- 10 Jun, 2013 32 commits
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Tejun Heo authored
commit 17543163 upstream. cgroup_create_dir() does weird dancing with dentry refcnt. On success, it gets and then puts it achieving nothing. On failure, it puts but there isn't no matching get anywhere leading to the following oops if cgroup_create_file() fails for whatever reason. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at /work/os/work/fs/dcache.c:552! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC Modules linked in: CPU 2 Pid: 697, comm: mkdir Not tainted 3.7.0-rc4-work+ #3 Bochs Bochs RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811d9c0c>] [<ffffffff811d9c0c>] dput+0x1dc/0x1e0 RSP: 0018:ffff88001a3ebef8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88000e5b1ef8 RCX: 0000000000000403 RDX: 0000000000000303 RSI: 2000000000000000 RDI: ffff88000e5b1f58 RBP: ffff88001a3ebf18 R08: ffffffff82c76960 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffff880015022080 R11: ffd9bed70f48a041 R12: 00000000ffffffea R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff88000e5b1f58 R15: 00007fff57656d60 FS: 00007ff05fcb3800(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004046f0 CR3: 000000001315f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process mkdir (pid: 697, threadinfo ffff88001a3ea000, task ffff880015022080) Stack: ffff88001a3ebf48 00000000ffffffea 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 ffff88001a3ebf38 ffffffff811cc889 0000000000000001 ffff88000e5b1ef8 ffff88001a3ebf68 ffffffff811d1fc9 ffff8800198d7f18 ffff880019106ef8 Call Trace: [<ffffffff811cc889>] done_path_create+0x19/0x50 [<ffffffff811d1fc9>] sys_mkdirat+0x59/0x80 [<ffffffff811d2009>] sys_mkdir+0x19/0x20 [<ffffffff81be1e02>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: 00 48 8d 90 18 01 00 00 48 89 93 c0 00 00 00 4c 89 a0 18 01 00 00 48 8b 83 a0 00 00 00 83 80 28 01 00 00 01 e8 e6 6f a0 00 eb 92 <0f> 0b 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 49 89 fe 41 RIP [<ffffffff811d9c0c>] dput+0x1dc/0x1e0 RSP <ffff88001a3ebef8> ---[ end trace 1277bcfd9561ddb0 ]--- Fix it by dropping the unnecessary dget/dput() pair. Signed-off-by:
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by:
Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Bjorn Helgaas authored
commit 4fa3e78b upstream. A bus_type has a list of devices (klist_devices), but the list and the subsys_private structure that contains it are not initialized until the bus_type is registered with bus_register(). The panic/reboot path has fixups that look up devices in pci_bus_type. If we panic before registering pci_bus_type, the bus_type exists but the list does not, so mach_reboot_fixups() trips over a null pointer and panics again: mach_reboot_fixups pci_get_device .. bus_find_device(&pci_bus_type, ...) bus->p is NULL Joonsoo reported a problem when panicking before PCI was initialized. I think this patch should be sufficient to replace the patch he posted here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/12/28/75 ("[PATCH] x86, reboot: skip reboot_fixups in early boot phase") Reported-by:
Joonsoo Kim <js1304@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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T Makphaibulchoke authored
commit 4965f566 upstream. Using a recursive call add a non-conflicting region in __reserve_region_with_split() could result in a stack overflow in the case that the recursive calls are too deep. Convert the recursive calls to an iterative loop to avoid the problem. Tested on a machine containing 135 regions. The kernel no longer panicked with stack overflow. Also tested with code arbitrarily adding regions with no conflict, embedding two consecutive conflicts and embedding two non-consecutive conflicts. Signed-off-by:
T Makphaibulchoke <tmac@hp.com> Reviewed-by:
Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@gmail.com> Cc: Wei Yang <weiyang@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo authored
commit eedce141 upstream. The genalloc code uses the bitmap API from include/linux/bitmap.h and lib/bitmap.c, which is based on long values. Both bitmap_set from lib/bitmap.c and bitmap_set_ll, which is the lockless version from genalloc.c, use BITMAP_LAST_WORD_MASK to set the first bits in a long in the bitmap. That one uses (1 << bits) - 1, 0b111, if you are setting the first three bits. This means that the API counts from the least significant bits (LSB from now on) to the MSB. The LSB in the first long is bit 0, then. The same works for the lookup functions. The genalloc code uses longs for the bitmap, as it should. In include/linux/genalloc.h, struct gen_pool_chunk has unsigned long bits[0] as its last member. When allocating the struct, genalloc should reserve enough space for the bitmap. This should be a proper number of longs that can fit the amount of bits in the bitmap. However, genalloc allocates an integer number of bytes that fit the amount of bits, but may not be an integer amount of longs. 9 bytes, for example, could be allocated for 70 bits. This is a problem in itself if the Least Significat Bit in a long is in the byte with the largest address, which happens in Big Endian machines. This means genalloc is not allocating the byte in which it will try to set or check for a bit. This may end up in memory corruption, where genalloc will try to set the bits it has not allocated. In fact, genalloc may not set these bits because it may find them already set, because they were not zeroed since they were not allocated. And that's what causes a BUG when gen_pool_destroy is called and check for any set bits. What really happens is that genalloc uses kmalloc_node with __GFP_ZERO on gen_pool_add_virt. With SLAB and SLUB, this means the whole slab will be cleared, not only the requested bytes. Since struct gen_pool_chunk has a size that is a multiple of 8, and slab sizes are multiples of 8, we get lucky and allocate and clear the right amount of bytes. Hower, this is not the case with SLOB or with older code that did memset after allocating instead of using __GFP_ZERO. So, a simple module as this (running 3.6.0), will cause a crash when rmmod'ed. [root@phantom-lp2 foo]# cat foo.c #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/genalloc.h> MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_VERSION("0.1"); static struct gen_pool *foo_pool; static __init int foo_init(void) { int ret; foo_pool = gen_pool_create(10, -1); if (!foo_pool) return -ENOMEM; ret = gen_pool_add(foo_pool, 0xa0000000, 32 << 10, -1); if (ret) { gen_pool_destroy(foo_pool); return ret; } return 0; } static __exit void foo_exit(void) { gen_pool_destroy(foo_pool); } module_init(foo_init); module_exit(foo_exit); [root@phantom-lp2 foo]# zcat /proc/config.gz | grep SLOB CONFIG_SLOB=y [root@phantom-lp2 foo]# insmod ./foo.ko [root@phantom-lp2 foo]# rmmod foo ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/genalloc.c:243! cpu 0x4: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c0000000bb0e7960] pc: c0000000003cb50c: .gen_pool_destroy+0xac/0x110 lr: c0000000003cb4fc: .gen_pool_destroy+0x9c/0x110 sp: c0000000bb0e7be0 msr: 8000000000029032 current = 0xc0000000bb0e0000 paca = 0xc000000006d30e00 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01 pid = 13044, comm = rmmod kernel BUG at lib/genalloc.c:243! [c0000000bb0e7ca0] d000000004b00020 .foo_exit+0x20/0x38 [foo] [c0000000bb0e7d20] c0000000000dff98 .SyS_delete_module+0x1a8/0x290 [c0000000bb0e7e30] c0000000000097d4 syscall_exit+0x0/0x94 --- Exception: c00 (System Call) at 000000800753d1a0 SP (fffd0b0e640) is in userspace Signed-off-by:
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Benjamin Gaignard <benjamin.gaignard@stericsson.com> Signed-off-by:
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Steven Rostedt authored
commit 54f7be5b upstream. The function rb_check_pages() was added to make sure the ring buffer's pages were sane. This check is done when the ring buffer size is modified as well as when the iterator is released (closing the "trace" file), as that was considered a non fast path and a good place to do a sanity check. The problem is that the check does not have any locks around it. If one process were to read the trace file, and another were to read the raw binary file, the check could happen while the reader is reading the file. The issues with this is that the check requires to clear the HEAD page before doing the full check and it restores it afterward. But readers require the HEAD page to exist before it can read the buffer, otherwise it gives a nasty warning and disables the buffer. By adding the reader lock around the check, this keeps the race from happening. Signed-off-by:
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by:
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Shawn Guo authored
commit f96972f2 upstream. As kernel_power_off() calls disable_nonboot_cpus(), we may also want to have kernel_restart() call disable_nonboot_cpus(). Doing so can help machines that require boot cpu be the last alive cpu during reboot to survive with kernel restart. This fixes one reboot issue seen on imx6q (Cortex-A9 Quad). The machine requires that the restart routine be run on the primary cpu rather than secondary ones. Otherwise, the secondary core running the restart routine will fail to come to online after reboot. Signed-off-by:
Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Denys Vlasenko authored
commit f34f9d18 upstream. In !CORE_DUMP_USE_REGSET case, if elf_note_info_init fails to allocate memory for info->fields, it frees already allocated stuff and returns error to its caller, fill_note_info. Which in turn returns error to its caller, elf_core_dump. Which jumps to cleanup label and calls free_note_info, which will happily try to free all info->fields again. BOOM. This is the fix. Signed-off-by:
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com> Cc: Venu Byravarasu <vbyravarasu@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by:
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Oleg Nesterov authored
wake_up_process() should be never used to wakeup a TASK_STOPPED/TRACED task CVE-2013-0871 BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1129192 wake_up_process() should never wakeup a TASK_STOPPED/TRACED task. Change it to use TASK_NORMAL and add the WARN_ON(). TASK_ALL has no other users, probably can be killed. Signed-off-by:
Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Andrew Morton authored
commit 522cff14 upstream. __ARCH_HAS_SA_RESTORER is the preferred conditional for use in 3.9 and later kernels, per Kees. Signed-off-by:
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Ben Hutchings authored
Vaguely based on upstream commit 574c4866 'consolidate kernel-side struct sigaction declarations'. flush_signal_handlers() needs to know whether sigaction::sa_restorer is defined, not whether SA_RESTORER is defined. Define the __ARCH_HAS_SA_RESTORER macro to indicate this. Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Emese Revfy authored
commit b9e146d8 upstream. This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls for compat processes. This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field when handling signals delivered from tkill. The place of the infoleak: int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from) { ... put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr); ... } Signed-off-by:
Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Signed-off-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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John Johansen authored
This patch fixes a regression in ptrace, introduced by commit 9e74eb39 (backport of 9899d11f) which makes assumptions about ptrace behavior which are not true in the 2.6.32 kernel. BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1145234 9899d11f makes the assumption that task_is_stopped() is not a valid state in ptrace because it is built on top of a series of patches which change how the TASK_STOPPED state is tracked (321fb561 which requires d79fdd6d and several other patches). Because Lucid does not have the set of patches that make task_is_stopped() an invalid state in ptrace_check_attach, partially revert 9e74eb39 so that ptrace_check_attach() correctly handles task_is_stopped(). However we must replace the assignment of TASK_TRACED with __TASK_TRACED to ensure TASK_WAKEKILL is cleared. Signed-off-by:
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Acked-by:
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Oleg Nesterov authored
ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL CVE-2013-0871 BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1129192 putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee does SAVE_REST again. set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the logic. As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace() call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths. Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before access_process_vm(). While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state(). Reported-by:
Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com> Reported-by:
Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com> Suggested-by:
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Oleg Nesterov authored
ptrace: introduce signal_wake_up_state() and ptrace_signal_wake_up() CVE-2013-0871 BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1129192 Cleanup and preparation for the next change. signal_wake_up(resume => true) is overused. None of ptrace/jctl callers actually want to wakeup a TASK_WAKEKILL task, but they can't specify the necessary mask. Turn signal_wake_up() into signal_wake_up_state(state), reintroduce signal_wake_up() as a trivial helper, and add ptrace_signal_wake_up() which adds __TASK_TRACED. This way ptrace_signal_wake_up() can work "inside" ptrace_request() even if the tracee doesn't have the TASK_WAKEKILL bit set. Signed-off-by:
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Oleg Nesterov authored
ptrace: ptrace_resume() shouldn't wake up !TASK_TRACED thread CVE-2013-0871 BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1129192 It is not clear why ptrace_resume() does wake_up_process(). Unless the caller is PTRACE_KILL the tracee should be TASK_TRACED so we can use wake_up_state(__TASK_TRACED). If sys_ptrace() races with SIGKILL we do not need the extra and potentionally spurious wakeup. If the caller is PTRACE_KILL, wake_up_process() is even more wrong. The tracee can sleep in any state in any place, and if we have a buggy code which doesn't handle a spurious wakeup correctly PTRACE_KILL can be used to exploit it. For example: int main(void) { int child, status; child = fork(); if (!child) { int ret; assert(ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0,0,0) == 0); ret = pause(); printf("pause: %d %m\n", ret); return 0x23; } sleep(1); assert(ptrace(PTRACE_KILL, child, 0,0) == 0); assert(child == wait(&status)); printf("wait: %x\n", status); return 0; } prints "pause: -1 Unknown error 514", -ERESTARTNOHAND leaks to the userland. In this case sys_pause() is buggy as well and should be fixed. I do not know what was the original rationality behind PTRACE_KILL. The man page is simply wrong and afaics it was always wrong. Imho it should be deprecated, or may be it should do send_sig(SIGKILL) as Denys suggests, but in any case I do not think that the current behaviour was intentional. Note: there is another problem, ptrace_resume() changes ->exit_code and this can race with SIGKILL too. Eventually we should change ptrace to not use ->exit_code. Signed-off-by:
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Kees Cook authored
commit 2ca39528 upstream. When the new signal handlers are set up, the location of sa_restorer is not cleared, leaking a parent process's address space location to children. This allows for a potential bypass of the parent's ASLR by examining the sa_restorer value returned when calling sigaction(). Based on what should be considered "secret" about addresses, it only matters across the exec not the fork (since the VMAs haven't changed until the exec). But since exec sets SIG_DFL and keeps sa_restorer, this is where it should be fixed. Given the few uses of sa_restorer, a "set" function was not written since this would be the only use. Instead, we use __ARCH_HAS_SA_RESTORER, as already done in other places. Example of the leak before applying this patch: $ cat /proc/$$/maps ... 7fb9f3083000-7fb9f3238000 r-xp 00000000 fd:01 404469 .../libc-2.15.so ... $ ./leak ... 7f278bc74000-7f278be29000 r-xp 00000000 fd:01 404469 .../libc-2.15.so ... 1 0 (nil) 0x7fb9f30b94a0 2 4000000 (nil) 0x7f278bcaa4a0 3 4000000 (nil) 0x7f278bcaa4a0 4 0 (nil) 0x7fb9f30b94a0 ... [akpm@linux-foundation.org: use SA_RESTORER for backportability] Signed-off-by:
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Kees Cook authored
commit d7402698 upstream To avoid an explosion of request_module calls on a chain of abusive scripts, fail maximum recursion with -ELOOP instead of -ENOEXEC. As soon as maximum recursion depth is hit, the error will fail all the way back up the chain, aborting immediately. This also has the side-effect of stopping the user's shell from attempting to reexecute the top-level file as a shell script. As seen in the dash source: if (cmd != path_bshell && errno == ENOEXEC) { *argv-- = cmd; *argv = cmd = path_bshell; goto repeat; } The above logic was designed for running scripts automatically that lacked the "#!" header, not to re-try failed recursion. On a legitimate -ENOEXEC, things continue to behave as the shell expects. Additionally, when tracking recursion, the binfmt handlers should not be involved. The recursion being tracked is the depth of calls through search_binary_handler(), so that function should be exclusively responsible for tracking the depth. Signed-off-by:
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Kees Cook authored
commit b66c5984 upstream If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak into the command line. Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively. However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching binfmt modules. Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted. They leave bprm->interp pointing to their local stack. This means on restart bprm->interp is left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the userspace argv areas. After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules. As such, we need to protect the changes to interp. This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the bprm->interp. To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default value is left as-is. Only when passing through binfmt_script or binfmt_misc does an allocation take place. For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from: http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/Signed-off-by:
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Oleg Nesterov authored
commit 1cc684ab upstream As Tetsuo Handa pointed out, request_module() can stress the system while the oom-killed caller sleeps in TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE. The task T uses "almost all" memory, then it does something which triggers request_module(). Say, it can simply call sys_socket(). This in turn needs more memory and leads to OOM. oom-killer correctly chooses T and kills it, but this can't help because it sleeps in TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE and after that oom-killer becomes "disabled" by the TIF_MEMDIE task T. Make __request_module() killable. The only necessary change is that call_modprobe() should kmalloc argv and module_name, they can't live in the stack if we use UMH_KILLABLE. This memory is freed via call_usermodehelper_freeinfo()->cleanup. Reported-by:
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by:
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Oleg Nesterov authored
commit 3e63a93b upstream No functional changes. Move the call_usermodehelper code from __request_module() into the new simple helper, call_modprobe(). Signed-off-by:
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Oleg Nesterov authored
commit 5b9bd473 upstream Minor cleanup. ____call_usermodehelper() can simply return, no need to call do_exit() explicitely. Signed-off-by:
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Oleg Nesterov authored
commit d0bd587a upstream Implement UMH_KILLABLE, should be used along with UMH_WAIT_EXEC/PROC. The caller must ensure that subprocess_info->path/etc can not go away until call_usermodehelper_freeinfo(). call_usermodehelper_exec(UMH_KILLABLE) does wait_for_completion_killable. If it fails, it uses xchg(&sub_info->complete, NULL) to serialize with umh_complete() which does the same xhcg() to access sub_info->complete. If call_usermodehelper_exec wins, it can safely return. umh_complete() should get NULL and call call_usermodehelper_freeinfo(). Otherwise we know that umh_complete() was already called, in this case call_usermodehelper_exec() falls back to wait_for_completion() which should succeed "very soon". Note: UMH_NO_WAIT == -1 but it obviously should not be used with UMH_KILLABLE. We delay the neccessary cleanup to simplify the back porting. Signed-off-by:
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Oleg Nesterov authored
commit b3449922 upstream Preparation. Add the new trivial helper, umh_complete(). Currently it simply does complete(sub_info->complete). Signed-off-by:
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Kees Cook authored
commit 20f1de65 upstream. Fix possible overflow of the buffer used for expanding environment variables when building file list. In the extremely unlikely case of an attacker having control over the environment variables visible to gen_init_cpio, control over the contents of the file gen_init_cpio parses, and gen_init_cpio was built without compiler hardening, the attacker can gain arbitrary execution control via a stack buffer overflow. $ cat usr/crash.list file foo ${BIG}${BIG}${BIG}${BIG}${BIG}${BIG} 0755 0 0 $ BIG=$(perl -e 'print "A" x 4096;') ./usr/gen_init_cpio usr/crash.list *** buffer overflow detected ***: ./usr/gen_init_cpio terminated This also replaces the space-indenting with tabs. Patch based on existing fix extracted from grsecurity. Signed-off-by:
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Jean Delvare authored
This is upstream commit b1e0d8b7 backported to the 2.6.32.x stable branch. The correct syntax for gcc -x is "gcc -x assembler", not "gcc -xassembler". Even though the latter happens to work, the former is what is documented in the manual page and thus what gcc wrappers such as icecream do expect. This isn't a cosmetic change. The missing space prevents icecream from recognizing compilation tasks it can't handle, leading to silent kernel miscompilations. Besides me, credits go to Michael Matz and Dirk Mueller for investigating the miscompilation issue and tracking it down to this incorrect -x parameter syntax. Signed-off-by:
Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Bernhard Walle <bernhard@bwalle.de> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 4b0c0f29 upstream. Prarit reported a crash on CPU offline/online. The reason is that on CPU down the NOHZ related per cpu data of the dead cpu is not cleaned up. If at cpu online an interrupt happens before the per cpu tick device is registered the irq_enter() check potentially sees stale data and dereferences a NULL pointer. Cleanup the data after the cpu is dead. Reported-by:
Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <bitbucket@online.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1305031451561.2886@ionosSigned-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
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Tirupathi Reddy authored
commit 42a5cf46 upstream. An inactive timer's base can refer to a offline cpu's base. In the current code, cpu_base's lock is blindly reinitialized each time a CPU is brought up. If a CPU is brought online during the period that another thread is trying to modify an inactive timer on that CPU with holding its timer base lock, then the lock will be reinitialized under its feet. This leads to following SPIN_BUG(). <0> BUG: spinlock already unlocked on CPU#3, kworker/u:3/1466 <0> lock: 0xe3ebe000, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: kworker/u:3/1466, .owner_cpu: 1 <4> [<c0013dc4>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0x11c) from [<c026e794>] (do_raw_spin_unlock+0x40/0xcc) <4> [<c026e794>] (do_raw_spin_unlock+0x40/0xcc) from [<c076c160>] (_raw_spin_unlock+0x8/0x30) <4> [<c076c160>] (_raw_spin_unlock+0x8/0x30) from [<c009b858>] (mod_timer+0x294/0x310) <4> [<c009b858>] (mod_timer+0x294/0x310) from [<c00a5e04>] (queue_delayed_work_on+0x104/0x120) <4> [<c00a5e04>] (queue_delayed_work_on+0x104/0x120) from [<c04eae00>] (sdhci_msm_bus_voting+0x88/0x9c) <4> [<c04eae00>] (sdhci_msm_bus_voting+0x88/0x9c) from [<c04d8780>] (sdhci_disable+0x40/0x48) <4> [<c04d8780>] (sdhci_disable+0x40/0x48) from [<c04bf300>] (mmc_release_host+0x4c/0xb0) <4> [<c04bf300>] (mmc_release_host+0x4c/0xb0) from [<c04c7aac>] (mmc_sd_detect+0x90/0xfc) <4> [<c04c7aac>] (mmc_sd_detect+0x90/0xfc) from [<c04c2504>] (mmc_rescan+0x7c/0x2c4) <4> [<c04c2504>] (mmc_rescan+0x7c/0x2c4) from [<c00a6a7c>] (process_one_work+0x27c/0x484) <4> [<c00a6a7c>] (process_one_work+0x27c/0x484) from [<c00a6e94>] (worker_thread+0x210/0x3b0) <4> [<c00a6e94>] (worker_thread+0x210/0x3b0) from [<c00aad9c>] (kthread+0x80/0x8c) <4> [<c00aad9c>] (kthread+0x80/0x8c) from [<c000ea80>] (kernel_thread_exit+0x0/0x8) As an example, this particular crash occurred when CPU #3 is executing mod_timer() on an inactive timer whose base is refered to offlined CPU #2. The code locked the timer_base corresponding to CPU #2. Before it could proceed, CPU #2 came online and reinitialized the spinlock corresponding to its base. Thus now CPU #3 held a lock which was reinitialized. When CPU #3 finally ended up unlocking the old cpu_base corresponding to CPU #2, we hit the above SPIN_BUG(). CPU #0 CPU #3 CPU #2 ------ ------- ------- ..... ...... <Offline> mod_timer() lock_timer_base spin_lock_irqsave(&base->lock) cpu_up(2) ..... ...... init_timers_cpu() .... ..... spin_lock_init(&base->lock) ..... spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base->lock) ...... <spin_bug> Allocation of per_cpu timer vector bases is done only once under "tvec_base_done[]" check. In the current code, spinlock_initialization of base->lock isn't under this check. When a CPU is up each time the base lock is reinitialized. Move base spinlock initialization under the check. Signed-off-by:
Tirupathi Reddy <tirupath@codeaurora.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1368520142-4136-1-git-send-email-tirupath@codeaurora.orgSigned-off-by:
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Stanislaw Gruszka authored
commit e6c42c29 upstream. The trinity fuzzer triggered a task_struct reference leak via clock_nanosleep with CPU_TIMERs. do_cpu_nanosleep() calls posic_cpu_timer_create(), but misses a corresponding posix_cpu_timer_del() which leads to the task_struct reference leak. Reported-and-tested-by:
Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130215100810.GF4392@redhat.comSigned-off-by:
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Mark Rutland authored
commit a7dc19b8 upstream. Currently tick_check_broadcast_device doesn't reject clock_event_devices with CLOCK_EVT_FEAT_DUMMY, and may select them in preference to real hardware if they have a higher rating value. In this situation, the dummy timer is responsible for broadcasting to itself, and the core clockevents code may attempt to call non-existent callbacks for programming the dummy, eventually leading to a panic. This patch makes tick_check_broadcast_device always reject dummy timers, preventing this problem. Signed-off-by:
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: Jon Medhurst (Tixy) <tixy@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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John Stultz authored
Commit 61b76840 ("time: Avoid making adjustments if we haven't accumulated anything") introduced a regression with nohz. Basically with kernels between 2.6.20-something to 2.6.32, we accumulate time in half second chunks, rather then every timer-tick. This was added because when NOHZ landed, if you were idle for a few seconds, you had to spin for every tick we skipped in the accumulation loop, which created some bad latencies. However, this required that we create the xtime_cache() which was still updated each tick, so that filesystem timestamps, etc continued to see time increment normally. Of course, the xtime_cache is updated at the bottom of update_wall_time(). So the early return on (offset < timekeeper.cycle_interval), added by the problematic commit causes the xtime_cache to not be updated. This can cause code using current_kernel_time() (like the mqueue code) or hrtimer_get_softirq_time(), which uses the non-updated xtime_cache, to see timers to fire with very coarse half-second granularity. Many thanks to Romain for describing the issue clearly, providing test case to reproduce it and helping with testing the solution. This change is for 2.6.32-stable ONLY! Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Romain Francoise <romain@orebokech.com> Reported-by:
Romain Francoise <romain@orebokech.com> Tested-by:
John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Jens Axboe authored
This reverts commit fb1e7538. "Benjamin S." <sbenni@gmx.de> reports that the patch in question causes a big drop in sequential throughput for him, dropping from 200MB/sec down to only 70MB/sec. Needs to be investigated more fully, for now lets just revert the offending commit. Conflicts: include/linux/blkdev.h Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com> (cherry picked from commit 79da0644) Cc: Thomas Bork <tom@eisfair.net> Signed-off-by:
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Ben Hutchings authored
This reverts commit 2af3af56, which was commit 6c4088ac upstream. This broke compilation of the driver in 2.6.32.y as the early_io{remap,unmap}() functions are not defined for ia64. The driver can *only* be built for ia64 (even in current mainline), so a fix for x86_64 is pointless. Signed-off-by:
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- 07 Oct, 2012 8 commits
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Willy Tarreau authored
Signed-off-by: -
Tony Luck authored
commit d114a333 upstream. Send the entire DMI (SMBIOS) table to the /dev/random driver to help seed its pools. Signed-off-by:
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by:
Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mark Brown authored
commit 27130f0c upstream. wm831x devices contain a unique ID value. Feed this into the newly added device_add_randomness() to add some per device seed data to the pool. Signed-off-by:
Mark Brown <broonie@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mark Brown authored
commit 9dccf55f upstream. The tamper evident features of the RTC include the "write counter" which is a pseudo-random number regenerated whenever we set the RTC. Since this value is unpredictable it should provide some useful seeding to the random number generator. Only do this on boot since the goal is to seed the pool rather than add useful entropy. Signed-off-by:
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Tony Luck authored
commit cbc96b75 upstream. Many platforms have per-machine instance data (serial numbers, asset tags, etc.) squirreled away in areas that are accessed during early system bringup. Mixing this data into the random pools has a very high value in providing better random data, so we should allow (and even encourage) architecture code to call add_device_randomness() from the setup_arch() paths. However, this limits our options for internal structure of the random driver since random_initialize() is not called until long after setup_arch(). Add a big fat comment to rand_initialize() spelling out this requirement. Suggested-by:
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Theodore Ts'o authored
commit c5857ccf upstream. With the new interrupt sampling system, we are no longer using the timer_rand_state structure in the irq descriptor, so we can stop initializing it now. [ Merged in fixes from Sedat to find some last missing references to rand_initialize_irq() ] Signed-off-by:
Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> [PG: in .34 the irqdesc.h content is in irq.h instead.] Signed-off-by:
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Theodore Ts'o authored
commit 7bf23575 upstream. Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Theodore Ts'o authored
commit b04b3156 upstream. Send the USB device's serial, product, and manufacturer strings to the /dev/random driver to help seed its pools. Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by:
Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Signed-off-by:
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