1. 06 Mar, 2015 27 commits
  2. 27 Feb, 2015 13 commits
    • Greg Kroah-Hartman's avatar
      Linux 3.10.70 · ef16065a
      Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
      ef16065a
    • Alex Elder's avatar
      rbd: drop an unsafe assertion · c30748a3
      Alex Elder authored
      commit 638c323c upstream.
      
      Olivier Bonvalet reported having repeated crashes due to a failed
      assertion he was hitting in rbd_img_obj_callback():
      
          Assertion failure in rbd_img_obj_callback() at line 2165:
      	rbd_assert(which >= img_request->next_completion);
      
      With a lot of help from Olivier with reproducing the problem
      we were able to determine the object and image requests had
      already been completed (and often freed) at the point the
      assertion failed.
      
      There was a great deal of discussion on the ceph-devel mailing list
      about this.  The problem only arose when there were two (or more)
      object requests in an image request, and the problem was always
      seen when the second request was being completed.
      
      The problem is due to a race in the window between setting the
      "done" flag on an object request and checking the image request's
      next completion value.  When the first object request completes, it
      checks to see if its successor request is marked "done", and if
      so, that request is also completed.  In the process, the image
      request's next_completion value is updated to reflect that both
      the first and second requests are completed.  By the time the
      second request is able to check the next_completion value, it
      has been set to a value *greater* than its own "which" value,
      which caused an assertion to fail.
      
      Fix this problem by skipping over any completion processing
      unless the completing object request is the next one expected.
      Test only for inequality (not >=), and eliminate the bad
      assertion.
      Tested-by: default avatarOlivier Bonvalet <ob@daevel.fr>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAlex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarSage Weil <sage@inktank.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarIlya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      c30748a3
    • Austin Lund's avatar
      media/rc: Send sync space information on the lirc device · b2b501af
      Austin Lund authored
      commit a8f29e89 upstream.
      
      Userspace expects to see a long space before the first pulse is sent on
      the lirc device.  Currently, if a long time has passed and a new packet
      is started, the lirc codec just returns and doesn't send anything.  This
      makes lircd ignore many perfectly valid signals unless they are sent in
      quick sucession.  When a reset event is delivered, we cannot know
      anything about the duration of the space.  But it should be safe to
      assume it has been a long time and we just set the duration to maximum.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAustin Lund <austin.lund@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b2b501af
    • Saran Maruti Ramanara's avatar
      net: sctp: fix passing wrong parameter header to param_type2af in sctp_process_param · 572d332c
      Saran Maruti Ramanara authored
      [ Upstream commit cfbf654e ]
      
      When making use of RFC5061, section 4.2.4. for setting the primary IP
      address, we're passing a wrong parameter header to param_type2af(),
      resulting always in NULL being returned.
      
      At this point, param.p points to a sctp_addip_param struct, containing
      a sctp_paramhdr (type = 0xc004, length = var), and crr_id as a correlation
      id. Followed by that, as also presented in RFC5061 section 4.2.4., comes
      the actual sctp_addr_param, which also contains a sctp_paramhdr, but
      this time with the correct type SCTP_PARAM_IPV{4,6}_ADDRESS that
      param_type2af() can make use of. Since we already hold a pointer to
      addr_param from previous line, just reuse it for param_type2af().
      
      Fixes: d6de3097 ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarSaran Maruti Ramanara <saran.neti@telus.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      572d332c
    • Florian Westphal's avatar
      ppp: deflate: never return len larger than output buffer · a7df378a
      Florian Westphal authored
      [ Upstream commit e2a4800e ]
      
      When we've run out of space in the output buffer to store more data, we
      will call zlib_deflate with a NULL output buffer until we've consumed
      remaining input.
      
      When this happens, olen contains the size the output buffer would have
      consumed iff we'd have had enough room.
      
      This can later cause skb_over_panic when ppp_generic skb_put()s
      the returned length.
      Reported-by: default avatarIain Douglas <centos@1n6.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      a7df378a
    • Eric Dumazet's avatar
      ipv4: tcp: get rid of ugly unicast_sock · 6bed3166
      Eric Dumazet authored
      [ Upstream commit bdbbb852 ]
      
      In commit be9f4a44 ("ipv4: tcp: remove per net tcp_sock")
      I tried to address contention on a socket lock, but the solution
      I chose was horrible :
      
      commit 3a7c384f ("ipv4: tcp: unicast_sock should not land outside
      of TCP stack") addressed a selinux regression.
      
      commit 0980e56e ("ipv4: tcp: set unicast_sock uc_ttl to -1")
      took care of another regression.
      
      commit b5ec8eea ("ipv4: fix ip_send_skb()") fixed another regression.
      
      commit 811230cd ("tcp: ipv4: initialize unicast_sock sk_pacing_rate")
      was another shot in the dark.
      
      Really, just use a proper socket per cpu, and remove the skb_orphan()
      call, to re-enable flow control.
      
      This solves a serious problem with FQ packet scheduler when used in
      hostile environments, as we do not want to allocate a flow structure
      for every RST packet sent in response to a spoofed packet.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      6bed3166
    • Eric Dumazet's avatar
      tcp: ipv4: initialize unicast_sock sk_pacing_rate · 23990c29
      Eric Dumazet authored
      [ Upstream commit 811230cd ]
      
      When I added sk_pacing_rate field, I forgot to initialize its value
      in the per cpu unicast_sock used in ip_send_unicast_reply()
      
      This means that for sch_fq users, RST packets, or ACK packets sent
      on behalf of TIME_WAIT sockets might be sent to slowly or even dropped
      once we reach the per flow limit.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Fixes: 95bd09eb ("tcp: TSO packets automatic sizing")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      23990c29
    • Roopa Prabhu's avatar
      bridge: dont send notification when skb->len == 0 in rtnl_bridge_notify · b4faf21b
      Roopa Prabhu authored
      [ Upstream commit 59ccaaaa ]
      
      Reported in: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92081
      
      This patch avoids calling rtnl_notify if the device ndo_bridge_getlink
      handler does not return any bytes in the skb.
      
      Alternately, the skb->len check can be moved inside rtnl_notify.
      
      For the bridge vlan case described in 92081, there is also a fix needed
      in bridge driver to generate a proper notification. Will fix that in
      subsequent patch.
      
      v2: rebase patch on net tree
      Signed-off-by: default avatarRoopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b4faf21b
    • Hannes Frederic Sowa's avatar
      ipv6: replacing a rt6_info needs to purge possible propagated rt6_infos too · 650a7901
      Hannes Frederic Sowa authored
      [ Upstream commit 6e9e16e6 ]
      
      Lubomir Rintel reported that during replacing a route the interface
      reference counter isn't correctly decremented.
      
      To quote bug <https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=91941>:
      | [root@rhel7-5 lkundrak]# sh -x lal
      | + ip link add dev0 type dummy
      | + ip link set dev0 up
      | + ip link add dev1 type dummy
      | + ip link set dev1 up
      | + ip addr add 2001:db8:8086::2/64 dev dev0
      | + ip route add 2001:db8:8086::/48 dev dev0 proto static metric 20
      | + ip route add 2001:db8:8088::/48 dev dev1 proto static metric 10
      | + ip route replace 2001:db8:8086::/48 dev dev1 proto static metric 20
      | + ip link del dev0 type dummy
      | Message from syslogd@rhel7-5 at Jan 23 10:54:41 ...
      |  kernel:unregister_netdevice: waiting for dev0 to become free. Usage count = 2
      |
      | Message from syslogd@rhel7-5 at Jan 23 10:54:51 ...
      |  kernel:unregister_netdevice: waiting for dev0 to become free. Usage count = 2
      
      During replacement of a rt6_info we must walk all parent nodes and check
      if the to be replaced rt6_info got propagated. If so, replace it with
      an alive one.
      
      Fixes: 4a287eba ("IPv6 routing, NLM_F_* flag support: REPLACE and EXCL flags support, warn about missing CREATE flag")
      Reported-by: default avatarLubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
      Tested-by: default avatarLubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      650a7901
    • subashab@codeaurora.org's avatar
      ping: Fix race in free in receive path · 688ba993
      subashab@codeaurora.org authored
      [ Upstream commit fc752f1f ]
      
      An exception is seen in ICMP ping receive path where the skb
      destructor sock_rfree() tries to access a freed socket. This happens
      because ping_rcv() releases socket reference with sock_put() and this
      internally frees up the socket. Later icmp_rcv() will try to free the
      skb and as part of this, skb destructor is called and which leads
      to a kernel panic as the socket is freed already in ping_rcv().
      
      -->|exception
      -007|sk_mem_uncharge
      -007|sock_rfree
      -008|skb_release_head_state
      -009|skb_release_all
      -009|__kfree_skb
      -010|kfree_skb
      -011|icmp_rcv
      -012|ip_local_deliver_finish
      
      Fix this incorrect free by cloning this skb and processing this cloned
      skb instead.
      
      This patch was suggested by Eric Dumazet
      Signed-off-by: default avatarSubash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org>
      Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      688ba993
    • Herbert Xu's avatar
      udp_diag: Fix socket skipping within chain · bd1f50c6
      Herbert Xu authored
      [ Upstream commit 86f3cddb ]
      
      While working on rhashtable walking I noticed that the UDP diag
      dumping code is buggy.  In particular, the socket skipping within
      a chain never happens, even though we record the number of sockets
      that should be skipped.
      
      As this code was supposedly copied from TCP, this patch does what
      TCP does and resets num before we walk a chain.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Acked-by: default avatarPavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      bd1f50c6
    • Hannes Frederic Sowa's avatar
      ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect · 8c6dafeb
      Hannes Frederic Sowa authored
      [ Upstream commit df4d9254 ]
      
      Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
      on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
      since commit f8864972 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
      
      Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
      will force dst_release to free them via RCU.  Unfortunately waiting for
      RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
      waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
      catch up under high softirq load.
      
      Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
      us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
      and deallocation.
      
      This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
      
      Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMarcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJulian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      8c6dafeb
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      net: sctp: fix slab corruption from use after free on INIT collisions · 727ab4c0
      Daniel Borkmann authored
      [ Upstream commit 600ddd68 ]
      
      When hitting an INIT collision case during the 4WHS with AUTH enabled, as
      already described in detail in commit 1be9a950 ("net: sctp: inherit
      auth_capable on INIT collisions"), it can happen that we occasionally
      still remotely trigger the following panic on server side which seems to
      have been uncovered after the fix from commit 1be9a950 ...
      
      [  533.876389] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff
      [  533.913657] IP: [<ffffffff811ac385>] __kmalloc+0x95/0x230
      [  533.940559] PGD 5030f2067 PUD 0
      [  533.957104] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
      [  533.974283] Modules linked in: sctp mlx4_en [...]
      [  534.939704] Call Trace:
      [  534.951833]  [<ffffffff81294e30>] ? crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0
      [  534.984213]  [<ffffffff81294e30>] crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0
      [  535.015025]  [<ffffffff8128c8ed>] __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x6d/0x170
      [  535.045661]  [<ffffffff8128d12c>] crypto_alloc_base+0x4c/0xb0
      [  535.074593]  [<ffffffff8160bd42>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x12/0x50
      [  535.105239]  [<ffffffffa0418c11>] sctp_inet_listen+0x161/0x1e0 [sctp]
      [  535.138606]  [<ffffffff814e43bd>] SyS_listen+0x9d/0xb0
      [  535.166848]  [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
      
      ... or depending on the the application, for example this one:
      
      [ 1370.026490] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff
      [ 1370.026506] IP: [<ffffffff811ab455>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x75/0x1d0
      [ 1370.054568] PGD 633c94067 PUD 0
      [ 1370.070446] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
      [ 1370.085010] Modules linked in: sctp kvm_amd kvm [...]
      [ 1370.963431] Call Trace:
      [ 1370.974632]  [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] ? SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960
      [ 1371.000863]  [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960
      [ 1371.027154]  [<ffffffff812100d3>] ? anon_inode_getfile+0xd3/0x170
      [ 1371.054679]  [<ffffffff811e3d67>] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130
      [ 1371.080183]  [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
      
      With slab debugging enabled, we can see that the poison has been overwritten:
      
      [  669.826368] BUG kmalloc-128 (Tainted: G        W     ): Poison overwritten
      [  669.826385] INFO: 0xffff880228b32e50-0xffff880228b32e50. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b
      [  669.826414] INFO: Allocated in sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp] age=3 cpu=0 pid=18494
      [  669.826424]  __slab_alloc+0x4bf/0x566
      [  669.826433]  __kmalloc+0x280/0x310
      [  669.826453]  sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp]
      [  669.826471]  sctp_auth_asoc_create_secret+0xcb/0x1e0 [sctp]
      [  669.826488]  sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key+0x68/0xa0 [sctp]
      [  669.826505]  sctp_do_sm+0x29d/0x17c0 [sctp] [...]
      [  669.826629] INFO: Freed in kzfree+0x31/0x40 age=1 cpu=0 pid=18494
      [  669.826635]  __slab_free+0x39/0x2a8
      [  669.826643]  kfree+0x1d6/0x230
      [  669.826650]  kzfree+0x31/0x40
      [  669.826666]  sctp_auth_key_put+0x19/0x20 [sctp]
      [  669.826681]  sctp_assoc_update+0x1ee/0x2d0 [sctp]
      [  669.826695]  sctp_do_sm+0x674/0x17c0 [sctp]
      
      Since this only triggers in some collision-cases with AUTH, the problem at
      heart is that sctp_auth_key_put() on asoc->asoc_shared_key is called twice
      when having refcnt 1, once directly in sctp_assoc_update() and yet again
      from within sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() via sctp_assoc_update() on
      the already kzfree'd memory, which is also consistent with the observation
      of the poison decrease from 0x6b to 0x6a (note: the overwrite is detected
      at a later point in time when poison is checked on new allocation).
      
      Reference counting of auth keys revisited:
      
      Shared keys for AUTH chunks are being stored in endpoints and associations
      in endpoint_shared_keys list. On endpoint creation, a null key is being
      added; on association creation, all endpoint shared keys are being cached
      and thus cloned over to the association. struct sctp_shared_key only holds
      a pointer to the actual key bytes, that is, struct sctp_auth_bytes which
      keeps track of users internally through refcounting. Naturally, on assoc
      or enpoint destruction, sctp_shared_key are being destroyed directly and
      the reference on sctp_auth_bytes dropped.
      
      User space can add keys to either list via setsockopt(2) through struct
      sctp_authkey and by passing that to sctp_auth_set_key() which replaces or
      adds a new auth key. There, sctp_auth_create_key() creates a new sctp_auth_bytes
      with refcount 1 and in case of replacement drops the reference on the old
      sctp_auth_bytes. A key can be set active from user space through setsockopt()
      on the id via sctp_auth_set_active_key(), which iterates through either
      endpoint_shared_keys and in case of an assoc, invokes (one of various places)
      sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key().
      
      sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() computes the actual secret from local's
      and peer's random, hmac and shared key parameters and returns a new key
      directly as sctp_auth_bytes, that is asoc->asoc_shared_key, plus drops
      the reference if there was a previous one. The secret, which where we
      eventually double drop the ref comes from sctp_auth_asoc_set_secret() with
      intitial refcount of 1, which also stays unchanged eventually in
      sctp_assoc_update(). This key is later being used for crypto layer to
      set the key for the hash in crypto_hash_setkey() from sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
      
      To close the loop: asoc->asoc_shared_key is freshly allocated secret
      material and independant of the sctp_shared_key management keeping track
      of only shared keys in endpoints and assocs. Hence, also commit 4184b2a7
      ("net: sctp: fix memory leak in auth key management") is independant of
      this bug here since it concerns a different layer (though same structures
      being used eventually). asoc->asoc_shared_key is reference dropped correctly
      on assoc destruction in sctp_association_free() and when active keys are
      being replaced in sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(), it always has a refcount
      of 1. Hence, it's freed prematurely in sctp_assoc_update(). Simple fix is
      to remove that sctp_auth_key_put() from there which fixes these panics.
      
      Fixes: 730fc3d0 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      727ab4c0