- 21 Nov, 2018 19 commits
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Tomi Valkeinen authored
[ Upstream commit 538f66ba ] A DMM timeout "timed out waiting for done" has been observed on DRA7 devices. The timeout happens rarely, and only when the system is under heavy load. Debugging showed that the timeout can be made to happen much more frequently by optimizing the DMM driver, so that there's almost no code between writing the last DMM descriptors to RAM, and writing to DMM register which starts the DMM transaction. The current theory is that a wmb() does not properly ensure that the data written to RAM is observable by all the components in the system. This DMM timeout has caused interesting (and rare) bugs as the error handling was not functioning properly (the error handling has been fixed in previous commits): * If a DMM timeout happened when a GEM buffer was being pinned for display on the screen, a timeout error would be shown, but the driver would continue programming DSS HW with broken buffer, leading to SYNCLOST floods and possible crashes. * If a DMM timeout happened when other user (say, video decoder) was pinning a GEM buffer, a timeout would be shown but if the user handled the error properly, no other issues followed. * If a DMM timeout happened when a GEM buffer was being released, the driver does not even notice the error, leading to crashes or hang later. This patch adds wmb() and readl() calls after the last bit is written to RAM, which should ensure that the execution proceeds only after the data is actually in RAM, and thus observable by DMM. The read-back should not be needed. Further study is required to understand if DMM is somehow special case and read-back is ok, or if DRA7's memory barriers do not work correctly. Signed-off-by:
Tomi Valkeinen <tomi.valkeinen@ti.com> Signed-off-by:
Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@ti.com> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Christophe Leroy authored
[ Upstream commit 803d690e ] When a process allocates a hugepage, the following leak is reported by kmemleak. This is a false positive which is due to the pointer to the table being stored in the PGD as physical memory address and not virtual memory pointer. unreferenced object 0xc30f8200 (size 512): comm "mmap", pid 374, jiffies 4872494 (age 627.630s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<e32b68da>] huge_pte_alloc+0xdc/0x1f8 [<9e0df1e1>] hugetlb_fault+0x560/0x8f8 [<7938ec6c>] follow_hugetlb_page+0x14c/0x44c [<afbdb405>] __get_user_pages+0x1c4/0x3dc [<b8fd7cd9>] __mm_populate+0xac/0x140 [<3215421e>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0xb4/0xb8 [<c148db69>] ksys_mmap_pgoff+0xcc/0x1fc [<4fcd760f>] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x38 See commit a984506c ("powerpc/mm: Don't report PUDs as memory leaks when using kmemleak") for detailed explanation. To fix that, this patch tells kmemleak to ignore the allocated hugepage table. Signed-off-by:
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by:
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Sean Paul authored
[ Upstream commit 96fc56a7 ] The atomic_check is a bit too aggressive with respect to planes which leave the active area. This caused a bunch of log spew when the cursor got to the edge of the screen and stopped it from going all the way. This patch removes the conservative bounds checks from atomic and clips the dst rect such that we properly display planes which go off the screen. Changes in v2: - Apply the clip to src as well (taking into account scaling) Changes in v3: - Use drm_atomic_helper_check_plane_state() to clip src/dst Cc: Sravanthi Kollukuduru <skolluku@codeaurora.org> Cc: Jeykumar Sankaran <jsanka@codeaurora.org> Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Jeykumar Sankaran <jsanka@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
Sean Paul <seanpaul@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Stephen Boyd authored
[ Upstream commit 2c043eef ] We got a bug report that this function oopses when trying to do a kasprintf(). PC is at string+0x2c/0x60 LR is at vsnprintf+0x28c/0x4ec pc : [<ffffff80088d35d8>] lr : [<ffffff80088d5fc4>] pstate: a0c00049 sp : ffffff80095fb540 x29: ffffff80095fb540 x28: ffffff8008ad42bc x27: 00000000ffffffd8 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffffff8008c216c8 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffffff80095fb720 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: ffffff80095fb720 x19: ffffff80095fb6f0 x18: 000000000000000a x17: 00000000b42ba473 x16: ffffff800805bbe8 x15: 00000000000a157d x14: 000000000000000c x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000ffff0000000f x11: 0000000000000003 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : 0000000000000040 x8 : 000000000000001c x7 : ffffffffffffffff x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000228 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : 0000000000007961 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 Process kworker/3:1 (pid: 61, stack limit = 0xffffff80095f8000) Call trace: Exception stack(0xffffff80095fb400 to 0xffffff80095fb540) b400: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000007961 ffff0a00ffffff04 b420: 0000000000000000 0000000000000228 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffff b440: 000000000000001c 0000000000000040 0000000000000001 0000000000000003 b460: 0000ffff0000000f 0000000000000000 000000000000000c 00000000000a157d b480: ffffff800805bbe8 00000000b42ba473 000000000000000a ffffff80095fb6f0 b4a0: ffffff80095fb720 0000000000000000 ffffff80095fb720 0000000000000000 b4c0: 0000000000000000 ffffff8008c216c8 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffd8 b4e0: ffffff8008ad42bc ffffff80095fb540 ffffff80088d5fc4 ffffff80095fb540 b500: ffffff80088d35d8 00000000a0c00049 ffffff80095fb550 ffffff80080d06a4 b520: ffffffffffffffff ffffff80088d5e0c ffffff80095fb540 ffffff80088d35d8 [<ffffff80088d35d8>] string+0x2c/0x60 [<ffffff80088d5fc4>] vsnprintf+0x28c/0x4ec [<ffffff80083973b8>] kvasprintf+0x68/0x100 [<ffffff800839755c>] kasprintf+0x60/0x80 [<ffffff800849cc24>] drm_encoder_init+0x134/0x164 [<ffffff80084d9a7c>] dpu_encoder_init+0x60/0x94 [<ffffff80084eced0>] _dpu_kms_drm_obj_init+0xa0/0x424 [<ffffff80084ed870>] dpu_kms_hw_init+0x61c/0x6bc [<ffffff80084f7614>] msm_drm_bind+0x380/0x67c [<ffffff80085114e4>] try_to_bring_up_master+0x228/0x264 [<ffffff80085116e8>] component_master_add_with_match+0x90/0xc0 [<ffffff80084f722c>] msm_pdev_probe+0x260/0x2c8 [<ffffff800851a910>] platform_drv_probe+0x58/0xa8 [<ffffff80085185c8>] driver_probe_device+0x2d8/0x40c [<ffffff8008518928>] __device_attach_driver+0xd4/0x10c [<ffffff800851644c>] bus_for_each_drv+0xb4/0xd0 [<ffffff8008518230>] __device_attach+0xd0/0x160 [<ffffff8008518984>] device_initial_probe+0x24/0x30 [<ffffff800851744c>] bus_probe_device+0x38/0x98 [<ffffff8008517aac>] deferred_probe_work_func+0x144/0x148 [<ffffff80080c8654>] process_one_work+0x218/0x3bc [<ffffff80080c883c>] process_scheduled_works+0x44/0x48 [<ffffff80080c95bc>] worker_thread+0x288/0x32c [<ffffff80080cea30>] kthread+0x134/0x13c [<ffffff8008084750>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Code: 910003fd 2a0403e6 eb0400ff 54000060 (38646845) Looking at the code I see that drm_encoder_init() is called from the DPU code with 'DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_DSI' passed in as the 'encoder_type' argument (follow from _dpu_kms_initialize_dsi()). That corresponds to the integer 16. That is then indexed into drm_encoder_enum_list in drm_encoder_init() to look up the name of the encoder. If you're still following along, that's an encoder not a connector! We really want to use DRM_MODE_ENCODER_DSI (integer 6) instead of DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_DSI here, or we'll go out of bounds of the encoder array. Pass the right thing and everything is fine. Cc: Jeykumar Sankaran <jsanka@codeaurora.org> Cc: Jordan Crouse <jcrouse@codeaurora.org> Cc: Sean Paul <seanpaul@chromium.org> Fixes: 25fdd593 (drm/msm: Add SDM845 DPU support) Tested-by:
Sai Prakash Ranjan <saiprakash.ranjan@codeaurora.org> Reviewed-by:
Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
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Anders Roxell authored
[ Upstream commit 6969019f ] When CONFIG_DEV_COREDUMP isn't defined msm_gpu_crashstate_capture doesn't pass the correct parameters. drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_gpu.c: In function ‘recover_worker’: drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_gpu.c:479:34: error: passing argument 2 of ‘msm_gpu_crashstate_capture’ from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types] msm_gpu_crashstate_capture(gpu, submit, comm, cmd); ^~~~~~ drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_gpu.c:388:13: note: expected ‘char *’ but argument is of type ‘struct msm_gem_submit *’ static void msm_gpu_crashstate_capture(struct msm_gpu *gpu, char *comm, ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_gpu.c:479:2: error: too many arguments to function ‘msm_gpu_crashstate_capture’ msm_gpu_crashstate_capture(gpu, submit, comm, cmd); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_gpu.c:388:13: note: declared here static void msm_gpu_crashstate_capture(struct msm_gpu *gpu, char *comm, In current code the function msm_gpu_crashstate_capture parameters. Fixes: cdb95931 ("drm/msm/gpu: Add the buffer objects from the submit to the crash dump") Signed-off-by:
Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Reviewed-By:
Jordan Crouse <jcrouse@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Axtens authored
[ Upstream commit f5e28480 ] When enumerating page size definitions to check hardware support, we construct a constant which is (1U << (def->shift - 10)). However, the array of page size definitions is only initalised for various MMU_PAGE_* constants, so it contains a number of 0-initialised elements with def->shift == 0. This means we end up shifting by a very large number, which gives the following UBSan splat: ================================================================================ UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in /home/dja/dev/linux/linux/arch/powerpc/mm/tlb_nohash.c:506:21 shift exponent 4294967286 is too large for 32-bit type 'unsigned int' CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.19.0-rc3-00045-ga604f927b012-dirty #6 Call Trace: [c00000000101bc20] [c000000000a13d54] .dump_stack+0xa8/0xec (unreliable) [c00000000101bcb0] [c0000000004f20a8] .ubsan_epilogue+0x18/0x64 [c00000000101bd30] [c0000000004f2b10] .__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x110/0x1a4 [c00000000101be20] [c000000000d21760] .early_init_mmu+0x1b4/0x5a0 [c00000000101bf10] [c000000000d1ba28] .early_setup+0x100/0x130 [c00000000101bf90] [c000000000000528] start_here_multiplatform+0x68/0x80 ================================================================================ Fix this by first checking if the element exists (shift != 0) before constructing the constant. Signed-off-by:
Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by:
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Fabio Estevam authored
[ Upstream commit 35d3cbe8 ] Andreas Müller reports: "Fixes: | Sep 04 09:05:10 imx6qdl-variscite-som systemd-udevd[220]: Failed to apply ACL on /dev/v4l-subdev0: Operation not supported | Sep 04 09:05:10 imx6qdl-variscite-som systemd-udevd[224]: Failed to apply ACL on /dev/v4l-subdev1: Operation not supported | Sep 04 09:05:10 imx6qdl-variscite-som systemd-udevd[215]: Failed to apply ACL on /dev/v4l-subdev10: Operation not supported | Sep 04 09:05:10 imx6qdl-variscite-som systemd-udevd[228]: Failed to apply ACL on /dev/v4l-subdev2: Operation not supported | Sep 04 09:05:10 imx6qdl-variscite-som systemd-udevd[232]: Failed to apply ACL on /dev/v4l-subdev5: Operation not supported | Sep 04 09:05:10 imx6qdl-variscite-som systemd-udevd[217]: Failed to apply ACL on /dev/v4l-subdev11: Operation not supported | Sep 04 09:05:10 imx6qdl-variscite-som systemd-udevd[214]: Failed to apply ACL on /dev/dri/card1: Operation not supported | Sep 04 09:05:10 imx6qdl-variscite-som systemd-udevd[216]: Failed to apply ACL on /dev/v4l-subdev8: Operation not supported | Sep 04 09:05:10 imx6qdl-variscite-som systemd-udevd[226]: Failed to apply ACL on /dev/v4l-subdev9: Operation not supported and nasty follow-ups: Starting weston from sddm as unpriviledged user fails with some hints on missing access rights." Select the CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL option to fix these issues. Reported-by:
Andreas Müller <schnitzeltony@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@nxp.com> Acked-by:
Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br> Signed-off-by:
Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Colin Ian King authored
[ Upstream commit 14b28483 ] There are several switch statements that are missing break statements. Add missing breaks to handle any fall-throughs corner cases. Detected by CoverityScan, CID#1457175 ("Missing break in switch") Fixes: 18aafc59 ("drm/amd/powerplay: implement fw related smu interface for iceland.") Acked-by:
Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
[ Upstream commit 74a07c0a ] In case memory resources for *bl_desc* were allocated, release them before return. Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1472021 ("Resource leak") Fixes: 0d466901 ("drm/nouveau/secboot/acr: Remove VLA usage") Signed-off-by:
Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Reviewed-by:
John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Masami Hiramatsu authored
[ Upstream commit 59158ec4 ] Current kprobe event doesn't checks correctly whether the given event is on unloaded module or not. It just checks the event has ":" in the name. That is not enough because if we define a probe on non-exist symbol on loaded module, it allows to define that (with warning message) To ensure it correctly, this searches the module name on loaded module list and only if there is not, it allows to define it. (this event will be available when the target module is loaded) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/153547309528.26502.8300278470528281328.stgit@devboxSigned-off-by:
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by:
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Miles Chen authored
[ Upstream commit 33a1a7be ] The issue is found by a fuzzing test. If tty_find_polling_driver() recevies an incorrect input such as ',,' or '0b', the len becomes 0 and strncmp() always return 0. In this case, a null p->ops->poll_init() is called and it causes a kernel panic. Fix this by checking name length against zero in tty_find_polling_driver(). $echo ,, > /sys/module/kgdboc/parameters/kgdboc [ 20.804451] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 104 at drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c:457 uart_get_baud_rate+0xe8/0x190 [ 20.804917] Modules linked in: [ 20.805317] CPU: 1 PID: 104 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.19.0-rc7ajb #8 [ 20.805469] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 20.805732] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO) [ 20.805895] pc : uart_get_baud_rate+0xe8/0x190 [ 20.806042] lr : uart_get_baud_rate+0xc0/0x190 [ 20.806476] sp : ffffffc06acff940 [ 20.806676] x29: ffffffc06acff940 x28: 0000000000002580 [ 20.806977] x27: 0000000000009600 x26: 0000000000009600 [ 20.807231] x25: ffffffc06acffad0 x24: 00000000ffffeff0 [ 20.807576] x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000000000000000 [ 20.807807] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: 0000000000000000 [ 20.808049] x19: ffffffc06acffac8 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 20.808277] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 20.808520] x15: ffffffffffffffff x14: ffffffff00000000 [ 20.808757] x13: ffffffffffffffff x12: 0000000000000001 [ 20.809011] x11: 0101010101010101 x10: ffffff880d59ff5f [ 20.809292] x9 : ffffff880d59ff5e x8 : ffffffc06acffaf3 [ 20.809549] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffff880d59ff5f [ 20.809803] x5 : 0000000080008001 x4 : 0000000000000003 [ 20.810056] x3 : ffffff900853e6b4 x2 : dfffff9000000000 [ 20.810693] x1 : ffffffc06acffad0 x0 : 0000000000000cb0 [ 20.811005] Call trace: [ 20.811214] uart_get_baud_rate+0xe8/0x190 [ 20.811479] serial8250_do_set_termios+0xe0/0x6f4 [ 20.811719] serial8250_set_termios+0x48/0x54 [ 20.811928] uart_set_options+0x138/0x1bc [ 20.812129] uart_poll_init+0x114/0x16c [ 20.812330] tty_find_polling_driver+0x158/0x200 [ 20.812545] configure_kgdboc+0xbc/0x1bc [ 20.812745] param_set_kgdboc_var+0xb8/0x150 [ 20.812960] param_attr_store+0xbc/0x150 [ 20.813160] module_attr_store+0x40/0x58 [ 20.813364] sysfs_kf_write+0x8c/0xa8 [ 20.813563] kernfs_fop_write+0x154/0x290 [ 20.813764] vfs_write+0xf0/0x278 [ 20.813951] __arm64_sys_write+0x84/0xf4 [ 20.814400] el0_svc_common+0xf4/0x1dc [ 20.814616] el0_svc_handler+0x98/0xbc [ 20.814804] el0_svc+0x8/0xc [ 20.822005] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [ 20.826913] Mem abort info: [ 20.827103] ESR = 0x84000006 [ 20.827352] Exception class = IABT (current EL), IL = 16 bits [ 20.827655] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 20.827855] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 20.828135] user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp = (____ptrval____) [ 20.828484] [0000000000000000] pgd=00000000aadee003, pud=00000000aadee003, pmd=0000000000000000 [ 20.829195] Internal error: Oops: 84000006 [#1] SMP [ 20.829564] Modules linked in: [ 20.829890] CPU: 1 PID: 104 Comm: sh Tainted: G W 4.19.0-rc7ajb #8 [ 20.830545] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 20.830829] pstate: 60000085 (nZCv daIf -PAN -UAO) [ 20.831174] pc : (null) [ 20.831457] lr : serial8250_do_set_termios+0x358/0x6f4 [ 20.831727] sp : ffffffc06acff9b0 [ 20.831936] x29: ffffffc06acff9b0 x28: ffffff9008d7c000 [ 20.832267] x27: ffffff900969e16f x26: 0000000000000000 [ 20.832589] x25: ffffff900969dfb0 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 20.832906] x23: ffffffc06acffad0 x22: ffffff900969e160 [ 20.833232] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: ffffffc06acffac8 [ 20.833559] x19: ffffff900969df90 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 20.833878] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 20.834491] x15: ffffffffffffffff x14: ffffffff00000000 [ 20.834821] x13: ffffffffffffffff x12: 0000000000000001 [ 20.835143] x11: 0101010101010101 x10: ffffff880d59ff5f [ 20.835467] x9 : ffffff880d59ff5e x8 : ffffffc06acffaf3 [ 20.835790] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffff880d59ff5f [ 20.836111] x5 : c06419717c314100 x4 : 0000000000000007 [ 20.836419] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 [ 20.836732] x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ffffff900969df90 [ 20.837100] Process sh (pid: 104, stack limit = 0x(____ptrval____)) [ 20.837396] Call trace: [ 20.837566] (null) [ 20.837816] serial8250_set_termios+0x48/0x54 [ 20.838089] uart_set_options+0x138/0x1bc [ 20.838570] uart_poll_init+0x114/0x16c [ 20.838834] tty_find_polling_driver+0x158/0x200 [ 20.839119] configure_kgdboc+0xbc/0x1bc [ 20.839380] param_set_kgdboc_var+0xb8/0x150 [ 20.839658] param_attr_store+0xbc/0x150 [ 20.839920] module_attr_store+0x40/0x58 [ 20.840183] sysfs_kf_write+0x8c/0xa8 [ 20.840183] sysfs_kf_write+0x8c/0xa8 [ 20.840440] kernfs_fop_write+0x154/0x290 [ 20.840702] vfs_write+0xf0/0x278 [ 20.840942] __arm64_sys_write+0x84/0xf4 [ 20.841209] el0_svc_common+0xf4/0x1dc [ 20.841471] el0_svc_handler+0x98/0xbc [ 20.841713] el0_svc+0x8/0xc [ 20.842057] Code: bad PC value [ 20.842764] ---[ end trace a8835d7de79aaadf ]--- [ 20.843134] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 20.843515] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [ 20.844289] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 20.844634] CPU features: 0x0,21806002 [ 20.844857] Memory Limit: none [ 20.845172] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- Signed-off-by:
Miles Chen <miles.chen@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sam Bobroff authored
[ Upstream commit f9bc28ae ] If an error occurs during an unplug operation, it's possible for eeh_dump_dev_log() to be called when edev->pdn is null, which currently leads to dereferencing a null pointer. Handle this by skipping the error log for those devices. Signed-off-by:
Sam Bobroff <sbobroff@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Joel Stanley authored
[ Upstream commit 960e3002 ] Ever since commit 15a3204d ("powerpc/64s: Set assembler machine type to POWER4") we force -mpower4 to be passed to the assembler irrespective of the CFLAGS used (for Book3s 64). When building a powerpc64 kernel with clang, clang will not add -many to the assembler flags, so any instructions that the compiler has generated that are not available on power4 will cause an error: /usr/bin/as -a64 -mppc64 -mlittle-endian -mpower8 \ -I ./arch/powerpc/include -I ./arch/powerpc/include/generated \ -I ./include -I ./arch/powerpc/include/uapi \ -I ./arch/powerpc/include/generated/uapi -I ./include/uapi \ -I ./include/generated/uapi -I arch/powerpc -I arch/powerpc \ -maltivec -mpower4 -o init/do_mounts.o /tmp/do_mounts-3b0a3d.s /tmp/do_mounts-51ce54.s:748: Error: unrecognized opcode: `isel' GCC does include -many, so the GCC driven gas call will succeed: as -v -I ./arch/powerpc/include -I ./arch/powerpc/include/generated -I ./include -I ./arch/powerpc/include/uapi -I ./arch/powerpc/include/generated/uapi -I ./include/uapi -I ./include/generated/uapi -I arch/powerpc -I arch/powerpc -a64 -mpower8 -many -mlittle -maltivec -mpower4 -o init/do_mounts.o Note that isel is power7 and above for IBM CPUs. GCC only generates it for Power9 and above, but the above test was run against the clang generated assembly. Peter Bergner explains: When using -many -mpower4, gas will first try and find a matching power4 mnemonic and failing that, it will then allow any valid mnemonic that gas knows about. GCC's use of -many predates me though. IIRC, Alan looked at trying to remove it, but I forget why he didn't. Could be either a gcc or gas issue at the time. I'm not sure whether issue still exists or not. He and I have modified how gas works internally a fair amount since he tried removing gcc use of -many. I will also note that when using -many, gas will choose the first mnemonic that matches in the mnemonic table and we have (mostly) sorted the table so that server mnemonics show up earlier in the table than other mnemonics, so they'll be seen/chosen first. By explicitly setting -many we can build with Clang and GCC while retaining the -mpower4 option. Signed-off-by:
Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au> Signed-off-by:
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Randy Dunlap authored
[ Upstream commit a3f7c3fc ] Loading then unloading wm97xx-ts.ko when CONFIG_AC97_BUS=m causes a WARNING: from drivers/base/driver.c: Unexpected driver unregister! WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1709 at ../drivers/base/driver.c:193 driver_unregister+0x30/0x40 Fix this by only calling driver_unregister() with the same condition that driver_register() is called. Fixes: ae9d1b5f ("Input: wm97xx: add new AC97 bus support") Signed-off-by:
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Su Sung Chung authored
[ Upstream commit 43c3ff27 ] [Why] A loop inside of build_evenly_distributed_points function that traverse through the array of points become an infinite loop when m_GammaUpdates does not get assigned to any value. [How] In DMColor, clear m_gammaIsValid bit just before writting all Zeromem for m_GammaUpdates, to prevent calling build_evenly_distributed_points before m_GammaUpdates gets assigned to some value. Signed-off-by:
Su Sung Chung <Su.Chung@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Aric Cyr <Aric.Cyr@amd.com> Acked-by:
Bhawanpreet Lakha <Bhawanpreet.Lakha@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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Christophe Leroy authored
[ Upstream commit 37e9c674 ] This patch fixes the following warnings (obtained with make W=1). arch/powerpc/mm/slice.c: In function 'slice_range_to_mask': arch/powerpc/mm/slice.c:73:12: error: comparison is always true due to limited range of data type [-Werror=type-limits] if (start < SLICE_LOW_TOP) { ^ arch/powerpc/mm/slice.c:81:20: error: comparison is always false due to limited range of data type [-Werror=type-limits] if ((start + len) > SLICE_LOW_TOP) { ^ arch/powerpc/mm/slice.c: In function 'slice_mask_for_free': arch/powerpc/mm/slice.c:136:17: error: comparison is always true due to limited range of data type [-Werror=type-limits] if (high_limit <= SLICE_LOW_TOP) ^ arch/powerpc/mm/slice.c: In function 'slice_check_range_fits': arch/powerpc/mm/slice.c:185:12: error: comparison is always true due to limited range of data type [-Werror=type-limits] if (start < SLICE_LOW_TOP) { ^ arch/powerpc/mm/slice.c:195:39: error: comparison is always false due to limited range of data type [-Werror=type-limits] if (SLICE_NUM_HIGH && ((start + len) > SLICE_LOW_TOP)) { ^ arch/powerpc/mm/slice.c: In function 'slice_scan_available': arch/powerpc/mm/slice.c:306:11: error: comparison is always true due to limited range of data type [-Werror=type-limits] if (addr < SLICE_LOW_TOP) { ^ arch/powerpc/mm/slice.c: In function 'get_slice_psize': arch/powerpc/mm/slice.c:709:11: error: comparison is always true due to limited range of data type [-Werror=type-limits] if (addr < SLICE_LOW_TOP) { ^ Signed-off-by:
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Michael Ellerman authored
[ Upstream commit 0d923962 ] When we're running on Book3S with the Radix MMU enabled the page table dump currently prints the wrong addresses because it uses the wrong start address. Fix it to use PAGE_OFFSET rather than KERN_VIRT_START. Signed-off-by:
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Nicholas Piggin authored
[ Upstream commit b851ba02 ] The recent module relocation overflow crash demonstrated that we have no range checking on REL32 relative relocations. This patch implements a basic check, the same kernel that previously oopsed and rebooted now continues with some of these errors when loading the module: module_64: x_tables: REL32 527703503449812 out of range! Possibly other relocations (ADDR32, REL16, TOC16, etc.) should also have overflow checks. Signed-off-by:
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Christophe Leroy authored
[ Upstream commit daf00ae7 ] commit b96672dd ("powerpc: Machine check interrupt is a non- maskable interrupt") added a call to nmi_enter() at the beginning of machine check restart exception handler. Due to that, in_interrupt() always returns true regardless of the state before entering the exception, and die() panics even when the system was not already in interrupt. This patch calls nmi_exit() before calling die() in order to restore the interrupt state we had before calling nmi_enter() Fixes: b96672dd ("powerpc: Machine check interrupt is a non-maskable interrupt") Signed-off-by:
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- 13 Nov, 2018 21 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Shaohua Li authored
commit 9e753ba9 upstream. Commit d595567d (MD: fix invalid stored role for a disk) broke linear hotadd. Let's only fix the role for disks in raid1/10. Based on Guoqing's original patch. Reported-by:
kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com> Cc: Gioh Kim <gi-oh.kim@profitbricks.com> Cc: Guoqing Jiang <gqjiang@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit fc09ab7a upstream. The commit 37a3a98e ("ALSA: hda - Enable runtime PM only for discrete GPU") added a new ops gpu_bound to be called when GPU gets bound. The patch overlooked, however, that vga_switcheroo_enable() is called only once at GPU is bound. When an audio client is registered after that point, it would miss the gpu_bound call. This leads to the unexpected lack of runtime PM in HD-audio side. For addressing that regression, just call gpu_bound callback manually at vga_switcheroo_register_audio_client() when the GPU was already bound. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201615 Fixes: 37a3a98e ("ALSA: hda - Enable runtime PM only for discrete GPU") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by:
Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Colascione authored
commit 1ae80cf3 upstream. The map-in-map frequently serves as a mechanism for atomic snapshotting of state that a BPF program might record. The current implementation is dangerous to use in this way, however, since userspace has no way of knowing when all programs that might have retrieved the "old" value of the map may have completed. This change ensures that map update operations on map-in-map map types always wait for all references to the old map to drop before returning to userspace. Signed-off-by:
Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by:
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jann Horn authored
commit d2f007db upstream. The current logic first clones the extent array and sorts both copies, then maps the lower IDs of the forward mapping into the lower namespace, but doesn't map the lower IDs of the reverse mapping. This means that code in a nested user namespace with >5 extents will see incorrect IDs. It also breaks some access checks, like inode_owner_or_capable() and privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(), so a process can incorrectly appear to be capable relative to an inode. To fix it, we have to make sure that the "lower_first" members of extents in both arrays are translated; and we have to make sure that the reverse map is sorted *after* the translation (since otherwise the translation can break the sorting). This is CVE-2018-18955. Fixes: 6397fac4 ("userns: bump idmap limits to 340") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Tested-by:
Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Reviewed-by:
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Mikulas Patocka authored
commit 943210ba upstream. If you run aptitude on framebuffer console, the display is corrupted. The corruption is caused by the commit d8ae7242. The patch adds "offset" to "start" when calling scr_memsetw, but it forgets to do the same addition on a subsequent call to do_update_region. Signed-off-by:
Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Fixes: d8ae7242 ("vt: preserve unicode values corresponding to screen characters") Reviewed-by:
Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19 Signed-off-by:
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David Ahern authored
commit e72bde6b upstream. Marco reported an error with hfsc: root@Calimero:~# tc qdisc add dev eth0 root handle 1:0 hfsc default 1 Error: Attribute failed policy validation. Apparently a few implementations pass TCA_OPTIONS as a binary instead of nested attribute, so drop TCA_OPTIONS from the policy. Fixes: 8b4c3cdd ("net: sched: Add policy validation for tc attributes") Reported-by:
Marco Berizzi <pupilla@libero.it> Signed-off-by:
David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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Filipe Manana authored
commit 9084cb6a upstream. We were iterating a block group's free space cache rbtree without locking first the lock that protects it (the free_space_ctl->free_space_offset rbtree is protected by the free_space_ctl->tree_lock spinlock). KASAN reported an use-after-free problem when iterating such a rbtree due to a concurrent rbtree delete: [ 9520.359168] ================================================================== [ 9520.359656] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rb_next+0x13/0x90 [ 9520.359949] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8800b7ada500 by task btrfs-transacti/1721 [ 9520.360357] [ 9520.360530] CPU: 4 PID: 1721 Comm: btrfs-transacti Tainted: G L 4.19.0-rc8-nbor #555 [ 9520.360990] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 9520.362682] Call Trace: [ 9520.362887] dump_stack+0xa4/0xf5 [ 9520.363146] print_address_description+0x78/0x280 [ 9520.363412] kasan_report+0x263/0x390 [ 9520.363650] ? rb_next+0x13/0x90 [ 9520.363873] __asan_load8+0x54/0x90 [ 9520.364102] rb_next+0x13/0x90 [ 9520.364380] btrfs_dump_free_space+0x146/0x160 [btrfs] [ 9520.364697] dump_space_info+0x2cd/0x310 [btrfs] [ 9520.364997] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x1ee/0x1f0 [btrfs] [ 9520.365310] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x1cc/0x620 [btrfs] [ 9520.365646] ? btrfs_update_time+0x180/0x180 [btrfs] [ 9520.365923] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40 [ 9520.366204] ? btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x2c0/0x5c0 [btrfs] [ 9520.366549] btrfs_prealloc_file_range_trans+0x23/0x30 [btrfs] [ 9520.366880] cache_save_setup+0x42e/0x580 [btrfs] [ 9520.367220] ? btrfs_check_data_free_space+0xd0/0xd0 [btrfs] [ 9520.367518] ? lock_downgrade+0x2f0/0x2f0 [ 9520.367799] ? btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x11f/0x6e0 [btrfs] [ 9520.368104] ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 [ 9520.368349] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa8/0x140 [ 9520.368638] btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x2af/0x6e0 [btrfs] [ 9520.368978] ? btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x870/0x870 [btrfs] [ 9520.369282] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa8/0x140 [ 9520.369534] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40 [ 9520.369811] ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1b8/0x230 [btrfs] [ 9520.370137] commit_cowonly_roots+0x4b9/0x610 [btrfs] [ 9520.370560] ? commit_fs_roots+0x350/0x350 [btrfs] [ 9520.370926] ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1b8/0x230 [btrfs] [ 9520.371285] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x5e5/0x10e0 [btrfs] [ 9520.371612] ? btrfs_apply_pending_changes+0x90/0x90 [btrfs] [ 9520.371943] ? start_transaction+0x168/0x6c0 [btrfs] [ 9520.372257] transaction_kthread+0x21c/0x240 [btrfs] [ 9520.372537] kthread+0x1d2/0x1f0 [ 9520.372793] ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0xb50/0xb50 [btrfs] [ 9520.373090] ? kthread_park+0xb0/0xb0 [ 9520.373329] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 9520.373567] [ 9520.373738] Allocated by task 1804: [ 9520.373974] kasan_kmalloc+0xff/0x180 [ 9520.374208] kasan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20 [ 9520.374447] kmem_cache_alloc+0xfc/0x2d0 [ 9520.374731] __btrfs_add_free_space+0x40/0x580 [btrfs] [ 9520.375044] unpin_extent_range+0x4f7/0x7a0 [btrfs] [ 9520.375383] btrfs_finish_extent_commit+0x15f/0x4d0 [btrfs] [ 9520.375707] btrfs_commit_transaction+0xb06/0x10e0 [btrfs] [ 9520.376027] btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x237/0x5c0 [btrfs] [ 9520.376365] btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x81/0xd0 [btrfs] [ 9520.376689] btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space+0x25/0x80 [btrfs] [ 9520.377018] btrfs_direct_IO+0x42e/0x6d0 [btrfs] [ 9520.377284] generic_file_direct_write+0x11e/0x220 [ 9520.377587] btrfs_file_write_iter+0x472/0xac0 [btrfs] [ 9520.377875] aio_write+0x25c/0x360 [ 9520.378106] io_submit_one+0xaa0/0xdc0 [ 9520.378343] __se_sys_io_submit+0xfa/0x2f0 [ 9520.378589] __x64_sys_io_submit+0x43/0x50 [ 9520.378840] do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x240 [ 9520.379081] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 9520.379387] [ 9520.379557] Freed by task 1802: [ 9520.379782] __kasan_slab_free+0x173/0x260 [ 9520.380028] kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 [ 9520.380262] kmem_cache_free+0xc1/0x2c0 [ 9520.380544] btrfs_find_space_for_alloc+0x4cd/0x4e0 [btrfs] [ 9520.380866] find_free_extent+0xa99/0x17e0 [btrfs] [ 9520.381166] btrfs_reserve_extent+0xd5/0x1f0 [btrfs] [ 9520.381474] btrfs_get_blocks_direct+0x60b/0xbd0 [btrfs] [ 9520.381761] __blockdev_direct_IO+0x10ee/0x58a1 [ 9520.382059] btrfs_direct_IO+0x25a/0x6d0 [btrfs] [ 9520.382321] generic_file_direct_write+0x11e/0x220 [ 9520.382623] btrfs_file_write_iter+0x472/0xac0 [btrfs] [ 9520.382904] aio_write+0x25c/0x360 [ 9520.383172] io_submit_one+0xaa0/0xdc0 [ 9520.383416] __se_sys_io_submit+0xfa/0x2f0 [ 9520.383678] __x64_sys_io_submit+0x43/0x50 [ 9520.383927] do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x240 [ 9520.384165] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 9520.384439] [ 9520.384610] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8800b7ada500 which belongs to the cache btrfs_free_space of size 72 [ 9520.385175] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of 72-byte region [ffff8800b7ada500, ffff8800b7ada548) [ 9520.385691] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 9520.385957] page:ffffea0002deb680 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff880108a1d700 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 9520.388030] flags: 0x8100(slab|head) [ 9520.388281] raw: 0000000000008100 ffffea0002deb608 ffffea0002728808 ffff880108a1d700 [ 9520.388722] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000130013 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 9520.389169] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 9520.389473] [ 9520.389658] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 9520.389943] ffff8800b7ada400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 9520.390368] ffff8800b7ada480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 9520.390796] >ffff8800b7ada500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 9520.391223] ^ [ 9520.391461] ffff8800b7ada580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 9520.391885] ffff8800b7ada600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 9520.392313] ================================================================== [ 9520.392772] BTRFS critical (device vdc): entry offset 2258497536, bytes 131072, bitmap no [ 9520.393247] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000011 [ 9520.393705] PGD 800000010dbab067 P4D 800000010dbab067 PUD 107551067 PMD 0 [ 9520.394059] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI [ 9520.394378] CPU: 4 PID: 1721 Comm: btrfs-transacti Tainted: G B L 4.19.0-rc8-nbor #555 [ 9520.394858] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 9520.395350] RIP: 0010:rb_next+0x3c/0x90 [ 9520.396461] RSP: 0018:ffff8801074ff780 EFLAGS: 00010292 [ 9520.396762] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff81b5ac4c [ 9520.397115] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000011 [ 9520.397468] RBP: ffff8801074ff7a0 R08: ffffed0021d64ccc R09: ffffed0021d64ccc [ 9520.397821] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0021d64ccb R12: ffff8800b91e0000 [ 9520.398188] R13: ffff8800a3ceba48 R14: ffff8800b627bf80 R15: 0000000000020000 [ 9520.398555] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88010eb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 9520.399007] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 9520.399335] CR2: 0000000000000011 CR3: 0000000106b52000 CR4: 00000000000006a0 [ 9520.399679] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 9520.400023] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 9520.400400] Call Trace: [ 9520.400648] btrfs_dump_free_space+0x146/0x160 [btrfs] [ 9520.400974] dump_space_info+0x2cd/0x310 [btrfs] [ 9520.401287] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x1ee/0x1f0 [btrfs] [ 9520.401609] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x1cc/0x620 [btrfs] [ 9520.401952] ? btrfs_update_time+0x180/0x180 [btrfs] [ 9520.402232] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40 [ 9520.402522] ? btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x2c0/0x5c0 [btrfs] [ 9520.402882] btrfs_prealloc_file_range_trans+0x23/0x30 [btrfs] [ 9520.403261] cache_save_setup+0x42e/0x580 [btrfs] [ 9520.403570] ? btrfs_check_data_free_space+0xd0/0xd0 [btrfs] [ 9520.403871] ? lock_downgrade+0x2f0/0x2f0 [ 9520.404161] ? btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x11f/0x6e0 [btrfs] [ 9520.404481] ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 [ 9520.404732] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa8/0x140 [ 9520.405026] btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x2af/0x6e0 [btrfs] [ 9520.405375] ? btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x870/0x870 [btrfs] [ 9520.405694] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa8/0x140 [ 9520.405958] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40 [ 9520.406243] ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1b8/0x230 [btrfs] [ 9520.406574] commit_cowonly_roots+0x4b9/0x610 [btrfs] [ 9520.406899] ? commit_fs_roots+0x350/0x350 [btrfs] [ 9520.407253] ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1b8/0x230 [btrfs] [ 9520.407589] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x5e5/0x10e0 [btrfs] [ 9520.407925] ? btrfs_apply_pending_changes+0x90/0x90 [btrfs] [ 9520.408262] ? start_transaction+0x168/0x6c0 [btrfs] [ 9520.408582] transaction_kthread+0x21c/0x240 [btrfs] [ 9520.408870] kthread+0x1d2/0x1f0 [ 9520.409138] ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0xb50/0xb50 [btrfs] [ 9520.409440] ? kthread_park+0xb0/0xb0 [ 9520.409682] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 9520.410508] Dumping ftrace buffer: [ 9520.410764] (ftrace buffer empty) [ 9520.411007] CR2: 0000000000000011 [ 9520.411297] ---[ end trace 01a0863445cf360a ]--- [ 9520.411568] RIP: 0010:rb_next+0x3c/0x90 [ 9520.412644] RSP: 0018:ffff8801074ff780 EFLAGS: 00010292 [ 9520.412932] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff81b5ac4c [ 9520.413274] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000011 [ 9520.413616] RBP: ffff8801074ff7a0 R08: ffffed0021d64ccc R09: ffffed0021d64ccc [ 9520.414007] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0021d64ccb R12: ffff8800b91e0000 [ 9520.414349] R13: ffff8800a3ceba48 R14: ffff8800b627bf80 R15: 0000000000020000 [ 9520.416074] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88010eb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 9520.416536] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 9520.416848] CR2: 0000000000000011 CR3: 0000000106b52000 CR4: 00000000000006a0 [ 9520.418477] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 9520.418846] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 9520.419204] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 9520.419666] Dumping ftrace buffer: [ 9520.419930] (ftrace buffer empty) [ 9520.420168] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 9520.420406] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- Fix this by acquiring the respective lock before iterating the rbtree. Reported-by:
Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by:
Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by:
Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Filipe Manana authored
commit 421f0922 upstream. At inode.c:evict_inode_truncate_pages(), when we iterate over the inode's extent states, we access an extent state record's "state" field after we unlocked the inode's io tree lock. This can lead to a use-after-free issue because after we unlock the io tree that extent state record might have been freed due to being merged into another adjacent extent state record (a previous inflight bio for a read operation finished in the meanwhile which unlocked a range in the io tree and cause a merge of extent state records, as explained in the comment before the while loop added in commit 6ca07097 ("Btrfs: fix hang during inode eviction due to concurrent readahead")). Fix this by keeping a copy of the extent state's flags in a local variable and using it after unlocking the io tree. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201189 Fixes: b9d0b389 ("btrfs: Add handler for invalidate page") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by:
Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Josef Bacik authored
commit c495144b upstream. We're getting a lockdep splat because we take the dio_sem under the log_mutex. What we really need is to protect fsync() from logging an extent map for an extent we never waited on higher up, so just guard the whole thing with dio_sem. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.18.0-rc4-xfstests-00025-g5de5edbaf1d4 #411 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ aio-dio-invalid/30928 is trying to acquire lock: 0000000092621cfd (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: get_user_pages_unlocked+0x5a/0x1e0 but task is already holding lock: 00000000cefe6b35 (&ei->dio_sem){++++}, at: btrfs_direct_IO+0x3be/0x400 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #5 (&ei->dio_sem){++++}: lock_acquire+0xbd/0x220 down_write+0x51/0xb0 btrfs_log_changed_extents+0x80/0xa40 btrfs_log_inode+0xbaf/0x1000 btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x26f/0xa80 btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x50/0x70 btrfs_sync_file+0x357/0x540 do_fsync+0x38/0x60 __ia32_sys_fdatasync+0x12/0x20 do_fast_syscall_32+0x9a/0x2f0 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x84/0x96 -> #4 (&ei->log_mutex){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0xbd/0x220 __mutex_lock+0x86/0xa10 btrfs_record_unlink_dir+0x2a/0xa0 btrfs_unlink+0x5a/0xc0 vfs_unlink+0xb1/0x1a0 do_unlinkat+0x264/0x2b0 do_fast_syscall_32+0x9a/0x2f0 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x84/0x96 -> #3 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}: lock_acquire+0xbd/0x220 __sb_start_write+0x14d/0x230 start_transaction+0x3e6/0x590 btrfs_evict_inode+0x475/0x640 evict+0xbf/0x1b0 btrfs_run_delayed_iputs+0x6c/0x90 cleaner_kthread+0x124/0x1a0 kthread+0x106/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 -> #2 (&fs_info->cleaner_delayed_iput_mutex){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0xbd/0x220 __mutex_lock+0x86/0xa10 btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x197/0x530 btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x4c/0x90 btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space+0x20/0x60 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x87/0x520 do_page_mkwrite+0x31/0xa0 __handle_mm_fault+0x799/0xb00 handle_mm_fault+0x7c/0xe0 __do_page_fault+0x1d3/0x4a0 async_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 -> #1 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}: lock_acquire+0xbd/0x220 __sb_start_write+0x14d/0x230 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x6a/0x520 do_page_mkwrite+0x31/0xa0 __handle_mm_fault+0x799/0xb00 handle_mm_fault+0x7c/0xe0 __do_page_fault+0x1d3/0x4a0 async_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 -> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: __lock_acquire+0x42e/0x7a0 lock_acquire+0xbd/0x220 down_read+0x48/0xb0 get_user_pages_unlocked+0x5a/0x1e0 get_user_pages_fast+0xa4/0x150 iov_iter_get_pages+0xc3/0x340 do_direct_IO+0xf93/0x1d70 __blockdev_direct_IO+0x32d/0x1c20 btrfs_direct_IO+0x227/0x400 generic_file_direct_write+0xcf/0x180 btrfs_file_write_iter+0x308/0x58c aio_write+0xf8/0x1d0 io_submit_one+0x3a9/0x620 __ia32_compat_sys_io_submit+0xb2/0x270 do_int80_syscall_32+0x5b/0x1a0 entry_INT80_compat+0x88/0xa0 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &mm->mmap_sem --> &ei->log_mutex --> &ei->dio_sem Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&ei->dio_sem); lock(&ei->log_mutex); lock(&ei->dio_sem); lock(&mm->mmap_sem); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by aio-dio-invalid/30928: #0: 00000000cefe6b35 (&ei->dio_sem){++++}, at: btrfs_direct_IO+0x3be/0x400 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 30928 Comm: aio-dio-invalid Not tainted 4.18.0-rc4-xfstests-00025-g5de5edbaf1d4 #411 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x7c/0xbb print_circular_bug.isra.37+0x297/0x2a4 check_prev_add.constprop.45+0x781/0x7a0 ? __lock_acquire+0x42e/0x7a0 validate_chain.isra.41+0x7f0/0xb00 __lock_acquire+0x42e/0x7a0 lock_acquire+0xbd/0x220 ? get_user_pages_unlocked+0x5a/0x1e0 down_read+0x48/0xb0 ? get_user_pages_unlocked+0x5a/0x1e0 get_user_pages_unlocked+0x5a/0x1e0 get_user_pages_fast+0xa4/0x150 iov_iter_get_pages+0xc3/0x340 do_direct_IO+0xf93/0x1d70 ? __alloc_workqueue_key+0x358/0x490 ? __blockdev_direct_IO+0x14b/0x1c20 __blockdev_direct_IO+0x32d/0x1c20 ? btrfs_run_delalloc_work+0x40/0x40 ? can_nocow_extent+0x490/0x490 ? kvm_clock_read+0x1f/0x30 ? can_nocow_extent+0x490/0x490 ? btrfs_run_delalloc_work+0x40/0x40 btrfs_direct_IO+0x227/0x400 ? btrfs_run_delalloc_work+0x40/0x40 generic_file_direct_write+0xcf/0x180 btrfs_file_write_iter+0x308/0x58c aio_write+0xf8/0x1d0 ? kvm_clock_read+0x1f/0x30 ? __might_fault+0x3e/0x90 io_submit_one+0x3a9/0x620 ? io_submit_one+0xe5/0x620 __ia32_compat_sys_io_submit+0xb2/0x270 do_int80_syscall_32+0x5b/0x1a0 entry_INT80_compat+0x88/0xa0 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Reviewed-by:
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Josef Bacik authored
commit 30928e9b upstream. This could result in a really bad case where we do something like evict evict_refill_and_join btrfs_commit_transaction btrfs_run_delayed_iputs evict evict_refill_and_join btrfs_commit_transaction ... forever We have plenty of other places where we run delayed iputs that are much safer, let those do the work. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by:
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Josef Bacik authored
commit 80ee54bf upstream. We were not handling the reserved byte accounting properly for data references. Metadata was fine, if it errored out the error paths would free the bytes_reserved count and pin the extent, but it even missed one of the error cases. So instead move this handling up into run_one_delayed_ref so we are sure that both cases are properly cleaned up in case of a transaction abort. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18+ Reviewed-by:
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Josef Bacik authored
commit 49940bdd upstream. When we insert the file extent once the ordered extent completes we free the reserved extent reservation as it'll have been migrated to the bytes_used counter. However if we error out after this step we'll still clear the reserved extent reservation, resulting in a negative accounting of the reserved bytes for the block group and space info. Fix this by only doing the free if we didn't successfully insert a file extent for this extent. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Reviewed-by:
Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Reviewed-by:
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Josef Bacik authored
commit fb5c39d7 upstream. max_extent_size is supposed to be the largest contiguous range for the space info, and ctl->free_space is the total free space in the block group. We need to keep track of these separately and _only_ use the max_free_space if we don't have a max_extent_size, as that means our original request was too large to search any of the block groups for and therefore wouldn't have a max_extent_size set. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Reviewed-by:
Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
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Josef Bacik authored
commit ad22cf6e upstream. We can't use entry->bytes if our entry is a bitmap entry, we need to use entry->max_extent_size in that case. Fix up all the logic to make this consistent. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by:
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Josef Bacik authored
commit 21a94f7a upstream. If we use up our block group before allocating a new one we'll easily get a max_extent_size that's set really really low, which will result in a lot of fragmentation. We need to make sure we're resetting the max_extent_size when we add a new chunk or add new space. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by:
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Filipe Manana authored
commit 5ce55557 upstream. When writing out a block group free space cache we can end deadlocking with ourselves on an extent buffer lock resulting in a warning like the following: [245043.379979] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 2608 at fs/btrfs/locking.c:251 btrfs_tree_lock+0x1be/0x1d0 [btrfs] [245043.392792] CPU: 4 PID: 2608 Comm: btrfs-transacti Tainted: G W I 4.16.8 #1 [245043.395489] RIP: 0010:btrfs_tree_lock+0x1be/0x1d0 [btrfs] [245043.396791] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000424b840 EFLAGS: 00010246 [245043.398093] RAX: 0000000000000a30 RBX: ffff8807e20a3d20 RCX: 0000000000000001 [245043.399414] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff8807e20a3d20 [245043.400732] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffff88041f39a700 R09: ffff880000000000 [245043.402021] R10: 0000000000000040 R11: ffff8807e20a3d20 R12: ffff8807cb220630 [245043.403296] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8807cb220628 R15: ffff88041fbdf000 [245043.404780] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88082fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [245043.406050] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [245043.407321] CR2: 00007fffdbdb9f10 CR3: 0000000001c09005 CR4: 00000000000206e0 [245043.408670] Call Trace: [245043.409977] btrfs_search_slot+0x761/0xa60 [btrfs] [245043.411278] btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x62/0xb0 [btrfs] [245043.412572] btrfs_insert_item+0x5b/0xc0 [btrfs] [245043.413922] btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0xfb/0x1e0 [btrfs] [245043.415216] do_chunk_alloc+0x1e5/0x2a0 [btrfs] [245043.416487] find_free_extent+0xcd0/0xf60 [btrfs] [245043.417813] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x96/0x1e0 [btrfs] [245043.419105] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xfb/0x4a0 [btrfs] [245043.420378] __btrfs_cow_block+0x127/0x550 [btrfs] [245043.421652] btrfs_cow_block+0xee/0x190 [btrfs] [245043.422979] btrfs_search_slot+0x227/0xa60 [btrfs] [245043.424279] ? btrfs_update_inode_item+0x59/0x100 [btrfs] [245043.425538] ? iput+0x72/0x1e0 [245043.426798] write_one_cache_group.isra.49+0x20/0x90 [btrfs] [245043.428131] btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x102/0x420 [btrfs] [245043.429419] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x11b/0x880 [btrfs] [245043.430712] ? start_transaction+0x8e/0x410 [btrfs] [245043.432006] transaction_kthread+0x184/0x1a0 [btrfs] [245043.433341] kthread+0xf0/0x130 [245043.434628] ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0x4e0/0x4e0 [btrfs] [245043.435928] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x40/0x40 [245043.437236] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [245043.441054] ---[ end trace 15abaa2aaf36827f ]--- This is because at write_one_cache_group() when we are COWing a leaf from the extent tree we end up allocating a new block group (chunk) and, because we have hit a threshold on the number of bytes reserved for system chunks, we attempt to finalize the creation of new block groups from the current transaction, by calling btrfs_create_pending_block_groups(). However here we also need to modify the extent tree in order to insert a block group item, and if the location for this new block group item happens to be in the same leaf that we were COWing earlier, we deadlock since btrfs_search_slot() tries to write lock the extent buffer that we locked before at write_one_cache_group(). We have already hit similar cases in the past and commit d9a0540a ("Btrfs: fix deadlock when finalizing block group creation") fixed some of those cases by delaying the creation of pending block groups at the known specific spots that could lead to a deadlock. This change reworks that commit to be more generic so that we don't have to add similar logic to every possible path that can lead to a deadlock. This is done by making __btrfs_cow_block() disallowing the creation of new block groups (setting the transaction's can_flush_pending_bgs to false) before it attempts to allocate a new extent buffer for either the extent, chunk or device trees, since those are the trees that pending block creation modifies. Once the new extent buffer is allocated, it allows creation of pending block groups to happen again. This change depends on a recent patch from Josef which is not yet in Linus' tree, named "btrfs: make sure we create all new block groups" in order to avoid occasional warnings at btrfs_trans_release_chunk_metadata(). Fixes: d9a0540a ("Btrfs: fix deadlock when finalizing block group creation") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199753 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CAJtFHUTHna09ST-_EEiyWmDH6gAqS6wa=zMNMBsifj8ABu99cw@mail.gmail.com/Reported-by:
E V <eliventer@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
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Filipe Manana authored
commit 7ed586d0 upstream. When using the NO_HOLES feature and logging a regular file, we were expecting that if we find an inline extent, that either its size in RAM (uncompressed and unenconded) matches the size of the file or if it does not, that it matches the sector size and it represents compressed data. This assertion does not cover a case where the length of the inline extent is smaller than the sector size and also smaller the file's size, such case is possible through fallocate. Example: $ mkfs.btrfs -f -O no-holes /dev/sdb $ mount /dev/sdb /mnt $ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xb60 0 21" /mnt/foobar $ xfs_io -c "falloc 40 40" /mnt/foobar $ xfs_io -c "fsync" /mnt/foobar In the above example we trigger the assertion because the inline extent's length is 21 bytes while the file size is 80 bytes. The fallocate() call merely updated the file's size and did not touch the existing inline extent, as expected. So fix this by adjusting the assertion so that an inline extent length smaller than the file size is valid if the file size is smaller than the filesystem's sector size. A test case for fstests follows soon. Reported-by:
Anatoly Trosinenko <anatoly.trosinenko@gmail.com> Fixes: a89ca6f2 ("Btrfs: fix fsync after truncate when no_holes feature is enabled") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CAE5jQCfRSBC7n4pUTFJcmHh109=gwyT9mFkCOL+NKfzswmR=_Q@mail.gmail.com/Signed-off-by:
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Filipe Manana authored
commit 3527a018 upstream. At inode.c:compress_file_range(), under the "free_pages_out" label, we can end up dereferencing the "pages" pointer when it has a NULL value. This case happens when "start" has a value of 0 and we fail to allocate memory for the "pages" pointer. When that happens we jump to the "cont" label and then enter the "if (start == 0)" branch where we immediately call the cow_file_range_inline() function. If that function returns 0 (success creating an inline extent) or an error (like -ENOMEM for example) we jump to the "free_pages_out" label and then access "pages[i]" leading to a NULL pointer dereference, since "nr_pages" has a value greater than zero at that point. Fix this by setting "nr_pages" to 0 when we fail to allocate memory for the "pages" pointer. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201119 Fixes: 771ed689 ("Btrfs: Optimize compressed writeback and reads") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by:
Liu Bo <bo.liu@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by:
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Qu Wenruo authored
commit 9c7b0c2e upstream. [BUG] In the following case, rescan won't zero out the number of qgroup 1/0: $ mkfs.btrfs -fq $DEV $ mount $DEV /mnt $ btrfs quota enable /mnt $ btrfs qgroup create 1/0 /mnt $ btrfs sub create /mnt/sub $ btrfs qgroup assign 0/257 1/0 /mnt $ dd if=/dev/urandom of=/mnt/sub/file bs=1k count=1000 $ btrfs sub snap /mnt/sub /mnt/snap $ btrfs quota rescan -w /mnt $ btrfs qgroup show -pcre /mnt qgroupid rfer excl max_rfer max_excl parent child -------- ---- ---- -------- -------- ------ ----- 0/5 16.00KiB 16.00KiB none none --- --- 0/257 1016.00KiB 16.00KiB none none 1/0 --- 0/258 1016.00KiB 16.00KiB none none --- --- 1/0 1016.00KiB 16.00KiB none none --- 0/257 So far so good, but: $ btrfs qgroup remove 0/257 1/0 /mnt WARNING: quotas may be inconsistent, rescan needed $ btrfs quota rescan -w /mnt $ btrfs qgroup show -pcre /mnt qgoupid rfer excl max_rfer max_excl parent child -------- ---- ---- -------- -------- ------ ----- 0/5 16.00KiB 16.00KiB none none --- --- 0/257 1016.00KiB 16.00KiB none none --- --- 0/258 1016.00KiB 16.00KiB none none --- --- 1/0 1016.00KiB 16.00KiB none none --- --- ^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ not cleared [CAUSE] Before rescan we call qgroup_rescan_zero_tracking() to zero out all qgroups' accounting numbers. However we don't mark all qgroups dirty, but rely on rescan to do so. If we have any high level qgroup without children, it won't be marked dirty during rescan, since we cannot reach that qgroup. This will cause QGROUP_INFO items of childless qgroups never get updated in the quota tree, thus their numbers will stay the same in "btrfs qgroup show" output. [FIX] Just mark all qgroups dirty in qgroup_rescan_zero_tracking(), so even if we have childless qgroups, their QGROUP_INFO items will still get updated during rescan. Reported-by:
Misono Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by:
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Filipe Manana authored
commit 0f375eed upstream. In a scenario like the following: mkdir /mnt/A # inode 258 mkdir /mnt/B # inode 259 touch /mnt/B/bar # inode 260 sync mv /mnt/B/bar /mnt/A/bar mv -T /mnt/A /mnt/B fsync /mnt/B/bar <power fail> After replaying the log we end up with file bar having 2 hard links, both with the name 'bar' and one in the directory with inode number 258 and the other in the directory with inode number 259. Also, we end up with the directory inode 259 still existing and with the directory inode 258 still named as 'A', instead of 'B'. In this scenario, file 'bar' should only have one hard link, located at directory inode 258, the directory inode 259 should not exist anymore and the name for directory inode 258 should be 'B'. This incorrect behaviour happens because when attempting to log the old parents of an inode, we skip any parents that no longer exist. Fix this by forcing a full commit if an old parent no longer exists. A test case for fstests follows soon. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by:
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