1. 14 Apr, 2011 36 commits
  2. 27 Mar, 2011 4 commits
    • Greg Kroah-Hartman's avatar
      Linux 2.6.32.36 · bd51e052
      Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
      bd51e052
    • Stuart Hayes's avatar
      dcdbas: force SMI to happen when expected · c293537d
      Stuart Hayes authored
      commit dd65c736 upstream.
      
      The dcdbas driver can do an I/O write to cause a SMI to occur.  The SMI handler
      looks at certain registers and memory locations, so the SMI needs to happen
      immediately.  On some systems I/O writes are posted, though, causing the SMI to
      happen well after the "outb" occurred, which causes random failures.  Following
      the "outb" with an "inb" forces the write to go through even if it is posted.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStuart Hayes <stuart_hayes@yahoo.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarDoug Warzecha <douglas_warzecha@dell.com>
      Cc: Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
      c293537d
    • Josef Bacik's avatar
      fs: call security_d_instantiate in d_obtain_alias V2 · 221b9dc7
      Josef Bacik authored
      commit 24ff6663 upstream.
      
      While trying to track down some NFS problems with BTRFS, I kept noticing I was
      getting -EACCESS for no apparent reason.  Eric Paris and printk() helped me
      figure out that it was SELinux that was giving me grief, with the following
      denial
      
      type=AVC msg=audit(1290013638.413:95): avc:  denied  { 0x800000 } for  pid=1772
      comm="nfsd" name="" dev=sda1 ino=256 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0
      tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=file
      
      Turns out this is because in d_obtain_alias if we can't find an alias we create
      one and do all the normal instantiation stuff, but we don't do the
      security_d_instantiate.
      
      Usually we are protected from getting a hashed dentry that hasn't yet run
      security_d_instantiate() by the parent's i_mutex, but obviously this isn't an
      option there, so in order to deal with the case that a second thread comes in
      and finds our new dentry before we get to run security_d_instantiate(), we go
      ahead and call it if we find a dentry already.  Eric assures me that this is ok
      as the code checks to see if the dentry has been initialized already so calling
      security_d_instantiate() against the same dentry multiple times is ok.  With
      this patch I'm no longer getting errant -EACCESS values.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJosef Bacik <josef@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
      221b9dc7
    • Trond Myklebust's avatar
      SUNRPC: Never reuse the socket port after an xs_close() · eaa255a8
      Trond Myklebust authored
      commit 246408dc upstream.
      
      If we call xs_close(), we're in one of two situations:
       - Autoclose, which means we don't expect to resend a request
       - bind+connect failed, which probably means the port is in use
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
      eaa255a8