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  1. 17 Apr, 2023 7 commits
    • Josef Bacik's avatar
      btrfs: abort the transaction if we get an error during snapshot drop · 9a93b5a3
      Josef Bacik authored 
      We were seeing weird errors when we were testing our btrfs backports
before we had the incorrect level check fix.  These errors appeared to
be improper error handling, but error injection testing uncovered that
the errors were a result of corruption that occurred from improper error
handling during snapshot delete.

With snapshot delete if we encounter any errors during walk_down or
walk_up we'll simply return an error, we won't abort the transaction.
This is problematic because we will be dropping references for nodes and
leaves along the way, and if we fail in the middle we will leave the
file system corrupt because we don't know where we left off in the drop.

Fix this by making sure we abort if we hit any errors during the walk
down or walk up operations, as we have no idea what operations could
have been left half done at this point.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      9a93b5a3
    • Josef Bacik's avatar
      btrfs: handle errors in walk_down_tree properly · 4e194384
      Josef Bacik authored 
      We can get errors in walk_down_proc as we try and lookup extent info for
the snapshot dropping to act on.  However if we get an error we simply
return 1 which indicates we're done with walking down, which will lead
us to improperly continue with the snapshot drop with the incorrect
information.  Instead break if we get any error from walk_down_proc or
do_walk_down, and handle the case of ret == 1 by returning 0, otherwise
return the ret value that we have.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      4e194384
    • Josef Bacik's avatar
      btrfs: drop root refs properly when orphan cleanup fails · 6989627d
      Josef Bacik authored 
      When we mount the file system we do something like this:

	while (1) {
		lookup fs roots;

		for (i = 0; i < num_roots; i++) {
			ret = btrfs_orphan_cleanup(roots[i]);
			if (ret)
				break;
			btrfs_put_root(roots[i]);
		}
	}

	for (; i < num_roots; i++)
		btrfs_put_root(roots[i]);

As you can see if we break in that inner loop we just go back to the
outer loop and lose the fact that we have to drop references on the
remaining roots we looked up.  Fix this by making an out label and
jumping to that on error so we don't leak a reference to the roots we
looked up.
Reviewed-by: default avatarJohannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      6989627d
    • Josef Bacik's avatar
      btrfs: add missing iputs on orphan cleanup failure · a13bb2c0
      Josef Bacik authored 
      We missed a couple of iput()s in the orphan cleanup failure paths, add
them so we don't get refcount errors. The iput needs to be done in the
check and not under a common label due to the way the code is
structured.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      a13bb2c0
    • Josef Bacik's avatar
      btrfs: handle errors from btrfs_read_node_slot in split · 9cf14029
      Josef Bacik authored 
      While investigating a problem with error injection I tripped over
curious behavior in the node/leaf splitting code.  If we get an EIO when
trying to read either the left or right leaf/node for splitting we'll
simply treat the node as if it were full and continue on.  The end
result of this isn't too bad, we simply end up allocating a block when
we may have pushed items into the adjacent blocks.

However this does essentially allow us to continue to modify a file
system that we've gotten errors on, either from a bad disk or csum
mismatch or other corruption.  This isn't particularly safe, so instead
handle these btrfs_read_node_slot() usages differently.  We allow you to
pass in any slot, the idea being that we save some code if the slot
number is outside of the range of the parent.  This means we treat all
errors the same, when in reality we only want to ignore -ENOENT.

Fix this by changing how we call btrfs_read_node_slot(), which is to
only call it for slots we know are valid.  This way if we get an error
back from reading the block we can properly pass the error up the chain.
This was validated with the error injection testing I was doing.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      9cf14029
    • Josef Bacik's avatar
      btrfs: replace BUG_ON with ASSERT in btrfs_read_node_slot · d4694728
      Josef Bacik authored 
      In btrfs_read_node_slot() we have a BUG_ON() that can be converted to an
ASSERT(), it's from an extent buffer and the level is validated at the
time it's read from disk.
Reviewed-by: default avatarJohannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      d4694728
    • Josef Bacik's avatar
      btrfs: use btrfs_handle_fs_error in btrfs_fill_super · 13b98989
      Josef Bacik authored 
      While trying to track down a lost EIO problem I hit the following
assertion while doing my error injection testing

  BTRFS warning (device nvme1n1): transaction 1609 (with 180224 dirty metadata bytes) is not committed
  assertion failed: !found, in fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4456
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/messages.h:169!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 1445 Comm: mount Tainted: G        W          6.2.0-rc5+ #3
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_assertfail.constprop.0+0x18/0x1a
  RSP: 0018:ffffb95fc3b0bc68 EFLAGS: 00010286
  RAX: 0000000000000034 RBX: ffff9941c2ac2000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffb6741f7d RDI: 00000000ffffffff
  RBP: ffff9941c2ac2428 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb95fc3b0bb38
  R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffffffb71438a8 R12: ffff9941c2ac2428
  R13: ffff9941c2ac2450 R14: ffff9941c2ac2450 R15: 000000000002c000
  FS:  00007fcea2d07800(0000) GS:ffff9941fbc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007f00cc7c83a8 CR3: 000000010c686000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   close_ctree+0x426/0x48f
   btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x7e/0xee
   ? legacy_parse_param+0x2b/0x220
   legacy_get_tree+0x2b/0x50
   vfs_get_tree+0x29/0xc0
   vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x73/0xb0
   btrfs_mount+0x11d/0x3d0
   ? legacy_parse_param+0x2b/0x220
   legacy_get_tree+0x2b/0x50
   vfs_get_tree+0x29/0xc0
   path_mount+0x438/0xa40
   __x64_sys_mount+0xe9/0x130
   do_syscall_64+0x3e/0x90
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc

This is because the error injection did an EIO for the root inode lookup
and we simply jumped to closing the ctree.  However because we didn't
mark the file system as having an error we skipped all of the broken
transaction cleanup stuff, and thus triggered this ASSERT().  Fix this
by calling btrfs_handle_fs_error() in this case so we have the error set
on the file system.
Reviewed-by: default avatarJohannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJosef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      13b98989
  3. 16 Apr, 2023 12 commits
  5. 15 Apr, 2023 6 commits
  7. 14 Apr, 2023 14 commits
  9. 13 Apr, 2023 1 commit
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge tag 'cgroup-for-6.3-rc6-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup · 44149752
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      Pull cgroup fixes from Tejun Heo:
 "This is a relatively big pull request this late in the cycle but the
  major contributor is the cpuset bug which is rather significant:

   - Fix several cpuset bugs including one where it wasn't applying the
     target cgroup when tasks are created with CLONE_INTO_CGROUP

  With a few smaller fixes:

   - Fix inversed locking order in cgroup1 freezer implementation

   - Fix garbage cpu.stat::core_sched.forceidle_usec reporting in the
     root cgroup"

* tag 'cgroup-for-6.3-rc6-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
  cgroup/cpuset: Make cpuset_attach_task() skip subpartitions CPUs for top_cpuset
  cgroup/cpuset: Add cpuset_can_fork() and cpuset_cancel_fork() methods
  cgroup/cpuset: Make cpuset_fork() handle CLONE_INTO_CGROUP properly
  cgroup/cpuset: Wake up cpuset_attach_wq tasks in cpuset_cancel_attach()
  cgroup,freezer: hold cpu_hotplug_lock before freezer_mutex
  cgroup/cpuset: Fix partition root's cpuset.cpus update bug
  cgroup: fix display of forceidle time at root
      44149752
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