback time if the file system is
in ENOSPC condition because we're releasing reservation for someones
else delayed buffer.

Fix this by only removing extents that corresponds to the part of the
page we want to invalidate.

This problem is reproducible by the following fio receipt (however I was
only able to reproduce it with fio-2.1 or older.

[global]
bs=8k
iodepth=1024
iodepth_batch=60
randrepeat=1
size=1m
directory=/mnt/test
numjobs=20
[job1]
ioengine=sync
bs=1k
direct=1
rw=randread
filename=file1:file2
[job2]
ioengine=libaio
rw=randwrite
direct=1
filename=file1:file2
[job3]
bs=1k
ioengine=posixaio
rw=randwrite
direct=1
filename=file1:file2
[job5]
bs=1k
ioengine=sync
rw=randread
filename=file1:file2
[job7]
ioengine=libaio
rw=randwrite
filename=file1:file2
[job8]
ioengine=posixaio
rw=randwrite
filename=file1:file2
[job10]
ioengine=mmap
rw=randwrite
bs=1k
filename=file1:file2
[job11]
ioengine=mmap
rw=randwrite
direct=1
filename=file1:file2
Signed-off-by: default avatarLukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      bbc80299
    • Nikolay Borisov's avatar
      ext4: avoid deadlocks in the writeback path by using sb_getblk_gfp · 1fc56e88
      Nikolay Borisov authored 
      commit c45653c3 upstream.

Switch ext4 to using sb_getblk_gfp with GFP_NOFS added to fix possible
deadlocks in the page writeback path.
Signed-off-by: default avatarNikolay Borisov <kernel@kyup.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      1fc56e88
    • Nikolay Borisov's avatar
      bufferhead: Add _gfp version for sb_getblk() · 52a0b6ce
      Nikolay Borisov authored 
      commit bd7ade3c upstream.

sb_getblk() is used during ext4 (and possibly other FSes) writeback
paths. Sometimes such path require allocating memory and guaranteeing
that such allocation won't block. Currently, however, there is no way
to provide user flags for sb_getblk which could lead to deadlocks.

This patch implements a sb_getblk_gfp with the only difference it can
accept user-provided GFP flags.
Signed-off-by: default avatarNikolay Borisov <kernel@kyup.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      52a0b6ce
    • Filipe Manana's avatar
      Btrfs: fix fsync data loss after append write · 895ee048
      Filipe Manana authored 
      commit e4545de5 upstream.

If we do an append write to a file (which increases its inode's i_size)
that does not have the flag BTRFS_INODE_NEEDS_FULL_SYNC set in its inode,
and the previous transaction added a new hard link to the file, which sets
the flag BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING in the file's inode, and then fsync
the file, the inode's new i_size isn't logged. This has the consequence
that after the fsync log is replayed, the file size remains what it was
before the append write operation, which means users/applications will
not be able to read the data that was successsfully fsync'ed before.

This happens because neither the inode item nor the delayed inode get
their i_size updated when the append write is made - doing so would
require starting a transaction in the buffered write path, something that
we do not do intentionally for performance reasons.

Fix this by making sure that when the flag BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING is
set the inode is logged with its current i_size (log the in-memory inode
into the log tree).

This issue is not a recent regression and is easy to reproduce with the
following test case for fstests:

  seq=`basename $0`
  seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
  echo "QA output created by $seq"

  here=`pwd`
  tmp=/tmp/$$
  status=1	# failure is the default!

  _cleanup()
  {
          _cleanup_flakey
          rm -f $tmp.*
  }
  trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15

  # get standard environment, filters and checks
  . ./common/rc
  . ./common/filter
  . ./common/dmflakey

  # real QA test starts here
  _supported_fs generic
  _supported_os Linux
  _need_to_be_root
  _require_scratch
  _require_dm_flakey
  _require_metadata_journaling $SCRATCH_DEV

  _crash_and_mount()
  {
          # Simulate a crash/power loss.
          _load_flakey_table $FLAKEY_DROP_WRITES
          _unmount_flakey
          # Allow writes again and mount. This makes the fs replay its fsync log.
          _load_flakey_table $FLAKEY_ALLOW_WRITES
          _mount_flakey
  }

  rm -f $seqres.full

  _scratch_mkfs >> $seqres.full 2>&1
  _init_flakey
  _mount_flakey

  # Create the test file with some initial data and then fsync it.
  # The fsync here is only needed to trigger the issue in btrfs, as it causes the
  # the flag BTRFS_INODE_NEEDS_FULL_SYNC to be removed from the btrfs inode.
  $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xaa 0 32k" \
                  -c "fsync" \
                  $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
  sync

  # Add a hard link to our file.
  # On btrfs this sets the flag BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING on the btrfs inode,
  # which is a necessary condition to trigger the issue.
  ln $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar

  # Sync the filesystem to force a commit of the current btrfs transaction, this
  # is a necessary condition to trigger the bug on btrfs.
  sync

  # Now append more data to our file, increasing its size, and fsync the file.
  # In btrfs because the inode flag BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING was set and the
  # write path did not update the inode item in the btree nor the delayed inode
  # item (in memory struture) in the current transaction (created by the fsync
  # handler), the fsync did not record the inode's new i_size in the fsync
  # log/journal. This made the data unavailable after the fsync log/journal is
  # replayed.
  $XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 32K 32K" \
               -c "fsync" \
               $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io

  echo "File content after fsync and before crash:"
  od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo

  _crash_and_mount

  echo "File content after crash and log replay:"
  od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo

  status=0
  exit

The expected file output before and after the crash/power failure expects the
appended data to be available, which is:

  0000000 aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa
  *
  0100000 bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
  *
  0200000
Signed-off-by: default avatarFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarLiu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      895ee048
    • Filipe Manana's avatar
      Btrfs: fix race between caching kthread and returning inode to inode cache · ff30e038
      Filipe Manana authored 
      commit ae9d8f17 upstream.

While the inode cache caching kthread is calling btrfs_unpin_free_ino(),
we could have a concurrent call to btrfs_return_ino() that adds a new
entry to the root's free space cache of pinned inodes. This concurrent
call does not acquire the fs_info->commit_root_sem before adding a new
entry if the caching state is BTRFS_CACHE_FINISHED, which is a problem
because the caching kthread calls btrfs_unpin_free_ino() after setting
the caching state to BTRFS_CACHE_FINISHED and therefore races with
the task calling btrfs_return_ino(), which is adding a new entry, while
the former (caching kthread) is navigating the cache's rbtree, removing
and freeing nodes from the cache's rbtree without acquiring the spinlock
that protects the rbtree.

This race resulted in memory corruption due to double free of struct
btrfs_free_space objects because both tasks can end up doing freeing the
same objects. Note that adding a new entry can result in merging it with
other entries in the cache, in which case those entries are freed.
This is particularly important as btrfs_free_space structures are also
used for the block group free space caches.

This memory corruption can be detected by a debugging kernel, which
reports it with the following trace:

[132408.501148] slab error in verify_redzone_free(): cache `btrfs_free_space': double free detected
[132408.505075] CPU: 15 PID: 12248 Comm: btrfs-ino-cache Tainted: G        W       4.1.0-rc5-btrfs-next-10+ #1
[132408.505075] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.1-0-g4adadbd-20150316_085822-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
[132408.505075]  ffff880023e7d320 ffff880163d73cd8 ffffffff8145eec7 ffffffff81095dce
[132408.505075]  ffff880009735d40 ffff880163d73ce8 ffffffff81154e1e ffff880163d73d68
[132408.505075]  ffffffff81155733 ffffffffa054a95a ffff8801b6099f00 ffffffffa0505b5f
[132408.505075] Call Trace:
[132408.505075]  [<ffffffff8145eec7>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7b
[132408.505075]  [<ffffffff81095dce>] ? console_unlock+0x356/0x3a2
[132408.505075]  [<ffffffff81154e1e>] __slab_error.isra.28+0x25/0x36
[132408.505075]  [<ffffffff81155733>] __cache_free+0xe2/0x4b6
[132408.505075]  [<ffffffffa054a95a>] ? __btrfs_add_free_space+0x2f0/0x343 [btrfs]
[132408.505075]  [<ffffffffa0505b5f>] ? btrfs_unpin_free_ino+0x8e/0x99 [btrfs]
[132408.505075]  [<ffffffff810f3b30>] ? time_hardirqs_off+0x15/0x28
[132408.505075]  [<ffffffff81084d42>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0xf
[132408.505075]  [<ffffffff811563a1>] ? kfree+0xb6/0x14e
[132408.505075]  [<ffffffff811563d0>] kfree+0xe5/0x14e
[132408.505075]  [<ffffffffa0505b5f>] btrfs_unpin_free_ino+0x8e/0x99 [btrfs]
[132408.505075]  [<ffffffffa0505e08>] caching_kthread+0x29e/0x2d9 [btrfs]
[132408.505075]  [<ffffffffa0505b6a>] ? btrfs_unpin_free_ino+0x99/0x99 [btrfs]
[132408.505075]  [<ffffffff8106698f>] kthread+0xef/0xf7
[132408.505075]  [<ffffffff810f3b08>] ? time_hardirqs_on+0x15/0x28
[132408.505075]  [<ffffffff810668a0>] ? __kthread_parkme+0xad/0xad
[132408.505075]  [<ffffffff814653d2>] ret_from_fork+0x42/0x70
[132408.505075]  [<ffffffff810668a0>] ? __kthread_parkme+0xad/0xad
[132408.505075] ffff880023e7d320: redzone 1:0x9f911029d74e35b, redzone 2:0x9f911029d74e35b.
[132409.501654] slab: double free detected in cache 'btrfs_free_space', objp ffff880023e7d320
[132409.503355] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[132409.504241] kernel BUG at mm/slab.c:2571!

Therefore fix this by having btrfs_unpin_free_ino() acquire the lock
that protects the rbtree while doing the searches and removing entries.

Fixes: 1c70d8fb ("Btrfs: fix inode caching vs tree log")
Signed-off-by: default avatarFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      ff30e038
    • Filipe Manana's avatar
      Btrfs: use kmem_cache_free when freeing entry in inode cache · 4899b628
      Filipe Manana authored 
      commit c3f4a168 upstream.

The free space entries are allocated using kmem_cache_zalloc(),
through __btrfs_add_free_space(), therefore we should use
kmem_cache_free() and not kfree() to avoid any confusion and
any potential problem. Looking at the kfree() definition at
mm/slab.c it has the following comment:

  /*
   * (...)
   *
   * Don't free memory not originally allocated by kmalloc()
   * or you will run into trouble.
   */

So better be safe and use kmem_cache_free().
Signed-off-by: default avatarFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: default avatarChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      4899b628
  5. 04 Aug, 2015 1 commit
  7. 30 Jul, 2015 1 commit
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