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- 23 Dec, 2018 2 commits
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Dave Watson authored
Add support for 192/256-bit keys using the avx gcm/aes routines. The sse routines were previously updated in e31ac32d (Add support for 192 & 256 bit keys to AESNI RFC4106). Instead of adding an additional loop in the hotpath as in e31ac32d, this diff instead generates separate versions of the code using macros, and the entry routines choose which version once. This results in a 5% performance improvement vs. adding a loop to the hot path. This is the same strategy chosen by the intel isa-l_crypto library. The key size checks are removed from the c code where appropriate. Note that this diff depends on using gcm_context_data - 256 bit keys require 16 HashKeys + 15 expanded keys, which is larger than struct crypto_aes_ctx, so they are stored in struct gcm_context_data. Signed-off-by:
Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Dave Watson authored
Add the gcm_context_data structure to the avx asm routines. This will be necessary to support both 256 bit keys and scatter/gather. The pre-computed HashKeys are now stored in the gcm_context_data struct, which is expanded to hold the greater number of hashkeys necessary for avx. Loads and stores to the new struct are always done unlaligned to avoid compiler issues, see e5b954e8 "Use unaligned loads from gcm_context_data" Signed-off-by:
Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 08 Oct, 2018 1 commit
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Eric Biggers authored
aesni-intel_glue.c still calls crypto_fpu_init() and crypto_fpu_exit() to register/unregister the "fpu" template. But these functions don't exist anymore, causing a build error. Remove the calls to them. Fixes: 944585a6 ("crypto: x86/aes-ni - remove special handling of AES in PCBC mode") Signed-off-by:
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 05 Oct, 2018 1 commit
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Ard Biesheuvel authored
For historical reasons, the AES-NI based implementation of the PCBC chaining mode uses a special FPU chaining mode wrapper template to amortize the FPU start/stop overhead over multiple blocks. When this FPU wrapper was introduced, it supported widely used chaining modes such as XTS and CTR (as well as LRW), but currently, PCBC is the only remaining user. Since there are no known users of pcbc(aes) in the kernel, let's remove this special driver, and rely on the generic pcbc driver to encapsulate the AES-NI core cipher. Signed-off-by:
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 14 Sep, 2018 1 commit
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Mikulas Patocka authored
This patch fixes gcmaes_crypt_by_sg so that it won't use memory allocation if the data doesn't cross a page boundary. Authenticated encryption may be used by dm-crypt. If the encryption or decryption fails, it would result in I/O error and filesystem corruption. The function gcmaes_crypt_by_sg is using GFP_ATOMIC allocation that can fail anytime. This patch fixes the logic so that it won't attempt the failing allocation if the data doesn't cross a page boundary. Signed-off-by:
Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 22 Feb, 2018 3 commits
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Dave Watson authored
Add gcmaes_crypt_by_sg routine, that will do scatter/gather by sg. Either src or dst may contain multiple buffers, so iterate over both at the same time if they are different. If the input is the same as the output, iterate only over one. Currently both the AAD and TAG must be linear, so copy them out with scatterlist_map_and_copy. If first buffer contains the entire AAD, we can optimize and not copy. Since the AAD can be any size, if copied it must be on the heap. TAG can be on the stack since it is always < 16 bytes. Only the SSE routines are updated so far, so leave the previous gcmaes_en/decrypt routines, and branch to the sg ones if the keysize is inappropriate for avx, or we are SSE only. Signed-off-by:
Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Dave Watson authored
The asm macros are all set up now, introduce entry points. GCM_INIT and GCM_COMPLETE have arguments supplied, so that the new scatter/gather entry points don't have to take all the arguments, and only the ones they need. Signed-off-by:
Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Dave Watson authored
Introduce a gcm_context_data struct that will be used to pass context data between scatter/gather update calls. It is passed as the second argument (after crypto keys), other args are renumbered. Signed-off-by:
Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 25 Jan, 2018 1 commit
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Stephan Mueller authored
GCM can be invoked with a zero destination buffer. This is possible if the AAD and the ciphertext have zero lengths and only the tag exists in the source buffer (i.e. a source buffer cannot be zero). In this case, the GCM cipher only performs the authentication and no decryption operation. When the destination buffer has zero length, it is possible that no page is mapped to the SG pointing to the destination. In this case, sg_page(req->dst) is an invalid access. Therefore, page accesses should only be allowed if the req->dst->length is non-zero which is the indicator that a page must exist. This fixes a crash that can be triggered by user space via AF_ALG. CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 22 Dec, 2017 2 commits
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Sabrina Dubroca authored
When I added generic-gcm-aes I didn't add a wrapper like the one provided for rfc4106(gcm(aes)). We need to add a cryptd wrapper to fall back on in case the FPU is not available, otherwise we might corrupt the FPU state. Fixes: cce2ea8d ("crypto: aesni - add generic gcm(aes)") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by:
Ilya Lesokhin <ilyal@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by:
Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Reviewed-by:
Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Sabrina Dubroca authored
generic_gcmaes_decrypt needs to use generic_gcmaes_ctx, not aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx. This is actually harmless because the fields in struct generic_gcmaes_ctx share the layout of the same fields in aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx. Fixes: cce2ea8d ("crypto: aesni - add generic gcm(aes)") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Reviewed-by:
Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 22 Sep, 2017 2 commits
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Corentin LABBE authored
This patch replace GCM IV size value by their constant name. Signed-off-by:
Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Colin Ian King authored
Arrays aesni_simd_skciphers and aesni_simd_skciphers2 are local to the source and do not need to be in global scope, so make them static. Cleans up sparse warnings: symbol 'aesni_simd_skciphers' was not declared. Should it be static? symbol 'aesni_simd_skciphers2' was not declared. Should it be static? Signed-off-by:
Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 04 Aug, 2017 1 commit
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Ard Biesheuvel authored
There are quite a number of occurrences in the kernel of the pattern if (dst != src) memcpy(dst, src, walk.total % AES_BLOCK_SIZE); crypto_xor(dst, final, walk.total % AES_BLOCK_SIZE); or crypto_xor(keystream, src, nbytes); memcpy(dst, keystream, nbytes); where crypto_xor() is preceded or followed by a memcpy() invocation that is only there because crypto_xor() uses its output parameter as one of the inputs. To avoid having to add new instances of this pattern in the arm64 code, which will be refactored to implement non-SIMD fallbacks, add an alternative implementation called crypto_xor_cpy(), taking separate input and output arguments. This removes the need for the separate memcpy(). Signed-off-by:
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 18 May, 2017 1 commit
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Sabrina Dubroca authored
Now that the asm side of things can support all the valid lengths of ICV and all lengths of associated data, provide the glue code to expose a generic gcm(aes) crypto algorithm. Signed-off-by:
Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 03 Feb, 2017 1 commit
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Herbert Xu authored
When aesni is built as a module together with pcbc, the pcbc module must be present for aesni to load. However, the pcbc module may not be present for reasons such as its absence on initramfs. This patch allows the aesni to function even if the pcbc module is enabled but not present. Reported-by:
Arkadiusz Miśkiewicz <arekm@maven.pl> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 30 Dec, 2016 1 commit
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Herbert Xu authored
If aesni is built-in but pcbc is built as a module, then aesni will fail completely because when it tries to register the pcbc variant of aes the pcbc template is not available. This patch fixes this by modifying the pcbc presence test so that if aesni is built-in then pcbc must also be built-in for it to be used by aesni. Fixes: 85671860 ("crypto: aesni - Convert to skcipher") Reported-by:
Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 27 Dec, 2016 1 commit
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Ilya Lesokhin authored
In the common case of !PageHighMem we can do zero copy crypto even if sg crosses a pages boundary. Signed-off-by:
Ilya Lesokhin <ilyal@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 28 Nov, 2016 1 commit
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Herbert Xu authored
This patch converts aesni (including fpu) over to the skcipher interface. The LRW implementation has been removed as the generic LRW code can now be used directly on top of the accelerated ECB implementation. Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 11 Nov, 2016 1 commit
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Arnd Bergmann authored
The rfc4106 encrypy/decrypt helper functions cause an annoying false-positive warning in allmodconfig if we turn on -Wmaybe-uninitialized warnings again: arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c: In function ‘helper_rfc4106_decrypt’: include/linux/scatterlist.h:67:31: warning: ‘dst_sg_walk.sg’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized] The problem seems to be that the compiler doesn't track the state of the 'one_entry_in_sg' variable across the kernel_fpu_begin/kernel_fpu_end section. This takes the easy way out by adding a bogus initialization, which should be harmless enough to get the patch into v4.9 so we can turn on this warning again by default without producing useless output. A follow-up patch for v4.10 rearranges the code to make the warning go away. Signed-off-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 01 Jul, 2016 1 commit
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Herbert Xu authored
Currently aesni uses an async ctr(aes) to derive the rfc4106 subkey, which was presumably copied over from the generic rfc4106 code. Over there it's done that way because we already have a ctr(aes) spawn. But it is simply overkill for aesni since we have to go get a ctr(aes) from scratch anyway. This patch simplifies the subkey derivation by using a straight aes cipher instead. Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 23 Jun, 2016 1 commit
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Herbert Xu authored
This patch fixes an old bug where gcm requests can be reordered because some are processed by cryptd while others are processed directly in softirq context. The fix is to always postpone to cryptd if there are currently requests outstanding from the same tfm. Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 13 Apr, 2016 1 commit
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Borislav Petkov authored
Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1459801503-15600-4-git-send-email-bp@alien8.deSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 16 Feb, 2016 1 commit
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Stephan Mueller authored
The patch centralizes the XTS key check logic into the service function xts_check_key which is invoked from the different XTS implementations. With this, the XTS implementations in ARM, ARM64, PPC and S390 have now a sanity check for the XTS keys similar to the other arches. In addition, this service function received a check to ensure that the key != the tweak key which is mandated by FIPS 140-2 IG A.9. As the check is not present in the standards defining XTS, it is only enforced in FIPS mode of the kernel. Signed-off-by:
Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 17 Aug, 2015 1 commit
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Herbert Xu authored
This patch removes the CRYPTO_ALG_AEAD_NEW flag now that everyone has been converted. Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 14 Jul, 2015 1 commit
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Herbert Xu authored
This patch converts rfc4106 to the new calling convention where the IV is now in the AD and needs to be skipped. Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 29 Jun, 2015 1 commit
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Tadeusz Struk authored
rfc4106(gcm(aes)) uses ctr(aes) to generate hash key. ctr(aes) needs chainiv, but the chainiv gets initialized after aesni_intel when both are statically linked so the setkey fails. This patch forces aesni_intel to be initialized after chainiv. Signed-off-by:
Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Tested-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 03 Jun, 2015 2 commits
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Herbert Xu authored
This patch converts the low-level __gcm-aes-aesni algorithm to the new AEAD interface. Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Herbert Xu authored
This patch converts rfc4106-gcm-aesni to the new AEAD interface. The low-level interface remains as is for now because we can't touch it until cryptd itself is upgraded. In the conversion I've also removed the duplicate copy of the context in the top-level algorithm. Now all processing is carried out in the low-level __driver-gcm-aes-aesni algorithm. Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 19 May, 2015 1 commit
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Ingo Molnar authored
We already have fpu/types.h, move i387.h to fpu/api.h. The file name has become a misnomer anyway: it offers generic FPU APIs, but is not limited to i387 functionality. Reviewed-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 13 May, 2015 1 commit
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Herbert Xu authored
This patch uses the crypto_aead_set_reqsize helper to avoid directly touching the internals of aead. Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 31 Mar, 2015 1 commit
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Stephan Mueller authored
Flag all AES-NI helper ciphers as internal ciphers to prevent them from being called by normal users. Signed-off-by:
Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 13 Mar, 2015 1 commit
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Stephan Mueller authored
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use cryptlen. The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding (ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size. In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD will be written beyond the already allocated buffer. Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes. Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate that the crypto operation still delivers the right results. [1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html CC: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 28 Feb, 2015 1 commit
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Tadeusz Struk authored
Changed the __driver-gcm-aes-aesni to be a proper aead algorithm. This required a valid setkey and setauthsize functions to be added and also some changes to make sure that math context is not corrupted when the alg is used directly. Note that the __driver-gcm-aes-aesni should not be used directly by modules that can use it in interrupt context as we don't have a good fallback mechanism in this case. Signed-off-by:
Adrian Hoban <adrian.hoban@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 14 Jan, 2015 1 commit
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Timothy McCaffrey authored
These patches fix the RFC4106 implementation in the aesni-intel module so it supports 192 & 256 bit keys. Since the AVX support that was added to this module also only supports 128 bit keys, and this patch only affects the SSE implementation, changes were also made to use the SSE version if key sizes other than 128 are specified. RFC4106 specifies that 192 & 256 bit keys must be supported (section 8.4). Also, this should fix Strongswan issue 341 where the aesni module needs to be unloaded if 256 bit keys are used: http://wiki.strongswan.org/issues/341 This patch has been tested with Sandy Bridge and Haswell processors. With 128 bit keys and input buffers > 512 bytes a slight performance degradation was noticed (~1%). For input buffers of less than 512 bytes there was no performance impact. Compared to 128 bit keys, 256 bit key size performance is approx. .5 cycles per byte slower on Sandy Bridge, and .37 cycles per byte slower on Haswell (vs. SSE code). This patch has also been tested with StrongSwan IPSec connections where it worked correctly. I created this diff from a git clone of crypto-2.6.git. Any questions, please feel free to contact me. Signed-off-by:
Timothy McCaffrey <timothy.mccaffrey@unisys.com> Signed-off-by:
Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 24 Nov, 2014 1 commit
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Kees Cook authored
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API, as demonstrated by Mathias Krause: https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70Signed-off-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 06 Nov, 2014 1 commit
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Valentin Rothberg authored
The CPP identifier 'HAS_PCBC' is defined when the Kconfig option CRYPTO_PCBC is set as 'y' or 'm', and is further used in two ifdef blocks to conditionally compile source code. This indirection hides the actual Kconfig dependency and complicates readability. Moreover, it's inconsistent with the rest of the ifdef blocks in the file, which directly reference Kconfig options. This patch removes 'HAS_PCBC' and replaces its occurrences with the actual dependency on 'CRYPTO_PCBC' being set as 'y' or 'm'. Signed-off-by:
Valentin Rothberg <valentinrothberg@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 02 Oct, 2014 1 commit
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Mathias Krause authored
This reverts commit 7da4b29d. Now, that the issue is fixed, we can re-enable the code. Signed-off-by:
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: Chandramouli Narayanan <mouli@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 24 Sep, 2014 1 commit
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Mathias Krause authored
The "by8" implementation introduced in commit 22cddcc7 ("crypto: aes - AES CTR x86_64 "by8" AVX optimization") is failing crypto tests as it handles counter block overflows differently. It only accounts the right most 32 bit as a counter -- not the whole block as all other implementations do. This makes it fail the cryptomgr test #4 that specifically tests this corner case. As we're quite late in the release cycle, just disable the "by8" variant for now. Reported-by:
Romain Francoise <romain@orebokech.com> Signed-off-by:
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: Chandramouli Narayanan <mouli@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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- 20 Jun, 2014 1 commit
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chandramouli narayanan authored
This patch introduces "by8" AES CTR mode AVX optimization inspired by Intel Optimized IPSEC Cryptograhpic library. For additional information, please see: http://downloadcenter.intel.com/Detail_Desc.aspx?agr=Y&DwnldID=22972 The functions aes_ctr_enc_128_avx_by8(), aes_ctr_enc_192_avx_by8() and aes_ctr_enc_256_avx_by8() are adapted from Intel Optimized IPSEC Cryptographic library. When both AES and AVX features are enabled in a platform, the glue code in AESNI module overrieds the existing "by4" CTR mode en/decryption with the "by8" AES CTR mode en/decryption. On a Haswell desktop, with turbo disabled and all cpus running at maximum frequency, the "by8" CTR mode optimization shows better performance results across data & key sizes as measured by tcrypt. The average performance improvement of the "by8" version over the "by4" version is as follows: For 128 bit key and data sizes >= 256 bytes, there is a 10-16% improvement. For 192 bit key and data sizes >= 256 bytes, there is a 20-22% improvement. For 256 bit key and data sizes >= 256 bytes, there is a 20-25% improvement. A typical run of tcrypt with AES CTR mode encryption of the "by4" and "by8" optimization shows the following results: tcrypt with "by4" AES CTR mode encryption optimization on a Haswell Desktop: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- testing speed of __ctr-aes-aesni encryption test 0 (128 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 343 cycles (16 bytes) test 1 (128 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 336 cycles (64 bytes) test 2 (128 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 491 cycles (256 bytes) test 3 (128 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1130 cycles (1024 bytes) test 4 (128 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 7309 cycles (8192 bytes) test 5 (192 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 346 cycles (16 bytes) test 6 (192 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 361 cycles (64 bytes) test 7 (192 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 543 cycles (256 bytes) test 8 (192 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1321 cycles (1024 bytes) test 9 (192 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 9649 cycles (8192 bytes) test 10 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 369 cycles (16 bytes) test 11 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 366 cycles (64 bytes) test 12 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 595 cycles (256 bytes) test 13 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1531 cycles (1024 bytes) test 14 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 10522 cycles (8192 bytes) testing speed of __ctr-aes-aesni decryption test 0 (128 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 336 cycles (16 bytes) test 1 (128 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 350 cycles (64 bytes) test 2 (128 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 487 cycles (256 bytes) test 3 (128 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1129 cycles (1024 bytes) test 4 (128 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 7287 cycles (8192 bytes) test 5 (192 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 350 cycles (16 bytes) test 6 (192 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 359 cycles (64 bytes) test 7 (192 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 635 cycles (256 bytes) test 8 (192 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1324 cycles (1024 bytes) test 9 (192 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 9595 cycles (8192 bytes) test 10 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 364 cycles (16 bytes) test 11 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 377 cycles (64 bytes) test 12 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 604 cycles (256 bytes) test 13 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1527 cycles (1024 bytes) test 14 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 10549 cycles (8192 bytes) tcrypt with "by8" AES CTR mode encryption optimization on a Haswell Desktop: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- testing speed of __ctr-aes-aesni encryption test 0 (128 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 340 cycles (16 bytes) test 1 (128 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 330 cycles (64 bytes) test 2 (128 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 450 cycles (256 bytes) test 3 (128 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1043 cycles (1024 bytes) test 4 (128 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 6597 cycles (8192 bytes) test 5 (192 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 339 cycles (16 bytes) test 6 (192 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 352 cycles (64 bytes) test 7 (192 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 539 cycles (256 bytes) test 8 (192 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1153 cycles (1024 bytes) test 9 (192 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 8458 cycles (8192 bytes) test 10 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 353 cycles (16 bytes) test 11 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 360 cycles (64 bytes) test 12 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 512 cycles (256 bytes) test 13 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1277 cycles (1024 bytes) test 14 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 8745 cycles (8192 bytes) testing speed of __ctr-aes-aesni decryption test 0 (128 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 348 cycles (16 bytes) test 1 (128 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 335 cycles (64 bytes) test 2 (128 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 451 cycles (256 bytes) test 3 (128 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1030 cycles (1024 bytes) test 4 (128 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 6611 cycles (8192 bytes) test 5 (192 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 354 cycles (16 bytes) test 6 (192 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 346 cycles (64 bytes) test 7 (192 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 488 cycles (256 bytes) test 8 (192 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1154 cycles (1024 bytes) test 9 (192 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 8390 cycles (8192 bytes) test 10 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 357 cycles (16 bytes) test 11 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 362 cycles (64 bytes) test 12 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 515 cycles (256 bytes) test 13 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1284 cycles (1024 bytes) test 14 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 8681 cycles (8192 bytes) crypto: Incorporate feed back to AES CTR mode optimization patch Specifically, the following: a) alignment around main loop in aes_ctrby8_avx_x86_64.S b) .rodata around data constants used in the assembely code. c) the use of CONFIG_AVX in the glue code. d) fix up white space. e) informational message for "by8" AES CTR mode optimization f) "by8" AES CTR mode optimization can be simply enabled if the platform supports both AES and AVX features. The optimization works superbly on Sandybridge as well. Testing on Haswell shows no performance change since the last. Testing on Sandybridge shows that the "by8" AES CTR mode optimization greatly improves performance. tcrypt log with "by4" AES CTR mode optimization on Sandybridge -------------------------------------------------------------- testing speed of __ctr-aes-aesni encryption test 0 (128 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 383 cycles (16 bytes) test 1 (128 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 408 cycles (64 bytes) test 2 (128 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 707 cycles (256 bytes) test 3 (128 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1864 cycles (1024 bytes) test 4 (128 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 12813 cycles (8192 bytes) test 5 (192 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 395 cycles (16 bytes) test 6 (192 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 432 cycles (64 bytes) test 7 (192 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 780 cycles (256 bytes) test 8 (192 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 2132 cycles (1024 bytes) test 9 (192 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 15765 cycles (8192 bytes) test 10 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 416 cycles (16 bytes) test 11 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 438 cycles (64 bytes) test 12 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 842 cycles (256 bytes) test 13 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 2383 cycles (1024 bytes) test 14 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 16945 cycles (8192 bytes) testing speed of __ctr-aes-aesni decryption test 0 (128 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 389 cycles (16 bytes) test 1 (128 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 409 cycles (64 bytes) test 2 (128 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 704 cycles (256 bytes) test 3 (128 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1865 cycles (1024 bytes) test 4 (128 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 12783 cycles (8192 bytes) test 5 (192 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 409 cycles (16 bytes) test 6 (192 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 434 cycles (64 bytes) test 7 (192 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 792 cycles (256 bytes) test 8 (192 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 2151 cycles (1024 bytes) test 9 (192 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 15804 cycles (8192 bytes) test 10 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 421 cycles (16 bytes) test 11 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 444 cycles (64 bytes) test 12 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 840 cycles (256 bytes) test 13 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 2394 cycles (1024 bytes) test 14 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 16928 cycles (8192 bytes) tcrypt log with "by8" AES CTR mode optimization on Sandybridge -------------------------------------------------------------- testing speed of __ctr-aes-aesni encryption test 0 (128 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 383 cycles (16 bytes) test 1 (128 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 401 cycles (64 bytes) test 2 (128 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 522 cycles (256 bytes) test 3 (128 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1136 cycles (1024 bytes) test 4 (128 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 7046 cycles (8192 bytes) test 5 (192 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 394 cycles (16 bytes) test 6 (192 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 418 cycles (64 bytes) test 7 (192 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 559 cycles (256 bytes) test 8 (192 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1263 cycles (1024 bytes) test 9 (192 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 9072 cycles (8192 bytes) test 10 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 408 cycles (16 bytes) test 11 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 428 cycles (64 bytes) test 12 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 595 cycles (256 bytes) test 13 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1385 cycles (1024 bytes) test 14 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 9224 cycles (8192 bytes) testing speed of __ctr-aes-aesni decryption test 0 (128 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 390 cycles (16 bytes) test 1 (128 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 402 cycles (64 bytes) test 2 (128 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 530 cycles (256 bytes) test 3 (128 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1135 cycles (1024 bytes) test 4 (128 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 7079 cycles (8192 bytes) test 5 (192 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 414 cycles (16 bytes) test 6 (192 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 417 cycles (64 bytes) test 7 (192 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 572 cycles (256 bytes) test 8 (192 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1312 cycles (1024 bytes) test 9 (192 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 9073 cycles (8192 bytes) test 10 (256 bit key, 16 byte blocks): 1 operation in 415 cycles (16 bytes) test 11 (256 bit key, 64 byte blocks): 1 operation in 454 cycles (64 bytes) test 12 (256 bit key, 256 byte blocks): 1 operation in 598 cycles (256 bytes) test 13 (256 bit key, 1024 byte blocks): 1 operation in 1407 cycles (1024 bytes) test 14 (256 bit key, 8192 byte blocks): 1 operation in 9288 cycles (8192 bytes) crypto: Fix redundant checks a) Fix the redundant check for cpu_has_aes b) Fix the key length check when invoking the CTR mode "by8" encryptor/decryptor. crypto: fix typo in AES ctr mode transform Signed-off-by:
Chandramouli Narayanan <mouli@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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