- 26 Apr, 2024 1 commit
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Puranjay Mohan authored
With BPF_PROBE_MEM, BPF allows de-referencing an untrusted pointer. To thwart invalid memory accesses, the JITs add an exception table entry for all such accesses. But in case the src_reg + offset is a userspace address, the BPF program might read that memory if the user has mapped it. Make the verifier add guard instructions around such memory accesses and skip the load if the address falls into the userspace region. The JITs need to implement bpf_arch_uaddress_limit() to define where the userspace addresses end for that architecture or TASK_SIZE is taken as default. The implementation is as follows: REG_AX = SRC_REG if(offset) REG_AX += offset; REG_AX >>= 32; if (REG_AX <= (uaddress_limit >> 32)) DST_REG = 0; else DST_REG = *(size *)(SRC_REG + offset); Comparing just the upper 32 bits of the load address with the upper 32 bits of uaddress_limit implies that the values are being aligned down to a 4GB boundary before comparison. The above means that all loads with address <= uaddress_limit + 4GB are skipped. This is acceptable because there is a large hole (much larger than 4GB) between userspace and kernel space memory, therefore a correctly functioning BPF program should not access this 4GB memory above the userspace. Let's analyze what this patch does to the following fentry program dereferencing an untrusted pointer: SEC("fentry/tcp_v4_connect") int BPF_PROG(fentry_tcp_v4_connect, struct sock *sk) { *(volatile long *)sk; return 0; } BPF Program before | BPF Program after ------------------ | ----------------- 0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) 0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 1: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) --\ 1: (bf) r11 = r1 ----------------------------\ \ 2: (77) r11 >>= 32 2: (b7) r0 = 0 \ \ 3: (b5) if r11 <= 0x8000 goto pc+2 3: (95) exit \ \-> 4: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) \ 5: (05) goto pc+1 \ 6: (b7) r1 = 0 \-------------------------------------- 7: (b7) r0 = 0 8: (95) exit As you can see from above, in the best case (off=0), 5 extra instructions are emitted. Now, we analyze the same program after it has gone through the JITs of ARM64 and RISC-V architectures. We follow the single load instruction that has the untrusted pointer and see what instrumentation has been added around it. x86-64 JIT ========== JIT's Instrumentation (upstream) --------------------- 0: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) 5: xchg %ax,%ax 7: push %rbp 8: mov %rsp,%rbp b: mov 0x0(%rdi),%rdi --------------------------------- f: movabs $0x800000000000,%r11 19: cmp %r11,%rdi 1c: jb 0x000000000000002a 1e: mov %rdi,%r11 21: add $0x0,%r11 28: jae 0x000000000000002e 2a: xor %edi,%edi 2c: jmp 0x0000000000000032 2e: mov 0x0(%rdi),%rdi --------------------------------- 32: xor %eax,%eax 34: leave 35: ret The x86-64 JIT already emits some instructions to protect against user memory access. This patch doesn't make any changes for the x86-64 JIT. ARM64 JIT ========= No Intrumentation Verifier's Instrumentation (upstream) (This patch) ----------------- -------------------------- 0: add x9, x30, #0x0 0: add x9, x30, #0x0 4: nop 4: nop 8: paciasp 8: paciasp c: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! c: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! 10: mov x29, sp 10: mov x29, sp 14: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]! 14: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]! 18: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]! 18: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]! 1c: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]! 1c: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]! 20: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]! 20: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]! 24: mov x25, sp 24: mov x25, sp 28: mov x26, #0x0 28: mov x26, #0x0 2c: sub x27, x25, #0x0 2c: sub x27, x25, #0x0 30: sub sp, sp, #0x0 30: sub sp, sp, #0x0 34: ldr x0, [x0] 34: ldr x0, [x0] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 38: ldr x0, [x0] ----------\ 38: add x9, x0, #0x0 -----------------------------------\\ 3c: lsr x9, x9, #32 3c: mov x7, #0x0 \\ 40: cmp x9, #0x10, lsl #12 40: mov sp, sp \\ 44: b.ls 0x0000000000000050 44: ldp x27, x28, [sp], #16 \\--> 48: ldr x0, [x0] 48: ldp x25, x26, [sp], #16 \ 4c: b 0x0000000000000054 4c: ldp x21, x22, [sp], #16 \ 50: mov x0, #0x0 50: ldp x19, x20, [sp], #16 \--------------------------------------- 54: ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 54: mov x7, #0x0 58: add x0, x7, #0x0 58: mov sp, sp 5c: autiasp 5c: ldp x27, x28, [sp], #16 60: ret 60: ldp x25, x26, [sp], #16 64: nop 64: ldp x21, x22, [sp], #16 68: ldr x10, 0x0000000000000070 68: ldp x19, x20, [sp], #16 6c: br x10 6c: ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 70: add x0, x7, #0x0 74: autiasp 78: ret 7c: nop 80: ldr x10, 0x0000000000000088 84: br x10 There are 6 extra instructions added in ARM64 in the best case. This will become 7 in the worst case (off != 0). RISC-V JIT (RISCV_ISA_C Disabled) ========== No Intrumentation Verifier's Instrumentation (upstream) (This patch) ----------------- -------------------------- 0: nop 0: nop 4: nop 4: nop 8: li a6, 33 8: li a6, 33 c: addi sp, sp, -16 c: addi sp, sp, -16 10: sd s0, 8(sp) 10: sd s0, 8(sp) 14: addi s0, sp, 16 14: addi s0, sp, 16 18: ld a0, 0(a0) 18: ld a0, 0(a0) --------------------------------------------------------------- 1c: ld a0, 0(a0) --\ 1c: mv t0, a0 --------------------------\ \ 20: srli t0, t0, 32 20: li a5, 0 \ \ 24: lui t1, 4096 24: ld s0, 8(sp) \ \ 28: sext.w t1, t1 28: addi sp, sp, 16 \ \ 2c: bgeu t1, t0, 12 2c: sext.w a0, a5 \ \--> 30: ld a0, 0(a0) 30: ret \ 34: j 8 \ 38: li a0, 0 \------------------------------ 3c: li a5, 0 40: ld s0, 8(sp) 44: addi sp, sp, 16 48: sext.w a0, a5 4c: ret There are 7 extra instructions added in RISC-V. Fixes: 80083428 ("bpf, arm64: Add BPF exception tables") Reported-by:Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> Suggested-by:
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by:
Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424100210.11982-2-puranjay@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
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- 22 Apr, 2024 2 commits
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Toke Høiland-Jørgensen authored
When redirecting a packet using XDP, the bpf_redirect_map() helper will set up the redirect destination information in struct bpf_redirect_info (using the __bpf_xdp_redirect_map() helper function), and the xdp_do_redirect() function will read this information after the XDP program returns and pass the frame on to the right redirect destination. When using the BPF_F_BROADCAST flag to do multicast redirect to a whole map, __bpf_xdp_redirect_map() sets the 'map' pointer in struct bpf_redirect_info to point to the destination map to be broadcast. And xdp_do_redirect() reacts to the value of this map pointer to decide whether it's dealing with a broadcast or a single-value redirect. However, if the destination map is being destroyed before xdp_do_redirect() is called, the map pointer will be cleared out (by bpf_clear_redirect_map()) without waiting for any XDP programs to stop running. This causes xdp_do_redirect() to think that the redirect was to a single target, but the target pointer is also NULL (since broadcast redirects don't have a single target), so this causes a crash when a NULL pointer is passed to dev_map_enqueue(). To fix this, change xdp_do_redirect() to react directly to the presence of the BPF_F_BROADCAST flag in the 'flags' value in struct bpf_redirect_info to disambiguate between a single-target and a broadcast redirect. And only read the 'map' pointer if the broadcast flag is set, aborting if that has been cleared out in the meantime. This prevents the crash, while keeping the atomic (cmpxchg-based) clearing of the map pointer itself, and without adding any more checks in the non-broadcast fast path. Fixes: e624d4ed ("xdp: Extend xdp_redirect_map with broadcast support") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+af9492708df9797198d6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by:
Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240418071840.156411-1-toke@redhat.comSigned-off-by:
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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Puranjay Mohan authored
The current implementation of the mov instruction with sign extension has the following problems: 1. It clobbers the source register if it is not stacked because it sign extends the source and then moves it to the destination. 2. If the dst_reg is stacked, the current code doesn't write the value back in case of 64-bit mov. 3. There is room for improvement by emitting fewer instructions. The steps for fixing this and the instructions emitted by the JIT are explained below with examples in all combinations: Case A: offset == 32: ===================== Case A.1: src and dst are stacked registers: -------------------------------------------- 1. Load src_lo into tmp_lo 2. Store tmp_lo into dst_lo 3. Sign extend tmp_lo into tmp_hi 4. Store tmp_hi to dst_hi Example: r3 = (s32)r3 r3 is a stacked register ldr r6, [r11, #-16] // Load r3_lo into tmp_lo // str to dst_lo is not emitted because src_lo == dst_lo asr r7, r6, #31 // Sign extend tmp_lo into tmp_hi str r7, [r11, #-12] // Store tmp_hi into r3_hi Case A.2: src is stacked but dst is not: ---------------------------------------- 1. Load src_lo into dst_lo 2. Sign extend dst_lo into dst_hi Example: r6 = (s32)r3 r6 maps to {ARM_R5, ARM_R4} and r3 is stacked ldr r4, [r11, #-16] // Load r3_lo into r6_lo asr r5, r4, #31 // Sign extend r6_lo into r6_hi Case A.3: src is not stacked but dst is stacked: ------------------------------------------------ 1. Store src_lo into dst_lo 2. Sign extend src_lo into tmp_hi 3. Store tmp_hi to dst_hi Example: r3 = (s32)r6 r3 is stacked and r6 maps to {ARM_R5, ARM_R4} str r4, [r11, #-16] // Store r6_lo to r3_lo asr r7, r4, #31 // Sign extend r6_lo into tmp_hi str r7, [r11, #-12] // Store tmp_hi to dest_hi Case A.4: Both src and dst are not stacked: ------------------------------------------- 1. Mov src_lo into dst_lo 2. Sign extend src_lo into dst_hi Example: (bf) r6 = (s32)r6 r6 maps to {ARM_R5, ARM_R4} // Mov not emitted because dst == src asr r5, r4, #31 // Sign extend r6_lo into r6_hi Case B: offset != 32: ===================== Case B.1: src and dst are stacked registers: -------------------------------------------- 1. Load src_lo into tmp_lo 2. Sign extend tmp_lo according to offset. 3. Store tmp_lo into dst_lo 4. Sign extend tmp_lo into tmp_hi 5. Store tmp_hi to dst_hi Example: r9 = (s8)r3 r9 and r3 are both stacked registers ldr r6, [r11, #-16] // Load r3_lo into tmp_lo lsl r6, r6, #24 // Sign extend tmp_lo asr r6, r6, #24 // .. str r6, [r11, #-56] // Store tmp_lo to r9_lo asr r7, r6, #31 // Sign extend tmp_lo to tmp_hi str r7, [r11, #-52] // Store tmp_hi to r9_hi Case B.2: src is stacked but dst is not: ---------------------------------------- 1. Load src_lo into dst_lo 2. Sign extend dst_lo according to offset. 3. Sign extend tmp_lo into dst_hi Example: r6 = (s8)r3 r6 maps to {ARM_R5, ARM_R4} and r3 is stacked ldr r4, [r11, #-16] // Load r3_lo to r6_lo lsl r4, r4, #24 // Sign extend r6_lo asr r4, r4, #24 // .. asr r5, r4, #31 // Sign extend r6_lo into r6_hi Case B.3: src is not stacked but dst is stacked: ------------------------------------------------ 1. Sign extend src_lo into tmp_lo according to offset. 2. Store tmp_lo into dst_lo. 3. Sign extend src_lo into tmp_hi. 4. Store tmp_hi to dst_hi. Example: r3 = (s8)r1 r3 is stacked and r1 maps to {ARM_R3, ARM_R2} lsl r6, r2, #24 // Sign extend r1_lo to tmp_lo asr r6, r6, #24 // .. str r6, [r11, #-16] // Store tmp_lo to r3_lo asr r7, r6, #31 // Sign extend tmp_lo to tmp_hi str r7, [r11, #-12] // Store tmp_hi to r3_hi Case B.4: Both src and dst are not stacked: ------------------------------------------- 1. Sign extend src_lo into dst_lo according to offset. 2. Sign extend dst_lo into dst_hi. Example: r6 = (s8)r1 r6 maps to {ARM_R5, ARM_R4} and r1 maps to {ARM_R3, ARM_R2} lsl r4, r2, #24 // Sign extend r1_lo to r6_lo asr r4, r4, #24 // .. asr r5, r4, #31 // Sign extend r6_lo to r6_hi Fixes: fc832653 ("arm32, bpf: add support for sign-extension mov instruction") Reported-by: syzbot+186522670e6722692d86@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by:Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by:
Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000e9a8d80615163f2a@google.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240419182832.27707-1-puranjay@kernel.org
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- 16 Apr, 2024 2 commits
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Xu Kuohai authored
When __bpf_prog_enter() returns zero, the s1 register is not set to zero, resulting in incorrect runtime stats. Fix it by setting s1 immediately upon the return of __bpf_prog_enter(). Fixes: 49b5e77a ("riscv, bpf: Add bpf trampoline support for RV64") Signed-off-by:
Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com> Acked-by:
Björn Töpel <bjorn@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240416064208.2919073-3-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com
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Xu Kuohai authored
When __bpf_prog_enter() returns zero, the arm64 register x20 that stores prog start time is not assigned to zero, causing incorrect runtime stats. To fix it, assign the return value of bpf_prog_enter() to x20 register immediately upon its return. Fixes: efc9909f ("bpf, arm64: Add bpf trampoline for arm64") Reported-by:
Ivan Babrou <ivan@cloudflare.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 12 Apr, 2024 1 commit
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Anton Protopopov authored
Long ago a map file descriptor in a pseudo ldimm64 instruction could only be present as an immediate value insn[0].imm, and thus this value was used in a verbose verifier message printed when the file descriptor wasn't valid. Since addition of BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX_VALUE/BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX the insn[0].imm field can also contain an index pointing to the file descriptor in the attr.fd_array array. However, if the file descriptor is invalid, the verifier still prints the verbose message containing value of insn[0].imm. Patch the verifier message to always print the actual file descriptor value. Fixes: 387544bf ("bpf: Introduce fd_idx") Signed-off-by:
Anton Protopopov <aspsk@isovalent.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 08 Apr, 2024 1 commit
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Jason Xing authored
Fix NULL pointer data-races in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue() which syzbot reported [1]. [1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in sk_psock_drop / sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue write to 0xffff88814b3278b8 of 8 bytes by task 10724 on cpu 1: sk_psock_stop_verdict net/core/skmsg.c:1257 [inline] sk_psock_drop+0x13e/0x1f0 net/core/skmsg.c:843 sk_psock_put include/linux/skmsg.h:459 [inline] sock_map_close+0x1a7/0x260 net/core/sock_map.c:1648 unix_release+0x4b/0x80 net/unix/af_unix.c:1048 __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline] sock_close+0x68/0x150 net/socket.c:1421 __fput+0x2c1/0x660 fs/file_table.c:422 __fput_sync+0x44/0x60 fs/file_table.c:507 __do_sys_close fs/open.c:1556 [inline] __se_sys_close+0x101/0x1b0 fs/open.c:1541 __x64_sys_close+0x1f/0x30 fs/open.c:1541 do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 read to 0xffff88814b3278b8 of 8 bytes by task 10713 on cpu 0: sk_psock_data_ready include/linux/skmsg.h:464 [inline] sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue+0x32d/0x390 net/core/skmsg.c:555 sk_psock_skb_ingress_self+0x185/0x1e0 net/core/skmsg.c:606 sk_psock_verdict_apply net/core/skmsg.c:1008 [inline] sk_psock_verdict_recv+0x3e4/0x4a0 net/core/skmsg.c:1202 unix_read_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:2546 [inline] unix_stream_read_skb+0x9e/0xf0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2682 sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0x77/0x220 net/core/skmsg.c:1223 unix_stream_sendmsg+0x527/0x860 net/unix/af_unix.c:2339 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x140/0x180 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x312/0x410 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x1e9/0x280 net/socket.c:2667 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x46/0x50 net/socket.c:2674 do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 value changed: 0xffffffff83d7feb0 -> 0x0000000000000000 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 10713 Comm: syz-executor.4 Tainted: G W 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/29/2024 Prior to this, commit 4cd12c60 ("bpf, sockmap: Fix NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready()") fixed one NULL pointer similarly due to no protection of saved_data_ready. Here is another different caller causing the same issue because of the same reason. So we should protect it with sk_callback_lock read lock because the writer side in the sk_psock_drop() uses "write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);". To avoid errors that could happen in future, I move those two pairs of lock into the sk_psock_data_ready(), which is suggested by John Fastabend. Fixes: 604326b4 ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface") Reported-by: syzbot+aa8c8ec2538929f18f2d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by:
Jason Xing <kernelxing@tencent.com> Signed-off-by:
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=aa8c8ec2538929f18f2d Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240329134037.92124-1-kerneljasonxing@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240404021001.94815-1-kerneljasonxing@gmail.com
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- 05 Apr, 2024 3 commits
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Björn Töpel authored
Lehui and Puranjay have been active RISC-V 64-bit BPF JIT contributors/reviewers for a long time! Let's make it more official by adding them as reviewers in MAINTAINERS. Thank you for your hard work! Signed-off-by:
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Puranjay Mohan authored
I would like to use the kernel.org address for kernel development from now on. Signed-off-by:
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Andrii Nakryiko authored
Turns out that due to CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF_MODULES not having an explicitly specified "menu item name" in Kconfig, it's basically impossible to turn it off (see [0]). This patch fixes the issue by defining menu name for CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF_MODULES, which makes it actually adjustable and independent of CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF, in the sense that one can have DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y and DEBUG_INFO_BTF_MODULES=n. We still keep it as defaulting to Y, of course. Fixes: 5f9ae91f ("kbuild: Build kernel module BTFs if BTF is enabled and pahole supports it") Reported-by:
Vincent Li <vincent.mc.li@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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- 04 Apr, 2024 26 commits
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/netLinus Torvalds authored
Pull networking fixes from Jakub Kicinski: "Including fixes from netfilter, bluetooth and bpf. Fairly usual collection of driver and core fixes. The large selftest accompanying one of the fixes is also becoming a common occurrence. Current release - regressions: - ipv6: fix infinite recursion in fib6_dump_done() - net/rds: fix possible null-deref in newly added error path Current release - new code bugs: - net: do not consume a full cacheline for system_page_pool - bpf: fix bpf_arena-related file descriptor leaks in the verifier - drv: ice: fix freeing uninitialized pointers, fixing misuse of the newfangled __free() auto-cleanup Previous releases - regressions: - x86/bpf: fixes the BPF JIT with retbleed=stuff - xen-netfront: add missing skb_mark_for_recycle, fix page pool accounting leaks, revealed by recently added explicit warning - tcp: fix bind() regression for v6-only wildcard and v4-mapped-v6 non-wildcard addresses - Bluetooth: - replace "hci_qca: Set BDA quirk bit if fwnode exists in DT" with better workarounds to un-break some buggy Qualcomm devices - set conn encrypted before conn establishes, fix re-connecting to some headsets which use slightly unusual sequence of msgs - mptcp: - prevent BPF accessing lowat from a subflow socket - don't account accept() of non-MPC client as fallback to TCP - drv: mana: fix Rx DMA datasize and skb_over_panic - drv: i40e: fix VF MAC filter removal Previous releases - always broken: - gro: various fixes related to UDP tunnels - netns crossing problems, incorrect checksum conversions, and incorrect packet transformations which may lead to panics - bpf: support deferring bpf_link dealloc to after RCU grace period - nf_tables: - release batch on table validation from abort path - release mutex after nft_gc_seq_end from abort path - flush pending destroy work before exit_net release - drv: r8169: skip DASH fw status checks when DASH is disabled" * tag 'net-6.9-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (81 commits) netfilter: validate user input for expected length net/sched: act_skbmod: prevent kernel-infoleak net: usb: ax88179_178a: avoid the interface always configured as random address net: dsa: sja1105: Fix parameters order in sja1110_pcs_mdio_write_c45() net: ravb: Always update error counters net: ravb: Always process TX descriptor ring netfilter: nf_tables: discard table flag update with pending basechain deletion netfilter: nf_tables: Fix potential data-race in __nft_flowtable_type_get() netfilter: nf_tables: reject new basechain after table flag update netfilter: nf_tables: flush pending destroy work before exit_net release netfilter: nf_tables: release mutex after nft_gc_seq_end from abort path netfilter: nf_tables: release batch on table validation from abort path Revert "tg3: Remove residual error handling in tg3_suspend" tg3: Remove residual error handling in tg3_suspend net: mana: Fix Rx DMA datasize and skb_over_panic net/sched: fix lockdep splat in qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() net: phy: micrel: lan8814: Fix when enabling/disabling 1-step timestamping net: stmmac: fix rx queue priority assignment net: txgbe: fix i2c dev name cannot match clkdev net: fec: Set mac_managed_pm during probe ... -
https://evilpiepirate.org/git/bcachefsLinus Torvalds authored
Pull bcachefs repair code from Kent Overstreet: "A couple more small fixes, and new repair code. We can now automatically recover from arbitrary corrupted interior btree nodes by scanning, and we can reconstruct metadata as needed to bring a filesystem back into a working, consistent, read-write state and preserve access to whatevver wasn't corrupted. Meaning - you can blow away all metadata except for extents and dirents leaf nodes, and repair will reconstruct everything else and give you your data, and under the correct paths. If inodes are missing i_size will be slightly off and permissions/ownership/timestamps will be gone, and we do still need the snapshots btree if snapshots were in use - in the future we'll be able to guess the snapshot tree structure in some situations. IOW - aside from shaking out remaining bugs (fuzz testing is still coming), repair code should be complete and if repair ever doesn't work that's the highest priority bug that I want to know about immediately. This patchset was kindly tested by a user from India who accidentally wiped one drive out of a three drive filesystem with no replication on the family computer - it took a couple weeks but we got everything important back" * tag 'bcachefs-2024-04-03' of https://evilpiepirate.org/git/bcachefs: bcachefs: reconstruct_inode() bcachefs: Subvolume reconstruction bcachefs: Check for extents that point to same space bcachefs: Reconstruct missing snapshot nodes bcachefs: Flag btrees with missing data bcachefs: Topology repair now uses nodes found by scanning to fill holes bcachefs: Repair pass for scanning for btree nodes bcachefs: Don't skip fake btree roots in fsck bcachefs: bch2_btree_root_alloc() -> bch2_btree_root_alloc_fake() bcachefs: Etyzinger cleanups bcachefs: bch2_shoot_down_journal_keys() bcachefs: Clear recovery_passes_required as they complete without errors bcachefs: ratelimit informational fsck errors bcachefs: Check for bad needs_discard before doing discard bcachefs: Improve bch2_btree_update_to_text() mean_and_variance: Drop always failing tests bcachefs: fix nocow lock deadlock bcachefs: BCH_WATERMARK_interior_updates bcachefs: Fix btree node reserve
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https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpfJakub Kicinski authored
Daniel Borkmann says: ==================== pull-request: bpf 2024-04-04 We've added 7 non-merge commits during the last 5 day(s) which contain a total of 9 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-). The main changes are: 1) Fix x86 BPF JIT under retbleed=stuff which causes kernel panics due to incorrect destination IP calculation and incorrect IP for relocations, from Uros Bizjak and Joan Bruguera Micó. 2) Fix BPF arena file descriptor leaks in the verifier, from Anton Protopopov. 3) Defer bpf_link deallocation to after RCU grace period as currently running multi-{kprobes,uprobes} programs might still access cookie information from the link, from Andrii Nakryiko. 4) Fix a BPF sockmap lock inversion deadlock in map_delete_elem reported by syzkaller, from Jakub Sitnicki. 5) Fix resolve_btfids build with musl libc due to missing linux/types.h include, from Natanael Copa. * tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf: bpf, sockmap: Prevent lock inversion deadlock in map delete elem x86/bpf: Fix IP for relocating call depth accounting x86/bpf: Fix IP after emitting call depth accounting bpf: fix possible file descriptor leaks in verifier tools/resolve_btfids: fix build with musl libc bpf: support deferring bpf_link dealloc to after RCU grace period bpf: put uprobe link's path and task in release callback ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240404183258.4401-1-daniel@iogearbox.netSigned-off-by:Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Eric Dumazet authored
I got multiple syzbot reports showing old bugs exposed by BPF after commit 20f2505f ("bpf: Try to avoid kzalloc in cgroup/{s,g}etsockopt") setsockopt() @optlen argument should be taken into account before copying data. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_replace net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1111 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_ipt_set_ctl+0x902/0x3dd0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1627 Read of size 96 at addr ffff88802cd73da0 by task syz-executor.4/7238 CPU: 1 PID: 7238 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2-next-20240403-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 kasan_check_range+0x282/0x290 mm/kasan/generic.c:189 __asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70 mm/kasan/shadow.c:105 copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline] copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline] do_replace net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1111 [inline] do_ipt_set_ctl+0x902/0x3dd0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1627 nf_setsockopt+0x295/0x2c0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101 do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2311 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a RIP: 0033:0x7fd22067dde9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fd21f9ff0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd2207abf80 RCX: 00007fd22067dde9 RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fd2206ca47a R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000020000880 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fd2207abf80 R15: 00007ffd2d0170d8 </TASK> Allocated by task 7238: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4069 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0x200/0x410 mm/slub.c:4082 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:664 [inline] __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt+0xd47/0x1050 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1869 do_sock_setsockopt+0x6b4/0x720 net/socket.c:2293 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802cd73da0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of allocated 1-byte region [ffff88802cd73da0, ffff88802cd73da1) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88802cd73020 pfn:0x2cd73 flags: 0xfff80000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0xfff) page_type: 0xffffefff(slab) raw: 00fff80000000000 ffff888015041280 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 raw: ffff88802cd73020 000000008080007f 00000001ffffefff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x12cc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 5103, tgid 2119833701 (syz-executor.4), ts 5103, free_ts 70804600828 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x1f3/0x230 mm/page_alloc.c:1490 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1498 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x2e7e/0x2f40 mm/page_alloc.c:3454 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x256/0x6c0 mm/page_alloc.c:4712 __alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:244 [inline] alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:271 [inline] alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x120 mm/slub.c:2249 allocate_slab+0x5a/0x2e0 mm/slub.c:2412 new_slab mm/slub.c:2465 [inline] ___slab_alloc+0xcd1/0x14b0 mm/slub.c:3615 __slab_alloc+0x58/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3705 __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3758 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3936 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4068 [inline] kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x286/0x450 mm/slub.c:4089 kstrdup+0x3a/0x80 mm/util.c:62 device_rename+0xb5/0x1b0 drivers/base/core.c:4558 dev_change_name+0x275/0x860 net/core/dev.c:1232 do_setlink+0xa4b/0x41f0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2864 __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3680 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x180b/0x20a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3727 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x89b/0x10d0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6594 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2559 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 page last free pid 5146 tgid 5146 stack trace: reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline] free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1110 [inline] free_unref_page+0xd3c/0xec0 mm/page_alloc.c:2617 discard_slab mm/slub.c:2511 [inline] __put_partials+0xeb/0x130 mm/slub.c:2980 put_cpu_partial+0x17c/0x250 mm/slub.c:3055 __slab_free+0x2ea/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4254 qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:163 [inline] qlist_free_all+0x9e/0x140 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:179 kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x14f/0x170 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:286 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x23/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:322 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3888 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3948 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4068 [inline] __kmalloc_node_noprof+0x1d7/0x450 mm/slub.c:4076 kmalloc_node_noprof include/linux/slab.h:681 [inline] kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x72/0x190 mm/util.c:634 bucket_table_alloc lib/rhashtable.c:186 [inline] rhashtable_rehash_alloc+0x9e/0x290 lib/rhashtable.c:367 rht_deferred_worker+0x4e1/0x2440 lib/rhashtable.c:427 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3218 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa2c/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3299 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3380 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243 Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88802cd73c80: 07 fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc fa fc fc fc ffff88802cd73d00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc >ffff88802cd73d80: fa fc fc fc 01 fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc ^ ffff88802cd73e00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc ffff88802cd73e80: 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by:
syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240404122051.2303764-1-edumazet@google.comSigned-off-by:
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nfJakub Kicinski authored
Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: Patch #1 unlike early commit path stage which triggers a call to abort, an explicit release of the batch is required on abort, otherwise mutex is released and commit_list remains in place. Patch #2 release mutex after nft_gc_seq_end() in commit path, otherwise async GC worker could collect expired objects. Patch #3 flush pending destroy work in module removal path, otherwise UaF is possible. Patch #4 and #6 restrict the table dormant flag with basechain updates to fix state inconsistency in the hook registration. Patch #5 adds missing RCU read side lock to flowtable type to avoid races with module removal. * tag 'nf-24-04-04' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: netfilter: nf_tables: discard table flag update with pending basechain deletion netfilter: nf_tables: Fix potential data-race in __nft_flowtable_type_get() netfilter: nf_tables: reject new basechain after table flag update netfilter: nf_tables: flush pending destroy work before exit_net release netfilter: nf_tables: release mutex after nft_gc_seq_end from abort path netfilter: nf_tables: release batch on table validation from abort path ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240404104334.1627-1-pablo@netfilter.orgSigned-off-by: -
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tnguy/net-queueJakub Kicinski authored
Tony Nguyen says: ==================== Intel Wired LAN Driver Updates 2024-04-03 (ice, idpf) This series contains updates to ice and idpf drivers. Dan Carpenter initializes some pointer declarations to NULL as needed for resource cleanup on ice driver. Petr Oros corrects assignment of VLAN operators to fix Rx VLAN filtering in legacy mode for ice. Joshua calls eth_type_trans() on unknown packets to prevent possible kernel panic on idpf. * '100GbE' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tnguy/net-queue: idpf: fix kernel panic on unknown packet types ice: fix enabling RX VLAN filtering ice: Fix freeing uninitialized pointers ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240403201929.1945116-1-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.comSigned-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
syzbot found that tcf_skbmod_dump() was copying four bytes from kernel stack to user space [1]. The issue here is that 'struct tc_skbmod' has a four bytes hole. We need to clear the structure before filling fields. [1] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x366/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:185 instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline] iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline] iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline] iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline] _copy_to_iter+0x366/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:185 copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:196 [inline] simple_copy_to_iter net/core/datagram.c:532 [inline] __skb_datagram_iter+0x185/0x1000 net/core/datagram.c:420 skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x5c/0x200 net/core/datagram.c:546 skb_copy_datagram_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:4050 [inline] netlink_recvmsg+0x432/0x1610 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1962 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x340 net/socket.c:1068 __sys_recvfrom+0x35a/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2242 __do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2260 [inline] __se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2256 [inline] __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x126/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2256 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 Uninit was stored to memory at: pskb_expand_head+0x30f/0x19d0 net/core/skbuff.c:2253 netlink_trim+0x2c2/0x330 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 netlink_unicast+0x9f/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1351 nlmsg_unicast include/net/netlink.h:1144 [inline] nlmsg_notify+0x21d/0x2f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2610 rtnetlink_send+0x73/0x90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:741 rtnetlink_maybe_send include/linux/rtnetlink.h:17 [inline] tcf_add_notify net/sched/act_api.c:2048 [inline] tcf_action_add net/sched/act_api.c:2071 [inline] tc_ctl_action+0x146e/0x19d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2119 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1737/0x1900 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6595 netlink_rcv_skb+0x375/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2559 rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x40 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6613 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xf4c/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 netlink_sendmsg+0x10df/0x11f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x877/0xb60 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2674 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 Uninit was stored to memory at: __nla_put lib/nlattr.c:1041 [inline] nla_put+0x1c6/0x230 lib/nlattr.c:1099 tcf_skbmod_dump+0x23f/0xc20 net/sched/act_skbmod.c:256 tcf_action_dump_old net/sched/act_api.c:1191 [inline] tcf_action_dump_1+0x85e/0x970 net/sched/act_api.c:1227 tcf_action_dump+0x1fd/0x460 net/sched/act_api.c:1251 tca_get_fill+0x519/0x7a0 net/sched/act_api.c:1628 tcf_add_notify_msg net/sched/act_api.c:2023 [inline] tcf_add_notify net/sched/act_api.c:2042 [inline] tcf_action_add net/sched/act_api.c:2071 [inline] tc_ctl_action+0x1365/0x19d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2119 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1737/0x1900 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6595 netlink_rcv_skb+0x375/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2559 rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x40 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6613 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xf4c/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 netlink_sendmsg+0x10df/0x11f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x877/0xb60 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2674 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 Local variable opt created at: tcf_skbmod_dump+0x9d/0xc20 net/sched/act_skbmod.c:244 tcf_action_dump_old net/sched/act_api.c:1191 [inline] tcf_action_dump_1+0x85e/0x970 net/sched/act_api.c:1227 Bytes 188-191 of 248 are uninitialized Memory access of size 248 starts at ffff888117697680 Data copied to user address 00007ffe56d855f0 Fixes: 86da71b5 ("net_sched: Introduce skbmod action") Signed-off-by:
Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240403130908.93421-1-edumazet@google.comSigned-off-by:
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Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez authored
After the commit d2689b6a ("net: usb: ax88179_178a: avoid two consecutive device resets"), reset is not executed from bind operation and mac address is not read from the device registers or the devicetree at that moment. Since the check to configure if the assigned mac address is random or not for the interface, happens after the bind operation from usbnet_probe, the interface keeps configured as random address, although the address is correctly read and set during open operation (the only reset now). In order to keep only one reset for the device and to avoid the interface always configured as random address, after reset, configure correctly the suitable field from the driver, if the mac address is read successfully from the device registers or the devicetree. Take into account if a locally administered address (random) was previously stored. cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.6+ Fixes: d2689b6a ("net: usb: ax88179_178a: avoid two consecutive device resets") Reported-by:
Dave Stevenson <dave.stevenson@raspberrypi.com> Signed-off-by:
Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez <jtornosm@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240403132158.344838-1-jtornosm@redhat.comSigned-off-by:
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Christophe JAILLET authored
The definition and declaration of sja1110_pcs_mdio_write_c45() don't have parameters in the same order. Knowing that sja1110_pcs_mdio_write_c45() is used as a function pointer in 'sja1105_info' structure with .pcs_mdio_write_c45, and that we have: int (*pcs_mdio_write_c45)(struct mii_bus *bus, int phy, int mmd, int reg, u16 val); it is likely that the definition is the one to change. Found with cppcheck, funcArgOrderDifferent. Fixes: ae271547 ("net: dsa: sja1105: C45 only transactions for PCS") Signed-off-by:
Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> Reviewed-by:
Michael Walle <mwalle@kernel.org> Reviewed-by:
Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ff2a5af67361988b3581831f7bd1eddebfb4c48f.1712082763.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.frSigned-off-by:
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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Paul Barker authored
The error statistics should be updated each time the poll function is called, even if the full RX work budget has been consumed. This prevents the counts from becoming stuck when RX bandwidth usage is high. This also ensures that error counters are not updated after we've re-enabled interrupts as that could result in a race condition. Also drop an unnecessary space. Fixes: c156633f ("Renesas Ethernet AVB driver proper") Signed-off-by:
Paul Barker <paul.barker.ct@bp.renesas.com> Reviewed-by:
Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240402145305.82148-2-paul.barker.ct@bp.renesas.comSigned-off-by:
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Paul Barker authored
The TX queue should be serviced each time the poll function is called, even if the full RX work budget has been consumed. This prevents starvation of the TX queue when RX bandwidth usage is high. Fixes: c156633f ("Renesas Ethernet AVB driver proper") Signed-off-by:
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Pablo Neira Ayuso authored
Hook unregistration is deferred to the commit phase, same occurs with hook updates triggered by the table dormant flag. When both commands are combined, this results in deleting a basechain while leaving its hook still registered in the core. Fixes: 179d9ba5 ("netfilter: nf_tables: fix table flag updates") Signed-off-by:
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Ziyang Xuan authored
nft_unregister_flowtable_type() within nf_flow_inet_module_exit() can concurrent with __nft_flowtable_type_get() within nf_tables_newflowtable(). And thhere is not any protection when iterate over nf_tables_flowtables list in __nft_flowtable_type_get(). Therefore, there is pertential data-race of nf_tables_flowtables list entry. Use list_for_each_entry_rcu() to iterate over nf_tables_flowtables list in __nft_flowtable_type_get(), and use rcu_read_lock() in the caller nft_flowtable_type_get() to protect the entire type query process. Fixes: 3b49e2e9 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add flow table netlink frontend") Signed-off-by:
Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
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Pablo Neira Ayuso authored
When dormant flag is toggled, hooks are disabled in the commit phase by iterating over current chains in table (existing and new). The following configuration allows for an inconsistent state: add table x add chain x y { type filter hook input priority 0; } add table x { flags dormant; } add chain x w { type filter hook input priority 1; } which triggers the following warning when trying to unregister chain w which is already unregistered. [ 127.322252] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1211 at net/netfilter/core.c:50 1 __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x21a/0x260 [...] [ 127.322519] Call Trace: [ 127.322521] <TASK> [ 127.322524] ? __warn+0x9f/0x1a0 [ 127.322531] ? __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x21a/0x260 [ 127.322537] ? report_bug+0x1b1/0x1e0 [ 127.322545] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 [ 127.322552] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x40 [ 127.322556] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 127.322563] ? kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 [ 127.322570] ? __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x6a/0x260 [ 127.322577] ? __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x21a/0x260 [ 127.322583] ? __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x6a/0x260 [ 127.322590] ? __nf_tables_unregister_hook+0x8a/0xe0 [nf_tables] [ 127.322655] nft_table_disable+0x75/0xf0 [nf_tables] [ 127.322717] nf_tables_commit+0x2571/0x2620 [nf_tables] Fixes: 179d9ba5 ("netfilter: nf_tables: fix table flag updates") Signed-off-by: -
Pablo Neira Ayuso authored
Similar to 2c9f0293 ("netfilter: nf_tables: flush pending destroy work before netlink notifier") to address a race between exit_net and the destroy workqueue. The trace below shows an element to be released via destroy workqueue while exit_net path (triggered via module removal) has already released the set that is used in such transaction. [ 1360.547789] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables] [ 1360.547861] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888140500cc0 by task kworker/4:1/152465 [ 1360.547870] CPU: 4 PID: 152465 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 6.8.0+ #359 [ 1360.547882] Workqueue: events nf_tables_trans_destroy_work [nf_tables] [ 1360.547984] Call Trace: [ 1360.547991] <TASK> [ 1360.547998] dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 [ 1360.548014] print_report+0xc4/0x610 [ 1360.548026] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xba/0x160 [ 1360.548040] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 1360.548054] ? nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548176] kasan_report+0xae/0xe0 [ 1360.548189] ? nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548312] nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548447] ? __pfx_nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x10/0x10 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548577] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x18/0x30 [ 1360.548591] process_one_work+0x2f1/0x670 [ 1360.548610] worker_thread+0x4d3/0x760 [ 1360.548627] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 1360.548640] kthread+0x16b/0x1b0 [ 1360.548653] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 1360.548665] ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50 [ 1360.548679] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 1360.548690] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 1360.548707] </TASK> [ 1360.548719] Allocated by task 192061: [ 1360.548726] kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 [ 1360.548739] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 1360.548750] __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 [ 1360.548760] __kmalloc_node+0x1f1/0x450 [ 1360.548771] nf_tables_newset+0x10c7/0x1b50 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548883] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xbc4/0xdc0 [nfnetlink] [ 1360.548909] nfnetlink_rcv+0x1a8/0x1e0 [nfnetlink] [ 1360.548927] netlink_unicast+0x367/0x4f0 [ 1360.548935] netlink_sendmsg+0x34b/0x610 [ 1360.548944] ____sys_sendmsg+0x4d4/0x510 [ 1360.548953] ___sys_sendmsg+0xc9/0x120 [ 1360.548961] __sys_sendmsg+0xbe/0x140 [ 1360.548971] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x120 [ 1360.548982] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d [ 1360.548994] Freed by task 192222: [ 1360.548999] kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 [ 1360.549009] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 1360.549019] kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 [ 1360.549028] poison_slab_object+0x100/0x180 [ 1360.549036] __kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x30 [ 1360.549042] kfree+0xb6/0x260 [ 1360.549049] __nft_release_table+0x473/0x6a0 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549131] nf_tables_exit_net+0x170/0x240 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549221] ops_exit_list+0x50/0xa0 [ 1360.549229] free_exit_list+0x101/0x140 [ 1360.549236] unregister_pernet_operations+0x107/0x160 [ 1360.549245] unregister_pernet_subsys+0x1c/0x30 [ 1360.549254] nf_tables_module_exit+0x43/0x80 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549345] __do_sys_delete_module+0x253/0x370 [ 1360.549352] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x120 [ 1360.549360] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d (gdb) list *__nft_release_table+0x473 0x1e033 is in __nft_release_table (net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:11354). 11349 list_for_each_entry_safe(flowtable, nf, &table->flowtables, list) { 11350 list_del(&flowtable->list); 11351 nft_use_dec(&table->use); 11352 nf_tables_flowtable_destroy(flowtable); 11353 } 11354 list_for_each_entry_safe(set, ns, &table->sets, list) { 11355 list_del(&set->list); 11356 nft_use_dec(&table->use); 11357 if (set->flags & (NFT_SET_MAP | NFT_SET_OBJECT)) 11358 nft_map_deactivate(&ctx, set); (gdb) [ 1360.549372] Last potentially related work creation: [ 1360.549376] kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 [ 1360.549384] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x9b/0xb0 [ 1360.549392] __queue_work+0x3fb/0x780 [ 1360.549399] queue_work_on+0x4f/0x60 [ 1360.549407] nft_rhash_remove+0x33b/0x340 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549516] nf_tables_commit+0x1c6a/0x2620 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549625] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0x728/0xdc0 [nfnetlink] [ 1360.549647] nfnetlink_rcv+0x1a8/0x1e0 [nfnetlink] [ 1360.549671] netlink_unicast+0x367/0x4f0 [ 1360.549680] netlink_sendmsg+0x34b/0x610 [ 1360.549690] ____sys_sendmsg+0x4d4/0x510 [ 1360.549697] ___sys_sendmsg+0xc9/0x120 [ 1360.549706] __sys_sendmsg+0xbe/0x140 [ 1360.549715] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x120 [ 1360.549725] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d Fixes: 0935d558 ("netfilter: nf_tables: asynchronous release") Signed-off-by:
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Pablo Neira Ayuso authored
The commit mutex should not be released during the critical section between nft_gc_seq_begin() and nft_gc_seq_end(), otherwise, async GC worker could collect expired objects and get the released commit lock within the same GC sequence. nf_tables_module_autoload() temporarily releases the mutex to load module dependencies, then it goes back to replay the transaction again. Move it at the end of the abort phase after nft_gc_seq_end() is called. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 72034434 ("netfilter: nf_tables: GC transaction race with abort path") Reported-by:
Kuan-Ting Chen <hexrabbit@devco.re> Signed-off-by:
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Pablo Neira Ayuso authored
Unlike early commit path stage which triggers a call to abort, an explicit release of the batch is required on abort, otherwise mutex is released and commit_list remains in place. Add WARN_ON_ONCE to ensure commit_list is empty from the abort path before releasing the mutex. After this patch, commit_list is always assumed to be empty before grabbing the mutex, therefore 03c1f1ef ("netfilter: Cleanup nft_net->module_list from nf_tables_exit_net()") only needs to release the pending modules for registration. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c0391b6a ("netfilter: nf_tables: missing validation from the abort path") Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Abeni authored
This reverts commit 9ab4ad29. I went out of coffee and applied it to the wrong tree. Blame on me. Signed-off-by:
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Nikita Kiryushin authored
As of now, tg3_power_down_prepare always ends with success, but the error handling code from former tg3_set_power_state call is still here. This code became unreachable in commit c866b7ea ("tg3: Do not use legacy PCI power management"). Remove (now unreachable) error handling code for simplification and change tg3_power_down_prepare to a void function as its result is no more checked. Signed-off-by:
Nikita Kiryushin <kiryushin@ancud.ru> Reviewed-by:
Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com> Reviewed-by:
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Haiyang Zhang authored
mana_get_rxbuf_cfg() aligns the RX buffer's DMA datasize to be multiple of 64. So a packet slightly bigger than mtu+14, say 1536, can be received and cause skb_over_panic. Sample dmesg: [ 5325.237162] skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffc043277a len:1536 put:1536 head:ff1100018b517000 data:ff1100018b517100 tail:0x700 end:0x6ea dev:<NULL> [ 5325.243689] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 5325.245748] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:192! [ 5325.247838] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 5325.258374] RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x4f/0x60 [ 5325.302941] Call Trace: [ 5325.304389] <IRQ> [ 5325.315794] ? skb_panic+0x4f/0x60 [ 5325.317457] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30 [ 5325.319490] ? skb_panic+0x4f/0x60 [ 5325.321161] skb_put+0x4e/0x50 [ 5325.322670] mana_poll+0x6fa/0xb50 [mana] [ 5325.324578] __napi_poll+0x33/0x1e0 [ 5325.326328] net_rx_action+0x12e/0x280 As discussed internally, this alignment is not necessary. To fix this bug, remove it from the code. So oversized packets will be marked as CQE_RX_TRUNCATED by NIC, and dropped. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2fbbd712 ("net: mana: Enable RX path to handle various MTU sizes") Signed-off-by:
Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by:
Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1712087316-20886-1-git-send-email-haiyangz@microsoft.comSigned-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() is called with the qdisc lock held, not RTNL. We must use qdisc_lookup_rcu() instead of qdisc_lookup() syzbot reported: WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.1.74-syzkaller #0 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/sched/sch_api.c:305 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 3 locks held by udevd/1142: #0: ffffffff87c729a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:306 [inline] #0: ffffffff87c729a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:747 [inline] #0: ffffffff87c729a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: net_tx_action+0x64a/0x970 net/core/dev.c:5282 #1: ffff888171861108 (&sch->q.lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:350 [inline] #1: ffff888171861108 (&sch->q.lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: net_tx_action+0x754/0x970 net/core/dev.c:5297 #2: ffffffff87c729a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:306 [inline] #2: ffffffff87c729a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:747 [inline] #2: ffffffff87c729a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog+0x84/0x580 net/sched/sch_api.c:792 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 1142 Comm: udevd Not tainted 6.1.74-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> [<ffffffff85b85f14>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] [<ffffffff85b85f14>] dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x28f lib/dump_stack.c:106 [<ffffffff85b86007>] dump_stack+0x15/0x1e lib/dump_stack.c:113 [<ffffffff81802299>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x1b9/0x260 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6592 [<ffffffff84f0054c>] qdisc_lookup+0xac/0x6f0 net/sched/sch_api.c:305 [<ffffffff84f037c3>] qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog+0x243/0x580 net/sched/sch_api.c:811 [<ffffffff84f5b78c>] pfifo_tail_enqueue+0x32c/0x4b0 net/sched/sch_fifo.c:51 [<ffffffff84fbcf63>] qdisc_enqueue include/net/sch_generic.h:833 [inline] [<ffffffff84fbcf63>] netem_dequeue+0xeb3/0x15d0 net/sched/sch_netem.c:723 [<ffffffff84eecab9>] dequeue_skb net/sched/sch_generic.c:292 [inline] [<ffffffff84eecab9>] qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:397 [inline] [<ffffffff84eecab9>] __qdisc_run+0x249/0x1e60 net/sched/sch_generic.c:415 [<ffffffff84d7aa96>] qdisc_run+0xd6/0x260 include/net/pkt_sched.h:125 [<ffffffff84d85d29>] net_tx_action+0x7c9/0x970 net/core/dev.c:5313 [<ffffffff85e002bd>] __do_softirq+0x2bd/0x9bd kernel/softirq.c:616 [<ffffffff81568bca>] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:447 [inline] [<ffffffff81568bca>] __irq_exit_rcu+0xca/0x230 kernel/softirq.c:700 [<ffffffff81568ae9>] irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:712 [<ffffffff85b89f52>] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x42/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1107 [<ffffffff85c00ccb>] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:656 Fixes: d636fc5d ("net: sched: add rcu annotations around qdisc->qdisc_sleeping") Reported-by:Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com> Acked-by:
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Horatiu Vultur authored
There are 2 issues with the blamed commit. 1. When the phy is initialized, it would enable the disabled of UDPv4 checksums. The UDPv6 checksum is already enabled by default. So when 1-step is configured then it would clear these flags. 2. After the 1-step is configured, then if 2-step is configured then the 1-step would be still configured because it is not clearing the flag. So the sync frames will still have origin timestamps set. Fix this by reading first the value of the register and then just change bit 12 as this one determines if the timestamp needs to be inserted in the frame, without changing any other bits. Fixes: ece19502 ("net: phy: micrel: 1588 support for LAN8814 phy") Signed-off-by:
Horatiu Vultur <horatiu.vultur@microchip.com> Reviewed-by:
Divya Koppera <divya.koppera@microchip.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240402071634.2483524-1-horatiu.vultur@microchip.comSigned-off-by:
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Piotr Wejman authored
The driver should ensure that same priority is not mapped to multiple rx queues. From DesignWare Cores Ethernet Quality-of-Service Databook, section 17.1.29 MAC_RxQ_Ctrl2: "[...]The software must ensure that the content of this field is mutually exclusive to the PSRQ fields for other queues, that is, the same priority is not mapped to multiple Rx queues[...]" Previously rx_queue_priority() function was: - clearing all priorities from a queue - adding new priorities to that queue After this patch it will: - first assign new priorities to a queue - then remove those priorities from all other queues - keep other priorities previously assigned to that queue Fixes: a8f5102a ("net: stmmac: TX and RX queue priority configuration") Fixes: 2142754f ("net: stmmac: Add MAC related callbacks for XGMAC2") Signed-off-by:
Piotr Wejman <piotrwejman90@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240401192239.33942-1-piotrwejman90@gmail.comSigned-off-by:
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Duanqiang Wen authored
txgbe clkdev shortened clk_name, so i2c_dev info_name also need to shorten. Otherwise, i2c_dev cannot initialize clock. Fixes: e30cef00 ("net: txgbe: fix clk_name exceed MAX_DEV_ID limits") Signed-off-by:
Duanqiang Wen <duanqiangwen@net-swift.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240402021843.126192-1-duanqiangwen@net-swift.comSigned-off-by:
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Jakub Kicinski authored
John Ernberg says: ==================== net: fec: Fix to suspend / resume with mac_managed_pm Since the introduction of mac_managed_pm in the FEC driver there were some discrepancies regarding power management of the PHY. This failed on our board that has a permanently powered Microchip LAN8700R attached to the FEC. Although the root cause of the failure can be traced back to f166f890 ("net: ethernet: fec: Replace interrupt driven MDIO with polled IO") and probably even before that, we only started noticing the problem going from 5.10 to 6.1. Since 557d5dc8 ("net: fec: use mac-managed PHY PM") is actually a fix to most of the power management sequencing problems that came with power managing the MDIO bus which for the FEC meant adding a race with FEC resume (and phy_start() if netif was running) and PHY resume. That it worked before for us was probably just luck... Thanks to Wei's response to my report at [1] I was able to pick up his patch and start honing in on the remaining missing details. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/1f45bdbe-eab1-4e59-8f24-add177590d27@actia.se/ v3: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240306133734.4144808-1-john.ernberg@actia.se/ v2: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240229105256.2903095-1-john.ernberg@actia.se/ v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240212105010.2258421-1-john.ernberg@actia.se/ ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240328155909.59613-1-john.ernberg@actia.seSigned-off-by:
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Wei Fang authored
Setting mac_managed_pm during interface up is too late. In situations where the link is not brought up yet and the system suspends the regular PHY power management will run. Since the FEC ETHEREN control bit is cleared (automatically) on suspend the controller is off in resume. When the regular PHY power management resume path runs in this context it will write to the MII_DATA register but nothing will be transmitted on the MDIO bus. This can be observed by the following log: fec 5b040000.ethernet eth0: MDIO read timeout Microchip LAN87xx T1 5b040000.ethernet-1:04: PM: dpm_run_callback(): mdio_bus_phy_resume+0x0/0xc8 returns -110 Microchip LAN87xx T1 5b040000.ethernet-1:04: PM: failed to resume: error -110 The data written will however remain in the MII_DATA register. When the link later is set to administrative up it will trigger a call to fec_restart() which will restore the MII_SPEED register. This triggers the quirk explained in f166f890 ("net: ethernet: fec: Replace interrupt driven MDIO with polled IO") causing an extra MII_EVENT. This extra event desynchronizes all the MDIO register reads, causing them to complete too early. Leading all reads to read as 0 because fec_enet_mdio_wait() returns too early. When a Microchip LAN8700R PHY is connected to the FEC, the 0 reads causes the PHY to be initialized incorrectly and the PHY will not transmit any ethernet signal in this state. It cannot be brought out of this state without a power cycle of the PHY. Fixes: 557d5dc8 ("net: fec: use mac-managed PHY PM") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/1f45bdbe-eab1-4e59-8f24-add177590d27@actia.se/Signed-off-by:Wei Fang <wei.fang@nxp.com> [jernberg: commit message] Signed-off-by:
John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240328155909.59613-2-john.ernberg@actia.seSigned-off-by:
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- 03 Apr, 2024 4 commits
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Joshua Hay authored
In the very rare case where a packet type is unknown to the driver, idpf_rx_process_skb_fields would return early without calling eth_type_trans to set the skb protocol / the network layer handler. This is especially problematic if tcpdump is running when such a packet is received, i.e. it would cause a kernel panic. Instead, call eth_type_trans for every single packet, even when the packet type is unknown. Fixes: 3a8845af ("idpf: add RX splitq napi poll support") Reported-by:
Balazs Nemeth <bnemeth@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Joshua Hay <joshua.a.hay@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Jesse Brandeburg <jesse.brandeburg@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com> Tested-by:
Salvatore Daniele <sdaniele@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Pavan Kumar Linga <pavan.kumar.linga@intel.com> Tested-by:
Krishneil Singh <krishneil.k.singh@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
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Kent Overstreet authored
If an inode is missing, but corresponding extents and dirent still exist, it's well worth recreating it - this does so. Signed-off-by:Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
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Kent Overstreet authored
We can now recreate missing subvolumes from dirents and/or inodes. Signed-off-by: -
Kent Overstreet authored
In backpointer repair, if we get a missing backpointer - but there's already a backpointer that points to an existing extent - we've got multiple extents that point to the same space and need to decide which to keep. Signed-off-by:
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