- 03 Oct, 2016 38 commits
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Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit b615e3c7 ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit c2f18fa4 ] * should zero on any failure * __get_user() should use __copy_from_user(), not copy_from_user() Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit fd2d2b19 ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit 22426465 ] should clear on access_ok() failures. Also remove the useless range truncation logics. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit aace880f ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit acb2505d ] ... that should zero on faults. Also remove the <censored> helpful logics wrt range truncation copied from ppc32. Where it had ever been needed only in case of copy_from_user() *and* had not been merged into the mainline until a month after the need had disappeared. A decade before openrisc went into mainline, I might add... Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit 2e29f50a ] a) should not leave crap on fault b) should _not_ require access_ok() in any cases. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit e33d1f6f ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit ae7cc577 ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit 43403eab ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit e69d7005 ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Vineet Gupta authored
[ Upstream commit 05d9d0b9 ] Al reported potential issue with ARC get_user() as it wasn't clearing out destination pointer in case of fault due to bad address etc. Verified using following | { | u32 bogus1 = 0xdeadbeef; | u64 bogus2 = 0xdead; | int rc1, rc2; | | pr_info("Orig values %x %llx\n", bogus1, bogus2); | rc1 = get_user(bogus1, (u32 __user *)0x40000000); | rc2 = get_user(bogus2, (u64 __user *)0x50000000); | pr_info("access %d %d, new values %x %llx\n", | rc1, rc2, bogus1, bogus2); | } | [ARCLinux]# insmod /mnt/kernel-module/qtn.ko | Orig values deadbeef dead | access -14 -14, new values 0 0 Reported-by:
Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit 8ae95ed4 ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by:
James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit a5e541f7 ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit f35c1e06 ] It's -EFAULT, not -1 (and contrary to the comment in there, __strnlen_user() can return 0 - on faults). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by:
Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit 3b8767a8 ] It should check access_ok(). Otherwise a bunch of places turn into trivially exploitable rootholes. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit eb47e029 ] * copy_from_user() on access_ok() failure ought to zero the destination * none of those primitives should skip the access_ok() check in case of small constant size. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by:
Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit 9ad18b75 ] both for access_ok() failures and for faults halfway through Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Yoshinori Sato authored
[ Upstream commit a02613a4 ] Current implemantation ptr argument evaluate 2 times. It'll be an unexpected result. Changes v5: Remove unnecessary const. Changes v4: Temporary pointer type change to const void* Changes v3: Some build error fix. Changes v2: Argument x protect. Signed-off-by:
Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by:
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Johannes Berg authored
[ Upstream commit ad5987b4 ] Due to an apparent copy/paste bug, the number of counters for the beacon configuration were checked twice, instead of checking the number of probe response counters. Fix this to check the number of probe response counters before parsing those. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 9a774c78 ("cfg80211: Support multiple CSA counters") Signed-off-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Huacai Chen authored
[ Upstream commit 3cbc6fc9 ] Commit 842dfc11 ("MIPS: Fix build with binutils 2.24.51+") missing a ".set pop" in macro fpu_restore_16even, so add it. Signed-off-by:
Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com> Acked-by:
Manuel Lauss <manuel.lauss@gmail.com> Cc: Steven J . Hill <Steven.Hill@caviumnetworks.com> Cc: Fuxin Zhang <zhangfx@lemote.com> Cc: Zhangjin Wu <wuzhangjin@gmail.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.18+ Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/14210/Signed-off-by:
Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Signed-off-by:
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Boris Brezillon authored
[ Upstream commit ebf9ff75 ] Some irqchip drivers need to take the generic chip lock outside of the irq context. Provide the irq_gc_{lock_irqsave,unlock_irqrestore}() helpers to allow one to disable irqs while entering a critical section protected by gc->lock. Note that we do not provide optimized version of these helpers for !SMP, because they are not called from the hot-path. [ tglx: Added a comment when these helpers should be [not] used ] Signed-off-by:
Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com> Cc: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@atmel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@free-electrons.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1473775109-4192-1-git-send-email-boris.brezillon@free-electrons.comSigned-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
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Matt Redfearn authored
[ Upstream commit 951c39cd ] If the paravirt machine is compiles without CONFIG_SMP, the following linker error occurs arch/mips/kernel/head.o: In function `kernel_entry': (.ref.text+0x10): undefined reference to `smp_bootstrap' due to the kernel entry macro always including SMP startup code. Wrap this code in CONFIG_SMP to fix the error. Signed-off-by:
Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.16+ Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/14212/Signed-off-by:
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Ard Biesheuvel authored
[ Upstream commit 2db34e78 ] The AES-CTR glue code avoids calling into the blkcipher API for the tail portion of the walk, by comparing the remainder of walk.nbytes modulo AES_BLOCK_SIZE with the residual nbytes, and jumping straight into the tail processing block if they are equal. This tail processing block checks whether nbytes != 0, and does nothing otherwise. However, in case of an allocation failure in the blkcipher layer, we may enter this code with walk.nbytes == 0, while nbytes > 0. In this case, we should not dereference the source and destination pointers, since they may be NULL. So instead of checking for nbytes != 0, check for (walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE) != 0, which implies the former in non-error conditions. Fixes: 49788fe2 ("arm64/crypto: AES-ECB/CBC/CTR/XTS using ARMv8 NEON and Crypto Extensions") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by:
xiakaixu <xiakaixu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by:
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Ard Biesheuvel authored
[ Upstream commit f82e90b2 ] The AES-CTR glue code avoids calling into the blkcipher API for the tail portion of the walk, by comparing the remainder of walk.nbytes modulo AES_BLOCK_SIZE with the residual nbytes, and jumping straight into the tail processing block if they are equal. This tail processing block checks whether nbytes != 0, and does nothing otherwise. However, in case of an allocation failure in the blkcipher layer, we may enter this code with walk.nbytes == 0, while nbytes > 0. In this case, we should not dereference the source and destination pointers, since they may be NULL. So instead of checking for nbytes != 0, check for (walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE) != 0, which implies the former in non-error conditions. Fixes: 86464859 ("crypto: arm - AES in ECB/CBC/CTR/XTS modes using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by:
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Herbert Xu authored
[ Upstream commit acdb04d0 ] When we need to allocate a temporary blkcipher_walk_next and it fails, the code is supposed to take the slow path of processing the data block by block. However, due to an unrelated change we instead end up dereferencing the NULL pointer. This patch fixes it by moving the unrelated bsize setting out of the way so that we enter the slow path as inteded. Fixes: 7607bd8f ("[CRYPTO] blkcipher: Added blkcipher_walk_virt_block") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by:
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Daniele Palmas authored
[ Upstream commit f190fd92 ] This patch adds support for Infineon flashloader 0x8087/0x0801. The flashloader is used in Telit LE940B modem family with Telit flashing application. Signed-off-by:
Daniele Palmas <dnlplm@gmail.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Trond Myklebust authored
[ Upstream commit b519d408 ] Ensure that we conform to the algorithm described in RFC5661, section 18.36.4 for when to bump the sequence id. In essence we do it for all cases except when the RPC call timed out, or in case of the server returning NFS4ERR_DELAY or NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID. Signed-off-by:
Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
[ Upstream commit ba63f23d ] Since setting an encryption policy requires writing metadata to the filesystem, it should be guarded by mnt_want_write/mnt_drop_write. Otherwise, a user could cause a write to a frozen or readonly filesystem. This was handled correctly by f2fs but not by ext4. Make fscrypt_process_policy() handle it rather than relying on the filesystem to get it right. Signed-off-by:
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.1+; check fs/{ext4,f2fs} Signed-off-by:
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Acked-by:
Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit 2545e5da ] ... in all cases, including the failing access_ok() Note that some architectures using asm-generic/uaccess.h have __copy_from_user() not zeroing the tail on failure halfway through. This variant works either way. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
[ Upstream commit 2561d309 ] it should clear the destination even when access_ok() fails. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Will Deacon authored
[ Upstream commit 872c63fb ] smp_mb__before_spinlock() is intended to upgrade a spin_lock() operation to a full barrier, such that prior stores are ordered with respect to loads and stores occuring inside the critical section. Unfortunately, the core code defines the barrier as smp_wmb(), which is insufficient to provide the required ordering guarantees when used in conjunction with our load-acquire-based spinlock implementation. This patch overrides the arm64 definition of smp_mb__before_spinlock() to map to a full smp_mb(). Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Reported-by:
Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by:
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Suzuki K Poulose authored
[ Upstream commit 293f2936 ] On arm/arm64, we depend on the kvm_unmap_hva* callbacks (via mmu_notifiers::invalidate_*) to unmap the stage2 pagetables when the userspace buffer gets unmapped. However, when the Hypervisor process exits without explicit unmap of the guest buffers, the only notifier we get is kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all() (via mmu_notifier::release ) which does nothing on arm. Later this causes us to access pages that were already released [via exit_mmap() -> unmap_vmas()] when we actually get to unmap the stage2 pagetable [via kvm_arch_destroy_vm() -> kvm_free_stage2_pgd()]. This triggers crashes with CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, which unmaps any free'd pages from the linear map. [ 757.644120] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff800661e00000 [ 757.652046] pgd = ffff20000b1a2000 [ 757.655471] [ffff800661e00000] *pgd=00000047fffe3003, *pud=00000047fcd8c003, *pmd=00000047fcc7c003, *pte=00e8004661e00712 [ 757.666492] Internal error: Oops: 96000147 [#3] PREEMPT SMP [ 757.672041] Modules linked in: [ 757.675100] CPU: 7 PID: 3630 Comm: qemu-system-aar Tainted: G D 4.8.0-rc1 #3 [ 757.683240] Hardware name: AppliedMicro X-Gene Mustang Board/X-Gene Mustang Board, BIOS 3.06.15 Aug 19 2016 [ 757.692938] task: ffff80069cdd3580 task.stack: ffff8006adb7c000 [ 757.698840] PC is at __flush_dcache_area+0x1c/0x40 [ 757.703613] LR is at kvm_flush_dcache_pmd+0x60/0x70 [ 757.708469] pc : [<ffff20000809dbdc>] lr : [<ffff2000080b4a70>] pstate: 20000145 ... [ 758.357249] [<ffff20000809dbdc>] __flush_dcache_area+0x1c/0x40 [ 758.363059] [<ffff2000080b6748>] unmap_stage2_range+0x458/0x5f0 [ 758.368954] [<ffff2000080b708c>] kvm_free_stage2_pgd+0x34/0x60 [ 758.374761] [<ffff2000080b2280>] kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x20/0x68 [ 758.380570] [<ffff2000080aa330>] kvm_put_kvm+0x210/0x358 [ 758.385860] [<ffff2000080aa524>] kvm_vm_release+0x2c/0x40 [ 758.391239] [<ffff2000082ad234>] __fput+0x114/0x2e8 [ 758.396096] [<ffff2000082ad46c>] ____fput+0xc/0x18 [ 758.400869] [<ffff200008104658>] task_work_run+0x108/0x138 [ 758.406332] [<ffff2000080dc8ec>] do_exit+0x48c/0x10e8 [ 758.411363] [<ffff2000080dd5fc>] do_group_exit+0x6c/0x130 [ 758.416739] [<ffff2000080ed924>] get_signal+0x284/0xa18 [ 758.421943] [<ffff20000808a098>] do_signal+0x158/0x860 [ 758.427060] [<ffff20000808aad4>] do_notify_resume+0x6c/0x88 [ 758.432608] [<ffff200008083624>] work_pending+0x10/0x14 [ 758.437812] Code: 9ac32042 8b010001 d1000443 8a230000 (d50b7e20) This patch fixes the issue by moving the kvm_free_stage2_pgd() to kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all(). Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.9+ Tested-by:
Itaru Kitayama <itaru.kitayama@riken.jp> Reported-by:
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Clemens Gruber authored
[ Upstream commit 6f3c4fb6 ] Problems with the signal integrity of the high speed USB data lines or noise on reference ground lines can cause the i.MX6 USB controller to violate USB specs and exhibit unexpected behavior. It was observed that USBi_UI interrupts were triggered first and when isr_setup_status_phase was called, ci->status was NULL, which lead to a NULL pointer dereference kernel panic. This patch fixes the kernel panic, emits a warning once and returns -EPIPE to halt the device and let the host get stalled. It also adds a comment to point people, who are experiencing this issue, to their USB hardware design. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #4.1+ Signed-off-by:
Clemens Gruber <clemens.gruber@pqgruber.com> Signed-off-by:
Peter Chen <peter.chen@nxp.com> Signed-off-by:
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Lee Jones authored
[ Upstream commit 7e9d2850 ] The STiH4{07,10} platform contains some interconnect clocks which are used by various IPs. If this clock isn't handled correctly by ST's EHCI/OHCI drivers, their hub won't be found, the following error be shown and the result will be non-working USB: [ 97.221963] hub 2-1:1.0: hub_ext_port_status failed (err = -110) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by:
Peter Griffin <peter.griffin@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> Acked-by:
Patrice Chotard <patrice.chotard@st.com> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
[ Upstream commit 816f318b ] When a seq-virmidi driver is initialized, it registers a rawmidi instance with its callback to create an associated seq kernel client. Currently it's done throughly in rawmidi's register_mutex context. Recently it was found that this may lead to a deadlock another rawmidi device that is being attached with the sequencer is accessed, as both open with the same register_mutex. This was actually triggered by syzkaller, as Dmitry Vyukov reported: ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 4.8.0-rc1+ #11 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- syz-executor/7154 is trying to acquire lock: (register_mutex#5){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff84fd6d4b>] snd_rawmidi_kernel_open+0x4b/0x260 sound/core/rawmidi.c:341 but task is already holding lock: (&grp->list_mutex){++++.+}, at: [<ffffffff850138bb>] check_and_subscribe_port+0x5b/0x5c0 sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:495 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&grp->list_mutex){++++.+}: [<ffffffff8147a3a8>] lock_acquire+0x208/0x430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3746 [<ffffffff863f6199>] down_read+0x49/0xc0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:22 [< inline >] deliver_to_subscribers sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:681 [<ffffffff85005c5e>] snd_seq_deliver_event+0x35e/0x890 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:822 [<ffffffff85006e96>] > snd_seq_kernel_client_dispatch+0x126/0x170 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2418 [<ffffffff85012c52>] snd_seq_system_broadcast+0xb2/0xf0 sound/core/seq/seq_system.c:101 [<ffffffff84fff70a>] snd_seq_create_kernel_client+0x24a/0x330 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2297 [< inline >] snd_virmidi_dev_attach_seq sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:383 [<ffffffff8502d29f>] snd_virmidi_dev_register+0x29f/0x750 sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:450 [<ffffffff84fd208c>] snd_rawmidi_dev_register+0x30c/0xd40 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1645 [<ffffffff84f816d3>] __snd_device_register.part.0+0x63/0xc0 sound/core/device.c:164 [< inline >] __snd_device_register sound/core/device.c:162 [<ffffffff84f8235d>] snd_device_register_all+0xad/0x110 sound/core/device.c:212 [<ffffffff84f7546f>] snd_card_register+0xef/0x6c0 sound/core/init.c:749 [<ffffffff85040b7f>] snd_virmidi_probe+0x3ef/0x590 sound/drivers/virmidi.c:123 [<ffffffff833ebf7b>] platform_drv_probe+0x8b/0x170 drivers/base/platform.c:564 ...... -> #0 (register_mutex#5){+.+.+.}: [< inline >] check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1829 [< inline >] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1939 [< inline >] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2266 [<ffffffff814791f4>] __lock_acquire+0x4d44/0x4d80 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3335 [<ffffffff8147a3a8>] lock_acquire+0x208/0x430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3746 [< inline >] __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:521 [<ffffffff863f0ef1>] mutex_lock_nested+0xb1/0xa20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:621 [<ffffffff84fd6d4b>] snd_rawmidi_kernel_open+0x4b/0x260 sound/core/rawmidi.c:341 [<ffffffff8502e7c7>] midisynth_subscribe+0xf7/0x350 sound/core/seq/seq_midi.c:188 [< inline >] subscribe_port sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:427 [<ffffffff85013cc7>] check_and_subscribe_port+0x467/0x5c0 sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:510 [<ffffffff85015da9>] snd_seq_port_connect+0x2c9/0x500 sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:579 [<ffffffff850079b8>] snd_seq_ioctl_subscribe_port+0x1d8/0x2b0 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:1480 [<ffffffff84ffe9e4>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x184/0x1e0 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2225 [<ffffffff84ffeae8>] snd_seq_kernel_client_ctl+0xa8/0x110 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2440 [<ffffffff85027664>] snd_seq_oss_midi_open+0x3b4/0x610 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_midi.c:375 [<ffffffff85023d67>] snd_seq_oss_synth_setup_midi+0x107/0x4c0 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c:281 [<ffffffff8501b0a8>] snd_seq_oss_open+0x748/0x8d0 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_init.c:274 [<ffffffff85019d8a>] odev_open+0x6a/0x90 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss.c:138 [<ffffffff84f7040f>] soundcore_open+0x30f/0x640 sound/sound_core.c:639 ...... other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&grp->list_mutex); lock(register_mutex#5); lock(&grp->list_mutex); lock(register_mutex#5); *** DEADLOCK *** ====================================================== The fix is to simply move the registration parts in snd_rawmidi_dev_register() to the outside of the register_mutex lock. The lock is needed only to manage the linked list, and it's not necessarily to cover the whole initialization process. Reported-by:
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
[ Upstream commit 9f8a7658 ] When a user timer instance is continued without the explicit start beforehand, the system gets eventually zero-division error like: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 27320 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0-rc3-next-20160825+ #8 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff88003c9b2280 task.stack: ffff880027280000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff858e1a6c>] [< inline >] ktime_divns include/linux/ktime.h:195 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff858e1a6c>] [<ffffffff858e1a6c>] snd_hrtimer_callback+0x1bc/0x3c0 sound/core/hrtimer.c:62 Call Trace: <IRQ> [< inline >] __run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1238 [<ffffffff81504335>] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x325/0xe70 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1302 [<ffffffff81506ceb>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x18b/0x420 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1336 [<ffffffff8126d8df>] local_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6f/0xe0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:933 [<ffffffff86e13056>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0xa0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:957 [<ffffffff86e1210c>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x8c/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:487 <EOI> ..... Although a similar issue was spotted and a fix patch was merged in commit [6b760bb2: ALSA: timer: fix division by zero after SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_CONTINUE], it seems covering only a part of iceberg. In this patch, we fix the issue a bit more drastically. Basically the continue of an uninitialized timer is supposed to be a fresh start, so we do it for user timers. For the direct snd_timer_continue() call, there is no way to pass the initial tick value, so we kick out for the uninitialized case. Reported-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
[ Upstream commit f65e0d29 ] snd_timer_notify1() is called outside the spinlock and it retakes the lock after the unlock. This is rather racy, and it's safer to move snd_timer_notify() call inside the main spinlock. The patch also contains a slight refactoring / cleanup of the code. Now all start/stop/continue/pause look more symmetric and a bit better readable. Signed-off-by:
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- 02 Oct, 2016 2 commits
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Mathias Nyman authored
[ Upstream commit bcf42aa6 ] The stop endpoint command has its own 5 second timeout timer. If the timeout function is triggered between USB3 and USB2 host removal it will try to call usb_hc_died(xhci_to_hcd(xhci)->primary_hcd) the ->primary_hcd will be set to NULL at USB3 hcd removal. Fix this by first checking if the PCI host is being removed, and also by using only xhci_to_hcd() as it will always return the primary hcd. CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Paul Mackerras authored
[ Upstream commit f077aaf0 ] In commit c60ac569 ("powerpc: Update kernel VSID range", 2013-03-13) we lost a check on the region number (the top four bits of the effective address) for addresses below PAGE_OFFSET. That commit replaced a check that the top 18 bits were all zero with a check that bits 46 - 59 were zero (performed for all addresses, not just user addresses). This means that userspace can access an address like 0x1000_0xxx_xxxx_xxxx and we will insert a valid SLB entry for it. The VSID used will be the same as if the top 4 bits were 0, but the page size will be some random value obtained by indexing beyond the end of the mm_ctx_high_slices_psize array in the paca. If that page size is the same as would be used for region 0, then userspace just has an alias of the region 0 space. If the page size is different, then no HPTE will be found for the access, and the process will get a SIGSEGV (since hash_page_mm() will refuse to create a HPTE for the bogus address). The access beyond the end of the mm_ctx_high_slices_psize can be at most 5.5MB past the array, and so will be in RAM somewhere. Since the access is a load performed in real mode, it won't fault or crash the kernel. At most this bug could perhaps leak a little bit of information about blocks of 32 bytes of memory located at offsets of i * 512kB past the paca->mm_ctx_high_slices_psize array, for 1 <= i <= 11. Fixes: c60ac569 ("powerpc: Update kernel VSID range") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+ Signed-off-by:
Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Reviewed-by:
Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by:
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