When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.

To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify.  The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.

Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.

This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/hamradio/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Thomas Sailer <t.sailer@alumni.ethz.ch>
cc: Joerg Reuter <jreuter@yaina.de>
cc: linux-hams@vger.kernel.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org

When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.

To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify.  The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.

Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.

This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/ethernet/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org

When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.

To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify.  The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.

Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.

This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/can/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
cc: Wolfgang Grandegger <wg@grandegger.com>
cc: linux-can@vger.kernel.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org

When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.

To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify.  The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.

Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.

This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/arcnet/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Michael Grzeschik <m.grzeschik@pengutronix.de>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org

When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.

To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify.  The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.

Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.

This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/appletalk/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org

When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.

To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify.  The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.

Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.

This patch annotates drivers in drivers/mmc/host/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Pierre Ossman <pierre@ossman.eu>
cc: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
cc: linux-mmc@vger.kernel.org

When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.

To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify.  The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.

Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.

This patch annotates drivers in drivers/misc/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.

To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify.  The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.

Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.

This patch annotates drivers in drivers/media/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
cc: mjpeg-users@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org

When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.

To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify.  The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.

Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.

This patch annotates drivers in drivers/isdn/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org

When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.

To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify.  The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.

Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.

This patch annotates drivers in drivers/input/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
cc: linux-input@vger.kernel.org

When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.

To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify.  The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.

Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.

This patch annotates drivers in drivers/iio/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: William Breathitt Gray <vilhelm.gray@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>
cc: linux-iio@vger.kernel.org

When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.

To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify.  The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.

Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.

This patch annotates drivers in drivers/i2c/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Acked-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
cc: linux-i2c@vger.kernel.org

When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.

To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify.  The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.

Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.

This patch annotates drivers in drivers/gpio/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: William Breathitt Gray <vilhelm.gray@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
cc: Alexandre Courbot <gnurou@gmail.com>
cc: linux-gpio@vger.kernel.org

When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.

To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify.  The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.

Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.

This patch annotates drivers in drivers/cpufreq/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org

When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.

To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify.  The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.

Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.

This patch annotates drivers in drivers/clocksource/.

[Note: With regard to cs5535-clockevt.c, Thomas Gleixner asked whether the
 timer_irq parameter is required for the driver to work on anything other than
 arbitrary hardware which has it mapped to 0.  Jens Rottmann replied that the
 parameter defaults to 0, which means:

	1. autodetect (=keep IRQ BIOS has set up)
	2. if that fails use CONFIG_CS5535_MFGPT_DEFAULT_IRQ
	   (see drivers/misc/cs5535-mfgpt.c: cs5535_mfgpt_set_irq())

 Jens further noted that there may not be any systems that have CS5535/36
 devices that support EFI and secure boot.]
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
cc: Jens Rottmann <Jens.Rottmann@ADLINKtech.com>
cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org

When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.

To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify.  The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.

Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.

This patch annotates drivers in drivers/char/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.

To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify.  The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.

Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.

This patch annotates drivers in drivers/char/mwave/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.

To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify.  The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.

Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.

This patch annotates drivers in drivers/char/ipmi/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
cc: openipmi-developer@lists.sourceforge.net

When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image.  Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.

To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify.  The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.

Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.

This patch annotates drivers in arch/x86/mm/.

[Note: With respect to testmmiotrace, an additional patch will be added
 separately that makes the module refuse to load if the kernel is locked
 down.]
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
cc: x86@kernel.org
cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
cc: nouveau@lists.freedesktop.org

Provided an annotation for module parameters that specify hardware
parameters (such as io ports, iomem addresses, irqs, dma channels, fixed
dma buffers and other types).

This will enable such parameters to be locked down in the core parameter
parser for secure boot support.

I've also included annotations as to what sort of hardware configuration
each module is dealing with for future use.  Some of these are
straightforward (ioport, iomem, irq, dma), but there are also:

 (1) drivers that switch the semantics of a parameter between ioport and
     iomem depending on a second parameter,

 (2) drivers that appear to reserve a CPU memory buffer at a fixed address,

 (3) other parameters, such as bus types and irq selection bitmasks.

For the moment, the hardware configuration type isn't actually stored,
though its validity is checked.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

refcount_t type and corresponding API should be
used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as
a reference counter. This allows to avoid accidental
refcounter overflows that might lead to use-after-free
situations.
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

refcount_t type and corresponding API should be
used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as
a reference counter. This allows to avoid accidental
refcounter overflows that might lead to use-after-free
situations.
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

Prepare to mark sensitive kernel structures for randomization by making
sure they're using designated initializers. These were identified during
allyesconfig builds of x86, arm, and arm64, with most initializer fixes
extracted from grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

We switched from "struct task_struct"->security to "struct cred"->security
in Linux 2.6.29. But not all LSM modules were happy with that change.
TOMOYO LSM module is an example which want to use per "struct task_struct"
security blob, for TOMOYO's security context is defined based on "struct
task_struct" rather than "struct cred". AppArmor LSM module is another
example which want to use it, for AppArmor is currently abusing the cred
a little bit to store the change_hat and setexeccon info. Although
security_task_free() hook was revived in Linux 3.4 because Yama LSM module
wanted to release per "struct task_struct" security blob,
security_task_alloc() hook and "struct task_struct"->security field were
not revived. Nowadays, we are getting proposals of lightweight LSM modules
which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob.

We are already allowing multiple concurrent LSM modules (up to one fully
armored module which uses "struct cred"->security field or exclusive hooks
like security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(), plus unlimited number of
lightweight modules which do not use "struct cred"->security nor exclusive
hooks) as long as they are built into the kernel. But this patch does not
implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field which will
become needed when multiple LSM modules want to use "struct task_struct"->
security field. Although it won't be difficult to implement variable length
"struct task_struct"->security field, let's think about it after we merged
this patch.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Tested-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>
Acked-by: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

Pull char/misc driver fixes from Greg KH:
 "A smattering of different small fixes for some random driver
  subsystems. Nothing all that major, just resolutions for reported
  issues and bugs.

  All have been in linux-next with no reported issues"

* tag 'char-misc-4.11-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (21 commits)
  extcon: int3496: Set the id pin to direction-input if necessary
  extcon: int3496: Use gpiod_get instead of gpiod_get_index
  extcon: int3496: Add dependency on X86 as it's Intel specific
  extcon: int3496: Add GPIO ACPI mapping table
  extcon: int3496: Rename GPIO pins in accordance with binding
  vmw_vmci: handle the return value from pci_alloc_irq_vectors correctly
  ppdev: fix registering same device name
  parport: fix attempt to write duplicate procfiles
  auxdisplay: img-ascii-lcd: add missing sentinel entry in img_ascii_lcd_matches
  Drivers: hv: vmbus: Don't leak memory when a channel is rescinded
  Drivers: hv: vmbus: Don't leak channel ids
  Drivers: hv: util: don't forget to init host_ts.lock
  Drivers: hv: util: move waiting for release to hv_utils_transport itself
  vmbus: remove hv_event_tasklet_disable/enable
  vmbus: use rcu for per-cpu channel list
  mei: don't wait for os version message reply
  mei: fix deadlock on mei reset
  intel_th: pci: Add Gemini Lake support
  intel_th: pci: Add Denverton SOC support
  intel_th: Don't leak module refcount on failure to activate
  ...

Merge tag 'driver-core-4.11-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core

Pull driver core fix from Greg KH:
 "Here is a single kernfs fix for 4.11-rc4 that resolves a reported
  issue.

  It has been in linux-next with no reported issues"

* tag 'driver-core-4.11-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core:
  kernfs: Check KERNFS_HAS_RELEASE before calling kernfs_release_file()

Pull tty/serial driver fixes from Greg KH:
 "Here are some tty and serial driver fixes for 4.11-rc4.

  One of these fix a long-standing issue in the ldisc code that was
  found by Dmitry Vyukov with his great fuzzing work. The other fixes
  resolve other reported issues, and there is one revert of a patch in
  4.11-rc1 that wasn't correct.

  All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
  issues"

* tag 'tty-4.11-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty:
  tty: fix data race in tty_ldisc_ref_wait()
  tty: don't panic on OOM in tty_set_ldisc()
  Revert "tty: serial: pl011: add ttyAMA for matching pl011 console"
  tty: acpi/spcr: QDF2400 E44 checks for wrong OEM revision
  serial: 8250_dw: Fix breakage when HAVE_CLK=n
  serial: 8250_dw: Honor clk_round_rate errors in dw8250_set_termios

Pull IIO driver fixes from Greg KH:
 "Here are some small IIO driver fixes for 4.11-rc4 that resolve a
  number of tiny reported issues. All of these have been in linux-next
  for a while with no reported issues"

* tag 'staging-4.11-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/staging:
  iio: imu: st_lsm6dsx: fix FIFO_CTRL2 overwrite during watermark configuration
  iio: adc: ti_am335x_adc: fix fifo overrun recovery
  iio: sw-device: Fix config group initialization
  iio: magnetometer: ak8974: remove incorrect __exit markups
  iio: hid-sensor-trigger: Change get poll value function order to avoid sensor properties losing after resume from S3

Pull USB/PHY fixes from Greg KH:
 "Here are a number of small USB and PHY driver fixes for 4.11-rc4.

  Nothing major here, just an bunch of small fixes, and a handfull of
  good fixes from Johan for devices with crazy descriptors. There are a
  few new device ids in here as well.

  All of these have been in linux-next with no reported issues"

* tag 'usb-4.11-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb: (26 commits)
  usb: gadget: f_hid: fix: Don't access hidg->req without spinlock held
  usb: gadget: udc: remove pointer dereference after free
  usb: gadget: f_uvc: Sanity check wMaxPacketSize for SuperSpeed
  usb: gadget: f_uvc: Fix SuperSpeed companion descriptor's wBytesPerInterval
  usb: gadget: acm: fix endianness in notifications
  usb: dwc3: gadget: delay unmap of bounced requests
  USB: serial: qcserial: add Dell DW5811e
  usb: hub: Fix crash after failure to read BOS descriptor
  ACM gadget: fix endianness in notifications
  USB: usbtmc: fix probe error path
  USB: usbtmc: add missing endpoint sanity check
  USB: serial: option: add Quectel UC15, UC20, EC21, and EC25 modems
  usb: musb: fix possible spinlock deadlock
  usb: musb: dsps: fix iounmap in error and exit paths
  usb: musb: cppi41: don't check early-TX-interrupt for Isoch transfer
  usb-core: Add LINEAR_FRAME_INTR_BINTERVAL USB quirk
  uwb: i1480-dfu: fix NULL-deref at probe
  uwb: hwa-rc: fix NULL-deref at probe
  USB: wusbcore: fix NULL-deref at probe
  USB: uss720: fix NULL-deref at probe
  ...

Pull more powerpc fixes from Michael Ellerman:
 "These are all pretty minor. The fix for idle wakeup would be a bad bug
  but has not been observed in practice.

  The update to the gcc-plugins docs was Cc'ed to Kees and Jon, Kees
  OK'ed it going via powerpc and I didn't hear from Jon.

   - cxl: Route eeh events to all slices for pci_channel_io_perm_failure state

   - powerpc/64s: Fix idle wakeup potential to clobber registers

   - Revert "powerpc/64: Disable use of radix under a hypervisor"

   - gcc-plugins: update architecture list in documentation

  Thanks to: Andrew Donnellan, Nicholas Piggin, Paul Mackerras, Vaibhav
  Jain"

* tag 'powerpc-4.11-6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux:
  gcc-plugins: update architecture list in documentation
  Revert "powerpc/64: Disable use of radix under a hypervisor"
  powerpc/64s: Fix idle wakeup potential to clobber registers
  cxl: Route eeh events to all slices for pci_channel_io_perm_failure state

Pull ext4 fixes from Ted Ts'o:
 "Fix a memory leak on an error path, and two races when modifying
  inodes relating to the inline_data and metadata checksum features"

* tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4:
  ext4: fix two spelling nits
  ext4: lock the xattr block before checksuming it
  jbd2: don't leak memory if setting up journal fails
  ext4: mark inode dirty after converting inline directory

Pull fscrypto fixes from Ted Ts'o:
 "A code cleanup and bugfix for fs/crypto"

* tag 'fscrypt-for-linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/fscrypt:
  fscrypt: eliminate ->prepare_context() operation
  fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation

Merge tag 'hwmon-for-linus-v4.11-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/groeck/linux-staging

Pull hwmon fixes from Guenter Roeck:

 - bug fixes in asus_atk0110, it87 and max31790 drivers

 - added missing API definition to hwmon core

* tag 'hwmon-for-linus-v4.11-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/groeck/linux-staging:
  hwmon: (asus_atk0110) fix uninitialized data access
  hwmon: Add missing HWMON_T_ALARM
  hwmon: (it87) Avoid registering the same chip on both SIO addresses
  hwmon: (max31790) Set correct PWM value

Pull rdma fixes from Doug Ledford:
 "This has been a slow -rc cycle for the RDMA subsystem. We really
  haven't had a lot of rc fixes come in. This pull request is the first
  of this entire rc cycle and it has all of the suitable fixes so far
  and it's still only about 20 patches. The fix for the minor breakage
  cause by the dma mapping patchset is in here, as well as a couple
  other potential oops fixes, but the rest is more minor.

  Summary:

   - fix for dma_ops change in this kernel, resolving the s390, powerpc,
     and IOMMU operation

   - a few other oops fixes

   - the rest are all minor fixes"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dledford/rdma:
  IB/qib: fix false-postive maybe-uninitialized warning
  RDMA/iser: Fix possible mr leak on device removal event
  IB/device: Convert ib-comp-wq to be CPU-bound
  IB/cq: Don't process more than the given budget
  IB/rxe: increment msn only when completing a request
  uapi: fix rdma/mlx5-abi.h userspace compilation errors
  IB/core: Restore I/O MMU, s390 and powerpc support
  IB/rxe: Update documentation link
  RDMA/ocrdma: fix a type issue in ocrdma_put_pd_num()
  IB/rxe: double free on error
  RDMA/vmw_pvrdma: Activate device on ethernet link up
  RDMA/vmw_pvrdma: Dont hardcode QP header page
  RDMA/vmw_pvrdma: Cleanup unused variables
  infiniband: Fix alignment of mmap cookies to support VIPT caching
  IB/core: Protect against self-requeue of a cq work item
  i40iw: Receive netdev events post INET_NOTIFIER state

Pull audit fix from Paul Moore:
 "We've got an audit fix, and unfortunately it is big.

  While I'm not excited that we need to be sending you something this
  large during the -rcX phase, it does fix some very real, and very
  tangled, problems relating to locking, backlog queues, and the audit
  daemon connection.

  This code has passed our testsuite without problem and it has held up
  to my ad-hoc stress tests (arguably better than the existing code),
  please consider pulling this as fix for the next v4.11-rcX tag"

* 'stable-4.11' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit:
  audit: fix auditd/kernel connection state tracking

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>

We must lock the xattr block before calculating or verifying the
checksum in order to avoid spurious checksum failures.

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=193661Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Pull clk fixes from Stephen Boyd:
 "A handful of Sunxi and Rockchip clk driver fixes and a core framework
  one where we need to copy a string because we can't guarantee it isn't
  freed sometime later"

* tag 'clk-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/clk/linux:
  clk: sunxi-ng: fix recalc_rate formula of NKMP clocks
  clk: sunxi-ng: Fix div/mult settings for osc12M on A64
  clk: rockchip: Make uartpll a child of the gpll on rk3036
  clk: rockchip: add "," to mux_pll_src_apll_dpll_gpll_usb480m_p on rk3036
  clk: core: Copy connection id
  dt-bindings: arm: update Armada CP110 system controller binding
  clk: sunxi-ng: sun6i: Fix enable bit offset for hdmi-ddc module clock
  clk: sunxi: ccu-sun5i needs nkmp
  clk: sunxi-ng: mp: Adjust parent rate for pre-dividers