The .remove() callback for a platform driver returns an int which makes
many driver authors wrongly assume it's possible to do error handling by
returning an error code. However the value returned is ignored (apart
from emitting a warning) and this typically results in resource leaks.

To improve here there is a quest to make the remove callback return
void. In the first step of this quest all drivers are converted to
.remove_new(), which already returns void. Eventually after all drivers
are converted, .remove_new() will be renamed to .remove().

Trivially convert this driver from always returning zero in the remove
callback to the void returning variant.
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jernej Skrabec <jernej.skrabec@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The health test result in the current code is only given for the currently
processed raw time stamp. This implies to react on the health test error,
the result must be checked after each raw time stamp being processed. To
avoid this constant checking requirement, any health test error is recorded
and stored to be analyzed at a later time, if needed.

This change ensures that the power-up test catches any health test error.
Without that patch, the power-up health test result is not enforced.

The introduced changes are already in use with the user space version of
the Jitter RNG.

Fixes: 04597c8d ("jitter - add RCT/APT support for different OSRs")
Reported-by: Joachim Vandersmissen <git@jvdsn.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

crypto_shash_alignmask() no longer has any callers, and it always
returns 0 now that the shash algorithm type no longer supports nonzero
alignmasks.  Therefore, remove it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Now that the shash algorithm type does not support nonzero alignmasks,
shash_alg::base.cra_alignmask is always 0, so OR-ing it into another
value is a no-op.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Now that the shash algorithm type does not support nonzero alignmasks,
shash_alg::base.cra_alignmask is always 0, so OR-ing it into another
value is a no-op.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Now that the shash algorithm type does not support nonzero alignmasks,
crypto_shash_alignmask() always returns 0 and will be removed.  In
preparation for this, stop checking crypto_shash_alignmask() in testmgr.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Now that the shash algorithm type does not support nonzero alignmasks,
crypto_shash_alignmask() always returns 0 and will be removed.  In
preparation for this, stop checking crypto_shash_alignmask() in drbg.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Now that the shash algorithm type does not support nonzero alignmasks,
crypto_shash_alignmask() always returns 0 and will be removed.  In
preparation for this, stop checking crypto_shash_alignmask() in
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Currently, the shash API checks the alignment of all message, key, and
digest buffers against the algorithm's declared alignmask, and for any
unaligned buffers it falls back to manually aligned temporary buffers.

This is virtually useless, however.  In the case of the message buffer,
cryptographic hash functions internally operate on fixed-size blocks, so
implementations end up needing to deal with byte-aligned data anyway
because the length(s) passed to ->update might not be divisible by the
block size.  Word-alignment of the message can theoretically be helpful
for CRCs, like what was being done in crc32c-sparc64.  But in practice
it's better for the algorithms to use unaligned accesses or align the
message themselves.  A similar argument applies to the key and digest.

In any case, no shash algorithms actually set a nonzero alignmask
anymore.  Therefore, remove support for it from shash.  The benefit is
that all the code to handle "misaligned" buffers in the shash API goes
away, reducing the overhead of the shash API.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The xcbc template is setting its alignmask to that of its underlying
'cipher'.  Yet, it doesn't care itself about how its inputs and outputs
are aligned, which is ostensibly the point of the alignmask.  Instead,
xcbc actually just uses its alignmask itself to runtime-align certain
fields in its tfm and desc contexts appropriately for its underlying
cipher.  That is almost entirely pointless too, though, since xcbc is
already using the cipher API functions that handle alignment themselves,
and few ciphers set a nonzero alignmask anyway.  Also, even without
runtime alignment, an alignment of at least 4 bytes can be guaranteed.

Thus, at best this code is optimizing for the rare case of ciphers that
set an alignmask >= 7, at the cost of hurting the common cases.

Therefore, this patch removes the manual alignment code from xcbc and
makes it stop setting an alignmask.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The vmac template is setting its alignmask to that of its underlying
'cipher'.  This doesn't actually accomplish anything useful, though, so
stop doing it.  (vmac_update() does have an alignment bug, where it
assumes u64 alignment when it shouldn't, but that bug exists both before
and after this patch.)  This is a prerequisite for removing support for
nonzero alignmasks from shash.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The hmac template is setting its alignmask to that of its underlying
unkeyed hash algorithm, and it is aligning the ipad and opad fields in
its tfm context to that alignment.  However, hmac does not actually need
any sort of alignment itself, which makes this pointless except to keep
the pads aligned to what the underlying algorithm prefers.  But very few
shash algorithms actually set an alignmask, and it is being removed from
those remaining ones; also, after setkey, the pads are only passed to
crypto_shash_import and crypto_shash_export which ignore the alignmask.

Therefore, make the hmac template stop setting an alignmask and simply
use natural alignment for ipad and opad.  Note, this change also moves
the pads from the beginning of the tfm context to the end, which makes
much more sense; the variable-length fields should be at the end.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The cmac template is setting its alignmask to that of its underlying
'cipher'.  Yet, it doesn't care itself about how its inputs and outputs
are aligned, which is ostensibly the point of the alignmask.  Instead,
cmac actually just uses its alignmask itself to runtime-align certain
fields in its tfm and desc contexts appropriately for its underlying
cipher.  That is almost entirely pointless too, though, since cmac is
already using the cipher API functions that handle alignment themselves,
and few ciphers set a nonzero alignmask anyway.  Also, even without
runtime alignment, an alignment of at least 4 bytes can be guaranteed.

Thus, at best this code is optimizing for the rare case of ciphers that
set an alignmask >= 7, at the cost of hurting the common cases.

Therefore, this patch removes the manual alignment code from cmac and
makes it stop setting an alignmask.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The cbcmac template is aligning a field in its desc context to the
alignmask of its underlying 'cipher', at runtime.  This is almost
entirely pointless, since cbcmac is already using the cipher API
functions that handle alignment themselves, and few ciphers set a
nonzero alignmask anyway.  Also, even without runtime alignment, an
alignment of at least 4 bytes can be guaranteed.

Thus, at best this code is optimizing for the rare case of ciphers that
set an alignmask >= 7, at the cost of hurting the common cases.

Therefore, remove the manual alignment code from cbcmac.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

This unnecessary explicit setting of cra_alignmask to 0 shows up when
grepping for shash algorithms that set an alignmask.  Remove it.  No
change in behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

This unnecessary explicit setting of cra_alignmask to 0 shows up when
grepping for shash algorithms that set an alignmask.  Remove it.  No
change in behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The zynqmp-sha3-384 algorithm sets a nonzero alignmask, but it doesn't
appear to actually need it.  Therefore, stop setting it.  This will
allow this algorithm to keep being registered after alignmask support is
removed from shash.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The stm32 crc32 algorithms set a nonzero alignmask, but they don't seem
to actually need it.  Their ->update function already has code that
handles aligning the data to the same alignment that the alignmask
specifies, their ->setkey function already uses get_unaligned_le32(),
and their ->final function already uses put_unaligned_le32().
Therefore, stop setting the alignmask.  This will allow these algorithms
to keep being registered after alignmask support is removed from shash.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

As far as I can tell, "crc32c-sparc64" is the only "shash" algorithm in
the kernel that sets a nonzero alignmask and actually relies on it to
get the crypto API to align the inputs and outputs.  This capability is
not really useful, though.  To unblock removing the support for
alignmask from shash_alg, this patch updates crc32c-sparc64 to no longer
use the alignmask.  This means doing 8-byte alignment of the data when
doing an update, using get_unaligned_le32() when setting a non-default
initial CRC, and using put_unaligned_le32() to output the final CRC.

Partially tested with:

    export ARCH=sparc64 CROSS_COMPILE=sparc64-linux-gnu-
    make sparc64_defconfig
    echo CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32C_SPARC64=y >> .config
    echo '# CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS is not set' >> .config
    echo CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y >> .config
    echo CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS=y >> .config
    make olddefconfig
    make -j$(getconf _NPROCESSORS_ONLN)
    qemu-system-sparc64 -kernel arch/sparc/boot/image  -nographic

However, qemu doesn't actually support the sparc CRC32C instructions, so
for the test I temporarily replaced crc32c_sparc64() with __crc32c_le()
and made sparc64_has_crc32c_opcode() always return true.  So essentially
I tested the glue code, not the actual SPARC part which is unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Most shash algorithms don't have custom ->import and ->export functions,
resulting in the memcpy() based default being used.  Yet,
crypto_shash_import() and crypto_shash_export() still make an indirect
call, which is expensive.  Therefore, change how the default import and
export are called to make it so that crypto_shash_import() and
crypto_shash_export() don't do an indirect call in this case.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Document SA8775P and SC7280 compatible for the True Random Number
Generator.
Signed-off-by: Om Prakash Singh <quic_omprsing@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Add a module alias for pkcs1pas so that it can be auto-loaded by
modprobe.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The modular build fails because the self-test code depends on pkcs7
which in turn depends on x509 which contains the self-test.

Split the self-test out into its own module to break the cycle.

Fixes: 3cde3174 ("certs: Add FIPS selftests")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

In a high-load arm64 environment, the pcrypt_aead01 test in LTP can lead
to system UAF (Use-After-Free) issues. Due to the lengthy analysis of
the pcrypt_aead01 function call, I'll describe the problem scenario
using a simplified model:

Suppose there's a user of padata named `user_function` that adheres to
the padata requirement of calling `padata_free_shell` after `serial()`
has been invoked, as demonstrated in the following code:

```c
struct request {
    struct padata_priv padata;
    struct completion *done;
};

void parallel(struct padata_priv *padata) {
    do_something();
}

void serial(struct padata_priv *padata) {
    struct request *request = container_of(padata,
    				struct request,
				padata);
    complete(request->done);
}

void user_function() {
    DECLARE_COMPLETION(done)
    padata->parallel = parallel;
    padata->serial = serial;
    padata_do_parallel();
    wait_for_completion(&done);
    padata_free_shell();
}
```

In the corresponding padata.c file, there's the following code:

```c
static void padata_serial_worker(struct work_struct *serial_work) {
    ...
    cnt = 0;

    while (!list_empty(&local_list)) {
        ...
        padata->serial(padata);
        cnt++;
    }

    local_bh_enable();

    if (refcount_sub_and_test(cnt, &pd->refcnt))
        padata_free_pd(pd);
}
```

Because of the high system load and the accumulation of unexecuted
softirq at this moment, `local_bh_enable()` in padata takes longer
to execute than usual. Subsequently, when accessing `pd->refcnt`,
`pd` has already been released by `padata_free_shell()`, resulting
in a UAF issue with `pd->refcnt`.

The fix is straightforward: add `refcount_dec_and_test` before calling
`padata_free_pd` in `padata_free_shell`.

Fixes: 07928d9b ("padata: Remove broken queue flushing")
Signed-off-by: WangJinchao <wangjinchao@xfusion.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

This should fix the undefined reference:

> /usr/bin/aarch64-alpine-linux-musl-ld: Unexpected GOT/PLT entries detected!
> /usr/bin/aarch64-alpine-linux-musl-ld: Unexpected run-time procedure linkages detected!
> /usr/bin/aarch64-alpine-linux-musl-ld: drivers/crypto/qcom-rng.o: in function `qcom_rng_probe':
> qcom-rng.c:(.text+0x130): undefined reference to `devm_hwrng_register'

Fixes: f29cd5bb ("crypto: qcom-rng - Add hw_random interface support")
Signed-off-by: André Apitzsch <git@apitzsch.eu>
Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

When an algorithm of the new "lskcipher" type is exposed through the
"skcipher" API, calls to crypto_skcipher_setkey() don't pass on the
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS flag to the lskcipher.  This causes
self-test failures for ecb(des), as weak keys are not rejected anymore.
Fix this.

Fixes: 31865c4c ("crypto: skcipher - Add lskcipher")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

During hisilicon accelerator live migration operation. In order to
prevent the problem of EQ/AEQ interrupt loss. Migration driver will
trigger an EQ/AEQ doorbell at the end of the migration.

This operation may cause double interruption of EQ/AEQ events.
To ensure that the EQ/AEQ interrupt processing function is normal.
The interrupt handling functionality of EQ/AEQ needs to be updated.
Used to handle repeated interrupts event.

Fixes: b0eed085 ("hisi_acc_vfio_pci: Add support for VFIO live migration")
Signed-off-by: Longfang Liu <liulongfang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The heuristics used by gcc triggers false positive truncation
warnings in hifn_alg_alloc.  The warning triggered by the strings
here are clearly false positives (see
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=95755).

Add checks on snprintf calls to silence these warnings, including
the one for cra_driver_name even though it does not currently trigger
a gcc warning.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Set the error value to -EINVAL instead of zero when the underlying
name (within "ecb()") fails basic sanity checks.

Fixes: 8aee5d4e ("crypto: lskcipher - Add compatibility wrapper around ECB")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202310111323.ZjK7bzjw-lkp@intel.com/Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

NIST FIPS 186-5 states that it is recommended that the security
strength associated with the bit length of n and the security strength
of the hash function be the same, or higher upon agreement. Given NIST
P384 curve is used, force using either SHA384 or SHA512.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

sha224 does not provide enough security against collision attacks
relative to the default keys used for signing (RSA 4k & P-384). Also
sha224 never became popular, as sha256 got widely adopter ahead of
sha224 being introduced.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

It is possible to stand up own certificates and sign PE-COFF binaries
using SHA-224. However it never became popular or needed since it has
similar costs as SHA-256. Windows Authenticode infrastructure never
had support for SHA-224, and all secureboot keys used fro linux
vmlinuz have always been using at least SHA-256.

Given the point of mscode_parser is to support interoperatiblity with
typical de-facto hashes, remove support for SHA-224 to avoid
posibility of creating interoperatibility issues with rhboot/shim,
grub, and non-linux systems trying to sign or verify vmlinux.

SHA-224 itself is not removed from the kernel, as it is truncated
SHA-256. If requested I can write patches to remove SHA-224 support
across all of the drivers.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Removes support for sha1 signed kernel modules, importing sha1 signed
x.509 certificates.

rsa-pkcs1pad keeps sha1 padding support, which seems to be used by
virtio driver.

sha1 remains available as there are many drivers and subsystems using
it. Note only hmac(sha1) with secret keys remains cryptographically
secure.

In the kernel there are filesystems, IMA, tpm/pcr that appear to be
using sha1. Maybe they can all start to be slowly upgraded to
something else i.e. blake3, ParallelHash, SHAKE256 as needed.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

PSP firmware may report additional error information in the SEV command
buffer registers in situations where an error occurs as the result of an
SEV command.  In this case, check if the command buffer registers have been
modified and if so, dump the contents.
Signed-off-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

In the Linux kernel, a function whose name has two leading underscores
is conventionally called by the same-named function without leading
underscores -- not the other way around.  __sha512_block_data_order()
got this backwards.  Fix this, albeit without changing the name in the
perlasm since that is OpenSSL code.  No change in behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

In the Linux kernel, a function whose name has two leading underscores
is conventionally called by the same-named function without leading
underscores -- not the other way around.  __sha256_block_data_order()
and __sha256_block_neon() got this backwards.  Fix this, albeit without
changing the names in the perlasm since that is OpenSSL code.  No change
in behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

In the Linux kernel, a function whose name has two leading underscores
is conventionally called by the same-named function without leading
underscores -- not the other way around.  __sha512_ce_transform() and
__sha512_block_data_order() got this backwards.  Fix this, albeit
without changing "sha512_block_data_order" in the perlasm since that is
OpenSSL code.  No change in behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

In the Linux kernel, a function whose name has two leading underscores
is conventionally called by the same-named function without leading
underscores -- not the other way around.  __sha2_ce_transform() and
__sha256_block_data_order() got this backwards.  Fix this, albeit
without changing "sha256_block_data_order" in the perlasm since that is
OpenSSL code.  No change in behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

In the Linux kernel, a function whose name has two leading underscores
is conventionally called by the same-named function without leading
underscores -- not the other way around.  __sha1_ce_transform() got this
backwards.  Fix this.  No change in behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Implement the ->digest method to improve performance on single-page
messages by reducing the number of indirect calls.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>